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A 614,283 



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ROBERT MARK WESLEY 

rKfipicssoR or PHiii'.iopiiv 

6I»T i'V his rvafiliEi 


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THE ALTERATIVE 



"If * 

THE ALTERNATIVE 



A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY 



" We fools of Nature."— Hamlet. 

" Oar bodies are our gardens to the which our wills are gardeners, so that if we 
will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, supply it with one 
gender of herbs or distract it with many, either to have it sterile with idleness or 
manured with industry, why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our 
wills."- Othello. 



&ontron 

MACMILLAN AND CO. 

1882 



Printed £7 R. & R. Clark, Edinburgh, 




\-3.s-3i'' 



ADVERTISEMENT. 

The Author of The Alternative is indebted to Mr. Henry 
Sidgwick for the following opinion of the work communicated 
in a letter to the Editor : — 

" I have had an unexpected interim of enforced cessation 
from my work, which I have employed in reading about half 
the proof-sheets you sent me. Without reading any more— 
which for the present I have not time to do — I feel no doubt 
that the book deserves the attention of all students of phi* 
losophy, from the amount of vigorous, precise, and independent 
thinking that it contains — thinking which appears to me 
generally consistent so far as it has been completely developed, 
though at some important points the work of definition and 
analysis does not seem to me to have been carried far enough. 
I also find the terse forcible individuality of the style attractive 
on the whole, though I cannot but wish that the Author had 
somewhat restrained his impulse to innovate in technical ter- 
minology." 



* ,' 



* » 



V- : 



i> ' 



f . 




CONTENTS. 



INTRODUCTION 



. 1-16 



BOOK I.— RECONSTRUCTIVE DEFINITIONS. 



CHAPTER I. 

Consciousness (pp. 19-31). 

§ L Discernment .... 
II. Object . . . . . 

III. Reality ..... 

IV. Idea ..... 
V. Objects are subjective or non-subjective. Percep- 
tion and Apperception 

VI. Inattention essential to Apperception 
VII. Sense-perception 

VIII. Apperception not essential to discernment 
IX. Apperception not intuitive of the Ego as Inex 

tended . . . . 

X. 1. Inapperceptive discernment should be ranked as 
a species of Consciousness 

2. Latent discernment of light 

3. Latent pain .... 

4. Latent emotion « 

5. Latent mental precursors and matrices of in- 

tellection ..... 



19 
20 
20 
20 

21 
22 
23 
23 

24 

25 
25 
26 
26 

27 



VI 



CONTENTS. 



§ X. 6. Consciousness is a genus that includes as 
species such latent events as the above 
7. Enumeration of species comprehended by 
Consciousness .... 
XI. 1. Consciousness complete or incomplete 
2. Consciousness normal or abnormal . 
XII. Discernment either apperceptive or inapperceptive 
XIII. 1. Distinctness and indistinctness 

2. Indistinctness supposes objectivity . 

3. Indistinctness abditive and inabditive 

4. Distinctness graduates into indistinctness 

CHAPTER II. 
Knowledge (pp. 32-39). 

§ XIV. New meaning of the term thesis 
XV. Certitude and Certainty 
XVI. Knowledge denned. It is either "certive" or 

"non-certive" 
XVII. Knowledge is either conscious or unconscious 
XVIII, 1. The new terms "thesic affection" and "cog- 
nitive compliment " explained 
. 2. Thesic affections are either complete or incom 

plete, proximate or non-proximate 

. 3. Proximate thesic affections are either native 

or acquired . . . 

XIX, Knowledge does not suppose the truth of what is 

known . . . . 

XX. 1, 2. Necessity 

,3. Seeming of necessity 

4. Complete and incomplete seeming of necessity 
.5. Inconsistency . 

6. It is not a species of Inconceivableness 

7. Seeming of inconsistency is k either intuitable 

or unintuitable , . . 

8. Guaranteed and unguaranteed certitude 

9. Guaranteed and unguaranteed knowledge 



PAGE 

28 

28 
29 
29 
29 
30 
31 
31 
31 



32 
33 

33 
34 

35 

,35 

36 

36 
36 
37 
38 
38 
38 

38 
39 
39 



CONTENTS. vii 



CHAPTER IIL 
Eeason (pp. 40-57). 



PACK 

4Q 
40 
40 



§ XXI. Probability ..... 
XXII. 1. Opinion . . . . . 

2. Strong and faint opinion . 

3. Emotive and unemotive opinion. Confidence, 

Faith, Self-confidence . . .41 

XXIII. Belief comprehends strong opinion . .41 

XXIV. Doubt . . . . .42 
XXV. Non-significant assertion . . .42 

XXVI. A Judgment is a non-significant assertion . 43 
XXVII. Question. It is either communicative or in- 
communicative . . . .44 
XXVIII. Apprehension . . . .44 
XXIX. Vindication of these definitions of Judgment 

and Apprehension . . . .44 

XXX. A Judgment is either a Certitude or a Strong 

Opinion . . . . .47 

XXXI. Exposition of Vice-judgment . . .47 

XXXII. Mnemonical, judicial, vice-judicial, and practi- 
cal Question. Eeason defined . .48 

XXXIII. 1. Secondary meaning of the term " reason " . 48 
2, 3. Practical and non-practical reasons. It 

is essential to reasons to be connected with 
question . . . . .49 

XXXIV. 1, 2. Non-practical reasons are either Axioms 

or Evidence . . . .50 

XXXV. Inference is judgment caused by evidence. It 
is essential to Inference to be Discovery. 
Definition of Discovery . . .51 

XXXVI, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Intuition. It is either certive 
or non- certive, judicial or non -judicial, 
conscious or unconscious, distinct or indis- 
tinct . . . • .51 



viii CONTENTS* 

PAGE 

§ XXXVII. 1. Datum . . . . .54 

2. Data general or particular . .54 

3. Data guaranteed or unguaranteed . 54 

4. Data judicial or non-judicial . .55 
XXXVIII. Axiom. Axioms are either discoverable or 

undiscoverable , . .55 

XXXIX. Fact . , . . .57 

XL. Reasoning communicative or tacit . .57 



CHAPTER IV. 
The Apparitional and iNAPPARrriONAL (pp. 58-63). 

§ XLI. 1. Objects that are, and objects that are not, 

appearances . . . .58 

2. The former consist chiefly of objects of 

sensational and emotive intuition . 59 

3. Of complete and incomplete appearances . 60 

4. Counterfeits of general names. Concepts of 

life and power Inapparitional . .60 

5. Examples of the Inapparitional . .62 
XLII. Refutation of the doctrine of the Law of the 

Conditioned . . . .63 

CHAPTER V. 

Attention and Comparison (pp. 64-68). 

§ XLIII. X. Attention is discernment that depends on 

intentional effort. It is not discernment of 
the central object of the "objective field" 64 

2. Quasi-attention . . . .66 

3. Attention is essential to discrimination, not 

to discernment . . .66 

XLIV. Contrast is elucidation by difference. It is a 
sine qua non of objectivity. Difference is 
either contrastive or non-contrastive . 67 



CONTENTS. ix 

PAGE 

§ XLV. 1. Comparison is attention or quasi-attention 

to contrast . . . .67 

2. It is judicial or non-judicial . . 68 

3. Secondary meaning of the term " com- 

parison" . . . .68 



OHAPTEE VI. 
Redintegration (pp. 69-71). 

§ XL VI. 1. Redintegration explained . .69 

2. It operates latently in and upon an uncon- 

scious part or accessory of the mind . 69 

3. It connects mental with bodily event. Skill 

depends on it . . .71 

CHAPTER VII. 
General Synthesis (pp. 72-73). 

§ XL VII. 1, 2. General Synthesis denned . . 72 

3. It is either conscious or unconscious . 73 

CHAPTER VIII. 
Retrospect (pp. 74-78). 

\ XL VIII. 1. Retrospect, Remembrance, and Memory 

denned . . . .74 

2. Counterfeits of Remembrance . .75 

3. Conceptual remembrance . .75 
XLIX. 1. Piecemeal formation of the idea of Time . 76 

2. This explains the law of Expectation of 

the like of the past . » .77 

3. Retrospect is mnemonical, historical, or 

transcendent . . .78 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER IX. 
Substance (pp. 79-112). 



PAGE 



§ L. Plan of the Chapter . . . .79 

LI. Quantity . . . . .80 

LII. 1, 2, 3. Sum . . . . .80 

LIII. Monad . . . . .81 

LTV. A Unit is an object destitute of Unveiled 

Plurality . . . . .82 

LV. 1. A Kind is a Sum that comprises all the like 

of a given archetype . . .83 

2. What hides the generality of Sums that are 

not accounted Kinds . . .84 

LVI. Self-sufficients and Self-insufficients denned. Ab- 

ditive and inabditive self-insufficients . 85 

LVII. Concrete and inconcrete . . .85 

LVIII. Certain inabditive self-insufficients contain a con- 
crete . . • .86 
LIX. 1. Attribute. It supposes a concrete support, but 
may have an inconcrete support. A Subject 
is a support of an Attribute. Fallacy of the 
received idea of Substance . . .86 

2. Attributes apparitional and inapparitional . 88 

3. Quality, Change, and Relation, three species 

of attributes not perfectly prescindable . 89 
LX. 1. Quality. Essence not necessarily a Quality. 
Essence is that which by its resemblances 
and differences determines the general place 
of a thing . . . .89 

2. Essence is either natural or factitious, import- 

ant or unimportant . . .91 

3. Attributes are either essential or accidental 91 

4. Quantity is a species of Quality for convenience 

regarded as a contrary of Quality . .91 

5. Protean quality . . . .91 



CONTENTS. xi 

PAGE 

§ LXI. Change. It is either natural or supernatural. 
Natural change is either optional or unoptional : 
the latter supposes that what changes remains 
the same . . . . .92 

LXII. 1, 2. Relation explained . . . 93 

LXIII. 1. A Substance is a naturally ungenerable con- 
crete . . . . .94 

2. It may be either a Self-sufficient or a latent 

Self-insufficient . . . .95 

3. Substance perdurable . . .95 

4. Substance material or immaterial . .96 

5. A material substance is either an Atom or a 

Body . . . . .96 

6. The non-perdurable quality, Collocation of 

concrete parts, is coeval with Material Sub- 
stance. The perdurable is fundamental but 
not antecedent to the non-perdurable. The 
first Cause is either Substance undergoing 
beginningless change, or a Creator who had 
terminated an eternity of idleness by a 
caprice . . . . .96 

7. Unoptional change does not suppose change 

of collocation of concretes . .97 

8. Is an inconcrete self-sufficient possible ? .98 

9. Chaos not necessarily the precursor of Cosmos 98 

10. Is the substance of the material universe Ex- 

tended ? The evidence does not shut us in 

to any conclusion . . .99 

11. It is expedient to familiarise the mind with the 

idea of the Extended self-insufficient .102 

1-2. Leibnitz* doctrine, that inextended things are 
not interiorly modifiable by interaction, un- 
warranted .... 103 

13. Greek myth corroborates this new idea of Sub- 

stance . . . . . 103 

14. Orderly concurrence of aptitudes . .105 
LXIV. - Misuse of the term Subject . . .107 



xii CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



§ LXV, As Essences are in respect of naturalness and 

importance, so axe their kinds . .107 

LXVI, Primary and Secondary Kinds . .108 

LXVII, Essences that are manifested by accidents . 108 
LXYIIL The bearing of Essence on the recognitive 
faculty is independent of verbal sign and of 
knowledge of Kind . . .110 

LXIX. 1. The kind, Things, is the swmmum gervus. It 
is divisible into the sub-genera, Entities 
and Quesits , . . .110 

2, Entities divided into Vacant and Non-vacant 

entities . . . .111 

LXX. Infima* species . .112 

CHAPTER X. 
Mind (pp. 113-117). 

§ LXXL Mind is a concrete .... 113 
LXX1I. Mental event includes Unconscious event . 115 

LXXIH. Propensity denned . . .116 

LXXIY. Mental qualities unintuitable . .116 

CHAPTEE XL 
Sensation and Sbnsr-pbbckptiok (pp. 118-131). 

§ LXXV. 1. Sensation is consciousness given as being a 

bodily attribute . . .118 

3. It isgivenas being proper to a part of the body 119 
3» Vice-sensation . . . .119 
4» Sensation quasi-intuitive and unintuitive . 119 
5, To be object of apperception is essential to 

Sensation .... 120 

6* Sejosational-discernment . .120 

LXXVL 1. Sensational -discernment is comprised by 

sensational -perception and sensational- 
apperception .... 120 



CONTENTS. xiii 

PAGE 

§ LXXVI. 2. Sensational -perception is comprised by 

sense-perception and in-looking sensa- 
tional-perception . . .120 

LXXVII. 1. Sense-perception may be attentive or inat- 
tentive .... 121 

2. Inattentive tactile perception distinguished 

from sensational apperception . .121 

3. To be objective to apperception is essential 

to sense-perception . . .122 

4. The immediate object of a sense-perception 

consists of a cardinal and a dependent 
constituent . . . .122 

5. The supersensuous faculty. The dependent 

constituent derives either from redinte- 
gration or from the supersensuous faculty 123 
LXXVIII. The products of the supersensuous faculty oc- 
casioned the scepticism of Hume . .124 
LXXIX. The possible fallaciousness of a datum does not 

impair its value as a differentia . .124 

LXXX. 1, 2, 3. It is correct to rank a certain species 
of hallucination as being a species of sense- 
perception. Hallucination rudely defined. 
Sensational deceptiveness not confined to 
hallucination . . . .125 

LXXXI. All colours, sounds, flavours, and odours, are 

not sensations . . . .126 

LXXXII. Defence of the classification that ascribes know- 
ledge of the life and consciousness of others 
to sense-perception . . .128 

LXXXIII. Space and Cosmos constant objects of sense- 
perception . . . .130 
LXXXIV. Certain sensations are given as involving, 
others as not involving, either pain, plea- 
sure, or desire . . . .130 
LXXXV. Appetite . . . . .130 



xiv CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XII. 
Apperception (pp. 132-138). 



"fc 



PAGE 



§ LXXXVL 1. Confusion of Apperception with Reflection 132 

2. Reflection defined. It is essential to Re- 

flection to be attentive, and to Apper- 
ception to be inattentive . .133 

3. Spiritual office of Reflection . .134 

4. Reflection fatigues, Apperception is easy 

as breathing . . 1 34 

5. Reflection has been confounded with 

psychological study . . .134 

6. It is essential to Reflection to be objective 

to Apperception . . .135 

LXXXVII. Apperception is either psychical or corporal 136 
LXXXVIII. Apperception is not cognisant of mental 

structure . . . .136 

LXXXIX. The datum that the Ego is immediately ap- 

perceived is not an axiom . .136 

XC. Experience exhibits no example of Apper- 
ception without Sensation . .138 



CHAPTER XIII. 
Emotion (pp. 139-142). 

§ XCI. 1. Emotion . . . .139 

2. Certain emotions are given as being per- 

ceptive. Heart-knowledge . .139 

3. Emotive aspects . . .140 
XCII. 1. Sympathy. It is either homogeneous or 

heterogeneous . . .141 

2. Ascriptive Emotion . .142 



CONTENTS. xv 

CHAPTER XIV. 
Experience (pp. 143-172). 



PAGE 



§ XCIII. 1. Fallacy of common notion of Experience . 143 

2. Ratiocinative and Irratiocinative knowledge 144 

3. One and the same event qud source of a ratio- 

cinative knowledge is not, and qud source 
of irratiocinative knowledge is, an Experi- 
ence. Considered in respect of their 
objects, Remembrance and Hallucination 
are not Experiences . . .145 

• 4. In so far as knowledge is derived from com- 
munication it is not derived from Experi- 
ence ..... 145 
5. Experience is mental event that originates 
Irratiocinative Non-hallucinative Uncom- 
municated knowledge . . .146 

XCIV. Experience of hallucination is partly apper- 
ceptive and partly perceptive . .146 
XCV. 1, 2. Latent Experience. The knowledge it 
begets is at first Unconscious, and is ascribed 
to Induction . . . .147 
3. Quasi-inference . . . .149 
XCVI. 1. Duration . . . .150 

2. Time-series . . . .150 

3. Paradoxic and Anti-paradoxic Experience . 151 
XCVII. The former supposes the unreality of its imme- 
diate object . . . .152 

XCVIII. Action of paradoxic experience on the mind 
analogous to that of the pencil-point making 
a crayon picture . . . .153 

XCIX. Two species of anti-paradoxic experience ex- 
plained . . . . .154 
C. Explanation of the kind of experience that ori- 
ginates knowledge of such series as Custom . 155 
CI. 1. Defect of previous ideas of Experience . 156 



xvi CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



§ CI. 2a. In the name of Experience Positivism de- 
poses experience . . . .157 
26. It rejects the datum of experience respect- 
ing Power . . . . .157 
2c, d. It contradicts experience respecting the 

quality, Life . . . .161 

2e. Does the Positivist doctrine evince a radical 
difference of mental structure ? . .165 

CII. Experience begets Opinion and Doubt . .166 

CIII. 1, 2. Empirical negation and Empirically-nega- 
tive Knowledge explained . . .166 
CIV. Of the Obvious Past, the Specious Present, the 

Real Present, and the Future . .167 

CV. The idea of Time indicative of the poverty of 

the knowing faculty . . .168 

CVI. Experience and Judgment not always easily 

distinguishable . . . .169 

CVTI. Experiment not limited to Experience . .169 

CVIII. The interaction of Man and ;his Environment 

which generates Skill is not Experience . 170 

CHAPTEE XV. 
No Knowledge X Priori (pp. 173-188). 

§ CIX. Nothing common and proper to the Kinds ac- 
counted d priori. Have Axioms and ideas of 
Time and Space an attribute common and 
proper to them ? . . . .173 

CX. Axioms are the offspring of experience . .174 

CXI. Kant's argument that the ideas of Time and 

Space are d priori . . . .175 

CXII. Refutation of Kant — 

1. An intuition of an Extension supposes, but 

does not ^suppose, discernment of a Void 176 
2a. Kant begs the question whether it be com- 
petent to experience to beget knowledge 
of the Absolute . . .176 



CONTENTS. xvii 

PACK 

§ CXII. 26. He violates Parsimony . . .178 

2c. Proof that Experience is cognisant of what 

is given as Absolute . . .179 

2d. Time and Space not given to all minds as 

Absolute . . . .180 

2e. Cause of the error that Experience is not 

cognisant of the Absolute . .181 

3. Certain men discover Infinity . .182 

CXIII. 1. Mill's argument for the empirical origin of 

all knowledge fallacious . .183 

2a. Example and Instance defined . .184 

26. Instances that cannot bear indistinctly on 

the mind .... 184 

gjt 2c. Error of the supposition that certain axioms 

are made known by a bearing of instances 185 
CXIV. The negation of the A Priori entails no great 
divergence from those who hold to it. The 
experience that generates Axioms generates 
the Ineffaceable . . . .187 

CXV. 1. Experience is comprised by six species, viz. — 188 
Apperception. 
Reflection. 

In-looking Sensational perception. 
Sense-perception. 
Emotive perception. 
Latent Experience. 
2. The operations of the supersensuous faculty 
do not constitute a species of Experience. 
They beget Transcendent and Non-trans- 
cendent knowledge . . .138 



CHAPTEE XVI. 
Recognition (pp. 189-202). 

§ CXVI. 1. Recognitional attribute . , .189 

2. Familiarity a species of recognitional attribute 189 

b 



xviii CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



§ CXVI. 3. Recognition is either Identification or non- 

identific recognition . . .190 

4. Identification is either temporal or non-tem- 

poral. Temporal identification is either 
recognitive or non-recognitive . .190 

5. Recognition is either conscious or unconscious 191 

6. It is empirical or non-empirical . .191 

7. Empirical recognition is caused by a latent 

action of likeness on the mind . .191 

CXVII. 1. Unitiveness. Likeness is either Unitive or 

Non-unitive . . . .191 

2. The higher degrees of Unitiveness tend to 

hide, the lower to leave exposed, the plur- 
ality of the object . . .192 

3. The law of e pluribus unwm . .192 

4. Unitive Likeness causes Empirical Recog- 

nitive Identification and Empirical Non- 
identific Recognition. The action is latent 192 

5. Difference of recognition caused by Unitive 

Likeness from recognition caused by non- 
unitive likeness . . .194 

6. It is probable that but for something ex- 

trinsic to it which modifies its action, Uni- 
tive Likeness would always cause Identifi- 
cation, — never Non-identific recognition . 195 
CXVIII. 1. An Archetype is an ideal type of which all 

the individuals of a Kind are Antitypes . 196 
2. A recognitive identification is an individual 

of a possible Kind . . .197 

CXIX. Non-identific recognition does not refer to Kind 197 
CXX. Recognition is either Redintegrative or Non- 
redintegrative. The former has been mis- 
taken for Reasoning . . .198 
CXXI. Fact is not conclusive that Recognition depends 

on prior discernment . . .200 



CONTENTS. xix 

CHAPTER XVIL 
Will and Instinct (pp. 203-227). 

PACK 

§ CXXII. 1. Intention. Intentional action. A Choice 

is an action that consists of a study and 
a preference. The study is, the prefer- 
ence is not, an Effect. Will is Power of 
Choice. A Volition is a preference in- 
volved in a choice . . ., 203 
2. Intentional action is either Optional or 

Un-optional .... 204 

CXXIII. 1. The greater part of human Jntentional 

actions are Un-optionaL It is essential 
to a Choice to refer to a Practical Alter- 
native. The comprehension of the kind 
"Instinct" should be enlarged to make 
room for the species, Unoptional Inten- 
tional Action . . .204 

2. The genesis of the idea of Instinct justifies 

the enlargement . . .205 

3. Instances of Intentional Action that obtain 

in spite of Will . . . 205 

CXXIV. Instinct either intentional or blind . . 206 

CXXV. The datum Every beginning has a cause is 
not universally true, and is not conclusive 
against Freedom . . . 206 

CXXVI. 1. Deliberation. It is either Selective or 

Expectant .... 207 
2. There are counterfeits of Selective deliber- 
ation ; There are instinctive ideas of 
Agenda : They make up our minds for 
us. In Volition we make up our minds 207 
CXXVII. 1. Conduct is the office of Will, but is not 

proper to Will . . . 208 

2. The office of Will is to steer, not to propel 209 

3. Conduct is either Begular or Irregular . 210 



xx CONTENTS. 

PACK 

§ CXXVIII Permission of the Will . . .210 

CXXIX. 1. Plausibility of the Necessarian argument. 

Duty demands that we counteract it by 
an arbitrium that we are Free . 211 

2. Predictableness of human action does not 

prove that the action is necessitated . 213 
CXXX. A counterfeit of Purpose by which we are 

frequently duped . . .214 

CXXXI. Volition a purely psychical act . .214 

CXXXII. 1. Attention is not Volition . .215 

2. There are degrees of Emotive Impulse that 

put Will in abeyance . .216 

CXXXIII. 1. Has modern physiology adduced evidence 

that should discredit the doctrine of the 
Soul? . . . .216 

2. The hypothesis of the " Cardinal atom " is 

available against the evidence . 216 

3. Definitions of the terms Life, Nutrition, 

Organ, Function, Reflex -action, and 
Non-vital Functional action . .219 

4. Rebuttal of the physiological evidence . 223 



CHAPTEE XVIII. 
General Ideas (pp. 228*248). 

§CXXXIV. 1. Difference between an idea of a Kind as a 

Sum of the parts and one that symbolises 
it as a Whole. The former is, the latter 
is not, a General Idea. There are ideas 
of Kinds that symbolise the Kinds as 
being Monads. A General Idea of a Kind 
that does not symbolise the Kind as a 
Whole . . . .228 

2. Conception. Concept. The terms General 

Idea and Concept synonymous . 229 

3. Concepts are either Abditive or Inabditive 229 



CONTENTS. xxi 

PAOB 

§ CXXXIV. 4. They are either Mediate or Immediate . 231 

5. Immediate objects other than concepts serve 

as Types. Design is a process of form- 
ing such a Type. Ideal images of anti- 
types do not accompany a Typical ideal 
image .... 233 

6. How the same ideal image may serve as 

mediate concept to a genus and its species 234 

7. Purely ideal mediate concepts are mere 

figments . . . . 234 

CXXXV. 1. The mental process termed Abstraction, 

as not " withdrawing " from the concrete, 
is not correctly denotable by that name 235 

2. Falseness of the metaphor that represents 

the process as " abstractive " . .237 

3. The process should be termed Subtle Dis- 

crimination . . . .238 

4. General terms should pass for General Ideas 239 

5. The doctrine of Abstraction is bolstered 

by " Ihapparitional " Ideas . .240 

6. Power of words to excite emotion without 

the help of ideas . . .241 

7. Ideas of * Quesits " help the doctrine . 242 

8. The Moral Imperative not discredited by 

being classed as a Quesit . . 243 

CXXXVI. Mnemonical Concepts . . .243 

CXXXVII. The primitive source of ideas of Kinds is the 

Latent Action of Unitive Likeness on 
the mind .... 244 

CXXXVIII. Experience of several individuals of a Kind 

is a sine qua non of an Idea of the Kind 245 
CXXXIX. Detection of the birth-throes of General Ideas 245 
CXL. 1. General-Synthesis . . .246 

2. Synthesis of attributes constituting Essence 

is not General-Synthesis . . 247 



xxii CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XIX. 
Quantity and Number (pp. 249-263). 



PAGE 



§ CXLI. 1. An idea of a Sum is not necessarily an idea 

of a Number .... 249 
2. "Plurive" and "implurive" subjects of 

quantity . . . .251 

CXLII. 1. Climactic plurive species. A Number is an 

individual of a climactic plurive species. 

The plurive scale . . .251 

2. Justification of definition of Number . 252 

CXLIII. 1. Ratio . . . . .252 

2. Proportion is equality of ratios . .253 

CXLIV. 1. Genesis of numerical discernment. First epoch 253 

2. Second epoch the origination of the first 

numerical sign . . . .254 

3. Third epoch the denotement of a like number 

by the same sign, making a given sign com- 
mon and proper to all the individuals of a 
plurive species, and also a general sign . 255 

4. Fourth epoch the first discernment of an un- 

intuitable number. What the. recognisable 
trait is to the intuitable number that the 
numerical sign is to the unintuitable num- 
ber. This puzzled philosophers and begot 
Nominalism .... 256 

5. Fifth epoch the invention of counting. The 

end and reason of counting is the ascertain- 
ment of an unintuitable number . .258 

6. Sixth epoch the denotement of a number by 

successive exhibitions of fingers. This 
secured the Decimal system . .258 

7. Seventh epoch the substitution of vocal for 

digital numerals. 



CONTENTS. xxiii 



PAGE 



§ CXLIV. Eighth epoch the promotion of a vocal nu- 
meral into a general type or Concept. 
Ninth epoch the first numerical judgment 

that does not result from counting. 
Tenth epoch the substitution of numerical 
signs for numerical ideas as the sole im- 
mediate objects of arithmetical discourse . 259 
CXLV. Evidence that Natural Language was the pre- 
cursor of Vocal Language and Digital Signs 
the precursors of Vocal Numerals . . 260 

CXLVL The question How the lingual instinct in the gen- 
eration of numerical names followed the method 
of decimal digital signification, an open one . 261 
CXLVII. The lingual instinct generates rules for making 

words . . . . . 262 



BOOK II.— REASONING. 

CHAPTER I. 
Judgment (pp. 267-277). 

§ CXLVIII. Psychology should study Reason in the 

domain of Logic . . .267 

CXLIX. 1. Judgments are either Augmentative or 

Unaugmentative : the latter are not 
necessarily Analytic and Explicative . 267 

2. Augmentative Judgments are either In- 

tuitive or Inferential. The former 
include operations of the Definitive 
faculty . . , .268 

3. The definitions of Geometry are examples 

of the product of the Definitive faculty 270 

4. The latter overlooked by Logicians . 270 

5. Judgment is General or Non-general, 

Synthetic or Disjunctive . .270 



xxiv CONTENTS* 



PAGE 



§ CL. 1. Inference consists of a Discernment of Evi- 
dence and a consequent conclusion . 271 
. 2. It is either Deduction or Induction. Deduc- 
tion is inference from evidence that eluci- 
dates a complete seeming of necessity. In- 
duction is Non-Deductive inference . 271 

3. Deduction either General or Non-general . 272 

4. Important difference between Deduction and 

Induction . . . .272 

5. Deduction is either partially or wholly guar- 

anteed ..... 272 

6. It is essential to Deduction to elucidate a 

seeming of Inconsistency of the Opposite . 272 

7. Supplementary and Non-supplementary in- 

ference . . . .273 

CLI. Proof-Sufficiency . . . .275 

CLII. 1. Recondite and Non-recondite Implication . 275 
2. Supplementary inference is that which elicits 
its conclusion from Non-recondite implica- 
tion. Evidence which exposes what is 
hidden in recondite implication is unknown 
prior to the inference . . . 276 



CHAPTER II. 
Induction (pp. 278-289). 

§ CLIII. 1. Induction is either General or Non-general . 278 
2. Non-general induction involving evidence on 
which a general induction depends does 
not depend upon the general induction . 278 
CLIV. 1. An unconscious beginning of knowledge 
caused by experience of instances, and a 
proximate thesic affection so caused, are 
not Inductions . . .279 



CONTENTS. xxv 

PAQl 

§CLIV. 2. Data that obtain unconsciously arc non- 
judicial, and either general or non-general. 
Non-judicial data : they are either general 
or non-general ; (the non-general are either 
individual or unique) ; they are' either 
guaranteed or unguaranteed . .281 

3. Every, experience involves a datum. Un- 

guaranteed general data are products of 
pure experience . . . .281 

4. Quasi-inferential data. Unconscious general- 

synthesis determines such data . .281 

CLY. 1. Accidental and Non-accidental induction . . 282 
2. A Non-accidental General induction is one 
that has for evidence a considerable natural 
regular series. Accidental induction is 
determined by the law of Like inherence 
Like appearance . . .282 

CLV1. Orderly concurrence of aptitudes excludes pre- 
sumption of fortuitousness . .283 
CLVII. Blind causes of Belief . . .284 
CLVIII. 1. Geometrical illustration of difference between 

Deduction and Induction : 

2. — that Deduction from a mediate concept 

does not need two efforts : 

3. — that Objectivity of the General is not 

needful to Deduction. 
4. — that there are Inapparitional Objects . 285 
CLIX. Arithmetic mainly an art for applying technical 
substitutes for counting. Its conclusions 
are Inductions . . . .288 



CHAPTER III. 
Syllogism (pp. 290-297). 

§ CLX. 1. Law. Imperative and Natural Law. Causes 

regular and irregular. Laws of Belief „ 290 



xxvi CONTENTS. 

PAOl 

§ CLX. 2. Families of Theses and Families of Beliefs . 291 

3. Exponents of laws of Belief. They are either 

obverse or reverse, a Dictum de omni or a 
Dictum de nullo. An exponent of a law of 
Belief may be a major premiss . .292 

4. Laws of Belief either Common or Uncommon : 

the latter either Eccentric or Morbid . 292 

5. Guaranteed and Unguaranteed exponents . 292 
CLXI. 1. Relation of Syllogism to wholly-guaranteed 

Deduction .... 293 

2. No symbol of Evidence in Syllogism. Evi- 

dence intervenes between the premisses . 294 

3. Induction excludes Syllogism » .295 

4. The error that Deduction is Inference from 

the General is an offspring of the error that 
Syllogism is The Form of Deduction . 296 

5. End of Logic qud art. Psychology the off- 

spring of Logic . . . .297 



BOOK III— PERSONAL AGENCY DEPENDENT 

ON SELF-DENIAL. 

CHAPTER I. 

Science (pp. 301-308). 

§CLXII. 1. Chief purport of the chapter . .301 

2. Definition of Science . . .301 

3. Why the definition does not affirm the Un- 

consciousness of the knowledge . . 304 

4a. The abditive concept gives Science as a vague 
concrete inhabiting scientific men. Utility 
of this symbol .... 304 
46. Science is either Theoretic or Practical The 
reason of this division different from that 
given by Aristotle. Art defined, and dis- 
tinguished from Science. Skill defined . 305 



y 



mm 



CONTENTS. xxvii 

PAOB 

§ CLXIII. Thoroughness . . . .307 

CLXIV. Difference between Scientific Certitude and 

Certitude grounded on Authority . 308 



CHAPTER II. 

Deduction of an Unconscious Part of the Mind and 
of Unconscious Mental Event (pp. 309-331). 

§ CLXV. Theorem to be demonstrated . .309 

CLXVI. 1. A durable knowledge supposes a durable 

Mental Modification related to the con- 
scious knowledge as organ : the modifi- 
cation and its action are Unconscious . 310 

2. Unconscious equivalents of interpretations 

and theories prove the theorem. So 
also the bearing of such equivalents on 
Indeliberate action. So too the bearing 
of unconscious knowledge of environing 
Customs . . . .311 

3. Prophetic and guiding analogues of sensa- 

tion prove the theorem . .317 

4. Deductions from evidence of which all the 

parts are not simultaneously discernible 
prove the theorem . . .318 

5. The train of ideas or conscious mental 

events suppose a train of unconscious 
mental events. The enhancement of 
the brain by increase of knowledge sup- 
poses an unconscious mental modifica- 
tion, which proves the theorem . 320 

6. Dream incidents, e.g. dream-conversations 

and poetic composition in dreams, sup- 
pose unconscious mental event, and 
prove the theorem . .322 

7. Change of belief not caused by reasoning 

proves the theorem . .324 



xxviii CONTENTS. 



FACT 



§CLXVL 8. The latent action of Unitive Likeness on 

which pictorial illusion and Recognition 
depend, proves the theorem . . 325 

9. Redintegration and the mental modifications 

it causes prove the theorem . . 326 

10. The latency of Latent Experience proves 

the theorem .... 327 

11. Negatively-empirical knowledge proves the 

theorem .... 328 

12. Surprise caused by deviations from the cus- 

tomary proves the theorem . . 328 

13. That we are sometimes stayed by unconscious 

equivalents of motives proves the theorem 329 

14. The unconsciousness of the proximate ante- 

cedent of Design proves the theorem . 330 

15. Unconscious equivalents of intention to re- 

sume interrupted work prove the theorem 330 

16. Unconscious equivalents of an appreciation 

of Weight prove the theorem . .331 

CHAPTER IBL 
The Brain a Part of the Mind (pp. 332-337). 

gCLXYIL 1, 2. Proof that the Brain is a part of the Mind 332 



CLXVllL Errors incident to privation of knowledge of 
the dependence of Consciousness on Cor- 
poral event .... 335 

< CHAPTER IV. 
Wisdom (pp. 338-382). 

§ CLXDL What is Wisdom ? , . . 338 

CLXX. Apology for the term « Moramess" . . 339 

CLXXT. " Moralness n and " preter-moral * denned . 340 
CLXX1I. Definitions of the terms " impero-moralness " 

and "pukhixMBondiiess" . 342 




CONTENTS. xxix 

PAOl 

§CLXXHI. Obligation explained. It comprehends Duty 

and obUgation-in-respect-of-what-is-not-due 342 
CLXXIV. Right denned . . . .343 

CLXXV. 1. Examination of the mental qualities on 

which depend the affections and emotions 
that are of a nature to elicit moral ap- 
proval : — .... 344 

2. Altruism denned. It comprehends Sordid 

and Non-sordid altruism. The latter 
comprehends Egotistic and Disinterested 
altruism .... 344 

3. Heterogeneous Sympathy proper to Non- 

sordid altruism . . .345 

4. Disinterested Altruism is either Reverential 

or Benevolent . . . 345 

5. Benevolence denned. It comprehends the 

five species, Embryonic, Adolescent, Adult, 
Affectionate, and 'Super-affectionate, bene- 
volence .... 345 
Disinterestedness essential to Super-affectionate 

Benevolence .... 346 
Benevolence a faculty and a propensity . 347 

6a. Reverence defined. The Impersonal Im- 
perative . . . .347 
66. Importance of the thesis that Reverence is 

incapable of Heterogeneous Sympathy . 349 
6c. Reverence engenders moral purity . 353 

Gd. Dignity is proper to Reverence . .356 

6«. Righteous reverence defined . .357 

6/. Reverence is intuitive . . .357 

7. The Consuetudinal faculty . .357 

8. The Pulchro-moral faculty . . 358 

9. Constituents of the Moral Faculty . 359 
10. Moral Goodness is either Impero-moral or 

Pulchro-moral ; and either structural or 
non-structural . . .359 



W CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



£ C^XX Y* \ \ » Critical and dynamic offices of the Impero- 

moral faculty after it has shed its pro- 
visional constituent . .360 

IS, The application of the natural ardour of 
godliness for the development of Bene- 
volence is peculiar to Christianity . 360 

1 3a. Perfect Impero-moral goodness includes 

Generosity . . - .361 

136. Generosity is a kind of proportion be- 
tween propensities . . .362 

14. Perfect Impero-moral Goodness excludes 

Self-love. Self-love is infantile, "De- 
tachment n is manhood . .363 

1 5. Impero-moral goodness includes all Pul- 

chro-moral goodness, except Courage 

and Fortitude . . . 365 

16. Moral Badness . . . 365 

17. Conscience . . . . . 366 
CLXXVI. 1. The Moral Faculty is not chargeable with 

caprice .... 367 
2-5. Exposition of Paradoxical goodness . 367 

6. Paradoxical goodness concurs with cer- 

tain speciosities to impart an air of 
caprice to the Moral Faculty . 370 

7. Confusion of Depraved with Moral ap- 

proval helps the error . .371 

8a. Moral discernment falsified by Fierceness 372 
86. Anger a convulsion . . .373 

CLXXVII. Utilitarianism the devil's counsellor against 

the Moral Faculty . . .374 

CLXXVIII. 1. Wisdom defined . . .376 

2. It is the cardinal constituent of the 

Summum Bonum . . .378 

3. The conversion of Godliness into Wisdom 

the End of Christianity . . 380 



CONTENTS. xxxi 

PAGE 

§ CLXXVIII. 4. Wisdom identical with the Christian spirit 

It may survive, but could not have ob- 
tained without, godliness . .381 



CHAPTER V. 

Man the Puppet, Dupe, and Victim of Unconscious 

Force (pp. 383-387). 

§ CLXXIX. Dependence of Consciousness on cerebration 

does not exclude Volition . .383 

CLXXX. Without self-denying Effort to conform be- 
haviour to Wisdom, men are dupes, pup- 
pets, and, for the most part, victims, of 
Nature .... 385 



INTRODUCTION. 



I. 



If I am not deceived, the following pages will show 
that, in so far as the study of Mind is concerned, 
those who have affected to employ the method of 
research which exclusively proceeds on intuition and 
deduction have been false to the method ; have been 
betrayed into a morass of indefinite ideas and un- 
warranted assumptions ; have, as regards the general, 
mistaken parts for their wholes ; have been extremely 
perfunctory, so that while they have been ambitious 
to achieve exhaustive explanation, they have not been 
at pains to provide for themselves solid standing 
ground ; have got themselves into such a plight that 
their motions are no longer a means of progress ; and 
that they have brought unmerited disgrace on the 
method which their indolence has misapplied. 

I show that a legitimate and vigorous use of the 
method might have anticipated induction as regards 
the existence of an unconscious part of the mind, and 
of unconscious mental events of which conscious mental 
events are effects. One of the most famous of the philo- 
sophers who have brought this reproach on deduction has 

B 



g THE ALTERNATIVK 

Kivmt \\n mi elaborate treatise on pwre Eeason, while 
Imwing nn to popular indefiniteness respecting Eeason. 
Dlamtiwlotig about the relation of experience to know- 
ing abound, while a part of experience has been 
\miv(WMt11y mistaken for the whole. An unimportant 
kind which it wan convenient to Logicians to put in 
w\M under the name Judgment, has masked one of 
thti mortt important of the differences it behoves 
philosophy to distinguish, the difference between Ap- 
|m*hen*ion and Judgment properly so called. Recogni- 
tion i* dug to a latent bearing of likeness of a certain 
dnftfttt on the mind. This bearing is now for the first 
lima madti known, The existence of consciousness 
void of iwlf* consciousness or what Leibnitz terms 
AWMWptton >**s overlooked. Unconscious know- 
\<h\$* wa ignored, although it should have been 
obvious tbat A man i$ not necessarily ignorant of 
what \\p is nt* thinking aboxit When the Mathema- 
Moiau is in avNia, in dwaxnfoss stags or absorbed in a 
ganw of whfett hid knowtedg* of xnatheaoaatics persists, 
A ktant ojwaiion of instance* on the mind, one which 
<*n*f* jpnttari synUwd*s that first obtain as unoon- 
jnvit'ina ttwwtadg** bad b**n mt&ataft for an operation 
itf *vid*noa, *nd <xmfonnded >rfch inference — ^with 

<\iN^h*nwnta of atttibafc* *** (§ HM **** supports 
of k)\* ivw*WtnWng atttihnt*** Faftio* *o imagine that 
* tvwqvfcit* <v*nM bo in lib* Ttlatio* of supjKsrt to the 
tVWW*ing )>wrta* <v*ahin*d ^*ith ibe t^oe^ity tf thought 
*M<*h wqniwi t)mt attribute $npp<**$ support, occa- 
^lAn^d Ww fcfoa *f *h* tignwnl $nb**«ii{* ; irtnch, like 
a *N*tyfn b<v(> in an <vty^ni*m> Had been ltam the first 
fotttng and ilfowwng it* **Nfc* Of tbfe philosophr 
(a *wa\ G* *H* tfo*t Www. *M. 




INTRODUCTION. 3 

What confusion must have reigned to give plausi- 
bility to the desperate doctrine, that the mind may be 
conversant about things inconceivable ! Infinity and 
the First Cause are held by Sir William Hamilton to 
be things inconceivable, things unthinkable, and, never- 
theless, things about which the mind is somehow con- 
versant The doctrine pretends that its marvel is 
determined by a law which it names the Law of the 
Conditioned. It has been approved by the adhesion of 
such notable minds as those of Mr. Herbert Spencer 
and Mr. Henry Longueville ManseL By applying the 
notion of the species, ideas that are not appearances — 
inapparitional ideas, — I dare believe that I have pre- 
cipitated the confusion which gave plausibility to the 
doctrine. An error which confounded Essence with 
Quality I have corrected. 

The confusion of Will with intentional-instinct 
overcasts psychology, ethics, and morality. A mental 
act which differs from attention only in the respect 
that it persists in a mind which would fain be rid 
of it, was confounded with attention, to which it is 
essential to depend upon conscious effort, — effort that 
the agent is free to suspend at pleasure. The delu- 
sion which Nature puts upon us in connection with 
this counterfeit of attention, viz. that it is a voli- 
tion, — that, in respect of it, we are free agents — 
exemplifies a delusion commensurate with nearly the 
whole of the practical life of mankind. The removal 
of the error (Bk. III.) exposes a fact of tremendous 
importance. Proving deductively that Mind includes 
an unconscious part, the theatre of unconscious mental 
events, and inductively, that this part includes or is 
comprised by the brain, and that an unconscious 
mental event — a corporo-mental event — is a condition 



4 THE ALTERNATIVE. 

sine qua non of a consciousness, I show that nearly the 
whole of the practical life of man is, has been, and, for 
an indefinite time to come, threatens to be, transacted by 
an tmconscious force or agent, — that we have been pup- 
pets, not personal agents — dupes as well as puppets — 
and, in view of the prevalence of wretchedness in 
human, life, victims. I show that from this state of 
puppet, dupe, and victim, there is but one way of 
escape, that of self-denying conduct according to Wis- 
dom. If, adopting an ideal of character opposed to 
his instincts, a man resolve to live in conformity with 
that ideal, and at cost of self-denial live accordingly, 
his practical life is initiated and controlled by his 
conscious mind, and is truly a personal life. In respect 
of it, ho is voluntary, — a free-agent He is master of 
himsolf, and, to a certain extent, of Nature. If this 
practice have, as Christianity presumes it to have, the 
property of altering the instincts with enhancement, 
the agent is in the way of terminating the conflict 
between Will and Instinct, by substituting a new man 
for the old, — in the new, a mind that is partly the 
oifapring of the will What a salvation had Christianity 
elicited aueh a purgatory from the will of Christendom ! 
Having exposed what was false in the connotation 
of the term Substance, 1 employ the term as denoting 
according to the true part of its connotation, le. as 
denoting the naturally ungenerable and unannihilable 
part of the univrnm, what may be termed its perdur- 
ftklft part,-— that which, in changing, remains always 
intrinsically tho aamo — the truly % f*nd/imf*tel part of 
th* rA irA* \ ahow that aubatanee is the subject of 
an attribute in virtuo of which it is sometimes mind, 
*\\\\ for Ih* moat part, an oquivalont of mind. This 
Mtrlbuti t Urm DfrtoVy fNffwwrfkv <>f aptitndcs, dis- 




INTRODUCTION. 5 

tinguishing it from a species that has been quite over- 
looked, viz. disorderly concurrence of aptitudes, or that 
which causes disorder. To the former is due the Cosmic 
character of the universe ; to the latter Chaos. Orderly 
concurrence of aptitudes is the ground of natural the- 
ology. During a certain phase of mental development, 
a law of belief gives it as presupposing a Designer— 
an intelligent first cause. I show that scrutiny strips 
the datum of the speciousness that made it seem to 
be a necessary truth. 

I exhibit in a new light the relation of Deduction 
to syllogism. The exhibition exposes two kinds of 
laws of belief, one relative to necessary truth, the 
other bearing on induction : it shows that there are 
exponents of laws of belief, and that the exponents 
of the laws relative to necessary truth are axioms, 
whereas those of the other kind are scarcely truthlike. 
It shows that syllogism has, if any, a merely fanciful 
connection with non-deductive inference. 

I prove that all knowledge is the offspring of 
experience — that there is no such thing as knowledge 
it priori, — that, nevertheless, in the controversy about 
the relation of knowledge to experience, the advocates 
of knowledge A priori have the best of it. As regards 
that controversy, my role is eclectic. It is the same 
as regards the question between Conceptualists and 
Nominalists. I show that both are partially right and 
partially wrong, that there are no such things as 
Abstract Ideas, and that there are such things as con- 
cepts : the vicarious function of names, whereby they 
serve in place of ideas, has made them pass for abstract 
ideas. 

Philosophy has been obstructed by the begging of 
vexed questions involved in the connotations of many 



6 THE ALTERNATIVE. 

of its most important terms, e.g. the begging of the 
question at issue between idealists and materialists 
when the term Sensation is understood to connote 
relation as attribute to a material subject — a body. 
The idealist denies that there is such a thing as a body 
or a bodily organ of the consciousness termed sensation. 
I define sensation, consciousness given as being either 
wholly or in part a bodily attribute. This definition 
does not imply that there is such a thing as a body : 
it does not imply that the connoted datum is true. It 
makes the term defined equally convenient to every 
school of philosophy. In all my fundamental defini- 
tions I eschew in like manner assumption and petitio 
principii. I draw my principal general lines within 
the pale of the records of consciousness visible to retro- 
spect. This domain exhibits to retrospect, not merely 
records of the simplest units, but also records of groups 
of consciousnesses determined by the mutual likeness 
of the units and their difference from all other units. 
Our ideas of kinds of consciousness originate in 
discernments of these groups, e.g. the groups, visual 
consciousnesses, auditory consciousnesses, remembrances, 
judgments, inferences, imaginations, etc. Of the kinds 
thus manifest to retrospect, I select those that seem to 
be the divisions of the domain of consciousness the 
demarcation of which facilitates in the greatest degree 
an exhaustive survey of the field, — first the subgenera, 
then the species, defining or otherwise indicating them 
by what is intrinsic to them in respect of which they 
resemble, or differ from, one another. This classifica- 
tion, which excludes petitio principii, I make the 
foundation of psychology. If it be not a terra firma, 
there is no footing for knowledge. This terra firma 
seems to be connected by data, including axioms, with 




INTRODUCTION. V 

a reality outside consciousness, a reality known as the 
not-self. I take for granted the veracity of data that 
are not tainted by inconsistency, and, moving upon 
them with the confidence of Common Sense, intuitively 
and inferentially explore what I take to be unconscious 
reality. Thus I discover the existence of unconscious 
mental event, and that Mind includes an unconscious 
part Accepting from the datum that there is such a 
thing as matter, that there are such things as Cosmos, 
human bodies, bodily organs of consciousness, e.g. the 
eye, ear, etc., and inductively inferring that what are 
given as nerves, spinal marrow, and encephalon, are also 
organs of consciousness, I fall in with the confluence of 
physiology and psychology, and allow that mental events 
include physiological processes. 



II. 



The author is a disciple of the school of common 
sense. The spirit of the school has suggested to him 
a method which has steered him to some of the most 
important of the conclusions of this treatise. What 
then is common sense, and what its method in philo- 
sophy ? Common sense is the mental quality which 
disposes the bulk of men to unanimity under like cir- 
cumstances, and to conservatism in respect of the actual 
system of their beliefs. The conservatism tends, not 
only to be tenacious of actual beliefs, but also to 
mould all accessions to belief. Our actual beliefs 
dispose, as a rule, to judge in accordance with them, 
inclining our minds towards certain hypotheses and 
away from others — a disposition, by the way, that 



8 THE ALTERNATIVE. 

manifests itself without any conscious reference to 
beliefs with which an hypothesis in question may 
agree or disagree. The accordant hypotheses, when 
candidates for belief, present a verisimilar aspect, and 
the discordant an inverisimilar one, without exhibiting 
agreement or disagreement with any actual belief. 
Conservatism in respect of belief is not proper to those 
who are qualified by common sense : a considerable 
minority of the conservative are of an eccentric mental 
structure, which causes them to differ notably from 
the majority as to system of belief. These and those 
who are devoid of conservatism as to belief are either 
partially or altogether devoid of common sense. People 
who, in relation to certain topics, are eccentric, are 
sometimes, in respect of all others, the reverse. The 
verdicts of common sense are sentiments so differentiated 
from all other kinds of sentiment save one that, except 
in so far as they are liable to be confounded with senti- 
ments of that kind, they are easily recognizable. For 
example, they are readily distinguished from approvals 
and disapprovals of the religious, moral, and aesthetic 
faculties, and from assents and dissents of Eeason in 
which common sense does not concur, and to which it 
does not demur. The sentiments with which they are 
liable to be confounded are those that constitute the 
assent and dissent of eccentric conservatism. These 
seem to the subject to be verdicts of common sense, 
from which indeed they are not distinguishable by any 
intuitable intrinsic difference. If they were, since it is 
presumable that common sense is a better guide than 
eccentricity, we should be better equipped for the 
voyage of life, and especially for the conduct of philo- 
sophy. It has been well said of common sense that it 
is a ballast which, although it keep the ship aground in 



I 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

shallow water, is indispensable for keeping her up- 
right where there is depth enough to float. Hume 
experienced the correcting influence of common sense 
when he found that he could not take his scepticism 
abroad with him. 

When I treat of Science (Chapter I. Book III.) I 
shall show that, according to the signification to which 
the term Philosophy has been narrowed within the 
last forty years, philosophy is the motherlye of science, 
— at least of theoretic science, and that satisfactoriness 
to common sense is the attribute which differentiates 
theoretic science from philosophy. So long as the 
products of philosophy do not justify themselves by 
evidence satisfactory to common sense they are not 
science nor constituents of science ; but in acquiring 
that evidence they undergo the crystallizing process 
which makes them either one or the other. Meta- 
physics is an example of a product of philosophy that 
has failed to satisfy common sense, and is therefore 
excommunicated by science. Positivism is a revolt of 
common sense against metaphysics as well as theology. 
Psychology is not, like metaphysics, an offence to 
common sense: it is even a favourite candidate for 
admission to the rank of science ; but it has not yet 
exhibited satisfactory credentials to common sense. 
Sociology is still in the liquid state, but manifestly 
about to crystallize. So much for common sense : let 
us now consider its method as pilot of philosophic 
speculation. 

Philosophic speculation aims at two things, viz. 
knowledge of facts, and the elimination of inconsistency 
from the system of our beliefs. As regards the elimi- 
nation, we should not hug the coast of certitude, but 
boldly put to sea in quest of a system of hypotheses 



10 THE ALTERNATIVE. 

in harmony with facts and with each other, not fearing 
to provisionally adopt, as favourite candidates for belief, 
hypotheses which, although otherwise well recom- 
mended, do not capture certitude. If the speculation 
achieve a system of hypotheses perfectly explanatory 
of a vast multitude of facts and in harmony with one 
another, the system, owing to a well-known mental law, 
would compel certitude of its truth. The explorer 
starts on the voyage equipped with a system of beliefs 
and with common sense which serves him, not only as 
ballast, but, in connection with his beliefs, as compass ; 
for, besides saving him from dangerous careening, it 
indicates the direction he should take, viz., along the 
line of consistent hypotheses that most accord with his 
beliefs and in the least degree innovate upon the 
system of those beliefs. For example, if two data be 
inconsistent with one another, he is to prefer that the 
elimination of which would cause the greater change in 
the system of his beliefs. Of course common sense is 
tenacious of all data that are not discredited by incon- 
sistency, but, above all, of those that serve as founda- 
tions of morality and religion, e.g., that there is a soul, 
that we are free agents. When such data become 
doubtful, the moral and religious faculties unite in a 
challenge to Will to prevent doubt from causing the 
moral paralysis and decay that might be inevitable if 
certitude of the falseness of the datum were in place 
of doubt They suggest to Will to apply what was 
known to the Latins under the name arbitrium, — an 
act which founds resolve on mere opinion, an act 
indispensable to those who have to navigate a sea 
of conjecture. Decree, they exclaim, the truth of the 
questionable datum, and, as regards conduct, rely on 
it as though it were the certitude it substitutes. Man- 




INTRODUCTION. 11 

liness, it seems to me, concurs with morality, religion, 
and common sense, in this challenge. How should it 
indolently "gape on" while doubt is undermining 
human dignity ? Considering the fallibility of the 
human mind, its dependence on data, the necessity it 
is under to proceed upon conjecture, the superiority of 
a limited conservatism to an unballasted proneness to 
novelty in the interpretation of nature, and the probable 
degradation of the race if it lose faith in free agency 
and responsibility, it seems to me that the foregoing 
method is recommended by transcendent credentials. 

The method repudiates the doctrine that virtue 
is an impediment to research — an impediment as 
indisposing the mind to beliefs that are hostile to it : 
the method proceeds on faith that virtue or wisdom is 
a faculty as needful to research as that of vision, 
though also as fallible. It is true that, if men be no 
better than maggots, the discovery of that truth by 
research under the tutelage of Wisdom risks postpone- 
ment ; but is the postponement a respite or a loss ? 
Morals at least would not be the worse for it. The 
tendency of the method to prevent research from bolt- 
ing is elucidated by the extravagance of the doctrine, 
that human behaviour is exclusively automatic — that 
consciousness has no more to do with it than the 
whistle of the locomotive with its motion. All that 
can be said for this doctrine is that it is not incon- 
sistent, and that it is competent to molecular change 
to cause behaviour which seems to be intentional. To 
infer from the facts which indicate this competence 
that man is a mere automaton, is a non sequitur. The 
method puts the doctrine out of court. 



12 THE ALTERNATIVE. 



III. 



It is new, even to philosophy, that exploration and 
discovery are possible to the faculty of Definition. It 
is taken for granted that the office of the faculty is 
confined to the humble work of making knowledge 
ship-shape, and explaining the meaning of words, — 
that he, for example, who achieves a definition of In- 
duction has not augmented — has merely arranged — 
knowledge. The obvious agreement of definitions with 
the known tends, when they augment knowledge, to 
hide the appearance of increase. The detection of a 
differentia is an increase of knowledge, and often an 
increase of the greatest importance ; but, though this 
must be manifest to the discoverer, it tends to elude 
those to whom he imparts his discovery : they think 
that they have profited only by having their know- 
ledge put for them in a clearer light. An analogous 
error disputed Bacon's title to be the originator of an 
intellectual epoch. Forsooth, people had inferred induc- 
tively prior to Bacon, and therefore the Novum Organum 
contained nothing new. It has escaped philosophers 
that the faculty of definition was the supreme faculty 
of Socrates, and that his dialectic was a method of 
driving people to the border of definition which was to 
enrich the world with new knowledge. Now in this 
Essay error is sapped and truth put in its place by a 
noiseless process of definition that tends to exclude an 
appearance of addition to knowledge. I might easily 
seem to have done no more than decant the known 
into another form. It is important, no less to the 
reader than to myself, that this error be avoided. 



X 



INTRODUCTION. 13 



IV. 



The treatise consists of three books. The First con- 
sists of Definitions demanded by a new classification of 
mental events and faculties — not the less new that the 
classes are denoted by familiar names. The Second 
treats of Seasoning. The Third consists of expositions 
which concur in showing the dependence of personal 
agency on Self-Denial. The first chapter of the third 
book shows that science is unconscious knowledge. 
The second deduces from familiar mental event the 
existence of an unconscious part of the mind and of 
unconscious mental event. The third proves that the 
unconscious part of the mind is corporal, consisting of 
the encephalon, etc. The fourth is an exposition of 
Wisdom. The fifth proves that man has been for the 
most part puppet, dupe, and victim of unconscious 
forces, and that self-denying conduct is a sine qua non 
of escape. It may be asked, — at this hour of the 
day, so long after Leibnitz had called attention to un- 
conscious mental event, and Dr. Carpenter had popular- 
ized knowledge of unconscious cerebration,— what need 
was there of a deduction of an unconscious part of 
the mind and of unconscious mental event ? I answer 
that, except as regards the insignificant species of un- 
conscious event noticed by Leibnitz, it has never been 
shown that there are unconscious mental events. It 
has been abundantly shown that certain unconscious 
events are conditions sine qua non, and otherwise 
accessories, of mental action, but never hitherto that 
mental events include other unconscious events than 
those indicated by Leibnitz. No one will suspect 



14 THE ALTERNATIVE. 

Professor Bain of overlooking the bearing of corporal 
upon mental event, yet his definition of Mind supposes 
mental event to exclude unconscious event. Accord- 
ing to Professor Bain Mind is a sum of operations 
and appearances that are either feelings, volitions, or 
thoughts. 1 Even Mr. Lewes, who held that event of 
which the obverse aspect belongs to the kind, mental 
events, has a reverse aspect which correctly ranks it, 
as being a neural tremor, in the kind, corporal events, 

1 "The operations and appearances that constitute Mind are indi- 
cated by such terms as Feeling, Thought, Memory, Reason, Conscience, 
Imagination, Will, Passions, Affections, Taste. But the Definition of 
Mind aspires to comprehend in few words, by some apt generalisation, 
the whole kindred of mental facts, and to exclude everything of a 
foreign character." 

w Mind is commonly opposed to Matter, but more correctly to the 
External World. These two opposites define each other. To know 
one is to know both. The External, or Object, World is distinguished 
by the property called Extension, which pertains both to resisting 
Matter, and to unresisting, or empty Space. The Internal, or the 
Subject, world is our experience of everything not extended; it is 
neither Matter nor Space. A tree, which possesses extension, is a part 
of the object world ; a pleasure, a volition, a thought, are facts of the 
subject world, or of mind proper. 

" Thus Mind is defined, in the first instance, by the method of con- 
trast, or as a remainder arising from subtracting the External World 
from the totality of existence. It happens that the External World 
is easily defined 0* circumscribed ; the one well-understood property, 
Extension, serves for this purpose. Hence the alternative, or the 
correlative, Mind, can be circumscribed with equal exactness. But it 
is desirable to possess, in addition to this negative definition, how- 
ever precise it may be, a positive definition, or a specification 6f the 
quality or qualities that appertain to the phenomena designated mind. 
Now, we have not here the good fortune to be able to refer to a single 
precise quality, like Extension for the object world ; we must refer to 
several qualities that conspire to make up our mental framework. 
Hence our positive definition, instead of being a unity, is a plurality, 
and is not only a Definition, but also a Division of the Mind." 

"The phenomena of the Inextended Mind are usually compre- 
hended under three heads : " — 

" I. Feeling, which includes, but is not exhausted by, our pleasures 



\ 



INTRODUCTION. 15 

inadvertently implies that unconscious event is not 
mental. But, though it had been inductively shown, 
the scientific spirit would exact a corresponding de- 
duction if the latter were possible ; not indeed in these 
days when induction is celebrating its prodigious suc- 
cesses in an orgie, but so soon as Philip shall have 
become sober. 

This treatise purports — 1st, a reconstruction of 
psychology; 2nd, exposure of the alternative that 
gives the treatise its title. The alternative is this — 
either puppet, dupe, and victim of unconscious forces, or 
self-denying conduct for the achievement of Wisdom. 
Although the work of reconstruction occupies nearly 
the whole of the treatise, and, if it bear any fair pro- 
portion to the labour bestowed upon it, should not be 

and pains. Emotion, passion, affection, sentiment — are names of 
Feeling." 

" II. Volition, or the Will, embracing the whole of our activity as 
directed by our feelings." 

" III. Thought, Intellect, or Cognition. 

Our Sensations, as will be afterwards seen, come partly under 
Feeling, and partly under Thought." — The Senses and The Intellect. 

Does Professor Bain advertently imply in the term, inextended 
mind, that there is such a thing as extended mind ? If he do and 
intend us to understand that extended mind is a bodily organ of which 
inextended mind is a function, are we also to understand him as teach- 
ing that mental event does not exclude unconscious event ? No ; for 
he limits inextended mind to the conscious events, feeling, volition, 
and thought. 

A better instance of the intoxication of the scientific spirit by the 
successes of the inductive faculty than the foregoing extract could 
scarcely be found. It tells us — 1st, That operations and appearances 
constitute the mind ; 2nd, That mind is a species of experience, viz. 
experience of the inextended ; 3rd, That it is the totality of Being 
minus extended things ; and then it implies (I believe inadvertently) 
that a species of mind is extended. In the old days, before induction 
had kicked over the traces, Professor Bain, by whose valuable contri- 
butions to philosophy I have profited, would not have thought and 
written thus. 



16 INTRODUCTION. 

unworthy of the attention of psychologists, it is, in 
respect of the exposure, a mere husk. My intention 
in laying bare the abjectness and wretchedness of our 
condition coincides with that of the Gospel without its 
supernaturalism and mysticism. It is to stir an insur- 
rection against the Infernal in Nature, for the subver- 
sion of the reign of Instinct and substitution of that of 
Wisdom and Will. 



I 



BOOK I. -DEFINITIONS. 



CHAPTEE I. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 
I. 

According to the primary meaning of the word per- 
cewe, one perceives not only when he sees, hears, smells, 
tastes, and undergoes tactile consciousness, but also 
when he imagines, remembers, conceives, judges, appre- 
hends danger in an emotion of fear or sacredness in one 
of reverence. According to this signification and the 
corresponding one of the cognate term, perception, the 
latter denotes the affection of mind that is correlated to 
objectivity, — the mind's embrace of an object. Philo- 
sophers have in modern times assigned a narrower 
signification to the term, perception. Convenience 
demands another alteration of its meaning, opposing it, 
as I shall presently explain, to what Leibnitz terms 
apperception. Accordingly, stripping the word discern- 
ment of its connotation of contrast, I assign to it the 
meaning originally annexed to the term, perception. 
Discernment and objectivity are correlatives, and per- 
ception is a species of discernment. This arrangement 
is facilitated by the fact that the term, discrimination, 
has been a synonym of, and can do duty for, the term 
discernment. 



^ 



20 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 



II. 

According to its primary signification the term 
object denotes what is discerned. Custom has impaired 
its utility by making it a synonym of the term, Thing. 
I employ it as though this abuse had not obtained. A 
discerned tree is, and an undiscerned tree is not, an 
object. Discernment and object, like concavity and 
convexity, are but opposite aspects of the same thing. 



III. 



Certain objects, e.g. muscoe volitantes, Ariel, or Fal- 
staff, are said to be unreal, others, as Mount Atlas, 
reed. When we contrast a pain with an idea of a pain 
the contrast lights up the reality of the former and the 
unreality of the latter, and the reality of all sensation, 
emotion, and volition, is, in like manner, put in relief 
when contrasted with the ideas of them. The ideas are 
mere objects ; the sensations, emotions, and volitions, 
are something more than objects. It is in virtue of 
the something- more that they are realities. Accord- 
ingly, Eeality may be defined, entity that comprises 
something more than objectivity. 



IV. 



According to Pythagoras, and after him Plato, idea 
is the common name of Types eternally existent in the' 



chap, l CONSCIOUSNESS. 21 

mind of God, — types conformably to which all contin- 
gent things were made. The meaning of the term was 
altered by popular misunderstanding and license so 
that Locke could apply it as the common name of 
objects. Thus understood, a stone, when object, and a 
toothache, are ideas. Locke did not intend this inor- 
dinate extent of signification. His definition extended 
it to real objects, but it is probable that he had only 
unreal objects in view. I believe that I am represent- 
ing the popular and philosophical understanding of the 
term in defining it as being the common name of 
unreal objects not given as real. According to this 
definition the immediate objects of sight, hearing, taste, 
smell, and tactile discernment, are not ideas. 



V. 



Self-consciousness is the objectivity of an individual 
to himself. It is therefore a mistake to oppose sub- 
jective consciousness to objectivity : it is a species of 
objectivity. Objectivity is either subjective or non- 
subjective ; in other words, objects are either subjective 
or non-subjective. What has been accounted opposition 
of subjective and objective consciousness is really 
opposition of subjective and non-subjective objectivity. 
Every normal discernment of which the object com- 
prises all that is objective at any one instant is discern- 
ment of a subjective and a non-subjective object, the 
former comprising what is given as self or the Ego and 
its appurtenances or modifications, the latter the not- 
self, the non-moi, the non-Ego. Such a discernment, 
accordingly, consists of two constituents, one known as 



22 THE ALTERNATIVE. book t. 

self-consciousness, and by Leibnitz more conveniently 
termed Apperception, 1 the other what refers to the 
opposed object The constituent that refers to self and 
its modifications I term apperception, and the other, 
perception. It is now obvious that I am conservative 
as regards the meaning of the term, perception, and 
that my innovation affects only the import of the term, 
discernment. 



VI. 



One may make himself the object of his own atten- 
tion. Self, as object of its own attention, is not a sub- 
jective object. When object of attention it is doubly 
objective, non-subjectively to the attentive discernment 
and subjectively to an inattentive one. Make the 
experiment. Attend to the Ego. The attentive dis- 
cernment is involved with an inattentive discernment of 
self as subject of the attention. You attentively per- 
ceive self, and inattentively discern (apperceive) self as 
subject of the attention. This gives us the differentia 
of apperception, viz., inattentiveness of discernment of 
what are given as self and its modifications. Accord- 
ingly, Apperception is discernment that is inattentively 
referent to what are given as self and its modifications, 
and Perception is discernment of a non - subjective 
object. 

1 Philosophy is indebted to Leibnitz for the term apperception. 
What he employs it to denote he defines, in contrast to perception, as 
follows, — " Perception is the internal state of the monad symbolic of 
things external, and apperception is the reflex knowledge of this in- 
terior state — a state not given to all souls nor at all times to the same 
soul." 



chap. i. CONSCIOUSNESS. 23 



VII. 



Let perception involved in seeing, hearing, tasting, 
smelling, and undergoing tactile consciousness, be 
termed sense-perception. 



VIII. 

Is there such a thing as discernment without apper- 
ception ? Yes : there is a species of abnormal discern- 
ment of which privation of apperception is the differentia. 
What sometimes occurs to patients suffering acute pain 
during sleep is an instance. They sometimes lose self- 
consciousness during sleep without getting relief. The 
pain persists. It is riven to the memory of the 
Jufferer as a thing that exists^ ae and L though 
nothing else existed save time and space. It involves 
no reference to an Ego given as being its subject. Here 
we have discernment without discernment of a person 
discerning,— a perception unconjoined with an apper- 
ception. Ecstasy gives us examples of discernment to 
which the Ego is not objective. Wordsworth's descrip- 
tion of an event of this kind in the Excursion is a fiction 
modelled on fact Eothen tells us that he experienced 
" a vegetable sense of cold," meaning, I take it, cold 
given, not as an attribute of a body annexed to an Ego, 
but as self-subsistent. The following mental event 
was given to the writer as having occurred while he 
was in a swoon. A discernment void of self-conscious- 
ness seemed to have for object a figure consisting of 
several luminous variously - coloured concentric rings, 



24 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

the largest about twelve feet in diameter. Time, space, 
and the figure, seemed to comprise all being. There 
was no spectator. After a while an impersonal won- 
der contemplating the figure obtained, and then, after a 
while, "I" was suddenly annexed to the wonder as sub- 
ject to attribute : for a moment I was aware of myself 
as gazing at the figure, and with the vanishing of the 
figure I recovered. 1 



IX. 



Subjective objectivity includes the body of the 
subject and certain of its states and changes. In 
every normal discernment embracing all that is at the 
time objective, the subject apperceives his body. In 
sense-perception he apperceives the perceiving organ, 
e.g. in seeing he apperceives the eye. We apperceive 
the expressions of our faces, the attitudes and motions 
of our bodies. One of the profoundest errors of philo- 
sophy is the assumption that self- consciousness is 
co^ant of nothing more than self given as subject 
of consciousness, and of varieties of consciousness 
which it undergoes, e.g. remembrance, imagination, 
judgment, emotion. The assumption begs a moment- 
ous question, viz., that self is given as being a soul, 

1 Comte reproaches psychology with a defect that is incident to its 
infancy and adolescence, namely, inattention to abnormal mental event. 
The reproach was ill-timed, for psychology was even then approaching 
a confluence with physiology and morbid pathology. What advantage 
it derives from the connection is instanced in the text. Those who 
imagine that psychology should not stoop to gather its facts from 
hospitals, lunatic asylums, and generally from the exceptional, will do 
well to consider the reproach of Comte. 



^\ 



chap. i. CONSCIOUSNESS. 25 

i.e., as being inextended and a monad. It is highly 
probable that the idea of an inextended subject of 
consciousness, a soul, is a product of philosophy, derived 
from the datum, that self is a durable thing, and from 
evidence that the body is a mere series void of a 
temporal identity measuring what is given as the life- 
time of the putative subject. It is probable that, in 
the infancy of human individuals and societies, the 
body is given as being the self. This datum easily 
maintains its ground so long as consciousness is all 
but absorbed in sensation, but is less tenacious in pro- 
portion as consciousness is more engaged in discourse. 
When the idea of an inextended self emerges, it is 
favoured by the ascendancy of discourse. 



X. 



1. To what known and named kind are we to 
assign the mental event, discernment-unconnected-with- 
apperception ? Known and named kinds afford it no 
room. It has been overlooked by philosophy as well 
as by popular experience. The kind with which it 
has most affinity is what has been hitherto denoted by 
the name, consciousness. But before deciding to treat 
it as a congener of this kind and to transfer the name 
Consciousness to the genus of which they are species, 
let us consider another ignored kind of mental event 
which is also a candidate for admission into the genus. 
The following are instances of the kind. 

2. If where the light is subdued a man inad- 
* vertently close his eyelids for some seconds and be 



26 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

then asked whether he sees anything, the question 
would develope an erroneous knowledge in him that he 
sees nothing. If, while the lids are closed, he cover 
them with his hand, he deepens the darkness, which 
establishes that, between the closing of the lids and the 
covering with the hand, his visual faculty had been the 
theatre of an event or entity, that is better entitled to 
the name, light, than the sethereal vibrations of which 
it is an effect. This ignored event pretends to be a 
consciousness. 

3. Belief sometimes discovers to us that we have 
been undergoing a mental event which, if it be not 
entitled to the name, pain, is nameless. The drawing 
of a blind shuts out a glare, the closing of a door a 
noise, that had been ignored, and so affects us that a 
sigh or groan of relief escapes us. The fact that the 
event was ignored does not make us indifferent to its 
recurrence. 

4. We see in others, and they see in us, signs that 
are given as signs of emotion, when the putative subject 
is ignorant that he is undergoing the emotion ascribed 
to him. How often does resentment shoot its arrows 
at us when the subject believes himself not only to be 
free from anger but to be actuated by regard for our 
interest or by pious zeal. We frequently discern emo- 
tion in ourselves which is given as having had a 
latent beginning and growth. People of conduct are 
led by their vigilance to the discovery of kinds of emo- 
tion that never manifest themselves in vulgar experi- 
ence. It achieves what is known in mystical language 
as discernment of spirits. The discovery penetrates 
even to emotions, which, when discerned, are found to 




chap. I. CONSCIOUSNESS. 27 

be the conscious sides — the faces or appearances — of 
states of the heart that are moulds of emotion, states of 
which " mood " is the common name. For example, one 
comes to detect an emotion that signifies a tendency to 
anger at a time when the heart is altogether free from 
anger,— nay is disposed to mirth, although with a 
tincture of irony. Or one may detect an emotion 
significant of a mood that is a mould of low and trivial 
sentiment. The discerned events are given as being 
emotions, — emotions that existed antecedently to, as 
well as at the time of, the discovery. If the datum be 
true, if the events be indeed what they seem to be, 
are they not Consciousness of which the subject is 
ignorant ? 

5. There is a mental event connected with exercises 
of memory which presents a claim equal to that of 
sensation and emotion to be accounted consciousness, 
and it refers to latent individuals of its species which, 
having a like claim to be classed as consciousnesses, 
are adducible as instances of latent consciousness. 
When we endeavour to remember, the effort proceeds 
upon a mental event that more resembles sensation 
than any other familiar species, a somewhat that inten- 
sifies and loses intensity, enhancing in proportion as it 
intensifies our consciousness of power to recall, and 
degrading it in proportion as it loses intensity. It 
culminates, so to speak, in the remembrance which 
it predicts, and, if it expire without having caused 
remembrance, we feel that it is impossible to recollect ; 
we have lost the clue. To those who notice the clue 
it is impossible to doubt that all effort to remember 
proceeds on such an event or such all but the " illa- 
tency." Analogous events, only more resembling emo- 



28 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

tion than sensation, move men to undertakings for 
which they previously felt no disposition, no courage, 
no aptitude. It fills them with consciousness of power 
to realise such or such an end, and for the most part 
truly. The mathematician feels that it is in him to 
solve the problem by which he has been perplexed : it 
is the Muse of the poet, the painter, the musical com- 
poser. When it is noticed it is given as being the 
like, save as to being known, of mental events that 
have always borne on human enterprise. It is sur- 
prising that a mental event of so low an order should 
be, as it were, the matrix of the highest intellectual 
exercise and success. If it be not ranked as conscious- 
ness our system of kinds has no room for it, and, if it 
be, it establishes the existence of latent consciousness. 

6. I make free to transfer the name consciousness 
from the kind discernment - involving - apperception, 
by which the name has been hitherto monopolised, to 
the genus of which that kind, and the kind, discern- 
ment-unconnected-with-apperception, and the kind 
instanced by the ignored light and pain, are species. 
The innovation exposes a genus hitherto unknown, and 
is innocent of any greater infringement than the trans- 
fer of a name from a species to its genus. I was shut 
in to the alternative of inventing for the genus a new 
name or transferring to it that of one of its species. 
The aversion of the mind to new names I deem a 
sufficient apology for my choice. It was impossible 
to avoid a shock to mental habit. I trust it will be 
found that I have avoided the greater violence. 

7. The enlargement of the signification of the term, 
consciousness, makes it the common name of such 



l 



chap, l CONSCIOUSNESS. 29 

mental events as ideas, perceptions, apperceptions, re- 
membrances, imaginations, judgments, speculations, sen- 
sations, emotions, intentions, and choice or volition 
properly so called. The term consciousness admits 
of the indefinite article before it and of the plural 
form. A volition, an idea, or a perception, is a con- 
sciousness, and the three are consciousnesses. 



XI. 



1. Discernment unconnected with apperception, and 
such latent consciousnesses as the ignored light and 
pain, have this in common, that, considered as con- 
sciousnesses, they seem to be incomplete. Conscious- 
ness accordingly is divisible into complete and incomplete 
consciousness. The former consists of Apperception 
and all apperceived consciousnesses, the latter of all 
unapperceived consciousnesses. 

2. An incomplete consciousness that obtains in a 
self-conscious mind, e.g. ignored light and pain, may be 
distinguished as normal ; one that obtains in a mind 
void of self-consciousness, e.g. pain without self-con- 
sciousness, as abnormal. 



XII. 



Discernments that involve apperception may be 
distinguished as apperceptive, all others as inappercep- 
tive. These distinctions afford us convenient terms. 
They enable us to put briefly and plainly what was 



30 THE ALTEBXATTYE. book l 

not previously expressible without drcnmlocutioii and 
obscurity, viz. that hitherto apperceptive discernment 
has monopolised the name, consciousness, and that the 
name now denotes the genus of which apperceptive 
discernment, inapperceptive discernment, and ignored 
complete consciousness, are species. 1 



XIIL 

1. I have now to explain what I understand by 
the terms distinctness and indistinctness. They denote 
nndefinable attributes of objects. When a tree is an 
object of visual perception and attention it is a distinct 
object, and its qualities, eg. its solidity, colour, faun, 
etc,, are indistinct objects. When a grove is an object 
of visual perception and attention it is a distinct 
object, and those of its trees that are nearest to the 
centre of the field of vision may, if not too remote, be 
distinct objects. In the second case, the trees near to 
the circumference of the field of vision mav be indis- 



1 The advantage of restoring the term. conscioiisnest, to the larger 
signification from which it was warped by philosophy, is evinced by 
the. misnomer, " unconscious feeling/' employed by the late Mr. Lewes. 
According to the popular and better understanding of the terms, am- 
seiousness and feeling, fooling is a species of conscionsneK. so that the 
term *' unconscious feeling " affects common sense with the shock of 
contradiction. The term Feeling has been popularly applied as denot- 
ing emotion and sensation ; but when philosophy detects the species, 
ignored or latent consciousness, that species tends to fall under the 
sub^genna, feeling. Latent consciousness is what Mr. Lewes Tnign»i*M»a 
unconscious feeling. Not Mr. Lewes, but philosophy, is responsible 
for the misnomer. The kind of consciousness which it denotes is never 
absent from the waking mind, and probably comprises what there k of 
owtacio uw fif wi In the lowest animaK 




chap. i. CONSCIOUSNESS. 31 

tinct. The qualities of a tree that is an indistinct 
object are more indistinct than those of a tree that is 
distinct. Of distinct objects those that are objects of 
attention are more distinct than those that are not. 
Thus we see that there are degrees of distinctness and 
of indistinctness. It is essential to the object of atten- 
tion to be distinct, but objects of inattentive discern- 
ment are not necessarily indistinct. 

2. Indistinctness supposes objectivity. What is 
not an object cannot be indistinct. 

3. There are two well-marked degrees of indistinct- 
ness, viz., that which does, and that which does not, 
exclude knowledge of the indistinct object. The indis- 
tinctness of normal inchoate consciousness, e.g. the 
ignored light, is an example of indistinctness that 
excludes knowledge of the object. Let indistinctness 
of this degree be distinguished as abditive. The indis- 
tinctness of objects near the circumference of the field 
of vision is an example of the kind that does not 
exclude knowledge. Let it be distinguished as m- 
ccbditive. 

4. Distinctness graduates, through instances, into 
inabditive indistinctness, and the latter into abditive 
indistinctness, as neighbour colours of the rainbow 
graduate one into the other, equally excluding a detec- 
tion of boundary and doubt of the existence of specific 
difference. For example, the graduation excludes the 
possibility of ascertaining a minimum of distance from 
the centre of the field of vision beyond which a thing 
that, within the distance, would be distinct, is indis- 
tinct. 



CHAPTEE II. 

KNOWLEDGE. 

XIV. 

In order to explain what is denoted by the term, 
Knowledge, I must take a liberty with the term, thesis, 
assigning to it a partially new meaning. I trust that 
the importance of the new signification, to which no 
other known term is, by its connotation, so well 
adapted, will be found a sufficient apology. I employ 
the term, thesis, as denoting a thing which, when objec- 
tive, is verbally expressible by a proposition and not 
otherwise. Imagine yourself seeing at a distance a 
person who so affects your faculty of identification as 
to beget in you a faint opinion that he is your father, 
imagine that the opinion alternates for a time with the 
opposite opinion until, getting near to the object, you 
become certain that it is your father. The objects of 
the fluctuating opinions and of the certitude which 
finally supplants them are not propositions. No verbal 
formula is on such occasions objective ; and a proposi- 
tion is a verbal formula. But an object such as it is 
the nature of a proposition to express, one exhibiting 
the aspect of probability, must be present to each of 
the opinions ; to the affirmative opinion an object cor- 



chap. n. KNOWLEDGE. 33 

responding to the proposition, The person I see is my 
father, to the negative one an object corresponding to 
the proposition, The person I see is not my father ; and 
a third kind of object must be present to the final 
certitude, viz., one corresponding to the proposition, The 
person I see is my father, but exhibiting the aspect of 
certainty instead of that of probability. Now these 
several objects are ideas intimately connected with the 
immediate object of the perception, — ideas which it is 
important to distinguish from that object. It is import- 
ant to distinguish them from propositions as not being 
verbal, and, as being ideas, from the immediate object 
of perception. 



XV. 



The correlatives, certainty and certitude, are undefin- 
able. The former is an attribute and aspect of a 
thesis, the latter an attribute of a mind to which the 
former is objective; in other words, when a thesis 
exhibits the aspect, certainty, the corresponding discern- 
ment involves the attribute, certitude. Certainty and 
certitude refer to truth, — to the truth of the thesis 
which they suppose. The correlation of certainty to 
certitude supposes that there is no such thing as abso- 
lute certainty. 



XVI. 

We are said to fow>w~what is not altogether strange 
to our minds, e.g. the name, John, the figment of fancy, 

D 



34 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

Ariel, a song, an art, 'and also to know what we are 
certain of, e.g. the truth of the thesis, Two and two are 
four. If the relation of mind to what is not altogether 
strange to it be knowledge, knowledge is a genus com- 
prised by the two species, knowledge that does, and 
knowledge that does not, suppose certitude. So far as 
I know, philosophy has ignored the genus and regarded 
knowledge as supposing certitude. This I presume has 
been an inadvertence, and I therefore adopt the popu- 
lar view, according to which knowledge is mental 
relation to what is not altogether strange. Knowledge 
that supposes certitude I distinguish as " certive," and 
the opposite as " non-certive" 



XVII. 

Knowledge is either conscious or unconscious, the 
former when the thing known is objective, otherwise the 
latter. The mathematician's knowledge of mathematics, 
subsists when he is in dreamless sleep. A man is not 
necessarily nor always ignorant of what he is not think- 
ing about, and what he is not ignorant of, though he 
be not thinking of it, he knows. Popular language 
implies the existence of unconscious knowledge. In. 
conformity with it I presume to disregard the dictum 
of Hamilton, "consciousness and knowledge each in- 
volves the other." But though consciousness be not 
essential to knowledge, it is essential to certitude and 
certainty. These determine knowledge, but are not 
commensurate with it in time : they necessarily obtain, 
but obtain only when the knowledge they determine is 
conscious. 



chap. ii. KNOWLEDGE. 35 



XVIII. 

1. There is a kind of mental affection of which 
tendency - to - become - knowledge is the differentia. 
For example, — the painful experience of the burned 
child begets a mental affection to the thesis, All things 
like that which burned me have a burning property, an 
affection involving a tendency to become knowledge. 
If the experience occur before the child has acquired 
the idea of the kind, luminous things like that which 
burned him, it is not a knowledge, but, to become 
knowledge, it only needs that experience beget know- 
ledge of the kind. Again, every man has a native or 
congenital affection to the general thesis, A whole is 
greater than its part, and this affection precedes know- 
ledge of the land, Wholes. It is not then a knowledge. 
To become a knowledge it is necessary that experience 
connect with it a knowledge of the kind, wholes. 
These affections, as being affections to theses in virtue 
of which the theses tend to assume the aspect of cer- 
tainty, may be distinguished as " thesic." Let us 
denote by the name cognitive complement the knowledge 
needful to convert a thesic affection into a knowledge. 
According to this analysis a " certive " knowledge is a 
"thesic" affection conjoined with its cognitive com- 
plement. 

2. Thesic affections are either complete or incom- 
plete, the former when they are, the latter when they 
are not, knowledges. Incomplete thesic affections are 
divisible into those that lack nothing to make them 
complete, but their cognitive complements, and those 
that lack something more. Before the child is burned 



36 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

he is the subject of a mental affection which the burning 
develops into the incomplete "thesic" affection to 
which I have referred. The former is so to speak an 
embryo of the latter : it is an affection to the thesis to 
which the latter is related, and is therefore a " thesic " 
affection. But it lacks something more than cognition 
of a cognitive complement to make it a constituent of 
a knowledge. It lacks the painful experience. Let 
incomplete "thesic" affections that lack nothing of 
completeness but their respective cognitive complements 
be distinguished as proximate, and all others as non- 
proximate. 

3. Proximate thesic affections are either native or 
acquired. Those that relate to axioms are native, all 
others are acquired. From this point of view it is 
obvious that geometrical axioms afford no ground for 
the theory of knowledge & priori. 



XIX. 

Knowledge does not suppose the truth of what is 
known. If it did, man would be infallible. There is 
a false as well as a true knowledge. 



XX. 



1. With a view to the exposition of two opposed 
species of knowledge, viz. guaranteed and unguaranteed 



chap. n. KNOWLEDGE. 37 

knowledge, I have to make some explanations respect- 
ing Necessity and consistency. 

2. Necessity is undefinable. It is an attribute, e.g. 
an attribute of the existence of the first cause, and, if 
realities correspond to the ideas of time and space, of 
the existence of time and space. Necessity has been 
incorrectly opposed to contingency. Contingency is 
the differentia of event and of what depends upon 
event, of beginnings and of what begins or can be sup- 
posed to have begun. But necessity is an attribute of 
contingent as well as of non-contingent things, for 
example of the existence of the Ego, or of the equality 
to one another of contingent things that are equal to 
the same, e.g. that of two gold rings that are equal to a 
third. The contingency of the rings supposes that of 
their equality ; the equality is necessary as well as con- 
tingent. Necessity accordingly is divisible into con- 
tingent and absolute necessity. The necessity that is 
an attribute of the equality of contingent things equal 
to the same is an example of contingent necessity ; that 
which attaches to the existence of the first cause or 
beginningless substance exemplifies absolute necessity. 

3. It is important to distinguish between necessity 
and a seeming of necessity. According to experience a 
seeming of necessity is not always true. Before science 
ascertains the relativity of the "up and down" of v^ 
space, it seems to be a necessary attribute of space, — 
the thesis, Space involves an " up and down," seems to 
be a necessary truth. Before weight is discovered to 
be gravitation and while yet it seems to be a necessary 
truth that space involves an "up and down," the 
thesis, Falling is the alternative of support, seems to be 



38 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

a necessary truth. Now, in so far as the mind is con- 
versant about what is given as being necessary, it is 
restricted to seeming of necessity, and, since the seem- 
ing may be false, (and we have no test by which to 
distinguish true from false seemings of necessity) 
Beason finds itself without the perfect security which 
intuition of the necessary seemed to have afforded. 
We are fallible as regards what is given as being 
necessary truth. 

4. Fire exhibits a seeming of necessity to burn, 
which, when contrasted with the seeming of necessity 
to be true presented by axioms, shows a defect that is 
fitly connoted by the name, incomplete seeming of 
necessity. I accordingly divide seemings of necessity 
into complete and incomplete. Necessity to cause of 
which the seeming is incomplete is an attribute of 
Nature — an attribute of all secondary causes. All 
axioms and all theses of which the truth is demon- 
strable exhibit a complete seeming of necessity. 

5. Inconsistency is necessity to be untrue. 

6. Inconsistency has been held to be a species of 
inconceivableness or unthinkableness. This as I shall 
show more fully by-and-by (xli 4) is an error. A 
square circle is conceivable, although it is impossible 
to form a corresponding image. If square circles were 
inconceivable there could be no question about them. 
So thinkable are they that we are now reasoning 
about them. 

7. Seemings of inconsistency are either intuitable 
or unintuitable. That of the opposite of an axiom is 



chap. n. KNOWLEDGE. 39 

intuitable : that of the thesis, The three angles of a 
triangle are unequal to two right angles, is unintuitable. 

8. The discovery of the species complete and in- 
complete seemings of necessity exposes two species that 
may be distinguished as guaranteed and unguaranteed 
certitude, and two corresponding species, guaranteed 
and unguaranteed certainty. The difference between 
guaranteed and unguaranteed certitude is qualitative, 
not quantitative. My unguaranteed certitude that 
there is a reality corresponding to my idea of Cosmos 
is not quantitatively inferior to my guaranteed certitude 
that the sum of the parts is equal to the whole ; but 
when I study these certitudes and their theses I discern 
a flaw in the unguaranteed certitude that does not dis- 
credit the guaranteed certitude : the seeming of neces- 
sity correlative to the former is incomplete ; it affords 
room for consistency of the opposite, whereas the other 
seeming of necessity seems to exclude possibility of a 
consistent opposite. Nevertheless it cannot be cor- 
rectly said that one is more certain when his certitude 
is guaranteed than when it is unguaranteed. 

9. Knowledge that involves guaranteed certitude is 
guaranteed, and all other knowledge is unguaranteed. 



CHAPTEE III. 

REASON. 

XXI. 

Probability is undefinable. like certainty, it is the 
differentia of a species of theses. It is quantitative, 
graduating from a minimum to a maximum that is 
scarcely distinguishable from certainty. Its minimum 
is a degree of a scale that graduates from a zero at 
which theses scarcely exhibit a sign of verisimilitude, 
and, indeed, this scale is itself part of a greater one 
which ascends from that zero to certainty. 



XXII 

1. An Opinion is the mental relation to a thesis 
supposed by probability of the thesis. If it were ten- 
able that opinion is a species of discernment, it might 
be defined as discernment of probability, but opinions, 
like knowledges, are for the most part unconscious, and 
must be defined accordingly. 

2. Opinion varies in degree with the correlated 




chap. m. REASON. 41 

probability. Its higher degrees are, as it were, a 
terra firma upon which the mind rests and acts with 
as much confidence as upon certainty, for which reason 
opinion of those degrees may be distinguished as strong, 
and the opposite species as faint, opinion. 

3. Opinion is divisible into the species, emotive 
and unemotive opinion. Faith, the confidence on 
which enterprise usually proceeds, and the opinion 
involved in fear, are examples of emotive opinion; 
belief in the Darwinian hypothesis, of unemotive 
opinion. Strong emotive opinion that has for object 
one's own power or the power and good disposition of 
another, is confidence. That which has for object 
divine power and goodness is faith ; that of which the 
object is one's own power is self-confidence. Self- 
confidence, which is a species of courage, is the 
fountain of enterprise, not a sine qua nan, — for a 
coward may be theoretically enterprising, — but the 
main source. 



XXIII. 

Circumstances have prepared the term, belief, for a 
more extended and important signification than what 
has been hitherto annexed to it According to this 
signification, a belief is either a knowledge or a strong 
opinion. Viewing belief as a genus, it comprehends 
the subgenera, knowledge and strong opinion. The 
latter comprehends the species, strong emotive opinion 
and strong unemotive opinion. 



42 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 



XXIV. 

Doubt is privation of certitude as regards a thesis 
that makes some pretension to belief, — one supported 
by some incentive to belief. When the mind is sus- 
pended between opposite incentives to belief of equal 
force, pure doubt (doubt unattended by any leaning to 
belief) obtains. Doubt is essential, but not proper, 
to opinion. It is either conscious or unconscious. 



XXV. 

There is a mental act which, although it be uncon- 
nected with an intention of communication or with 
words or any significant act, so resembles a funda- 
mental constituent of what is commonly denoted by 
the term, assertion, that it is entitled to be. classed as a 
species of assertion ; in other words, the signification 
of the name, assertion, should be enlarged so as to 
include it. According to this arrangement, assertion 
is either significant or nonsignificant, the former when 
it does, and the latter when it does not, involve a pro- 
position. The correlatives, affirmation and negation, 
are essential to assertion. An affirmative proposition 
implies negation of the opposite of what is affirmed, 
and a negative one affirmation of the opposite of what 
is denied. But in certain cases both correlatives are 
obvious, and in others one of them is latent, — latently 
implicit, — relatively to the assertor. In propositions 
constituting narrative one of the correlatives is gener- 
ally latent. In philosophical and scientific proposi- 




chap. in. REASON. 43 

tions, on the other hand, both correlatives are obvious. 
The assertor consciously denies the opposite of what 
he affirms or affirms the opposite of what he denies. 
Now obvious affirmation and negation are essential to 
non-significant assertion. When evidence begets dis- 
covery the discovery is united with a non-significant 
assertion involving obvious affirmation and negation, as 
in the case of the juryman to whom the evidence dis- 
covers the guilt of the accused, or in that of the 
mathematical pupil to whom it discovers the truth of 
the theorem. Now significant assertion is not con- 
fined to discovery. If the truth of what is known, 
e.g. that I exist, be put in question, the question may 
excite a non-significant assertion affirmative of the 
existence and negative in respect of its opposite. 



XXVI. 

A judgment is a nonsignificant assertion. It in- 
volves a conscious reference to opposite theses, being affir- 
mative of one and negative of the other. It is essential 
to it to be conscious. It is instantaneous, it has no 
duration — the knowledge which it initiates, or which 
precedes and follows it and refers to the same object, is 
not a judgment. I know when I am not thinking of 
the matter that things equal to the same are equal to 
one another ; if this be put in question in my mind, I 
judge that it is true, and I may dwell for a certain 
time on the truth: the unconscious knowledge that 
precedes the truth and the dwelling on the truth are 
not judgments. 



44 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 



XXVII. 

A Judgment supposes question. Question is unde- 
finable. It comprehends the two kinds, communi- 
cative and incommunicative question, the former b^ing 
that which is put by one person to another, and the 
latter that which the mind puts to itself. 



XXVIII. 

Apprehension is discernment that is not a judgment. 
All actual objects that are not objects of judgment are 
objects of apprehension. Judgment involves apprehen- 
sion. To judge that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right angles, there must be apprehension 
of right angles, of a triangle, and of its three angles. 
Apprehension unconnected with judgment, e.g. percep- 
tion, remembrance, fancy, is simple apprehension. 



XXIX. 

Some of the greatest errors that deface and obstruct 
philosophy are incident to oversight of the boundaries 
that divide judgment from apprehension, and it is 
remarkable that, while the spontaneity from which 
language for the most part proceeds respects those 
limits, it is by philosophers they have been effaced. 
The name, Judge, is appropriated to the functionaries 
on whom the administration of law mainly depends, 
and it connotes the differentia of the mental acts that 
constitute the supreme part of their function. These 



chap. in. REASON. 45 

acts are non-significant assertions respecting what is in 
question. They are types of a kind of mental event 
that is entitled to the greatest possible distinction. 
No better disposition can be made of the familiar 
term, judgment, than to confine it to the denotement 
of individuals of this kind. The popular tendency as 
regards the use of the term has been to apply it in this 
way, but the tendency has been thwarted by philoso- 
phers who would have the term to be the common 
name of mental events that are expressible by credited 
propositions, — a kind as real and of as much import- 
ance as the kind, Men with a mole on the cheek. Logic 
originated the perversion. Overlooking the fact that 
propositions express objects of simple apprehension as 
well as objects of judgment, and excite simple appre- 
hension as well as judgment, e.g. the proposition, It rains, 
uttered without question, or the propositions that 
constitute a narrative, they accounted every mental 
event that is expressible by a proposition a judgment. 
They thus put in relief a kind to which the indolence 
of philosophy could refer a great and perplexing 
variety of mental events the sorting of which might 
otherwise cost toilsome study and long delay ; and the 
temptation prevailed. According to Sir William 
Hamilton, to be conscious is to judge : to see, hear, 
smell, etc., is to judge. "The fourth condition of 
consciousness," he tells us, "which may be assumed 
as very generally acknowledged, is, that it involves 
judgment. A judgment is the mental act by which 
one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This 
fourth condition is in truth only a necessary con- 
sequence of the third, — for it is impossible to discri- 
minate without judging, — discrimination or contra- 
distinction being in fact only the denying one thing 



46 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

of another. It may to some seem strange that 
consciousness, the simple and primary act of intelli- 
gence, should be a judgment, which philosophers in 
general have viewed as a compound and derivative 
operation. This is however altogether a mistake. A 
judgment is, as I shall hereafter show you, a simple 
act of mind, for every act of mind implies a judgment. 
Do we perceive or imagine without affirming, in the 
act, the external or internal existence of the object ? 
Now these fundamental affirmations are the affirma- 
tions, — in other words the judgments, — of conscious- 
ness." * Accordingly, we are required to believe that 
the first perception of the infant involves a synthesis 
of the perceived appearance with the mental symbol 
or idea of reality, and that the appearance and the 
symbol present themselves disjoined, but as candidates 
for union, to the judging faculty, which, without a 
reason for the synthesis, unites them. Is it not a 
needless invoking of prodigy to demand that the infant, 
at the very beginning of conscious life, generates an 
idea of existence unconnected with a symbol of an 
existent somewhat ? What hinders our supposing that 
the reality of the appearance is given without any 
mental act that could be accounted a synthesis and, 
for that reason, classed with the judgments of those 
who are specially known as judges ? That analysis can 
detect, in the infant's apprehension, what is expressible 
by a proposition, is surely no reason for diluting the 
valuable common meaning of the term, judgment, of 
which Sir William Hamilton remarked, "the name 
has been exclusively limited to the more varied and 
elaborate comparison of one notion with another and 
the enouncement of their agreement or disagreement." 

1 Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture XI. 




chap. in. REASON. 47 



XXX. 

A judgment may be either a certitude or a strong 
opinion. Judgments that involve certitude may be 
distinguished as cognitive, and those that involve 
strong opinion as incognitive. 



XXXI. 

There is a species of apprehension which so re- 
sembles judgment that the difference between them 
seems at first sight scarcely important enough to be 
specific. The exigencies of a battle elicit, as they 
occur, from the inventive faculty of either general 
commanding, ideas of means which he at once applies 
without having referred to their opposites,— without 
assertion. He does not affirm that the measures sym- 
bolised by the ideas are apt, he does not deny that 
they are deficient in aptness. The ideas are objects of 
apprehension, not of judgment. Although the aptness 
of the means which he invents and applies exhibits to 
him an aspect not of certainty but of probability, and 
the correlative opinion would seem to suppose a con- 
scious, reference to opposites, no such reference obtains. 
Conscious reference to opposites is not essential to 
conscious opinion. The chess-player opines that the 
move he is about to make is apt, but he does not always 
consciously refer to the opposite theses, it is apt, it is 
not apt ; he does not judge that the move is apt. 
When occasion elicits from craft a satisfactory scheme, 
the schemer does not usually affirm the fitness of the 
scheme and deny the contrary ; the scheme is appre- 



48 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

hended as apt, not judged to be apt. Now this kind 
of apprehension resembles recollection, — effort of 
memory consequent to question — as being apprehen- 
sion consequent to question and to a corresponding 
attention in quest of an object, but it has an affinity 
with judgment which recollection does not possess. 
This affinity consists in a likeness for the peculiarity 
of which language has provided no name. Let appre- 
hension having this affinity be known by the name 
" vice -judgment ." Vice- judgment is conversant only 
about agenda. 



XXXII. 

Incommunicative question is divisible into several 
species which are respectively determined by the 
faculty addressed. Question addressed to memory, 
e.g. what is the name of the person approaching, is 
mnemonical ; that addressed to will or intentional in- 
stinct, e.g. with what motive comply, is practical ; that 
addressed to the faculty of judgment is judicial ; that 
addressed to the faculty of vice-judgment is vice-judicial. 
Attention caused by judicial question is speculation. 
Reason is the faculty of judicial and vice-judicial ques- 
tion, of speculation, of judgment and vice-judgment. 
This definition seems to me to exhaust all the offices 
of Eeason. 



XXXIII. 

1. A reason, according to a secondary signification 
of the term, is an objective and questioned incentive to 
either intentional action or belief. To be a reason, an 




chap. in. REASON. 49 

incentive must be discerned and connected with ques- 
tion. An unobjective motive that instinctively causes 
action is not a reason. A condition or law of belief 
that latently determines a belief is not a reason. 
When Bakewell discovered the connection between a 
tendency to rapid fattening and a certain make of 
cattle, he had not in view the general principle, A 
thesis affirmative of a universal connection of certain 
subjects with certain attributes, if accredited by many 
instances of its truth and undiscredited by a contrary 
instance, is true. Although this principle contributed 
as law of belief to determine the induction, it bore 
latently on BakewelTs mind, and therefore not as a 
reason. To be a reason, an incentive to belief must 
be connected with question respecting the thesis to be 
believed. Beliefs that originate without questions are 
not caused by reasons. 

2. Eeasons that are incentives to action may be 
distinguished as practical, those that are incentives to 
belief as non-practical. 

3. When a man, moved by a desire of a forbidden 
pleasure, and also by a counteracting sentiment of 
duty, deliberates what he shall do, — with which motive 
comply, — both motives are practical reasons, whereas 
a motive which bears without being in question or in 
any way objective, is not a reason. Action consequent 
to motives that are not reasons is, as I shall fully 
show in a subsequent chapter (xvii.), instinctive, not 
voluntary. By the way, a confusion of Will with 
intentional instinct, — instinct that begets intentional 
action, — is the main cause of modern infidelity respect- 
ing the freedom of the will. 

E 



50 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 



XXXIV. 

1. Non-practical reasons are divisible into two 
species, of which one may be distinguished as cuxyiorruztic, 
and the other as evidential,~^-0T evidence. When a 
non-practical reason is itself the thesis to be believed 
it is axiomatic, — an axiom — what has been termed a 
self-evident truth ; otherwise it is evidential. Accord- 
ingly, an evidence may be defined a non-practical reason 
that is not itself the thesis in respect of which it is an 
incentive to belief 

2. The foregoing definition retrenches the customary 
meaning of the term, evidence, effacing the species, 
self-evidence. In the Dictionnaire des Sciences Philoso- 
phises Evidence is defined " dans les objets ce qui les 
fait paraltre et les rend intelligibles," — that in objects 
which causes them to be apparent and renders them 
intelligible. According to this definition, axioms and 
objects of perception are evident, — contain evidence of 
their own truth, — are self-evident. Now the classifi- 
cation which annexes this meaning to the term, evi- 
dence, is not without a basis of likeness ; but the kind 
which that basis supports is, as regards psychological 
theory, not worth attention. To make it a genus 
relatively to the various species to which the name, 
evidence, is conveniently applied, would be to give 
occasion for a more minute and cumbersome generalisa- 
tion than is needful, and for a needless addition of 
technical terms. My definition supposes " evidence " 
to be an object that tends to cause belief respecting 
another object. 



^ 



chap. in. REASON. 51 



XXXV. 

Inference is judgment caused by evidence. It is 
essential to it to be a beginning of belief memorable to 
the subject, — a discovery. One cannot infer what he 
already knows. He may consider the relation of a 
thesis, the truth of which he formerly inferred and has 
not forgotten, to the evidence that made it known to 
him, but this is not to infer ; or, he may invent new 
evidence of the truth, but the invention is not infer- 
ence. One can reinfer only on the condition of having 
forgotten. It is customary to speak of evidence as 
inferring the conclusion. This of course is figurative. 
What does not seem to the subject to be discovery is 
not inference. 



XXXVI. 

1. Theology originated the term intuition, denoting 
by it immediate discernment of God, — an event which 
the theologian held to be supernatural. Philosophy 
borrowed the term from theology, employing it to 
denote mental event that originates immediate know- 
ledge of reality. Perception and the mental event 
wherein originates knowledge of the Ego and its modi- 
fications were supposed to be its principal species. 
This theory of intuition was exploded by the discovery 
of the mediateness of perceptive knowledge. Kant, 
allowing the mediateness of perception, persisted in 
treating it as a species of. intuition. Hamilton, insist- 



52 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

ing that perception is immediate knowledge of reality, 
held it to be in that sense intuitive. Intuition, accord- 
ing to Schelling, is immediate knowledge of the Abso- 
lute. The Scotch and French schools of Common 
Sense held intuitive knowledge to be belief or judg- 
ment that obtains without reasoning or reflection. 
The writer is at one with this school as regards the 
extension of the kind which he denotes by the name, 
intuition. He has not succeeded in laying bare its 
differentia ; but the following seems to him to be the 
equivalent of a definition. Intuition is knowledge not 
caused by such means as evidence or counting. Infer- 
ence is the species to which intuition is most conspic- 
uously opposed. Knowledge of number achieved by 
counting is not intuitive, because of the intervention 
of the counting. If there be other kinds of knowledge 
that, because of mediateness, are unintuitive, it is 
highly probable that the mediateness has such analogy 
with that of evidence and counting as justifies the use 
of the epithet " such " in the substitute for definition. 

2. Intuition is either "certive" or " non-certive." 
Sense-perceptions are examples of " non-certive " in- 
tuitions, intuitions of the truth of axioms of those that 
are " certive." " Non-certive " knowledge may originate 
either in intuition or in inference, e.g. knowledge of 
one's father or of London Bridge is an example of 
non-certive knowledge that originates in intuition; 
knowledge of electricity is an example of non-certive 
knowledge that originates in inference. That which 
arises in inference is unsatisfactory, that which arises 
in intuition is the reverse. To the uncultured mind 
non-certive knowledge that originates in intuition 
seems to be exhaustive: to all minds that which 



* 



chap. in. REASON. 53 

originates in inference is as unsatisfactory as the pos- 
session of a needle in a bundle of hay. 

3. Intuition is either judicial or non-judicial, the 
former when it is, the latter when it is not, a judg- 
ment Discovery of the truth of the datum, To be 
contained in a region is essential to a limit, is an 
example of judicial intuitions. Owing to a certain 
indolence of the mind, certain limits, e.g. the sky and 
the plane of the earth in respect of the apparent void 
that commonly passes for space, are not at first appre- 
hended as limits surrounded by a region. So little are 
they so apprehended that the discovery of infinity is 
due to a quest of an absolute limit, such as an abso- 
lutely limiting sky. The knowledge cannot be sup- 
posed to obtain unconsciously, nor consciously out of 
a judgment. Discovery of the truth of the datum, An 
extension consists of extensions, and of that of the 
datum, A time consists of times, data from which we 
deduce infinite divisibility, is also an example of judi- 
cial intuition. Perception and ordinary recognition 
are examples of non-judicial intuition. 

Certain judicial intuitions are discoveries; others 
are not. The discovery of the truth of the axioms, A 
time consists of times, an extension of extensions, a 
limit of a part of space supposes a beyond, exemplifies 
the former: the judgment that things equal to the 
same are equal to one another is an example of the 
latter. 

4. Intuition is either conscious or unconscious. 
Perception is an example of conscious intuition. In- 
tuition that begets knowledge of a custom, of the suc- 
cession of day and night, of the seasons, of a kind of 
which the differentia is not known, is an example of 



54 



THE ALTERNATIVE. 



BOOK I. 



unconscious intuition, for it consists of a latent process 
that fabricates the knowledge out of material furnished 
by several experiences, — as will be more fully shown 
when I treat of experience (chap. xiv.). 

5. Conscious intuition is either distinct or indis- 
tinct. 1 Intuition that is discovery is an example of 
distinct intuition, e.#. finding what one is looking for. 
Ordinary recognition, e.g. the identification involved in 
seeing an acquaintance, is an example of indistinct 
intuition. Apperception is also an example of this 
kind. 



XXXVII. 

1. A Datum is a thesis of which the truth is intui- 
tively known? 

2. Data are either general or particular, the former 
when they do, the latter when they do not, consist of 
general theses. The datum, Things equal to the same 
are equal to one another, is an example of general 
data, the datum, It rains, incident to seeing rain, is an 
example of particular data. 



3. Data are either guaranteed or unguaranteed, the 
guaranteed being those of which the opposites seem to 

1 Indistinctness supposes objectivity. It is not predicable of what 
is not objective. 

3 According to a secondary signification of the term! datum, a pre- 
miss is a datum. 



chap. in. REASON. 55 

be inconsistent. The datum, Things equal to the same 
are equal to one another, is an example of guaranteed 
data ; the datum, The object 1 see exists independently 
of vision, is an example of unguaranteed data. 

4. Another important division of data, viz., into 
judicial and non-judicial data, will fall to be considered 
when 1 treat of Induction (Book II., chap. ii.). 



XXXVIII. 

An axiom is a guaranteed datum. Axioms are 
either discoverable or undiscoverdble. The axiom, A 
whole is greater than its part, is an example of the 
latter. The axioms, A space limit is contained in a 
space, A time limit is contained in a time, are examples 
of the former. The thesis, Two triangles that have 
two sides and the included angle in the one equal to 
two sides and the included angle in the other are 
equal, is a discoverable axiom. The mental structure 
admits of our apprehending a space limit, — a limit of 
a part of space — e.g. the sky, as though it did not sup- 
pose a beyond, — as though it were not essential to it 
to be contained in a space. A like mental indolence 
gives room for the apprehension of a time limit, — a 
limit of a part of time — e.g. the beginning of Cosmos, — 
as though it were not essential to it to be contained in 
a time, as though it did not suppose an antecedent 
part of time. To disabuse itself of the error, the mind 
needs to be roused to scrutiny : over and above seeing, 
it must look. The scrutiny dissipates the error without 
the help of evidence, so that intuition, and not infer- 



56 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

ence, is the discoverer of the truth of the theses, A space 
limit is contained in a space, A time limit is contained 
in a time. In relation to certitude the theses are 
axioms, not conclusions. A child is told that above 
the sky is a region named Heaven. His imagination 
had bounded this region by another sky which, in 
advance of scrutiny, had passed with him for a limit 
not contained in a space, — a limit that does not sup- 
pose a beyond. But scrutiny is challenged, and when 
he strives to imagine the limit as excluding a beyond, 
he fails. Another region bounded by another sky 
emerges. Several other abortive trials of this kind, 
which perhaps project him into a seventh heaven, 
terminate in the certitude that there is no end of 
upward beyonds. So, in the writer, somewhere about 
his seventh year, originated his idea of Infinity, — an 
event that constitutes one of the most conspicuous and 
ineffaceable epochs of his life. He did not distinctly 
formulate the thesis, A space limit is contained in a 
space : he unconsciously discovered its truth : the 
event originated unconscious knowledge of the truth 
of the thesis. One might easily fall into the error that 
the discovery was a conclusion. It might be supposed 
that the abortive trials were so many instances of the 
exclusion of containing spaces by space limits, and con- 
stituted evidence for the induction, that all such limits 
exclude containing spaces; but the discovered thesis 
is guaranteed, whereas it is not competent to induction 
to beget discernment of inconsistency of the opposite, 
and multitude of instances has no weight with deduc- 
tion. On this more light will be thrown when we 
treat of Deduction and Induction. Ignorance that it is 
essential to evidence to be a thesis other than the 
thesis urged on belief misled Euclid into a counterfeit 



chap. m. REASON. 57 

of demonstration as regards the thesis, Two triangles 
that have two sides and the included angle in the one 
equal to two sides and the included angle in the other 
are equal The thesis, although not obvious without 
scrutiny, convinces scrutiny of its truth without the 
help of another thesis. 



XXXIX. 

Fact is intuitable reality. The name, fact, is some- 
times used as denoting unintuitable as well as intuit- 
able reality; but, as it is important to distinguish 
intuitable reality by a special name, the name should 
be confined to the narrower meaning. 



XL. 



Reasoning is either communicative or tacit, the 
former when it is discourse for the enlightenment or 
deception of another, the latter when it is discovery of 
truth or argument, or speculation in quest of such 
discovery. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

THE APPARITIONAL AND INAPPARITIONAL. 

XLI. 

1. Colours, sounds, odours, flavours, ideas of bodies, 
are examples of objects that are appearances. Identity, 
familiarity, durability, infinity, necessity, value, polity, 
are examples of objects that are not appearances. If 
the term, phenomenon, were applied according to its 
etymological import, it would be the common name of 
objects that are appearances, it would be confined to 
these, while the immediate objects symbolic of identity, 
familiarity, durability, etc., would not be classed as 
phenomena. But the distinction between objects that 
are and objects that are not appearances is now I 
believe made for the first time, and therefore the 
term, phenomenon, cannot be supposed to have been 
customarily restricted, even by philosophers, to the 
former. For this reason it is presumable that the 
kind to which Kant applied and restricted the term, 
intuition, includes objects that are not appearances; 
that discernment of identity, for example, is, according 
to this idea, an intuition. Had he confined the term 
to the denotement of discernment of objects that are 
appearances, he would have turned its familiarity to 



I 
\ 



chap. iv. THE APPARITIONAL & IN APPARITION AL.. 59 

good account, for no species of discernment better 
deserves a familiar non-descriptive 1 name. To fill the 
void I distinguish immediate objects that are appear- 
ances and the corresponding remote objects as appa- 
ritional. The idea of a man is an apparitional idea, 
and a man (supposing man to resemble the ideal 
image whereby he is known) is apparitional. The 
idea of electricity is inapparitionaL The ideas of 
identity, durability, familiarity, etc., are inapparitional, 
and the things they symbolise are inapparitional. I 
also distinguish as apparitional all discernments of 
which the objects are appearances, and the opposite 
species as inapparitional. 

2. Appearances, whether immediate or remote ob- 
jects, include all objects of sensational intuition, e.g. 
colour, figure, solidity, flavour, odour, heat, cold, and 
the corresponding remote objects; they include all 
objects of emotive intuition, e.g. beauty, ugliness, virtue, 
purity, vice, foulness, nobleness, baseness, and the 
concretes of which these are attributes. They seem to 
include representations of past consciousness from 
which we derive what we know of consciousness that 
is not sensationally or emotively intuited, e.g. repre- 
sentations of remembrance, imagination, judgment, voli- 
tion, etc. I do not pretend to trace the whole of the 
boundary that divides between appearances and the 
inapparitional. I am at a loss in which of the kinds 
to place our ideas of mental events not originally made 
known by sensational or emotive intuition, and in 
which to place the Ego qud object. 

1 Non-descriptive names are those that respectively consist of a 
single word, e.g. man; descriptive names are those that respectively 
consist of two or more words, e.g. John's horse. 



60 THE ALTERNATIVE. book r. 

3. Appearances are either complete or incomplete. 
An appearance that, except as regards what is needful 
for contrast, is possible out of connection with any 
other appearance, is complete: all other appearances 
are incomplete. The appearance of a man, a horse, a 
cloud, is an example of complete appearances ; that of 
solidity, circularity, angularity, of incomplete appear- 
ances. The importance of this division will appear 
when we treat of Abstract Ideas (chap, xviii). 

4. There are counterfeits of general names, counter- 
feits that denote no kinds, correspond to no concept — 
to no idea whatever — yet serve as hinges of ques- 
tion and judgment, e.g. the counterfeit, square circles, 
which gives ground for the judgment, square circles 
are impossible. Such counterfeits tend to impose be- 
lief that they correspond to concepts and that the con- 
cepts are inapparitional. I was betrayed into this 
error and therefore think it expedient to warn the 
reader against it. 

The concepts symbolic of life and power are in- 
apparitional These qualities are liable to be con- 
founded with the appearances that manifest them ; 
but, when distinguished from these, e.g. force from 
motion, it is plain that they are inapparitional I 
shall show [§ CI. 26] that a species of power is appari- 
tionally symbolised but scrutiny finds that the thing 
symbolised is inapparitional. 

The utility of the discovery of the inapparitional 
is instanced in the solution of the following question ; 
— seeing that what is apparitional in the immediate 
object of a tactile or visual perception never includes 
more than what corresponds to a part of the body 
perceived, and that, when we remember or in any way 



i' 



chap. iv. THE APPARITIONAL & INAPPARITIONAL. 61 

think of the body without perceiving it, what is 
apparitional in the immediate object of the remem- 
brance or thought corresponds to only a part of the 
body, how do we come by an idea of the body, — of the 
whole of the body ? We cannot by any effort appari- 
tionally imagine the whole of our friend, or of a house, 
or more of either, in any one instance, than can be 
simultaneously perceived. But if we never discern an 
appearance that corresponds to the whole of the friend 
or the house, and if there be no such thing as an 
inapparitional object, the fact that the whole of the 
friend or house is known to us mocks the criterion of 
inconsistency of the opposite. The solution is, that 
percepts symbolic of bodies, and the corresponding 
immediate objects of imperceptive discernment, consist 
of apparitional and inapparitional constituents, the 
apparitional constituent being symbolic of only a 
part of the remote object, and the inapparitional one 
of the complement. One can apparitionally imagine 
all the parts of his house successively, but can never 
have an apparitional idea of all of them. The fact 
that one can imagine the whole partly by means of an 
. appearance and partly by means of an inapparitional 
object, and that he can, with perfect facility, succes- 
sively and apparitionally imagine the other parts shift- 
ing from one imagined part to another without losing 
the idea of the whole, causes the assumption that he 
simultaneously imagines all the parts by means of an 
apparitional idea. But experiment is decisive that we 
see and otherwise discern only parts of bodies, and this 
supposes, unless it be held with Eeid that we think 
and consciously know without the" intervention of 
ideas, that discernment of bodies has for object an in- 
apparitional complement 



62 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

5. Contrast a thing considered as sample with the 
same thing not so considered, say a handful of wheat 
or a mathematical diagram, the wheat relative, as 
sample, to a cargo, the diagram to a kind of angles, 
triangles, or circles. How different is the object con- 
sidered as sample from what it is when not so con- 
sidered. But is the difference an apparitional object ? 
Clearly not. What is denoted by the word " all " — 
the somewhat that excludes more — is also an example 
of the inapparitional object. The ideas of Nothing, and 
Annihilation, are inapparitional objects, but objects 
perfectly consistent and intelligible. Extreme Nomi- 
nalism is probably the offspring of ignorance of the 
kind, inapparitional objects. The constitution of the 
mind is such that it is competent to names to be at 
times the sufficient substitutes of both apparitional 
and inapparitional ideas. This function, favoured by 
ignorance of the kind, inapparitional objects, suggested 
the hypothesis that general names are in all cases the 
sole objects of general judgments. As though a man 
whose circumstances had transferred him from less to 
more agreeable customs could not know the good that 
had befallen him if he had not the general name, 
custom, or a corresponding general name, to be a 
nucleus of the knowledge. The idea of Custom is in 
part inapparitional. We 'remember our customs by 
means of a sample without any reference whatever to 
a name. By means of such samples we imagine, 
compare, and expect customs without reference to a 
name. One may imagine a counterpart of St. Paul's 
occupying the site of the Tuileries, the ideal image of 
the Cathedral being in no respect, save as to its 
circumstances, different from that whereby we think of 
the real St. Paul's. But the total object of which the 



chap. iv. THE APPARITIONAL & INAPPARITIONAL. 63 

latter image is a part, differs from that of which the 
former is a part, the one including a symbol of reality, 
the other a symbol of unreality. These symbols are 
inapparitional constituents, the one of the total object 
of one of the discernments, the other of the total object 
of the other. Now to every discernment its total 
object must seem either real or unreal, and therefore 
the total object of every discernment must involve an 
inapparitional constituent. 

XLII. 

The idea of Infinity is not an appearance of an 
infinite magnitude. It is a mere inapparitional 
symbol. Sir William Hamilton, taking it for granted 
that the infinite is not cogitable without an appearance 
of an infinite magnitude, which he rightly knew to be 
impossible, judged that the infinite is incogitable, — un- 
knowable. How, being unknowable, it could be in 
question, he does not inform us, but, instead, constructs 
for us a stupendous hypothesis concerning what he 
terms the Law of the Conditioned. He might as well, 
on the ground that we are incapable of an ideal image 
of all actual and possible triangles, deny that we know 
the universality of the equality of the three angles of 
a triangle to two right angles. The immediate object 
of this knowledge is an inapparitional symbol. The 
infinite referred to when the object is infinite divisi- 
bility, is also symbolised by an inapparitional symbol. 
The symbol originates in the discovery of the truth of 
the unobvious axioms that an integral part of time 
consists of integral parts of time, or an integral part 
of space consists of integral parts of space, or that an 
extension consists of extensions. 



CHAPTEE V. 

ATTENTION AND COMPARISON. 

XLIIL 

1. The common idea of attention supposes it to be 
discernment dependent on volition. But volition, as 
will be fully shown when I treat of Will (chap, xvii.), 
is merely a species of intentional action, the opposed 
species being action of instinct that proceeds on inten- 
tion. The error that gives all intentional action as 
volition being dissipated and the common notion of 
attention correspondingly modified, Attention is found 
to be (and so I define it) discernment that depends upon 
intentional effort, whether voluntary or involuntary. 
I am corroborated by Sir William Hamilton not only 
as regards the difference between the genus, intentional 
action, and its species, volition, but also as regards the 
thesis that it is intentional action, not volition, that is 
essential to attention. "I am persuaded," he says, 
" that we are frequently determined to an act of atten- 
tion, as to many other acts, independently of our free 
and deliberate volition." * A mental event, however 
that resembles attention in every respect save that of 
dependence on intentional effort, is commonly con- 

1 Lectures on Metaphysics. Lecture XIV. 



chap. v. ATTENTION AND COMPARISON. 65 

founded with attention. There are objects that 
fascinate and all but absorb the mind, for example, 
intense pain or recent good fortuna So far is the 
concentration of mind caused by such objects from 
being dependent on intentional effort that the utmost 
efforts of the subject to direct his mind to other objects 
are abortive. This kind of discernment then, if 
dependence on intentional effort be essential to atten- 
tion, is not attention. It is a mistake to advise the 
grieved friend to divert attention from the grief. He 
does not hold to, but is held by, the grief. Another 
error mistakes for attention the discernments of the 
point of greatest vividness in the field of objects that 
simultaneously occupy a mind. Following the analogy 
of the term " field of vision," the term " objective 
field" has been given as the common name of the 
wholes of which the parts are the objects that are 
simultaneously present to a single mind. The field of 
vision is but a part of the objective field. In both 
there is a point of maximum of vividness. In propor- 
tion as objects in the field of vision are remote from 
this point they are obscure, and there is a correspond- 
ing gradation from vividness to obscurity in the 
objective field. When one is absorbed in meditation 
with his eyes open in broad daylight, although he is 
not looking, he sees, and his field of vision has its 
point of greatest vividness, but the point is not an object 
of attention. We have good reason to believe that the 
point of greatest vividness in the objective field, like 
that in the field of vision, is not always an object of 
attention. Eeverie does not exclude from the objective 
field a point of greatest vividness, but it does exclude 
attention, for privation of attention is its differentia. 
Accordingly, discernment of the point of greatest vivid- 

F 



"% 



66 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

ness in the objective field is not always attention. 
Attention makes the point of the objective field on 
which it is directed the point of greatest vividness, but 
inattention does not exclude from the field a point of 
greatest vividness. It is not true that " there is no 
consciousness without attention." 1 

2. Let the concentration of mind that is caused by 
the attraction of the object be termed qvasi-attention. 

3. Attention is essential to discrimination, but not 
to discernment. We discern, but do not discriminate, 
the distinct parts of the field of vision that surround 
the centre, and of these the parts near the centre are 
more vivid than the remote. The discernment of the 
various apparent sizes of the visual object which the 
percipient is approaching, is a notable example of 
undiscriminating discernment ; every one of them is 
discerned, and for lack of attention not one discrimi- 
nated. The discernment begets an unconscious know- 
ledge that approach to and recession from a visual 
object occasion variation of the apparent size of the 
object ; but few, if any, remember individual instances 
of such a variation. We undergo a series of percep- 
tions of different sizes, but not discernment of the 
series. The experience may found in our minds the 
condition of a remembrance of the series, in other 
words, it may give us unconscious knowledge of the 
series, but this knowledge is not discernment of the 
series. When one perceives an increase of temperature, 
he undergoes a series of perceptions of degrees and also 
discerns the series. A comparison of this series with 
that of the perceptions of sizes exposes in the one a 
discernment that is wanting in the other. 

1 Sir William Hamilton's Lectures. Lecture XIV. 



"F" " 



chap. v. ATTENTION AND COMPARISON. 67 



XLIV. 

Contrast is elucidation by difference. It is a con- 
dition sine qua non of objectivity. No contrast no 
discernment. Difference is divisible into that which 
is, and that which is not, contrastive. The difference 
between colours, that between odours, that between 
sounds, the difference between any two correlatives, 
are examples of contrastive difference. 



XLV. 

1. Comparison is attention or quasi- attention to 
contrast Contrast without comparison, e.g. that which 
determines the objects of vision that are not objects of 
attention or quasi-attention, may be distinguished as 
fundamental; contrast involved with comparison, as 
dependent. Dependent contrast presupposes objects 
given by fundamental contrast. Certain philosophers 
employ the term, comparison, as denoting discernment 
of relation. This is a departure from the popular 
meaning of the term which is the reverse of conveni- 
ent Relations are objective in every perception,— % -e.g. 
in the perception of a man the mutual situation of the 
parts of his body, in that of a canal the parallelism 
of its banks, — but every perception does not involve 
what is commonly signified by the term " comparison," 
because they do not all involve attention to contrast 
The objectivity of parallelism of the banks in the per- 
ception of a canal is indistinct, and therefore the corre- 



68 THE ALTERNATIVE. book r. 

lated discernment is inattentive. It is essential to the 
object of comparison to be distinct. 

2. Comparison is either judicial or non-judicial; 
the former when the discernment which it involves 
obtains under question, otherwise the latter. When 
it is in question whether a temperature has increased, 
and one judges that it has, the judgment is involved 
in a judicial comparison; when, without question, one 
is conscious of increase of heat, the discernment is 
involved in a non-judicial comparison. 

3. To consider two or more objects with a view to 
comparison is termed comparison. This is a secondary 
meaning of the term. 



CHAPTEK VI. 

REDINTEGRATION. 

XLVI. 

1. We owe to Sir William Hamilton the denote- 
ment by the name "redintegration" of the great 
mental law hitherto known as the law of the Association 
of Ideas, and, in this name, an explanatory connotation 
of the peculiarity of the law. It is this ; — when a 
part of a cause which had for effect a certain mental 
event is acting on the mind, the mind tends to 
generate and undergo the like of the whole event. 
For example, I see a carriage in motion and at the 
same time hear a certain sound which is then for the 
first time given to me as effect of the motion of the 
carriage ; on another occasion I hear the sound with- 
out seeing the carriage, and my mind generates and 
undergoes an image of a moving carriage given as 
cause of the sound. The like of only a part of the 
cause is in action, and nevertheless the mind produces 
the like of the whole corresponding mental event 

2. But Sir William Hamilton does not seem to 
have been aware of the full scope of the law which he 
so happily named. He supposed it to be confined to 



70 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i 

the suggestion of thought by thought, whereas the 
operations which it determines are mainly in and upon 
either an unconscious part or an unconscious accessory 
of the mind : the connections and order of conscious- 
nesses which it determines being mere effects of latent 
operations. The operations are evidence of the exist- 
ence of an unconscious part or accessory of mind 
which bears to consciousness such a relation as the 
magic lantern bears to the pictorial disc it casts upon 
the screen. All the figures in the disc and all its 
pictorial changes are effects of the lantern and of 
changes wrought in it, and all the objects in the field 
of consciousness and all their changes are effects of 
the part or accessory and of its changes. No figure in 
the disc is in the relation of cause to any other figure, 
and although many consciousnesses are remote causes 
of others, no consciousness is a proximate cause of 
another. Visual perception of solidity exemplifies the 
bearing of the law of redintegration. Concurrent 
vision and touch give an object as being of a certain 
colour and solid. % Afterwards, when the like of the 
colour bears on the eye without any concurrent tactile 
experience, the object is apprehended as solid. Now, 
in the second perception, the symbol of the colour does 
not precede that of the solidity ; they obtain simul- 
taneously; therefore the action of the external cause 
of the perception whereby the redintegrative work is 
wrought must have been upon a mental part or acces- 
sory outside the pale of consciousness. It is not the 
symbol of the colour which suggests that of the solidity, 
as Sir William Hamilton's theory pretends, but a 
latent action upon some such mental part or accessory 
as Physiology has found the encephalic and nervous 
system to be. 



\ 



chap, tl EEDINTEGRATION. 71 

3. Connections and sequences of mental symbols 
are not the only products of redintegration. It con- 
nects mental event with the motions and attitudes of 
the body. I shall show, by-and-by, that trains of 
cerebrations underlie and cause the train of ideas, so 
that both are subject to the law of redintegration. 
Skill is the offspring of redintegration, which disposes 
the organs to produce automatically the whole of a 
series of actions intentionally begun, if the actions 
have been repeatedly otherwise performed, e.g. walking 
to a given place according to intention when the mind 
is otherwise occupied, knitting, spinning, sometimes 
playing the piano in sleep, reporting while asleep in 
the House of Commons (a fact authenticated* by Dr. 
Carpenter), etc. 



CHAPTEE VII. 

GENERAL SYNTHESIS. 

XLVII. 

1. As* I shall have occasion to employ the term, 
general synthesis, before I define Kind and Essence, 
and the order of definition requires that kind and 
essence be defined in advance of what I term general 
synthesis, I give in this chapter an explanation of the 
meaning which I annex to the term, an explanation 
which, although in its right place it is a definition, 
makes no pretension here to scientific exactness. 

2. The mental act which generates a beginning of 
knowledge, whether conscious or unconscious, that 
individuals of one kind are to those of another in the 
relation of subject to attribute, may be termed "general 
synthesis." It is not pretended that the term truly 
describes what is wrought by the act it denotes, it is 
merely figurative and technical. When an English- 
man in Scotland discovers, by his own experience, that 
Scotchmen are shrewd, he seems to put together in the 
relation of subject to attribute the concept that serves 
as sample of the kind, Scotchmen, and that which 
serves as sample of the kind, shrewdness or shrewd- 




chap. vu. GENERAL SYNTHESIS. 73 

nesses. This seeming of synthesis of concepts suggests 
the figurative name, " general synthesis." 

3. General synthesis may be either conscious or 
unconscious. The first physicist who saw a diamond 
burn underwent a conscious general synthesis in the 
judgment, All diamonds are combustible. The general 
synthesis of the burned child is an example of uncon- 
scious general synthesis. Eepeated inattentive and 
undiscriminating discernments of connections of events, 
•e.g. of that of rain with a certain appearance of clouds, 
sometimes beget an unconscious general synthesis, e.g. 
that clouds of that appearance are subjects of a condi- 
tion of imminent rain. The discernments so modify 
the mind that the general synthesis might obtain 
either consciously or unconsciously. An accident 
conjunctive with the completion of the modifying 
process might make the synthesis conscious ; without 
such an accident the synthesis must obtain uncon- 
sciously. Unconscious knowledge of physiognomical 
indications, and of symptoms, and an unconscious 
equivalent of weather- wisdom, obtain in this way. 
The knowledge manifests itself for the most part in 
individual instances, scarcely ever in general judg- 
ments. The subject knows, he cannot tell why, that 
such or such a person is untrustworthy, or has such or 
such a malady, or that it is about to rain or clear. 
Something, he knows not what, in the person or the 
sky, informs him; the person or sky is significant, 
although the difference that makes it so is undiscerned. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

RETROSPECT. 

xlviil 

1. Retrospect is discernment of what is given as 
being the whole or a part of the obvimis past or as 
having belonged to the obvious past, e.g. the time 
antecedent to Cosmos, the foundation of Rome, Caesar, 
a past experience of the subject. Retrospects com- 
prehend a remarkable species which deserves a mono- 
poly of the name, remembrance, viz. retrospect that 
seems to be immediate discernment of a past event 
undergone by the subject. The seeming is obviously 
inconsistent, but none the less a valid differentia. I 
shall restrict to this signification my use of the term, 
Remembrance, and correspondingly that of the term, 
Memory. Memory I understand to be the faculty of 
remembrance. According to Sir William Hamilton, 
" Memory is the power of retaining knowledge in the 
mind, but out of consciousness." l This is clearly a 
wide departure from the common idea of remembrance 
and memory, and by no means an improvement. It 
supposes a man to be remembering what he is not 
thinking about, e.g. the foundation of Rome or the 

1 Lectures on Metaphysics. Lecture XX. 




chap. vm. KETROSPECT. 75 

equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles. 
It evinces the confusion in which the ideas are in- 
volved, and the need of a new classification. 

2. Eetrospect sometimes refers to events that were 
experiences of the subject but are quite forgotten, 
e.g. that during a certain remote period the subject 
regularly breakfasted, dined, and slept. The object of 
this retrospect is not immediately, but is mediately, 
given as having been an event undergone by the 
subject. At first sight the retrospect opposed to 
remembrance presents the aspect of an inference, and 
belongs to a kind of mental event of which I shall 
treat by-and-by (xcv.) under the name, quasi-infer- 
ence. If the subject endeavour to explain the origin 
of the knowledge it involves, the first suggestion likely 
to oner itself is that it sprang from an inference too 
rapid for notice, and based on the evidence that priva- 
tion of regular breakfasts, dinners, and sleep during 
any considerable period is an event too conspicuous to 
be forgotten. That no such inference obtained or was 
possible, is proved by the fact that, ever since the 
period in question, he was unconsciously cognisant of 
the pretended conclusion. The knowledge was an 
unconscious product of experience, a kind of mental 
event which will occupy our attention by-and-by. The 
contrast of this knowledge with that of remembrance 
serves to reveal in the latter a superior degree of 
intimacy and satisfactoriness attaching to the differentia, 
seeming of immediateness. 

3. Having in view the difference which the above 
contrast exposes in mnemonical knowledge, we are 
able to distinguish a species of remembrance that 



76 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

would otherwise be liable to be confounded with non- 
mnemonical retrospect. A change from adversity to 
prosperity occasions a change of the customs of a life 
which tends to make the dreary ones a frequent object 
of retrospect They are not forgotten, they are re- 
membered, not directly, but by means of an ideal event 
that serves as type in respect of which they are anti- 
types, — a true concept. Nevertheless the retrospect 
seems to be an immediate discernment of a past event 
undergone by the subject, and is therefore a remem- 
brance. 



XLIX. 

1. It is probable that the idea of time is developed 
piecemeal, and that its constituent which symbolises 
the past originates in a remembrance. It is consis- 
tently conceivable that the infant, undergoing remem- 
brance before he had undergone expectation, should 
have the past incidentally for object before an ideal 
symbol of the future obtained in him. An ideal 
symbol of the past is not possible apart from one of 
the present, so that the infant's idea of the past, un- 
connected with a reference to the future, must sym- 
bolise the past in contrast to a present. It is also 
consistently conceivable that the infant, undergoing 
expectation before he had undergone remembrance, 
should have the future incidentally for object before 

ideal symbol of the past had obtained in him, the 
fittaft being given in contrast to the present. And, 
since consistency does not object to the possibility of a 
gradual development of the idea of Time, such a de- 




chap. viii. RETROSPECT. 77 

velopment is probable. When the origin of an idea 
can be consistently imputed to experience, common 
sense demands that it be. so imputed, though the 
notion of an A priori origin of the idea be consistent. 
It seems to me probable that expectation contributes 
its quota of the idea of Time, viz. the symbol of the 
future, before remembrance develops a symbol of the 
past. Irritability having caused the first suckling of 
the nurse's breast, when the infant's mouth again en- 
counters the nipple redintegration would connect with 
the tactile perception the idea of the associated satis- 
faction as being imminent, determining an expectation, 
and therein a symbol of the future. It seems to me 
probable that the circumstances of the infant favour 
the obtaining of such an expectation in advance of a 
remembrance, and, therefore, the objectivity of the 
future in advance of that of the past. 

2. The thesis that expectation caused by redinte- 
gration engenders the idea of the future, is corroborated 
by its explanatoriness. It explains the great law of 
expectation of the like of the past, — how we are 
determined to count on a future that mainly resembles 
the past, — a law which probably determines or con- 
tributes to determine our belief that, for an indefinite 
time, nature will function as she has functioned. The 
infant's first idea of the future, according to this theory, 
is the idea of an imminent event like one he had pre- 
viously experienced. He makes no comparison, he 
discerns no likeness, he does not refer to the past ; but 
what he anticipates is the like of a past object of his 
experience. Because he experienced that object, he 
expects the like. The future he expects is necessarily 
the counterpart of what he experienced ; but events 



78 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

will instruct him to expect variety as well as similarity, 
only the variety is to be superficial, the similarity 
fundamental 

3. Let retrospect that has for object what is given 
as past event be distinguished as historical, and that 
which has for object past time unconnected with event 
as transcendent. A retrospect that has for object the 
foundation of Eome, or that I breakfasted this morn- 
ing, is historical ; one that contemplates time anterior 
to Cosmos is transcendent. 




CHAPTEE IX. 

SUBSTANCE. 

L. 

One of the leading intentions of this chapter is to 
define hind and essence. A kind being a species of 
sum, it behoves to define the term " sum " before 
defining Kind. But a definition of the term, sum, 
depends upon a definition of the term " unit." Now, 
the differentia of the kind, units, is far from obvious, 
seeing that a unit may itself consist of units. To 
find out what is common and proper to units that do 
and units that do not consist of units, for example, to 
a monad such as an atom, an emotion, a volition, 
and such a unit as one hundred, one thousand, one 
million, is not an easy matter. I shall have to tax 
the attention of the reader in quest of the differentia 
of Unity. Essence being a species of attribute, I should 
define " attribute " before I define essence. But, attri- 
bute having been hitherto held to be a correlative 
of substance, it becomes necessary, as a preliminary of 
a definition of attribute, to examine the idea of Sub- 
stance. But this idea breaks down, or rather evapor- 
ates, under scrutiny. The valid idea which it masks 
proves to be that of the correlatives " concrete " and 



80 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

" attribute." Not the speciosity, Substance, but the 
reality " concrete," turns out to be the support of 
attribute. 

I define essence and accident, showing that 
essence differs from quality. I briefly consider the 
three grand divisions of attributes, viz. qualities, 
changes or events, and relations. I next attach the 
term, substance, relieved of the erroneous part of its 
meaning, to a signification to" which it has been always 
tending, making it the common name of all parts of 
the to irav that are naturally ungenerable and annihila- 
ble ; and I exhibit a superlative attribute of substance 
which makes it an equivalent of Mind, viz. orderly 
concurrence of aptitudes. 



LI. 



Quantity is that in a thing in virtue of which it is 
possible for the thing to be greater, less, or equaL It 
is the pivot of the relations " greaterness," " lessness," 
and equality. After I have defined Quality I shall 
show that quantity is a species of quality. 



LII. 



1. We have no common name for subjects of 
plurality, things of which each consists of two or more 
things, but the received meaning of the term, sum, 
recommends it as the best to connote bare plurality. 
The difference between a sum and a whole is not 




chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 81 

obvious. Wholes are a species of sums, viz. sums of 
which the units are so related that the relation gives 
to their plurality the aspect of being involved in unity, 
e.g. the sum of the molecules that constitute a stone. 
The mind can at will eliminate from the idea of the 
parts of a whole the symbol of totality, and consider 
them discretively as constituting a mere sum,— a non- 
total sum. Euclid avails himself of this power in the 
axiom, The sum of the parts is equal to the whole. 

2. Plurality, or the differentia of sums, is a species 
of quantity. It does not necessarily nor always 
exhibit the aspect of quantity. Crowds, herds, swarms, 
constellations, dots composing a picture, are only occa- 
sionally apprehended as subjects of quantity. The 
feature common and proper to all perceptible pairs, 
that common and proper to all perceptible triads, that 
to all perceptible quaternions, that to all perceptible 
units, do not necessarily nor always exhibit the aspect 
of quantity. 

3. Certain sums may be distinguished as eccentric, 
others as uneccentric. The sum consisting of creation, 
Caesar, mathematics, and madness, is an example of the 
kind, eccentric sums ; a regiment, a bird, a flock, of 
uneccentric sums. 



LIII. 

Let monad be the common name of things that are 
not sums. This extends the signification of the term 
beyond what Leibnitz assigned to it, but advantage- 

G 



82 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

ously, and so as to be easily accommodated to the 
meaning it displaces. Atoms, souls, sensations, ideas, 
emotions, volitions, are examples of monads. 



LIY. 



The term, unity, is frequently employed as denoting 
the opposite of plurality. This is incorrect, for there 
are pluial as well as non-plural units, eg. the sum, a 
hundred guineas, is one of ten plural units that con- 
stitute the sum, a thousand guineas. What then is a 
writ f The definition depends upon the discrimina- 
tion of two unobvious kinds, one of which may be 
termed pseudo-monads, and the other veiled sums. 
Certain sums tend to pass for monads, e+g. a stone, a 
mountain; they consist of concrete parts, but the 
plurality is masked; such sums I distinguish as 
pseudo-monads. When the object of attention is a 
sum that is given as consisting of sums, eg. a hundred 
guineas consisting of five piles of twenty guineas each, 
the plurality of the parts is obscured, — not hidden, but 
is as it were veiled. Accordingly certain sums exhibit 
the aspect of veiled plurality and others that of un- 
veiled plurality. A sum of which the plurality is 
veiled may be termed a veiled sum. Xow monads, 
pseudo-monads, and veiled sums, are objects that re- 
semble each other and differ from all other things in 
this respect, that they are without unveiled plurality. 
Privation of unveiled plurality then is the dijfcirmtia 
of a species of objects. The name, unit, is the common 
name of these objects. Accordingly, a w*it is an 
object that is destitute of mrnmttd plurality. Unity 




chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 83 

or the essence of a unit is the opposite, not of plurality, 
but, of unveiled plurality. 



LV. 



1. A Kind is a sum that comprises all the like of 
a given archetype, — or comprises all the like of any 
one of its units. It may be objected that twins, and 
the assembly of all men on the day of judgment, are 
sums that comprise all the like of a given archetype 
but are not kinds. They are kinds, but kinds viewed 
under a strange aspect, and the strangeness hides the 
aspect of kind. The ordinary idea of a kind contains 
no symbol of a limit of the sum it symbolises, and the 
effect of this privation is that when all the individuals 
of a kind are presented to the mind as a sum of which 
the limit is conspicuous, the sum does not seem to be 
a kind. The local boundary of such sums as Twins 
and An assembly of all nZ jars upon mental habit 
when we are challenged to regard them as kinds. 
By the way, when I say that the ordinary idea of a 
kind does not contain a symbol of a limit of the sum 
it symbolises, I do not imply that it symbolises an 
infinite or an indefinite sum. It is one thing to sym- 
bolise a sum without symbolising a limit of the sum, 
and quite another to symbolise it as limitless — as 
infinite or indefinite. Euclid's contrast of the sum of 
the parts and the whole instances the possibility of 
thinking the several without assigning it a limit, and 
of not assigning it a limit without apprehending it as 
limitless ; the whole, in this contrast, being the several 
viewed as bounded, and the sum of the parts being the 
same several not so viewed. As regards the offence 



84 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

to mental habit which tends to discredit the definition, 
it is easily atoned by dividing Kinds into those that 
are and those that are not important, and by sweeping 
out of sight, as unimportant kinds, all those which 
the habit ignores. 

2. A cause which it is instructive to consider has 
contributed to hide the general aspect of sums that 
might be, but are not, accounted kinds. No sums 
save those that make themselves objects of public 
knowledge could acquire a non-descriptive name. 
Therefore the lingual instinct assigns no non-descrip- 
tive name to kinds that are not objects of public 
knowledge. The consequent nominal exclusion of 
sums unobvious to public notice from the rank of 
kinds tends to hide their general aspect even from the 
philosopher. What is instructive in the consideration 
of this tendency is that it brings to light an important 
part of the method of the lingual instinct. A sign 
that is at first instinctively employed to denote an 
individual and is then proper to that individual, is 
afterwards; through the influence of the faculty of 
recognition, employed to denote other like individuals, 
and so becomes common. In becoming common it 
acquires a connotation, viz. connotation of the kind to 
which the individuals belong, so that the kind is 
necessarily an object of public knowledge with those 
amongst whom the common name is in use. The 
connotation suggests the employment of the name 
slightly modified as name of the kind, — a proper 
name of an object of public knowledge. Thus is 
fashioned an instrument of great utility whereby an 
object of public knowledge is made to be an indicator 
of one not publicly known. 



I 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 85 



LVI. 

Let self-sufficient be the common name of things 
that depend for existence on nothing extrinsic to them 
other than time and space. Cosmos is an example of 
the kind Self-sufficients. Whether it contain parts 
that are self-sufficients, is a question which seems to 
be insoluble. Every body and atom may, for aught we 
know, depend for existence on every, or some other, 
body or atom. Such an interdependence may consti- 
tute the universe a monad. Let self-insufficient be the 
common name of all things that depend for existence 
on something other than time and space. The depend- 
ence may be such that it tends to be manifest when 
the subject is objective. Let such dependence be dis- 
tinguished as inabditive, and dependence of the oppo- 
site kind as abditive. Let self-insufficients of which 
the dependence tends to be manifest be distinguished 
as inabditive, and all others as abditive. The assign- 
ment of a general place and a name to the kind, 
abditive self-insufficients, does not imply that there 
is such a reality as an abditive self-insufficient. It 
implies, in this direction, nothing more than that the 
idea of the kind is not inconsistent. The kinds, 
Qualities, Eelations, and Events, are species and ex- 
amples of the sub-genus, inabditive self-insufficients. 



LVII. 

Let concrete be the name of a complement of inab- 
ditive self-insufficients that is either a self-sufficient or 
an abditive self-insufficient, and let the adjective, con- 



86 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

crete, signify the state of being a concrete. The 
logical meaning of the word has fitted it beyond any 
other to take on the new meaning which I now assign 
to it. I take leave also to coin the word " inconcrete" 
signifying, as noun, reality that is not a concrete, and, 
as adjective, the state of being such a reality. Con- 
creteness differentiates a species of sums of self- 
insufficients. The life, weight, and memory of a man 
constitute a sum of inabditive self-insufficients that is 
not a complement and is not concrete; the sum of the 
inabditive self-insufficients which comprise the man is 
a complement of self-insufficients and a concrete. An 
inconcrete sum of inabditive self-insufficients is an 
inabditive self-insufficient ; a concrete sum of them is 
either a self-sufficient or an abditive self-insufficient 



LVIII. 

There are abditive self-insufficients that contain 
concretes, e.g. a bodily organ. The relation of vital 
connection with an organism is essential to an organ 
and makes it an inabditive self-insufficient, whereas 
the solid part is a concrete. Every correlate that 
contains a solid part, e.g. a parent, a child; a sun, a 
planet ; a lawyer, a client ; a physician, a patient ; is 
an abditive self-insufficient that contains a concrete. 



LIX. 

1. An Attribute is an inabditive self-insufficient, e.g. 
Solidity. It may be either an alienable or inalienable 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 87 

attribute of its concrete ; e.g. memory is an alienable, 
solidity an inalienable, attribute of its concrete. An 
attribute supposes a concrete support, but may have 
also an inconcrete support; e.g. the virility of virile elo- 
quence, being a modification of the attribute, eloquence, 
has that attribute for support, and also the concrete 
supposed by the supporting attribute, viz. the orator. 
A support of an attribute is termed Subject. Subjects 
are either concrete or inconcrete. An attribute of an 
inconcrete subject is also an attribute of a concrete 
one. We tend to think of support as something 
several from, and altogether independent of, the thing 
supported; but this is not true of the species of 
supports termed subjects. What a subject supports 
is a constituent of the support, e.g. lead supports its 
own weight, and the weight is a constituent of the 
support. Oversight of this notable difference of sub- 
jective from all other support occasioned an inconsist- 
ent idea, — that of Substance. Unable to imagine the 
possibility of a concrete support of attributes, and 
necessitated to ascribe to them a support that is not 
itself an attribute, philosophers were obliged to adopt 
the inconsistent thesis, that a subject of the kind 
supposed by all attributes is not an attribute nor a 
complement of attributes. To this impossible thing 
they gave the name "substance." They were not 
deterred by the fact that an analysis of body finds in 
it no room for a constituent that is not an attribute, 
e.g. an unextended thing serving as support of a 
solidity, an extension, a figure, a mobility, and a weight 
Combine in thought these six qualities and nothing 
else, and your synthesis has constituted a symbol of a 
body. Try to enhance it by the addition of something 
unextended serving as support to the six qualities, and 



88 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

you find no room for improvement. It is surprising 
that the superfluity survived the raking it received 
from Locke: it is as robust in the philosophy of 
Hamilton as in that of Aristotle. Hamilton puts it as 
being an incomprehensible thing imposed by a neces- 
sity of thought, — a thing that is neither attribute nor 
concrete, but somehow clothed or penetrated with attri- 
butes. Attributes he holds to be intelligible things, 
and some if not all to be intuitable. He gives room 
for the understanding that if it were possible to 
imagine an intelligible support of attributes the un- 
intelligible one named substance should be rejected by 
philosophy; and the idea of a concrete support of 
attributes being the idea of an intelligible support, is 
entitled, on this understanding, to expel and replace 
that of substance. The name Substance, however, has 
been tending to a meaning different from that in 
which it has been hitherto understood,— a meaning of 
great importance to philosophy, and one carrying with 
it so much of the old signification of the term that the 
latter is ready to put on its new import with scarce 
any violence to mental habit. In ridding philosophy 
of an obstruction I am not to deprive language of a 
familiar and useful term. After I have examined the 
three grand divisions of attributes, Qualities, Changes, 
and Eelations, I shall explain the new old meaning 
which I recognise as rightfully belonging to the term, 
Substance. 

2. Attributes are either apparitional or inappari- 
tional, in other words, either sensible or supersensible. 
Solidity, colour, and figure, are examples of apparitional 
attributes: power, not given as discernible by sense, 
e.g. that of the moving billiard-ball to cause motion, 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 89 

is an example of inapparitional attributes. Inappari- 
tional attributes occasioned the scepticism of Hume. 
The structure of his mind obliged him to assume that 
sensible experience comprises experience, and that be- 
lief in the existence of what is not given as existing 
by sensible experience, is groundless. He accordingly- 
dismissed the symbol of Power from his philosophy, 
and substituted that of necessary-connection. 

3. Attributes comprehend three species, viz. Qua- 
lity, Change, and Eelation, whereof two, viz. quality 
and change, are, in respect of all other things save the 
third, prescindable ; Eelation exhibits no peculiarity 
that completely separates it from Quality and Change. 
It has hitherto eluded definition. 



LX. 



1. A Quality is an attribute that is a part of its 
subject, and either an inseparable part or one that 
tends to be permanent Qualities accordingly compre- 
hend the two species, separable and inseparable quali- 
ties. All human faculties on which the existence of 
the subject does not depend, — for instance Eeason, a 
faculty which the subject sometimes survives, — are 
examples of the kind, separable qualities. According 
to certain philosophers quality and essence are identical, 
and accident is opposed to quality. This division 
supposes essence to be quality on which the existence 
of the subject depends. Convenience demands a more 
extended meaning for the term, essence. If it be 
restricted to inseparable quality we imply that there 



90 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

are kinds void of essence, e.g. the kinds, Essence, Ked- 
ness, Benevolence, Solidity, and the kind, Vertebrata, of 
which the essence is concrete. Essence is that which, 
by its resemblances and differences, determines the general 
place of a thing — its place in the system of kinds. 
Subject and essence may be identical, e.g. redness 
is its own essence. Essence may be concrete, e.g. a 
spine is the essence of an individual of the kind, 
Vertebrata. Accident is attribute that does not deter- 
mine the general place of its subject, e.g. this or that 
thought or emotion, or the state of health or illness, is 
an attribute that does not determine the general place 
of the subject. The existence of the material orb 
known as Mars does not depend on its motion around 
the sun; the motion therefore is an accident of the 
orb: but it is a part of the essence of the planet, 
M^rs, for regular motion around a sun is essential to a 
planet. The being projected or having been projected 
is, relatively to the projected body, an accident, but it is 
part of the essence of a projectile. To possess medical 
skill is an accident of the possessor qud man, but it is 
part of the essence of the physician. These examples 
expose an ambiguity of the term Subject which tends 
to envelope our ideas of essence and accident in some 
confusion. To prevent confusion, it needs only that 
what is denoted by the term Subject be carefully dis- 
tinguished, mindful that what is essence relatively to 
a given thing may be accident relatively to a part of 
the thing ; e.g. revolution around a sun is essential to 
the planet, Mars, whereas it is a mere accident of the 
orb, Mars, which is but a part of the planet The 
acuteness of an acute angle is the essence of the angle 
qud acute, and an accident of the angle qud mere 
angle. 



II 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 91 

2. Essence is either natural or factitious, important 
or unimportant The essences of organised things are 
examples of natural essence ; those of the kinds, houses, 
and physicians, of factitious essence. The seventy- 
sevenths of solids, men born on Friday, the cows in 
John's field, are examples of kinds of which the 
essences are unimportant. 

3. Attributes are either essential or accidental. 
Those on which the existence of the subject depends 
are essential; all others are accidental. Eevolution 
around the sun is an essential attribute of the planet, 
Mars, and an accidental attribute of the orb, Mars. 
The life of a man is an essential quality ; his visual 
faculty an accidental one. 

4. Quantity is a species of quality. It is common 
and convenient to treat of quantity as though it were 
the opposite of quality, and for the sake of convenience 
we shall continue to do so. Custom sanctions the 
employment of the generic name of a thing as connot- 
ing privation of the differentia of some species of the 
genus to which the name refers, for example, in the 
depreciatory assertion " he is an animal," or " she is a 
mere female," or in the contrast of "ideas" and 
"things," or that of "words" and "acts," whereas 
words are acts and ideas are things. By nominally 
opposing Quantity to Quality we merely oppose it to 
all other qualities. 

5. Let the term, Protean quality, denote an accident 
the specific like of which is a condition sine qua non of 
the existence of the subject, e.g. the figure of a piece of 
wax, and let a kind of such accidents, e.g. the kind, figure, 



92 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

be termed a Protean kind. The existence of a piece of 
wax depends upon the Protean kind, Figure, but not 
upon any individual of the kind. I term the kind 
Protean on the metaphorical pretext that an abstract 
figure underlies every particular figure, as the Eealists 
supposed an abstract Man to be the basis of every 
concrete man and to be one and the same in all con- 
crete men, — one and the same variously metamor- 
phosed. — Note that the substitution of one Protean 
quality for another of the same kind in a concrete, e.g. 
the substitution of a square form for a round one in a 
piece of wax, does not affect the temporal identity or 
duration of the concrete. The temporal identity of a 
concrete is determined by the temporal identities of 
its qualities that are not Protean. The importance of 
this observation will appear when we treat of Sub- 
stance. 



LXI. 

A Change is a temporal beginning or end or a series 
of such beginnings and ends. It is either natural or 
supernatural. Natural change is either optional or 
unoptional. The beginning and end of a volition 
constitute an optional change; all other change is 
unoptional. An unoptional change is a beginning or 
end, or a beginning and end, of something naturally 
generable and annihilable, involving a metamorphosis 
of something not naturally generable and annihilable, 
the latter being divested of one naturally generable 
and annihilable attribute and clothed with another, 
e.g. the naturally ungenerable constituent of water 
divested of liquidity and clothed with hardness or 




chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 93 

aeriformity. By the way, — unoptional or meta- 
morphic change supposes that what changes remains 
the same. Supernatural change is a beginning or an 
end not naturally caused, e.g. a creation. An event 
is either a change or a beginning, an end and an inter- 
vening duration, e.g. the beginning, duration, and end 
of Caesar. 



LXII. 

1. A relation supposes two or more things; the 
relation of a thing in one state or circumstance to 
itself in another is not an exception. For example, 
the relation of resemblance between the Bismarck of 
yesterday and the Bismarck of to-day supposes the 
two different circumstances yesterday and to-day. 
Identity may appear to be a relation and an instance 
of a relation that does not suppose two or more things. 
But identity is not a relation. It is compounded with 
a relation on which the discernment of it depends, and 
so is mistaken for a relation. That with which it is 
confounded is the relation of two or more aspects of a 
single remote object, e.g. that of Bismarck existent 
yesterday and that of Bismarck existent to-day, to the 
single enduring object Bismarck ; or that of the aspect 
" four " and that of the aspect " two pairs " to the same 
real sum ; or that of the aspect " acclivity " and that 
of the aspect " declivity " to the same incline ; or that 
of the aspect "sum of the parts" and the aspect 
" whole " to the same complement of parts, 

2. Belation is either extrinsic or intrinsic. Con- 



94 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

sidered in respect of the things related a relation is ex- 
trinsic, e.g. the fraternity of two brothers is extrinsic to 
each of them; considered in respect of a subject of 
which it is a constituent, a subject that is not one of 
the things related, e.g. the mutual relation of any two 
qualities of the same concrete gud constituent of the 
concrete, a relation is intrinsic. A given relation may 
be extrinsic in respect of one subject and intrinsic in 
respect of another. Extrinsicality distinguishes ex- 
trinsic relations from qualities, but intrinsic relations 
being constituents of their subjects, their difference 
from quality is as remote from saliency as the differ- 
ence between two primary colours. 



LXIII. 

1. We now revert to Substance. By a change of 
connotation we may annex to the term Substance a 
signification which it has always been tending to 
acquire. The thesis that the Universe is a series of 
Universes which either spring or are created out of 
nothing, and either naturally return to nothing or are 
supernaturally annihilated, could not be seriously 
entertained by a sane mind. We are constrained to 
believe in the duration or temporal identity 1 of the 
Universe, or rather of a concrete part of it. But parts 
of it are of comparatively brief duration, e.g. the forms 
we impose on wax, the liquidity which the atoms or 
molecules of melting ice assume, the aeriformity which 

1 Duration is coincidence of the same with a divisible part of time 
or with all time. An instant is an indivisible part of time, — a mere 
limit of a part of time. 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 95 

the same atoms or molecules assume in becoming gases. 
The Universe, therefore, consists of parts of which the 
duration is, and parts of which the duration is not, 
commensurate with its duration. The former are 
those which science allows to be naturally ungenerable 
and unannihilable, the latter are naturally generable 
and annihilable. The former, as being in the relation 
of support to the latter, may be distinguished as funda- 
mental, — fundamental constituents of the Universe. 
Every natural change, volition excepted, is a meta- 
morphosis of a fundamental constituent of the Universe, 
a constituent that is divested of one naturally gener- 
able and annihilable attribute and endued with another. 
Certain metamorphoses of fundamental constituents 
are obvious, e.g. growth ; others are unobvious, needing 
the eye of science to detect them, e.g. lightning, rain, 
the apparent annihilation of fuel. Now the idea of 
Substance is in part the offspring of metamorphic 
change symbolising not only support of attribute but 
also persistence under change and transcendent dura- 
tion. Excluding what error inserted into the idea, 
viz. that what it symbolises is inconcrete, we come by 
a definition of substance that eclectically reconciles 
Locke and Aristotle. It is this, — a substance is a 
naturally ungenerable concrete. 

2. A substance may be either a self-sufficient or 
an abditive self-insufficient. 

3. For brevity's sake let the naturally ungenerable 
be known as the perdurable, and all other entity as 
the non-perdurable. Substance and its inalienable 
qualities are perdurable. 



96 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

4. Substance is either material or immaterial That 
of which solidity is given as being a constituent is 
material ; all other substance is immaterial. An im- 
material substance capable of being a subject of con- 
sciousness is a soul or spirit. 

5. A material substance is either an atom or a 
body; the former if it do not, the latter if it do, 
consist of separable material parts. Although ex- 
perience acquaints us with no atom of a size percep- 
tible by sense, an atom is not necessarily minute. 

6. As being a substance composed of mobile sub- 
stances, — a concrete composed of mobile concretes, — 
the material Universe includes amongst its qualities a 
Protean quality, viz. an individual of the Protean 
kind, arrangements or collocations of the concrete 
parts of the Universe. It is impossible that the 
material Universe could exist out of some collocation 
of its concrete parts, and no such collocation is neces- 
sary to its existence. Non-perdurable quality, then, is 
coeval with material substance, and if the latter be 
pre -eternal so also is the former. As regards the 
material Universe the perdurable is fundamental to 
but not antecedent to the non-perdurable. Nor, if the 
material substance of the Universe be pre-eternal, is it 
antecedent to change: it is fundamental to but not 
antecedent to change. There is no escape from this 
thesis but in the hypothesis that material substance is 
the creature of a spiritual substance — a Creator. This 
hypothesis is not inconsistent, but it is disgraced by its 
implication, of a pre-eternity of inactivity passed by 
the Creator antecedently to the creation, and of a 
capricious termination of the pre-eternity by a creation. 




chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 97 

The mind to which Being without dignity is a sty— 
the reverential mind — has to choose between pre- 
eternal substance undergoing coeval change, and a 
Creator culpable of a pre -eternity of idleness ter- 
minated by a caprice. The former of these hypotheses 
is burdened by the condition of infinite regress, but it 
is not inconsistent. 

7. We have irresistible though undemonstrative 
proof that certain non-perdurable attributes, amongst 
others dynamic attributes, depend upon certain colloca- 
tions of material substances. When vapour locally 
succeeds to gas, water to vapour, and ice to water, 
different collocations of material substances are given 
as being determining conditions and essential accom- 
paniments of non- perdurable attributes; a different 
collocation of the same substances is given as determin- 
ing a different set of attributes. An organism is a 
collocation of material substances, and like organisms 
are given as being, the subjects of like susceptibilities, 
powers, and instincts; different organisms as being 
the subjects of different susceptibilities, powers, and 
instincts. We have cogent evidence for the belief 
that changes of collocation of the substances constitut- 
ing the brain and nervous system are the proximate 
causes of all consciousness except volition. The 
evidence has swept the bulk of the scientific world to 
the conclusion that all change either is or depends on 
change of collocation of substances. This implies that 
what is termed volition is an effect of a motion and 
collocation of material substances, a change that 
obtains outside consciousness. The conclusion tramples 
upon a datum which is the pivot of human dignity 
and of morality, the datum which affirms that man is 

H 



98 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

capable of choice, in other words, that the human will 
is free. Is it wise to allow undemonstrative evidence 
to undermine a datum of such importance, or modest 
to pretend to knowledge that, in the domain of Nature, 
no change is possible but what either is or depends 
upon change of collocation of material substances ? 
Does not the dogmatism of such a pretension bear to 
that of theology a ratio about equal to that of a beam 
to a mote ? 

8. Is an inconcrete self-sufficient possible ? If the 
idea of such an entity be inconsistent I have failed to 
discern the inconsistency, but, happily, philosophy is 
not pressed to tax itself for an answer. 

9. The primordial state of substance is commonly 
held to have been chaotic. Mythology, the Mosaic 
revelation, and a favourite conjecture of modern 
science, affirm the antecedence of Chaos in respect of 
the Cosmos. The evidence that suggested and sup- 
ports the theory of evolution deserves as regards our 
astral system serious consideration, but does it warrant 
an inductive leap to the conclusion, that all material 
substance was primarily and during a pre-eternity a 
chaos ? A part of the Universe might lapse into a 
chaotic state, recover, and exhibit signs of the recovery. 
This possibility protests against the inference of a 
universal pre-eternal chaos. Abortion rebukes all 
effort to infer the history of eternity. That an 
important part of event has been what is fitly 
described by the epithet, evolutionary, and that natural 
laws include laws of evolution, — laws of change from 
a lower to a higher type, — are theses so strongly 
attested that scarce any philosopher is now minded to 




chap. ix. . SUBSTANCE. . 99 

dispute them ; but, to jump from these theses to the 
judgment that all substance was pre-eternally a sum 
of substances which, had there been any eye to observe 
them, would have exhibited no difference one from the 
other except difference of quantity, and that the pre- 
eternity was brought to a close by a beginning of 
differentiation and integration, is unwarrantable. The 
utmost warranted by the evidence is that the to irav 
has been temporarily, and either wholly or in part, 
chaotic. It may have pre-eternally alternated between 
chaotic and cosmic states, or parts of it may have so 
alternated, but Chaos has not been more a matrix of 
Cosmos than Cosmos of Chaos; and, in respect of 
attributes, the latter must be as heterogeneous as 
the former, for every difference of a developed thing 
supposes a corresponding difference in its embryo. 
Evolution is not, as Mr. Spencer defines it, a change 
from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but a change from 
heterogeneity that is not, to heterogeneity that is, of a 
nature to be perceptible by sense. 

10. Is the substance that constitutes the material 
Universe extended, or unextended? The hypothesis 
that it is unextendedy and that nothing real corresponds 
to the ideas of Space and Extension, seems to be con- 
sistent. It seems to afford a consistent theory of the 
Universe, — indeed a simpler one than the datum 
which encumbers being with space and extension. 
The soul or subject of consciousness may be an unex- 
tended substance connected with the other unextended 
substances constituting its organism, and having for its 
habitat a composite of still other unextended substances; 
and our idea of the connection, though symbolising it 
as being a relation of an unextended thing to extended 



100 THE ALTERNATIVE. book t. 

things, may be valid as enabling its subject to elicit 
event according to anticipation and intention. The 
likeness or unlikeness of an idea to a remote object 
which it symbolises is of no practical importance. 
We have valid knowledge of things exterior to con- 
sciousness when the things and their laws are sym- 
bolised by ideas which, though dissimilar to both, 
enable us to anticipate their events and to act so as to 
^elicit anticipated events. The illiterate man is not 
ignorant of sound, heat, light, colour, because he does 
not apprehend them as molecular storms. The pro- 
gress of science is ever more and more undoing the 
prejudice that the remote objects of knowledge resem- 
ble our ideas of them. Kant has made bold to deny 
the existence of a reality answering to the idea of 
Space, and a considerable part of the philosophic world 
has acquiesced. It may be objected that, if there be 
no reality resembling the idea of Space and Extension, 
geometry must be a chimera, not a science. The 
answer is that there are realities and conditions of 
reality which correspond to, without resembling, those 
ideas, and geometry is, in a certain degree, the condi- 
tion of a correct cognitive relation. 

On the other hand, no show of inconsistency forbids 
the tenet that substances are both simple and extended, 
that they are void of substantive parts, — the parts to 
which the controversy respecting infinite divisibility 
refers. It is true that extension supposes such parts as 
halves, quarters, eighths, etc. But it does not suppose 
them to be self-sufficients. They may be incapable of 
existence apart from the whole of which they are parts. 
The qualities that compose the whole, minus the ex- 
tension, may be such that the like could not be a 
complement in connection with any greater or less 




chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 101 

extension, nor therefore constitute a self-sufficient part 
of the thing. The controversy respecting infinite 
divisibility has been kept alive by the inadvertent 
assumption that an extended thing must be a self- 
sufficient, and must consist of cohering parts, an 
assumption which a moment's scrutiny dissipates. It 
seems on the contrary to be a necessary truth that 
bodies consist of extended parts which are not sub- 
stances and do not cohere ; for a cohesion is a relation, 
and a relation supposes two or more related things of 
which one, apart from all other things, could not, as 
support, afford the relation possibility of existence; so 
that cohesion supposes things which do not consist of 
cohering parts. Now, cohering things, to constitute 
an extended thing, must be themselves extended ; for 
no sum of cohering unextended things could be an 
extended thing ; therefore extended things consist of 
extended parts without mutual cohesion. The necessity 
of the truth may be discerned from another point of 
view. Hardness that depends upon cohesion, e.g. that 
of adamant, supposes a hardness that does not depend 
upon cohesion ; it is a sum of hardnesses of the latter 
kind. Hardness of the latter kind may be distin- 
guished as elemental, that of the former as non- 
elemental. Elemental hardness supposes its subject to 
consist of parts that are extended, but are not self- 
sufficients nor mutually cohesive : indeed elemental 
hardness may be held to be solidity proper, and the 
term, solidity, to have a secondary signification when 
it denotes non-elemental hardness. Admitting, then, 
that there are realities corresponding to the ideas of 
Time and Space, we are free to suppose that bodies are 
composed of extended parts which are not themselves 
aggregates of cohering parts, but consist of extended 



THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

102 



Luteed in by any sign of inconsistency to a conclusion 

^■pering the question whether the substances that 

poee the material Universe are or are not extended. 

Common sense, however, prefers the thesis, that matter 

is extended. 

1 1 The idea of the extended self-insufficieTU affords 
-oat to minds that fail to find footing on the notion of 
. jjjjyg divisibility. They find a terra firma in the 
unity which it supposes. It will not be amiss to 
taniliarise the mind with this idea, and with the con- 
sistency of the repugnant thesis, that Bodies are self- 
insufficient. The mobility of bodies and their change- 
ableness as to mutual situation seem at first sight to 
suppose that they are self-sufficients, but the seeming 
avows its deceptiveness to a little scrutiny. A body 
xn«y depend for existence on the remainder of the 
material Universe, and, if it do, which supposes the 
material Universe to be a single substance or monad, 
it is, in spite of its mobility, a self- insufficient. 
Familiarity with the consistency of the thesis, that 
Bodies are self-insufficients, helps to undo our tend- 
ency to mistake unguaranteed data for necessary 
truths. It is not impossible that the thesis might 
one day prove to be the key, and the sole one, to a 
perfectly satisfactory explanation of the Universe. If it 
should, it would command and would deserve to com- 
mand universal acceptance at the cost of superseding 
data which, in the present state of our knowledge, it 
would be absurd to discredit. If we were lamed by 
the error, that mobility supposes the movable thing to 
be a self-sufficient, we should be able, when all other 
conditions of that explanation obtained, to profit by 



^ 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 103 

them. The familiarity tends to rid the mind of this 
kind of obstruction. 

12. Leibnitz held that unextended things are not 
interiorly modifiable by interaction. This tenet banishes 
the theory of natural causation as regards such things, 
and substitutes that of Pre-established Harmony. Its 
reason is that parts which admit of local change are a 
sine qua non of susceptibility to modification. The 
idea of Cause is the offspring of intuition of motion, 
and is all but invariably connected with the idea of 
motion. This has begotten the prejudice that causa- 
tion supposes motion, a prejudice to which we owe the 
ingenious hypothesis'of pre-established harmony. How 
baseless it is appears" when we consider that between a 
cause and its immediate effect there intervenes no 
means, nothing that could be considered explanatory 
of the " how " of the cause. The vast variety of modi- 
fications which the thinking substance undergoes, 
though there be good reason to suppose that it depends 
on changes of extended parts (those of the brain), is 
totally unexplained by such changes. The antecedents 
that explain their sequents are, if any, extremely few. 
In view of our almost utter dearth of explanation as 
regards the " how " of the operation of cause, it seems 
strange that we should think ourselves competent to 
judge that there can be no natural interaction between 
unextended things or between extended and unex- 
tended things. The naturally ungenerable accident, 
weight, is an example of a modification of one thing 
by another that cannot be supposed to depend on a 
local change of parts. 

1 3. Greek myth intimates that my exposition of Sub- 



i 



104 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

stance is a revival of a pre-historic philosophy. What 
should it symbolise by the metamorphoses of Pan but 
those of to irav } — all natural change, or the substantive 
Universe ever putting off and on non- perdurable 
attributes ? The symbol almost literally indicates 
what it symbolises, and it is part of a system of 
symbols which, as being signs of a cosmogony that 
modern science is only too prone to adopt, corroborate 
one another. According to this cosmogony Cosmos is 
the offspring of Chaos. Primordially and pre-eternally 
Being comprised only Time and Chaos. Besides the 
attributes adverse to order — the Titans — Chaos in- 
cluded an attribute or power (Ops) in virtue of which 
it tended to generate order, so that its concrete con- 
stituents — its substances — should become constituents 
of Cosmos. As needing the co-operation of time to 
engender and to mature her offspring, Ops was the 
wife of Chronos or Saturn ; but duration was denied to 
her children, as though Time, jealous of it, devoured 
every nascent germ of order. At last a beginning of 
order escaped the notice of Time, and the embryo 
developed into Cosmos. When it achieved strength 
that guaranteed a duration which as to infinity rivalled 
time, Saturn was deposed (not destroyed) by his son 
Jupiter — Order — Cosmos. So far the philosophy 
which Greek myth expressed was merely deductive ; 
but under the figure of the insurrection of the Titans 
it exhibits signs of a pre-historic geology conversant 
with the Plutonic upheavals which according to modern 
geology played so great a part in the causation of the 
Earth's structure. The Titans hurling fragments of the 
Earth's crust at Jove, rocks which fell back upon and 
reburied them, — has not this an imposing air of signi- 
fying an abortive outbreak of chaotic incandescent 



-.1- ^-^B^fc^__ l ^••~ - , t 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 105 

violence ? Is it not possible that a pre -historic 
civilisation may have expected a cataclysm which 
would extinguish science, and sought to give signs of 
itself to a future civilisation by putting into mythic 
parcels, portable by barbarian or even savage minds, 
indications that man had already attained to the height 
of the interpreting science. That cosmogony tends to 
shape the idea of the divine is evinced by the Hindoo 
Trinity consisting of a creator Brahma, a preserver 
Vischnou, and a destroyer Siva, 

14. Substance possesses an attribute in virtue of 
which it is the equivalent of Mind, the attribute 
orderly concurrence of aptitudes. The opposed species, 
disorderly concurrence of aptitudes, seems to have 
been altogether overlooked, as though there were no 
concurrent aptitudes in the various parts of Chaos to 
generate and maintain disorder. Orderly concurrence 
of aptitudes tends to elicit belief according to a remark- 
able law, which will have it that the concurrence pre- 
supposes a Designer. To this law we owe natural 
theology. The organic kingdom exhibits the most 
felicitous examples of orderly concurrence of aptitudes ; 
all reversionary processes, of disorderly concurrence of 
aptitudes. Brahma and Vischnou symbolise the one, Siva 
the other. Orderly concurrence of aptitudes is the con- 
dition sine qua non of the Cosmic character of the to wav, 
of the organic kingdom, including man, of the human 
brain, and therein of the proximate conditions of all 
human design and of human intellection of every kind. 
It is the source of all the marvels of the world of 
instinct, the source of science, philosophy, art, skill, 
and even of religion. Wisdom is its offspring. Its 
proceedings, on account of their likeness to designed 



106 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

actions, have seemed to be the proceeding of an im- 
personal Reason, — a speciousness that has of late be- 
gotten the inconsistent theory of "the unconscious 
idea." It works with and without consciousness, — as 
mind or as a mere equivalent of mind. In what is 
known as "reflex" action, when the action is not coupled 
with consciousness, as in the withdrawal of a paralysed 
limb from contact with an irritant, or in the instance 
of a decapitated frog removing with his foot a drop of 
acid poured upon his back, we have an example of 
orderly concurrence of aptitudes unconnected with 
consciousness, and behaving as a mere equivalent of 
mind. In what is known as consensual action, 1 e.g. 
the instinctive motion of the eyeballs adjusting them 
to single vision, a motion assumed to be caused by the 
visual sensation resulting from the impact of rays on 
the retinae, orderly concurrence of aptitudes is coupled 
with consciousness, and behaves as mind. It contains 

1 It is probable that the difference which is supposed to separate 
consensual from reflex action is not real. The action termed consen- 
sual may be the effect, not of the consciousness supposed to be its 
cause, but, of the somatic event that is the proximate cause of the 
consciousness. Analogy protests strongly in favour of this hypothesis. 
When an extraordinary object of vision causes surprise, the visual per- 
ception is not antecedent to the surprise. They obtain simultaneously, 
and therefore as co-effects of the proximate cause of the perception. 
Recognition involved with sense-perception is not consequent to the 
perception : both are effects of the same encephalic event. What 
redintegration annexes to the immediate object of a sense-perception 
that is not itself the creature of redintegration, e.g. the unseen part of 
a seen man, tree, or house, is not consequent to visual consciousness 
of the seen part : both parts are simultaneously perceived and are 
co-effects of the same encephalic event. When one slips, and, through 
the raising of a leg, recovers his safe relation to the centre of gravity, 
he is aware, if he be a practised observer, that consciousness of the 
slipping is not antecedent to the raising of the leg. The cerebral change 
that is the proximate cause of his consciousness of slipping is also the 
proximate cause of his instinctive effort to recover the safe position. 




chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 107 

a divine and an infernal part, the divine being all of it 
that makes for virtue and wisdom, the infernal that 
which makes for malignity, impurity, and misery. 



LXIV. 

The term, subject, applied to that of which we pre- 
dicate, is a misnomer, seeing that a negative proposition 
denies that the so-called subject is a subject, e.g. the 
proposition, A is not guilty, denies that A is subject 
relatively to guilt. Let the term denoting that of 
which one predicates be known as first term of the 
proposition, and the term denoting what is predicated 
be known as the second term of the proposition. Let 
the member of a thesis hitherto denoted by the first 
term of a proposition be termed first member of the 
thesis, and that denoted by the second as the third 
member of the thesis; the copula is the second 
member. In negative theses the first members are 
not subjects, and in certain affirmative theses the first 
members are not subjects. The first member of the 
thesis expressed by the proposition, The statue is 
marble, is not a subject, nor is the third an attribute. 
It might be correctly predicated of the statue that it is 
a piece of marble, and as correctly of the piece of 
marble that it is a statue or a stone. 



LXV. 

As essences are in respect of concreteness, natural- 
ness, and importance, so are their kinds; in other 



108 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

words, there are concrete and inconcrete, natural and 
fictitious, important and unimportant, kinds. 



LXVL 

Kinds are further divisible into those of which our 
ideas do, and those of which our ideas do not, form 
upon discrimination of a determining differentia. The 
idea of the kind, acute angles, supposes discernment of 
the differentia, acuteness; that of Mankind forms with- 
out discernment of the differentia of the kind. Public 
knowledge does not even now afford a definition of 
Man. A kind the idea of which does not form upon 
discernment of a determining difference may be dis- 
tinguished as primary, kinds of the opposite species as 
secondary. Secondary kinds comprehend kinds the 
ideas of which originate inadvertently and kinds the 
ideas of which originate consciously. The various 
species of trees are examples of the former, the species 
Vertebrata of the latter. The former may be dis- 
tinguished as obvious, the latter as unobvious, second- 
ary kinds. 



LXVII. 

There are essences that are manifested by accidents. 
Those of the various species of the vegetable and 
animal kingdoms are so manifested. The essence that 
differentiates the species Man is manifested by a 
system of accidents constituting a form similar to that 
of Caesar, Cleopatra, Queen Elizabeth. The resem- 



»_»_. . „__ _ 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 109 

bling systems of attributes that manifest the essence 
in the various individuals of the species differ greatly 
from one another, — as much as the form of an infant 
from that of an adult man, or the form of a woman 
from that of a man, or that of a Hottentot from the 
form of a shapely European; to say nothing of the 
endless diversities of people of the same age, country, 
culture, and pursuit. It is wonderful that such great 
differences do not exclude the likeness which manifests 
the specific essence. The frequency with which these 
similar systems of accidents are presented to the 
faculty of recognition that refers to Man, so relates 
them to the mind, that when circumstances lead it to 
look for the differentia of the human animal an ima- 
gined sample of them tends to pass for it. But when it 
is considered that men are often deprived of one or 
more of the organs that determine the typical form 
constituting the supposed differentia, philosophy is 
obliged to acknowledge that what it took to be essence 
is a mere system of accidents. It cannot, however, 
surrender the belief that there is a human essence. 
Inconsistency prevents the surrender. This taxes the 
inventive faculty and it begets a new idea of the 
differentia, according to which the differentia is an 
organic tendency to develope and maintain a human 
form, — a form like that of Caesar. In like manner we 
get at the essences of all things that are classed 
according to their visible qualities, systems of acci- 
dents being the effects and signs of the essences. The 
abortive efforts to define Man, — which provoked the 
irony that flung a plucked chicken into one of the 
Greek schools, proceeded on the error that mistook for 
essence the system of accidents which is its effect and 
sign. 



110 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



LXVIII. 

The bearing of essence on the recognitive faculty- 
is independent on verbal sign. It excites recognition 
in the lower animals as well as in man, and the former 
connect with it no name. When the dog barks at a 
beggar he manifests recognition, and in that recog- 
nition the bearing of the essence of the human indi- 
vidual as well as of the accidents that signify a 
mendicant animus and habit. The bearing is also inde- 
pendent on idea of kind. Eecognition, as I shall soon 
explain (chap, xvi.), excludes reference of its object to 
a kind. 



LXIX. 

1. Let Thing be the common name of individuals 
of the summum genus. Is existence essential to things, 
— to the thing, possibility, as well as to. the thing 
Substance ? The absolute necessity of a whole to be 
greater than its part, and of a two and a two to be a 
four, is a thing that would be though nothing existed 
save time and space. Its existence — if it can be said 
to have existence — is independent of the existence 
involved in such things as atoms, molecules, bodies, 
spiritual substances, and the attributes of these. Is 
this necessity an existence, — an entity ? I put the 
question in order to plead the vagueness which it is 
likely to evoke in apology for the makeshift division of 
the summum genus, Things, which I find it convenient to 



chap. ix. SUBSTANCE. 1 1 1 

make. I divide Things into two subgenera, viz. 
entities, and things which I make free to term quesits ; 
the former comprising all things to which the popular 
mind easily imputes reality, the latter such things as 
possibility and necessity. I do not imply in the 
name, entities, that existence is proper to entities, — 
that it is not an attribute of quesits. I leave the 
question open. This rude division gives us two kinds 
which we distinguish, as we distinguish primary kinds, 
without discerning their differentia, and it gives us 
names of the kinds which suggest the question that 
elucidates the kinds. One advantage of the name, 
quesit, is, that it enables us to treat perspicuously and 
concisely of a kind of object which delusively tends to 
pass for an abstract idea and to support the doctrine 
of Abstraction (cxxxv. 8). 

2. It may be objected that I class time and space 
as entities, whereas it is in question, whether realities 
correspond to our ideas of Time and Space. My classi- 
fication does not beg this question. The term entity, 
as I employ it, connotes, not existence, but, objectivity 
that tends to impose itself on the popular mind as 
real. The pretension of Time and Space to reality 
pales before scrutiny, and yet, to deny it is to deny 
the reality of extension and event, e.g. the existence of 
matter and motion (lxiii. 10). Common sense pro- 
tests that in the present state of knowledge such a 
negation is frivolous. But we shall do well to signalise 
the great difference between such entities and those of 
which the entity, body, is an example. Let us accord- 
ingly divide entities into the two kinds, vacant and 
non-vacant entities, putting Time and Space as the 
great exemplars of the former. I leave it to the 



112 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

reader to determine in which of these two kinds he 
will place points, lines, mobile voids, and temporal 
beginnings and ends. 



LXX. 

Infimce species constitute the lowest degree of the 
scale of kinds. An infima species is a kind of which 
the individuals differ from one another in no important 
respect, e.g. circles of an inch diameter. 



CHAPTEK X. 

MIND. 

LXXI. 

According to Positivism, Mind is merely either — 1st, 
the consciousness or sum of consciousnesses that obtains 
at any instant in an individual, or 2nd, the sum of the 
consciousnesses, both simultaneous and successive, that 
obtain throughout life in an individual. Their defini- 
tion transfers the name, Mind, from the subject of con- 
sciousness, to which spontaneous generalisation had 
annexed it, to what that generalisation ranked as the 
determining attribute, — the consciousness. It implies 
at least distrust of two axioms, one that mind is a 
durable thing, the other that consciousness is an attri- 
bute. It must be allowed to the credit of Positivism 
that it is a method originated and in part determined 
by a revolt of Common Sense. Deduction that pro- 
ceeds on axioms, after having achieved one great suc- 
cess, — Mathematics, — had betrayed speculation into 
the labyrinth known as Metaphysics, where it wasted 
human intellect, while Induction, proceeding on un- 
guaranteed data, was proving itself by its fruits to be 
the better way. Consequently Metaphysics and its 
method lost credit with Common Sense, which was 

I 



114 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

then for confining speculation to the pursuit of un- 
guaranteed knowledge. It would thenceforward have 
utility and the enablement of precision to be the sole 
tests of truth. It inadvertently arrogated the liberty 
of rejecting data inconvenient to its spirit, — those that 
sloped to Metaphysics. In this its impetus carried it 
beyond its goal. It could maintain itself on the slope 
without falling into Metaphysics. It could admit that 
mind is a concrete or sum of concretes and conscious- 
ness an attribute, without rolling into pertinent insol- 
uble questions, saying to these with Horatio, — "It 
were to inquire too curiously." It has not improved 
the situation by taking up the alternative that mind is 
not a durable thing and that a consciousness is not an 
attribute. I restore the name, Mind, to its old signifi- 
cation. It denotes a concrete or mm of concretes that 
either is or involves what lacks nothing essential to a 
subject of consciovsness. So far as this definition implies, 
a mind may be material or immaterial, it may exclu- 
sively consist of an immaterial subject of consciousness, 
or of this and the brain, nervous system, and other 
parts of the organs of sense. It does not imply that 
the subject of consciousness is a spirit. It consists 
with the consistent thesis that the subject of conscious- 
ness is an atom, which might, in certain relations, be 
incapable of consciousness, and might be a constituent 
of an inorganic body. Solidity and extension do not 
exclude from their subject susceptibilities and powers 
adequate to the highest exercises of mind. We have 
conclusive though undemonstrative evidence that know- 
ledge mainly depends upon modifications of the brain 
wrought by experience, that it is neither more nor less 
than the relation of the subject of consciousness to 
such modifications, that knowledge acquired by experi- 



chap. x. MIND. 115 

ence antecedently to a certain injury to the brain has 
been superseded or destroyed without any manifest 
degradation of power to acquire such knowledge anew 
from like experience. Mind, therefore, it might not 
unreasonably be held, includes both those modifications 
and the modified organ. I shall show by-and-by that 
those modifications, serving as bases or hinges of 
unconscious knowledge, are in live connection with 
conscious knowledge, — that, as unconscious equivalents 
of reasons, they determine conscious knowledge. When 
this is proved, it must be admitted that bodily organs 
are constituents of the human mind ; not accessories, 
but constituents. Our definition admits of such a 
conclusion. 



LXXIL 

It is obvious that an inception, enhancement, decay, 
or termination, of an unconscious knowledge, is a 
mental event ; — that, therefore, mental events include 
unconscious events. Unconscious mental events are 
not confined to inceptions, terminations, and changes, 
of unconscious knowledges. They include redintegra- 
tive operations, e.g. that which in the mind of the 
burned child inserts the symbol of ardent heat into 
the immediate object symbolic of the next luminous 
thing he sees ; they include the latent bearing of like- 
ness on the mind, to which, as I shall explain by-and- 
by, we are indebted for recognition, for the grouping 
of minima visibilia into bodies, and of bodies into 
flocks, herds, crowds, swarms, etc. They include the 
latent mental processes which beget our knowledge of 
primary kinds and our knowledge of our own customs 



116 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

and of those of our social environment, — processes to be 
fully explained when I treat of Experience (chap, xiv.), 
whereof they are species. It is not important, nor 
would it be easy, to ascertain the differentia of mental 
event. Indefiniteness in respect of it, however, har- 
bours no risk of error. 



LXXHI. 



Let "propensity" be the common name of all mental 
qualities that are presupposed by motives, intentions,, 
and actions which proceed upon intention; e.g. the 
appetites, irascibility, fear, reverence, benevolence, con- 
science, the moral sense, the aesthetic sense. 



LXXIV. 

Mental qualities, whether faculties or propensities, 
are things unconscious and unintuitable. Apperception 
is not cognisant of them. They are knowable only 
through inference. Their existence is signified, to the 
illative faculty, by the consciousnesses of which they 
are the mental causes ; e.g., sensations of hunger and 
thirst and sexual yearnings and pleasures signify to 
the illative faculty their unintuitable mental causes, 
the appetites; emotions of anger signify to it their 
unintuitable mental cause, irascibility ; remembrances, 
their unintuitable mental cause, memory ; judgments, 
their unintuitable mental cause, Season. Apperception 
is cognisant of but one durable part of the mind, viz. 




•chap. x. MIND. 117 

the Ego or subject of consciousness; but whether 
that be material or immaterial, whether the immediate 
object symbolic of the Ego be a reality or a mere 
symbol, it is ignorant. To pretend, as Positivism pre- 
tends, that consciousnesses comprise the mind, is to 
deny that there exists a complement of qualities corre- 
sponding to our ideas of memory, imagination, Eeason, 
propensity. If there be no such qualities, no differ- 
ences of the proportions in which they are compounded, 
in different men, what determines the order of mental 
■events, the regular recurrences of like consciousnesses 
on like occasions, the constancy of character of the 
individual mind and its differences from other minds ? 
If the qualities be cerebral, why then, the brain is 
•either the mind or a part of the mind. The existence 
of the qualities is presupposed by the events, con- 
sciousnesses ; and the concrete subject of the qualities, 
whether material or immaterial or a composite of matter 
and spirit, is Mind. 



CHAPTEK XI 

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

LXXV. 

1. The consciousnesses, hunger, thirst, heat and cold 
of one's own body, what we are conscious of when 
relieved of bodily pain, vertigo, nausea, the various 
thrills that constitute bodily pleasure, are examples of 
what is commonly denoted by the term, sensation. 
They suppose discernments of which they are respec- 
tively objects, but are not given as being themselves 
discernments. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and 
tactile consciousness, are intuitions that are given as 
being involved in sensations, sensations to which it 
is essential to be intuitive as well as intuited. We 
intuite the motions and attitudes of our bodies without 
sight or touch, also the expressions of our faces, and, 
when we perceive by means of one of the five senses, 
we intuite the sense as well as the thing perceived. 
All these intuitions are given as being involved in 
sensations. What is common and proper to the con- 
sciousnesses to which we give the common name, sen- 
sation, is, appearance of being an attribute of the body 
of the subject. The appearance is such as to make it 
doubtful whether the consciousnesses be not given as 




■tfMm 



chap, xl SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 119 

attributes of composite subjects, each consisting of an 
inextended Ego or mind and a body ; but the datum 
is decisive as to the human body being either the 
exclusive or the partial subject. Accordingly, I define 
Sensation, consciousness given as being a bodily attri- 
bute. 

2. A sensation is given as being an attribute of a 
part of the body, e.g. hunger, of the stomach, thirst, of 
the throat, vertigo, of the head, visual intuition, of the 
eye, auditory intuition, of the ear. 

3. Consciousnesses that differ from sensation only 
as being latent, or as being inchoate^ I term vice- 
sensation. Pain that survives the self-consciousness 
of the sleeping patient is an example of the kind, 
vice-sensations. The latent consciousness that obtains 
when the eyes are closed in moderate light is also an 
example. The kind of consciousnesses to which the 
name, sensation, is commonly applied, is undefinable 
except upon condition of dividing it into the species 
which I denote by the names sensation and vice-sensa- 
tion. This division brings it within the pale of defini- 
tion, which is of course a gain for science. It exposes 
an obvious differentia of one of the species, viz. the 
being given as a bodily attribute, and also a differentia 
of the other, which, although obscure, suffices for defini- 
tion. The genus may be defined, consciousnesses given 
as bodily attributes, and consciousnesses so resembling 
these that, although not so given, the likeness binds 
them together in even a more intimate general union. 

4. Let sensation given as being intuitive be distin- 
guished as quasi-intuitive, and all other sensation as 



1 20 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

unintuitive. The term "quasi-intuitive sensation" does 
not commit us as regards the question whether sensa- 
tion do or do not involve discernment. 

5. It is essential to sensation to be object of apper- 
ception. This it is that differentiates it from vice-sen- 
sation. It is sometimes doubly objective. One may- 
have a moderate pain in the foot to which he some- 
times attends but is for the most part inattentive : 
when he attends to it, the sensation is doubly objective, 
— objective to a perception and an apperception, — to 
an attentive and an inattentive discernment. The 
attentive discernment seems to be locally remote from 
it, as being situated in the head ; the inattentive one 
to be more than locally near it: they seem to be 
mutually interpenetrative. 

6. Let discernment that is given as being involved 
in sensation be distinguished as sensational, and all 
other discernment as non-sensational. 



LXXVI. 

1. Sensational discernment is divisible into sensa- 
tional perception and sensational apperception. 

2. Sensational perception is divisible into sense- 
perception, i.e. perception given as being involved in a 
sensation of one of the five senses, and a species that 
may be named in-looking sensational perception. When 
one attends to the expression of his oym face, or, with- 
out looking, to the attitude of his body, the perception 






chap. xi. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 121 

is given as being sensational, but not as being involved 
/in a sensation of one of the five senses. As being 
directed inward upon the body of the subject, the per- 
ception is fitly characterised as in -looking. Actors 
and unprofessional mimics have frequent occasion for 
the exercise of in-looking sensational perception. Atten- 
tion is essential to it and differentiates it especially 
from apperception qud discernment of bodily events. 
We apperceive, as well as perceive, our natural lan- 
guage, and, generally, the motions and attitudes of our 
bodies. 



LXXVII. 

1. Sense -perception is either attentive or inatten- 
tive. We usually attend to but a small part of the 
field of vision, and one whose mind is absorbed by 
discourse attends to no part of it. 

2. Parts of the body of the subject are sometimes 
objects of attentive sense-perception, as when a man 
looks at his hand, and sometimes of inattentive sense- 
perception, as when a man sees, without looking at, his 
hand, or, inadvertently clasping his hands, perceives by 
each the other. According to Buffon, these double 
perceptions are conditions of the discrimination of self 
from its environment. Inattentive tactile sense-per- 
ception has so much in common with sensational apper- 
ception that it takes attention to distinguish between 
them. Both are sensational inattentive discernments 
referent to the body of the subject. They differ only 
in this, that one is, and the other is not, given as being 
involved in a sensation of one of the five senses, the 



122 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

tactile sense being understood to include the whole of 
the sensitive periphery. 

3. It is essential to sense-perception to be con- 
joined with and objective to apperception, by which it 
is apprehended as a modification of the Ego. The 
apperception has especially for object, 1st, the per- 
ceiving organ, e.g. the eye, ear, nose, mouth, or hand ; 
2nd, the relation of the thing perceived to the per- 
ceiving organ, a relation given as proximate cause of 
the perception; 3rd, the perception, including the 
sensation in which it is given as being involved. 
These are the objects that are extinguished when, 
owing to ecstasy, apperception is in abeyance and 
sight persists. Philosophy has all but ignored them. 
They were noticed by Plato and Aristotle, but no 
place was assigned to them in the system of Kinds. 

4. The immediate object of ordinary sense-percep- 
tion consists of two constituents, of which one is, in 
respect of the other, cardinal. The cardinal constituent 
is either — 1st, solidity, including extension and figure, 
or, 2nd, colour including extension and figure, or, 3rd, 
sound, or, 4th, flavour, or, 5th, odour. The dependent 
constituent is an attribute or sum of attributes which 
scrutiny finds to be intangible, invisible, inaudible, and 
neither a flavour nor an odour, eg. the symbols of 
identity, durability, power, thickness, the life and 
consciousness of others. When we interrogate the 
mind as to whether these objects are indeed objects of 
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile intui- 
tion, a negative datum emerges. Sense disavows all 
but the cardinal constituents of sense-perception. The 
lingual instinct conforms language to the datum. To 



chap. xi. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 123 

say that one sees the identity involved in the object 
of a visual perception would be to violate usage. It 
is agreeable to common sense to distinguish sense- 
perception into two parts, one which may be termed 
its cardinal part, corresponding to the cardinal con- 
stituent of its object, the other, which may be termed 
its dependent part, corresponding to the dependent 
constituent of its object. Colour is the cardinal part 
of visual perception, and discernment of whatever over 
and above colour extension and figure is objective to 
the perception, is its dependent part. 

5. The dependent part of the object of sense-percep- 
tion is derived from one or other of two sources, one 
redintegration, and the other a faculty hitherto unre- 
corded. This faculty, as supplying immediate objects 
or constituents of immediate objects beyond the scope 
of sense intuition, may be denoted the swpersensuous 
faculty. It contributes to the dependent part of the 
object of sense -perception such constituents as the 
symbols of identity, durability, power, thickness, and 
of the life and consciousness of others. Indeed we owe 
to it the idea of the third dimension whether in void or 
thickness, for the experience which occasions the idea 
does not account for it as being an object of sense. 
Eedintegration contributes to the dependent object of 
sense -perception such . constituents as the symbol of 
solidity annexed to colour when a solid is visually 
perceived, or the visual aspect of an unseen speaker 
when he is heard. It furnishes the complements of 
immediate objects of which only parts bear directly 
upon sense, as the unseen parts of a seen man or tree 
or house. 



124 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i 



LXXVIII. 

The constituents furnished to the objects of sense- 
perception by the supersensuous faculty occasioned the 
scepticism of Hume and the elaborate system of Kant. 
They justified scepticism by refuting the doctrine of 
Natural Eealism ; but they afforded no ground for the 
doctrine of knowledge d priori. If knowledge of 
power is, as Kant pretends, to be accounted & priori 
because a reality answering to the idea of Power is not 
immediately objective to sense-perception, — to what 
Kant terms the internal sense, — knowledge of thick- 
ness should also be accounted d priori ; but matter is 
thickness (is given as being thickness), and therefore 
knowledge of matter should be accounted d priori, — 
which leaves nothing worth notice to be object of 
knowledge d posteriori. Thickness is hidden from 
sense behind its surfaces. The mental symbol of it is 
as much the product of the supersensuous faculty as 
the mental symbol of power. 



LXXIX. 

The datum that certain sensations are discernments 
may be false, but the falseness of the seeming does 
not prevent its being a valid and useful differentia, 
serving as a line of demarcation in the map of gener- 
alisation. As affording a basis of descriptive termi- 
nology, it may be a means of proof of its own falseness. 



chap. xi. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 125 

LXXX. 

1. The foregoing definition of sense-perception is 
amenable to the objection that it supposes a species of 
hallucination to be a species of sense-perception. In 
dream and waking hallucination we have perceptions 
that are given as being involved in sensations of one or 
other of the five senses, whereas no reality corresponds 
to the immediate objects. According to the definition, 
this discernment belongs to the kind, perception ; we 
see, hear, smell, taste, and undergo tactile conscious- 
ness, in dreams, and in waking hallucination. Psycho- 
logical classification has ignored the relation of hallu- 
cinative exercises of the senses to sensation, but 
spontaneity has classed them conformably to our 
definition ; for it is common to speak of seeing, hear- 
ing, smelling, tasting, and touching, in dreams. The 
name " visionary" implies that perception comprehends 
the species, hailucinative perception. 

2? Hailucinative and non-hallucinative perception 
present to apprehension no marks by which they are 
immediately distinguishable. It would seem, at first 
sight, as though there must be such a mark, since 
dream, when remembered, is apprehended as hallucina- 
tion. But this apprehension is immediate ; it is not 
caused by a sign. It resembles, in this respect, imme- 
diate identification. One does not at first remember 
the events of the dream as realities, and then infer 
from a sign that they are mere fictions; they are 
given, from the first, either to memory or to a faculty 
that coalesces with memory, as fictitious. Hailucina- 
tive and non-hallucinative perception, therefore, con- 



126 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

sidered as mere consciousnesses, exhibit no intrinsic 
difference. They are rudely distinguishable by a cir- 
cumstance that attends hallucination, viz. that it is 
commonly given to memory and to the observation of 
others as hallucination. I accordingly define Hallu- 
cinative sense-perception, sense-perception differentiated 
by deceptiveness that tends to become soon obvious. Hal- 
lucination I define, deceptive sensational discernment 
of which the deceptiveness tends to become soon obvious. 
It comprehends the two species hallucinative sense- 
perception and hallucinative in-looking sensational 
discernment. Men who have lost a limb sometimes 
undergo an in-looking sensational discernment of a 
fictitious substitute. 

3. Sensational deceptiveness is not confined to 
hallucination. When sense-perception gives the reality 
perceived as immediate object ; when it gives colour, 
sound, flavour, odour, cold and heat, as things that are 
not consciousnesses ; when it gives the earth as being 
a plane, the sky as a crystalline vault, the moon as a 
circular disc of a few inches diameter; when it* gives 
the like as the same and masks succession under the 
appearance of duration ; — it is deceptive, but there is 
no tendency in the deceptiveness to become soon 
obvious: on the contrary, the detection of it is in 
every civilisation a late achievement. 



LXXXI. 

When it was discovered that the immediate objects 
of sense-perception are unreal, colour, sound, odour and 



chap. xi. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 127 

flavour were indiscriminately classed as sensations, 
tjiose of them that are given as attributes of things 
different from the perceiving organ as well as those 
that seem to be such attributes. The influences tend- 
ing to beget this confusion were certainly strong. To 
the scientific mind it was obvious that consciousnesses 
of both kinds are products of bodily organs, and the 
general bond that connects flavour with flavour, sound 
with sound, etc., is so intimate, that it tends to mask 
any difference demanding a general separation. But 
dependence on a part of the body of the subject scien- 
tifically discerned is one thing, and the seeming of 
dependence that determines the kind to which the 
term, sensation, was originally annexed, is quite another. 
The seeming is wanting to certain consciousnesses to 
which science correctly imputed the dependence. Ac- 
cordingly, prior to discovery they were not accounted 
sensations, and to class them as sensations is to sup- 
plant the differentia that originally determined the 
kind, — indeed still determines it for the unscientific. 
If this differentia be suppressed, if we beg in the term 
Sensation the affirmative of the question mooted by 
the idealist and answered by him in the negative, we 
debar ourselves from the use of the term in our dispute 
with him. Our definition of the term not only restores 
it to its original signification, but conforms to the rule 
of giving philosophy and science a system of terms 
unencumbered by seriously questionable connotations. 
The definition does not imply that there is not a kind 
correctly denotable by the name, flavour, which com- 
prehends both sensations and non-sensational conscious- 
nesses, nor does it imply, that there is not a kind of 
consciousnesses differentiated by dependence for exist- 
ence upon a part of the body of the subject, a kind 



128 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

that comprehends both sensational and non-sensational 
consciousness. The kind which I denote by the name, 
Sensation, excludes those of them that are given as 
attributes of things perceived by sense, and includes 
those that are not so given ; it excludes the red of the 
rose, the sound of. the flute, the odour of the violet, 
the flavour of the wine ; it includes the bad odour and 
flavour which a disordered digestion sometimes occa- 
sions, the sounds termed " ringing in the ear," the lumin- 
ous crescent caused by pressure upon the eyeball, the 
colours, sounds, odours, flavours, and tinglings excited 
by an electric current that traverses a certain part of 
the brain. 



LXXXII. 

Intuition of life and consciousness other than our 
own has not received from philosophers the attention 
it deserves. They have put us off with the shallow 
hypothesis that, observing the resemblance of other 
men and of the lower animals to ourselves, — how they 
have organs of sense like our own, and leave a state of 
rest as we do without being compelled into motion by 
the action of another body, — we, in accordance with 
the law of belief which gives the unobvious like as 
inhering in the obvious like, impute to them the like 
of the life and consciousness which we experience in 
ourselves. Now, the natural language of the mother 
elicits from the infant such signs of cordial intuition 
of the emotions from which it proceeds, that we must 
suppose the infant to be at least vaguely intuitive of 
those emotions, and therefore of the life and conscious- 
ness of the mother. But no such natural language 




chap. xi. * SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 129 

had previously obtained in the infant, so that he could 
not know, by experience of anything occurring in him- 
self, of the connection of its signs with such or such 
emotions, nor therefore that the signs exhibited by the 
mother resemble signs that had obtained in himself. 
Moreover the experience of the infant affords him no 
such idea of his own form as to enable a discernment 
of the resemblance to it of other forms. It is highly 
probable that the natural language of our own species 
has the property of causing intuition of the emotions 
from which it proceeds independently of any prior 
mental event, and therein of life ftnd consciousness 
other than those of the subject. But this does not 
sanction the judgment that intuition of life and con- 
sciousness other than those of the subject is thus 
originated, for we intuite the life and consciousness of 
the lower animals without the aid of natural language. 
There is no inconsisteucy in the hypothesis, that we 
at first impute life and consciousness to all bodies, 
and that the intuition of certain things as inanimate is 
a product of experience. The occasional behaviour of 
children and of savage adults to inanimate things gives 
some countenance to this hypothesis ; the worship of 
stocks and stones and the tendency to prosopopeia also 
lend it countenance. We are not here concerned to 
find a solution of the question. It is enough for us to 
establish that our knowledge of the life and conscious- 
ness of others is intuitive, not achieved by means of com- 
parison or inference. This being established, it follows 
that the intuition which originates the knowledge is 
sense-perception. We perceive life and consciousness, 
and perception of the inanimate supposes the per- 
cipient to be aware that the object is without life 
and .consciousness. Symbols of life and conscious- 

K 



130 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

ness are occasional constituents of the object of 
perception. 



LXXXIII. 

Space and Cosmos are constant objects of sense- 
perception. The perception is necessarily inattentive. 
If we endeavour to make space and Cosmos objects of 
attentive sense-perception, we find ourselves attending 
to mere ideas of them. Space and Cosmos are given to 
sense-perception as the habitat of all its other objects. 



LXXXIV. 

Certain sensations are given as involving desire, e.g. 
hunger, thirst, the sexual sensation, the sensation con- 
sequent to suspension of breathing. Pleasing sensa- 
tions that do not menace departure, e.g. warmth, 
sensations constituting or incident to relief, the sensa- 
tion caused by agreeable muscular exertion, are given 
as not involv4 desire. Certain sensations are iiven 
as involving neither pain, pleasure, nor desire, viz. 
those to which no uneasiness succeeds. 



LXXXV. 

Appetite is the common name of certain of the 
sensations that are given as involving desire, e.g. hunger, 
thirst, the sexual sensation. The name is limited to 



chap. xi. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 131 

those that are of periodic recurrence. The most notable 
are hunger, thirst, and lust ; but the craving for rest 
when we are fatigued, for exercise when the supply of 
animal force is ample, for sleep during a considerable 
part of the twenty-four hours, are readily allowed to 
be appetites. If the animal economy in man were 
such that the need of respiration should occur only at 
periods separated by intervals of three or four hours, 
and the need were manifested by the sensation by 
which it is now manifested when respiration is sus- 
pended for a few seconds, that sensatiorl would be 
accounted an appetite. 



CHAPTEE XII. 

APPERCEPTION. 

LXXXVI. 

1. What is denoted by the term, apperception, has 
been confounded with a species of perception which 
Locke denoted by the name, " reflection." He says of 
it, " though it be not sense, as having nothing to do 
with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might 
properly enough be called 'internal sense.'" 1 He 
implies that attention is essential to " reflection," im- 
puting the child's ignorance of psychical event to his 
inability as regards reflective attention. Eeflection, he 
implies, attentively inspects such mental events as 
perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, 
knowing, willing, 1 and so begets knowledge of them. 
According to Ancillon, — "The reflective Ego ... is 
never developed in the majority of mankind at all, and 
even in the thoughtful and reflective few it is formed 
only at a mature period, and is even then only in 
activity by starts and at intervals." 2 This sentence is 
opportunely cited by Sir William Hamilton, and that it 
implies what agrees with his theory of Eeflection is cor- 

1 Human Understanding, B. II. chap. 1, sec. 4. 
2 Metaphysics, Lecture XIX. 



■tfSllHI 



\ 



chap. xii. APPERCEPTION. 133 

roborated by his remark that " The faculty of self- 
consciousness corresponds with the Eeflection of Locke." 1 
This remark, in view of his doctrine that self-conscious- 
ness is essential to consciousness, 2 exposes the vicious- 
ness of the confusion of apperception with reflection ; 
for it implies that consciousness is wanting to the 
majority of mankind. 

2. Reflection is perception given as having for 
immediate and sole object a consciousness of its sub- 
ject. It is essential to it to be attentive. If such a 
thing were possible as an inattentive reflection, it would 
not be distinguishable from apperception, and philo- 
sophy could know nothing about it. Unintuitive 
sensations and unintuitive emotions endure its gaze, 
but not discernments. It sometimes surprises and is 
surprised by a discernment, but the object seems to 
vanish at the instant it is seen. Whether there are 
men who have the power to watch their intellectual 
operations and the discernments involved in discourse, 
— in remembering, imagining, etc. — the writer is ignor- 
ant ; but that there are none such seems to be proved ' 
by the meanness of the results of psychological specu- 
lation. There seems to be no room in the mind for a 
study of discernment. The aversion of discernment to 
be attentively discerned is shown by the fact, that when 
reflective attention is turned upon an intuitive emotion 
the intuitive element of the emotion vanishes at once, 
leaving a part that tends to recover the element so 
soon as reflection withdraws its eye. An irascible per- 
son who aims at conduct may profit by the mental law 
under which this curious kind of fact obtains. If he 
watch the emotion, anger, he occults its object, and, 

1 Metaphysics, Lecture XXIX. a Lecture XI. 



134 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

deprived of discernment, the emotion tends to decline 
and perish. If he persist long enough the emotion 
dies. If he cease to stare at it before it has lost its 
intensity, it is sure to recover its object and its first 
force. 

3. ^Reflection watchful of the spirit of its subject 
that he may keep it pure, has an important function in 
what is known as the spiritual or interior life. It 
speedily discovers to the ascetic those of his instincts 
that are opposed to the Christian spirit. One of the 
first striking results of Saint Theresa's surrender to her 
vocation was her psychological enlightenment ; nor is 
this wonderful, seeing that the instincts symbolised by 
the Christian trinity of evil, the Devil the World and 
the Flesh, must expose themselves in strife with the 
new spirit 

4> Xo mental exercise is more fatiguing than 
reflection It differs greatly in this respect from 
apperception, which is as little fatiguing as breathing 
or the pulsation of the heart. 

5. ^Reflection has been confounded with philosophic 
stady of ideas of kinds of mental events, — a study 
that is the hmTiifftfiiate source of psychology. Apper- 
ception of mental everts begets ideas of corresponding 
fends*. c#l of the kinds*, perception, remsnbrance, 
JMftgimfciMi jqrigHMHTft, as experience of event exterior 
to eoBfieMOSKSS begets ideas of motion and rest, force 
awl JnedOMBS^. action ami reaction, births growth, and 
4nfck> Tie mmd is not a conscious party to the pro- 
dtati&a rf sSAer set of idea&. Between the conscious 
e sp rn m ee titafc begets them and their inception there 




chap. xii. APPERCEPTION. 135 

intervenes no discourse. They are the offspring of a 
latent action of the mind fecundated by conscious 
experience. The study of these concepts, whether of 
those that are symbolic of mental events or of those 
that symbolise unconscious events, is not an exercise 
of reflection. The judgments which it engenders, and 
in which are explicated what is either obviously or 
unobviously implicit in the concepts, do not derive from 
reflection. The study is occasionally interrupted and 
assisted by an experiment on the mind which some- 
times has the effect of freshening, augmenting, retrench- 
ing, or in some way correcting, one or more of the 
concepts studied. We set Eeason, memory, or imagina- 
tion, to work in order to study afterwards the record of 
the operation, — not to study the operation while it is 
proceeding. It is the connection of this kind of experi- 
ment with the study of ideas of mental event that 
causes the confusion of both study and experiment with 
reflection and self-consciousness. This, by the way, 
exposes the futility of Comte's objection to psychology 
as being the product of a mere counterfeit of observa- 
tion. The psychologist, he maintains, is confined to 
the method of attempting to observe his mental opera- 
tions while the faculties are at work, which he correctly 
holds to be abortive; and, with this error, he is for 
scourging psychology out of the temple of science. 

6. When one reflects, he is inattentively aware that 
he is reflecting, i.e. a reflection is always attended by 
an apperception. This contrast puts in the most strik- 
ing relief the difference between the two. 



136 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 



LXXXYTL 

Apperception, qud referent to a consciousness, may 
be distinguished as psychical, and, qud referent to a 
bodily event, as corporal. 



LXXXV11L 

Apperception does not acquaint us with the struc- 
ture of the mind; it acquaints us with no mental 
quality except the existence of the subject of conscious- 
nessu AH other mental qualities are unintuitable. 
Apperception acquaints us with certain mental events, 
with consciousnesses, but not with the mental attributes 
which they presuppose, — for example, with remembrance 
but not with memory, with imaginations but not with 
the faculty, Imagination, with conceptions but not with 
the conceptual faculty, with judgments but not with 
the faculty, Keason, with motives and intentions but 
not with a moving or intending faculty, — not, if there 
be such a thing with WilL How penuriously know- 
ledge of the mind — knowledge that can afford to be 
brought to book — is imputed to us, is evinced by the 
opinion, now obtaining ascendency amongst philoso- 
phgs, that the immfdiatp object which passes for the Ego 
is not a reality but a mere modification of consciousness. 



T.XYYIY 



The immediate object of apperception that passes 




chap. xn. APPERCEPTION. 137 

with it for the Ego or subject of consciousness, is it 
real ? To Descartes the affirmative seemed to be an 
axiom, and the pivot of all guaranteed knowledge. It 
is the support of his famous argument, Cogito ergo sum. 
The affirmative is a datum ; but its pretence to be an 
axiom is not universally allowed. To certain minds 
the idea of subjectless consciousness does not seem to 
be inconsistent. Indeed, by perhaps the majority of 
modern physiologists, consciousness is implicitly held 
to be subjectless. They hold it to be an effect of 
ganglionic, cerebral, or other corporal event, but not an 
attribute of a bodily organ or organism in such a sense 
that the organ or organism could be supposed to be 
conscious. If this be true, the immediate object of 
apperception given as being the Ego is not real ; nor is 
it a true symbol. If it be held that the symbol is 
true because the organ or organism corresponds to its 
significance as the thing signified, it is only partially 
true. It is untrue in so far as it symbolises the remote 
object as being, not only a source or cause, but also, a 
subject of consciousness. Admitting that there is a 
subject of consciousness, — a thing that, besides being 
a source or cause, is also a subject, of consciousness, — 
it does not follow that the immediate object of apper- 
ception which passes for the Ego is real. When a 
patient who during sleep undergoes unapperceived pain 
awakes and apperceives the pain, the immediate object 
of the apperception may consist of a real and an un- 
real object, viz., the pain, and a symbol of the subject of 
the pain. The idea of cerebration causing in the soul 
a pain and with it a symbol of a subject of conscious- 
ness, is not inconsistent : therefore the datum, that the 
immediate object of apperception is real, is not 
guaranteed — is not an axiom. We seem to be at 



138 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

present without means of ascertaining whether the 
datum be or be not true. Here we have striking proof 
that inconsistency of the opposite is not an indefectible 
guarantee. Until physiology exposed the dependence 
of consciousness on corporal event, the thesis, that the 
immediate object of apperception is real, seemed to be 
an axiom, and now it is manifest that the seeming is 
merely specious, and that its speciousness is determined 
by privation of a thesis — by poverty of philosophic 
imagination. (§ xx. 3.) 



XC. 



Experience affords no example of apperception 
without sensation. It must therefore be conceded to 
the materialist that, in all probability, sensation is a 
sine qua non of apperception, — that the unconscious 
" niento-corporal " event which causes the one neces- 
sarily causes the other. 



CHAPTEE XIII. 

EMOTION. 

XCI. 

1. Emotion is consciousness involving either pleasure 
or pain, and given as having the heart for its habitat, 
but not as its subject. It differs from sensation only 
in the respect that it does not seem to be a bodily 
attribute. Its difference from sensation is put in sharp 
relief when events that usually cause painful emotion 
cause instead a sensational pain in the heart. Pain, 
pleasure, and desire, are proper to sensations and 
emotions. 

2. Certain emotions are given as being perceptive, 
others as being imperceptive. The datum that gives 
emotion as being perceptive is so obscure that its 
exposure had to await the advent of Hutcheson, but, 
once detected, it is easily made plain to all the world. 
The attribute, sacredness, is no more empirically know- 
able apart from an emotion of reverence, the attribute, 
beauty, apart from an aesthetic emotion, the attribute, 
duty, apart from a moral emotion, than light is empiri- 
cally knowable by the blind. Fear is essential to the 
empirical perception of danger, a peculiar emotion of 



140 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

approbation to that of nobleness, a peculiar emotion of 
aversion to that of vice. 

Emotive perception is what is denoted by the name 
sentiment. One may have an unemotive knowledge 
or belief and a heart-knowledge or sentiment of the 
same thesis, e.g. that there is a God ; that the moral 
imperative is the will of God ; that an enemy who has 
insulted and otherwise injured the subject, as not having 
achieved personality and therein power of choice, is a 
proper object of pity, not of censure or resentment ; 
that the retributive spirit is a stultifying devil, which 
makes a hell upon earth, and, without impairing 
the efficiency of civil surgery, should be drowned in 
charity. When, in the change known as " change of 
heart," the heart discovers what was previously known 
only to the intellect, the discovered thesis is not recog- 
nised, and the discoverer learns with surprise that it is 
possible for one to discover what he knew before. 
Heart -knowledge of the deliverances of revelation is 
what Christendom terms faith. The emotive element 
of the knowledge is quantitative, so that those in whom 
it is greater seem to know better. Under certain cir- 
cumstances, e.g. those which give occasion for obedience 
to divine command, it is an incentive, and either 
instigates, or, as motive, solicits the will. This ex- 
plains the relation of faith to works in virtue of which 
works are the measure of faith. It will appear by- 
and-by (§ clxxix.) that wisdom is a high degree of heart- 
knowledge of moral law, and that " as a man thinketh 
in his heart so is he." 

3. By the way, the immediate objects of emotive 
perception are a species of aspects which, on account of 
their dependence on emotion, may be termed emotive 



chap. xiii. EMOTION. 141 

aspects. The discrimination of the species enables 
controversy respecting the foundation of morals to come 
to close quarters, instead of making passes in the dark 
altogether wide of the mark. Those who insist upon 
the absoluteness of the moral imperative must allow 
that it is knowable only by a contingent aspect which 
depends upon the emotive constitution of the person 
knowing. Is that aspect a phantom of the heart 
unrelated to the absolute? — or is it a face of the 
absolute determined by its contact with the contingent? 



XCII. 

1. When treating of Wisdom (Bk. III. chap, iv.) I 
shall have occasion to refer to a species of sympathy 
that has not been hitherto noticed. On this species 
and a kind of emotion on which it depends, we have 
now to bestow a moment's attention. Sympathy is 
emotion caused by what seems to be the emotion or 
sensation of another, and having a tendency to dispose 
to kindness; e.g. pity, and convivial emotion. The 
ascription of emotion ov sensation to another being is a 
condition sine qua rum of sympathy. Sympathy is 
divisible into that which does, and that which does not, 
arise out of concurrence of emotions of the same kind. 
Conviviality is sympathy that arises out of such a con- 
currence : pity for one in pain is sympathy that does 
not so arise. Let sympathy of the former kind, as 
being conditioned by homogeneity of emotions, be dis- 
tinguished as homogeneous, and sympathy of the latter 
kind as heterogeneous. Sympathy is further divisible 
into that which does, and that which does not, either 



142 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

* 

beget or enhance a feeling of fellowship. Homogene- 
ous sympathy always excites such a feeling. Not so 
heterogeneous sympathy. Pity for a lower animal in 
pain has no tendency to cause or enhance such a 
feeling. 

2. There is reason to believe that the immediate 
object symbolic of the emotion which we intuitively 
ascribe to another is for the most part agreeable. There 
are people who, without sympathy or antipathy, have 
pleasure in the intuitive ascription of emotion to others. 
Many who seem to be incapable of sympathy have 
pleasure in the intuitive ascription of emotion caused 
by the drama and by romance. This it is, probably, 
that throngs the scaffold and constituted the bad plea- 
sure with which a Eoman watched a shipwreck from 
his villa. Poets, dramatists, and writers of romance, 
have an exceptional power of imagining the emotions 
of others, and, apart from sympathy, have pleasure in 
its exercise. Men who are greatly swayed by public 
opinion sometimes seem to imagine the censure of 
which they take themselves to be the objects by means 
of a vicarious emotion, in which, as though they were a 
part of the critical public, they condemn themselves. 
It is probable that the power of worldliness is due to 
such vicarious and symbolic emotion. I do not risk 
much in taking for granted the existence of what I 
shall term ascriptive emotion. Heterogeneous sympathy 
depends upon ascriptive emotion. 



CHAPTEE XIV. 

EXPERIENCE. 

XCIII. 

1. If experience were defined, event involving a rela- 
tion of a mind to a reality in virtue of which the reality 
is immediately objective and known to the mind, the 
definition would correspond to the common notion of 
experience. This notion supposes the mind to embrace 
as it were and penetrate the reality, and, so, to have it 
for object and object of knowledge. The supposition 
received a shock to which it has since succumbed 
when physiology detected the series of nerve and 
cerebral changes that intervene between peripheral 
contact and consequent sense - perception. That a 
cerebral event, and not a proximity of the thing per- 
ceived, should be the proximate cause of sense-percep- 
tion, discredited the datum of immediate objectivity of 
reality in the foremost species of experience. When 
Hume showed, or seemed to show, that power or cause 
could not be immediately objective, the idea of it was 
transferred from the kind ideas d, posteriori to the kind 
ideas & priori, so intimately connected were ideas 
imputed to experience with immediate objectivity of 
reality. But. the common notion of experience, 



144 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

although it supposes that kind of objectivity to be 
intimately connected with, does not suppose it to be 
essential to, experience ; for the notion, although pro- 
foundly altered by proof that, certain consciousnesses 
excepted, reality is never immediately objective, has, 
in philosophic minds, survived that proof. What then 
is the differentia of Experience which contributed to 
determine the ictea of it prior to the physiological 
discovery, and now determines the philosophic idea of 
it ? To answer this, question it is necessary to dis- 
tinguish and name two species of knowledge that have 
hitherto escaped notice. . 

2. Let knowledge that originates in a ratiocination, 
and refers to an object other than the ratiocination, be 
distinguished as ratiocinative; 1 and all other know- 
ledge as " ilTatiocinative. ,, (I make free to enlarge 
the synonyms, Eatiocination and Seasoning, and their 
cognates, from the narrow signification to which con- 
trary to a law of language they have been confined, 
and to use them as denoting every exercise of Keason, 
its barren scrutiny as well as its most fruitful deduc- 
tion or induction.) Knowledge of infinity, as originat- 
ing in an act of Eeason and not having the act in 
which it originates for object, is an example of 
ratiocinative knowledge; on the other hand, know- 
ledge of the judgment that originates knowledge of 
infinity, is an example of irratiocinative knowledge. 
Again, knowledge of the guilt of John, inferentially 
originated, is ratiocinative, and knowledge of the 
originating inference is irratiocinative. 

1 To distinguish this kind of knowledge as "judicial" would be 
preferable, but that it would commit us to a contradiction in terms, 
viz. that in one of its aspects a judgment might be non-judicial. 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 145 

3. I call attention to the foregoing division of 
knowledge and the terms it occasions in order to 
provide verbal material for a definition of Experience, 
A judgment qud source of knowledge of itself is an 
experience, and, if it originate a different knowledge, 
qud source of that knowledge it is not an experience. 
When evidence originates knowledge in me of the 
guilt of John, the judgment in which the discovery- 
obtains, qud source of knowledge of the guilt of John, 
is not an experience, whereas qud source of knowledge 
of itself it is an experience. By confining the signifi- 
cation of the term Experience to irratiocinative know- 
ledge, we exclude from the kind, experience, agreeably 
to the common and philosophic idea of it, judgment 
qud source of knowledge of something other than itself, 
and we place in the kind the self-same mental event 
qud source of knowledge of itself. Eemembrance and 
hallucination, like ratiocination, overlap as it were and 
hide a part of the boundary of experience. Considered 
with reference to its object a remembrance is not an 
experience, but, considered as source of the knowledge 
of which it is itself the object, it is an experience. 
As not originating the knowledge of its object it is not 
experience; for it is essential to experience to be 
originative of knowledge. Hallucination considered 
with reference to its object is not experience, but, 
considered as source of the knowledge of which it is 
itself the object, it is experience. Dreams are experi- 
ences of dreaming, — the source of our knowledge of 
that kind of event, — but^ because their objects are not 
realities, considered with reference to those objects 
they are not experiences. . 

4. Knowledge, to be empirical, must be, not only 

L 



146 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

irratiocinative and non-hallucinative, but also, uncom- 
municated by the expression of another. Knowledge 
communicated by one man to another, whether by 
doctrine, testimony, or expression of any kind pro- 
ceeding from intention to communicate, is not the 
immediate and pure offspring of experience. 

5. What is proper and common to all species of 
events that have been classed together under the name 
Experience is, origination of irratiocinative non-hallu- 
cinative uncommunicated knowledge. This is what is 
the differentia and has been a part of the differentia of 
things denoted by the name Experience. Accord- 
ingly, I define Experience, mental event that originates 
irratiocinative non-Jvallurtinative uncommunicated know- 
ledge. 

XCIV. 

The experience of which reasoning and remem- 
brance are at once the sources and objects is appercep- 
tive. Experience of hallucination is partly apperceptive 
and partly perceptive. The subject is one that 
deserves an attention and analysis not hitherto 
bestowed upon it. The apperceptive part of the 
experience obtains contemporaneously with the hal- 
lucination, the perceptive when the hallucination is 
first remembered. The perceptive part of the experi- 
ence is mnemonical, at least it is involved in a 
remembrance. While we dream the dream events are 
given to apperception as real ; to the first remembrance 
of them they are given as figments of imagination. 
Without the corrective action of the remembrance the 
experience needful for the origination of knowledge of 
the hallucination is incomplete. 




chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 147 



XCV. 

1. Experience, according to the common notion of 
it, is event which the mind consciously undergoes, e.g. 
sense-perception ; but latent mental processes are con- 
cerned in begetting knowledge which that notion 
ascribes to experience. Knowledge of primary kinds 
(§ lxvi.) originates in experience which consists of a con- 
scious and a latent part. The conscious part acquaints 
us with individuals, not with a kind, not with a sum 
given as comprising all the like of a given type. There 
needs a mental event other than mere experience of 
individuals, e.g. mere sense-perceptions or apperceptions, 
to group, as it were, the mental symbols of individuals 
into sums, and annex to each sum the aspect of com- 
prising all the like. A latent mental process causes an 
equivalent of such a grouping and annexation, and per- 
fects in the unconscious region of the mind an equivalent 
of an idea of the kind. Primary kinds made known by 
experience alone are unconsciously known before they are 
consciously known — before ideas of them obtain. Know- 
lege of primary kinds originates thus unconsciously 
during adult life long after we have become capable of 
distinctly noticing our conscious mental processes, 
especially when one travels into remote lands and 
makes acquaintance with new species. We do not 
always discriminate the specific attributes of the strange 
species which then become known to us, nor are we 
conscious of a discourse constructive of ideas of the 
species. We are unconsciously, before we are consciously, 
cognisant of them. Another notable example of latent 
experience is experience of indistinct instances or those 



148 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

that, apart from question of any general thesis, bear on 
the mind so as to cause knowledge of the truth of such 
a thesis, e.g. of the general connection of whiteness with 
the other attributes usually discerned in swans; of that 
of combustibility with the other attributes of coal, 
wood, and turf ; of that of the hunger ^appeasing pro- 
perty of food with its other attributes ; of that of the 
thirst-appeasing property of water with its other attri- 
butes. A latent process consequent to such experience 
begets unconscious knowledge of the corresponding general 
truths, e.g., that swans are white, that coal, wood, turf, 
etc., are combustible. Such knowledges have been hitherto 
held to be the offspring of inference, and have been accounted 
inductions. Knowledge of natural signs, e.g. symptoms, 
weather-signs, physiognomical signs, originate in ex- 
periences which involve the operation of the latent 
mental event known as redintegration. Hectic, for 
example, having frequently borne on the mind in con- 
nection with other symptoms of consumption, is, through 
the action of redintegration, when it appears alone, 
apprehended as a sign of consumption. Weather signs 
and signs of human character have a similar origin. 
Knowledge of dream originates in experience that in- 
volves a latent constituent. Dreaming is a part of the 
experience that begets the knowledge, but only a part : 
the complement is a latent mental event of a noteworthy 
character ; it clothes the thing known with an attribute 
which shows itself to remembrance as hallucination. 
What seems to the dreamer while dreaming to be a 
real event seems to his remembrance to have been a 
figment. Experience therefore extends beyond the 
sphere of events which the mind consciously undergoes. 
In Chapter II., Book III., I deduce from familiar 
mental events the occurrence of unconscious mental 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 149 

events and the existence of an unconscious part of the 
mind. The facts were as familiar at the dawn of 
philosophy as they are to-day, without a suspicion on 
the part of philosophers that an important part of 
knowledge originates as unconscious knowledge. The 
possibility of unconscious mental event was not ima- 
gined, and privation of power to imagine it gave an 
air of necessary truth to false theses respecting the 
origin of certain species of knowledge. Knowledge of 
primary kinds was supposed to be due to discrimination 
of differentiae which refused to show themselves to the 
eye of philosophy, and certive knowledge (§ xvi) due 
to unconscious intuition was imputed to elaborate 
discourse of the illative faculty. 

2. Let experience that consists of latent processes 
be distinguished as latent, and the opposite species as 
manifest. Latent experience is always supplementary 
to manifest experience. 

3. Let latent experience consequent to experience 
of instances be distinguished as quasi-inferentialy and 
let the knowledge it begets be also distinguished by 
the same term. It is important to stigmatise, by this 
epithet, the deeply-rooted error that mistakes for in- 
ference a species of experience. 

An exposition of a species of experieuce which I 
distinguish as experience of time-series calls for de- 
finitions or explanation of the terms, duration, time- 
series, and motion. 



150 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



XCVL 

1. Duration is coincidence of the same with a 
divisible part of time or with all time. It is a species 
of what may be termed time-coincidence. This genus 
is comprised by the two species, duration, and what 
may be denominated serial coincidence with time. 
The coincidence of a man with the time between his 
birth and death is an example of duration, that of a 
melody with a part of time exemplifies serial time- 
coincidence. Time, duration, and serial time -coinci- 
dence, have a common and proper attribute to which 
no name has been given ; they are congeners of a 
nameless genus. Analogously, space and the extended 
things it contains have a common and proper attribute, 
— are congeners of a nameless genus. 

2. Let series that coincide with a divisible part of 
time or with all time be denominated time-series, and 
let event that is merely instantaneous be denominated 
non-serial event. Every point in space and every 
divisible part of space is an absolute place. It is a 
place by virtue of its relation to other points and parts 
of space, and absolute because it and they and the 
relations between them exist of necessity. A series 
of absolute places comprising all such places within 
its limits is continuous. A motion is coincidence for 
an instant with each place of a continuous series of 
mutually equal, absolute, places, without the interven- 
tion of a divisible part of time between any two of the 
instants} 

1 I here indicate rather than express what I take to be a truth : I 
do so by means of two inconsistent theses, one that two instants un- 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 151 

3. The foregoing definitions prepare us for a defini- 
tion of a species of experience which research has not 
hitherto had occasion to bring into view. Experience 
of time-series, e.g. motions, music, days, nights, seasons, 
customs, comprehends a species of which the differentia 
is, that the whole of the object seems (inconsistently) 
to exist at the present instant ; e.g. motion that seems 
to be occurring at the present instant, increase of 
light, heat, pleasure, or pain, that seems to be 
occurring at the present instant. When we watch 
the flight' of a bird, a part of the flight seems to be 
occurring at the present instant, and a part to have 
occurred prior to the present instant. Experience of 
this pre-present part exemplifies the species of experi- 
ence opposed to that which I am putting in relief. 
All experience of time-series save what refers to those 
that are extremely brief, e.g. a flash of forked lightning, 
consists of experiences of both kinds, one referent to a 
series given as occurring at the present instant, and the 
other as referent to a series given as having occurred 
prior to the present instant. The whole object, if the 
time of the experience do not exceed a few seconds, 
seems to be contained in a larger present of which the 
present instant seems to be the term. Let us dis- 
tinguish these two species of experience, the one as 
paradoxic, because it apprehends as occurring at an 
instant what coincides with a divisible time, the other 
as antirparadoayic. 

divided by a time are possible, the other that two mutually continuous 
places undivided by a space are possible. In my explanation of 
motion the two inconsistencies are opposed and cancel each other. The 
explanation is a pis alter, but in the region of the antinomial we have 
no right to be fastidious. 



152 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



XCVII. 

Experience of time-series supposes an immediate 
and a remote object, and that the beginning of the 
immediate object either coincides in time with the end 
of the remote one or is altogether posterior to it. For 
illustration of this truth as regards paradoxic experience 
let us consider a paradoxic experience of motion. To 
see a motion either is or involves the seeing at an 
instant what coincides with a divisible time. Divide 
the time of any extremely brief visible motion into the 
five equal parts ABODE. The motion cannot be 
seen during the time A, for the parts of it that measure 
BCDE have not yet obtained. It cannot be seen 
during the time C, for that which measures the time A 
has ceased and the parts which measure D E have not 
yet obtained. It follows that the whole of the motion 
is not immediately visible at any instant whatever, 
and that the immediate object of the perception must 
be unreal, must be a mental modification serving as 
vicar or symbol of a remote object, viz. the motion, and 
that the beginning of the immediate object must be 
either coincident with or posterior to the end of the 
remote one. Several successive perceptions, each 
having for object a part of a motion, however rapidly 
one may follow another, are not a perception of the 
motion, and, if a perception of the motion obtain, it 
must be by means of a modification of consciousness 
symbolic of the motion, — an immediate unreal object 
symbolic of a remote one. The several perceptions are 
no more a perception of the motion than vision which 
discerns every object in its field is perception of the 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 153 

field of vision. The field of vision is invisible. Para- 
doxic experience of intensification of pain also illustrates 
the dependence of experience of time-series on an im- 
mediate object vicarious of a real and remote one ; for, 
when the greater of the contrasted degrees of pain 
obtains, the less has ceased to exist, and must be sym- 
bolised in the contrast by an unreal and vicarious 
object. As regards anti-paradoxic experience the truth 
is obvious, since it is essential to the object of this kind 
of experience to include what the subject knows to have 
ceased to exist, e.g. any pre-present part of a bird's 
flight observed during two or three seconds. 



XCVIII. 

Paradoxic experience on which an anti-paradoxic 
experience depends acts upon the mind somewhat as 
the pencil point with which a crayon picture is made 
acts upon the paper. Each modifies what it acts upon, 
and the series of its actions is the antecedent and cause 
of a modification different from what is caused by any 
unit of the series,— in the one case a picture, in the 
other the object of an anti-paradoxic experience: a 
single impact of the pencil point causes a dot, not a 
picture ; a single bearing of the paradoxic experience 
causes not the object of the anti-paradoxic experience, 
nor one resembling it, but an object resembling a minute 
part of it In all probability the analogy fails in this 
respect, that the dot is a durable thing and a constituent 
of the picture, but the product of the paradoxic experi- 
ence is not a durable thing nor a constituent of the 
object of the anti-paradoxic experience. The metaphor 



154 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

which puts the mind as being a tabula rasa on which 
experience depicts is not to be mistaken for a literal 
expression of fact It is not to be supposed that when 
we remember an object of experience we discern a 
durable modification of the mind. Of course a durable 
modification of the mind caused by the experience 
generates the immediate object of the remembrance, 
but the object is one thing, and the modification 
another ; the one is fugitive, the other durable ; the one 
is the equivalent of an organ, — an equivalent fashioned 
by the experience, — the other an effect of the function 
of that equivalent. This I put now as extremely 
probable ; by-and-by (Book III.) I shall show that it 
is certain. 



XCIX. 

Anti-paradoxic experience comprehends a species 
of which the peculiarity is, that its objects exclusively 
consist of parts specifically like their wholes and coun- 
terparts of objects of the related paradoxic experiences : 
it also comprehends a species of which the objects 
include parts unlike any of the objects of anti-paradoxic 
experience. A visual experience of the flight of a bird 
during five seconds is an example of the first of these 
two species : the whole of the motion consists of motions 
that were objects of the paradoxic experiences on which 
the anti-paradoxic experience depends. Experience of 
a dream or of a Kind is an example of the second. The 
objects of the paradoxic experiences on which the 
experience of a dream depends include nothing like the 
fictiveness ; on the contrary, their objects are given as 
being realities. The objects of the paradoxic experi- 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 155 

ences on which experience of a Kind depends includes 
nothing resembling an idea of the general. 



C. 



Knowledge of individuals of the kind, Custom, is the 
product of latent experience, and is at first unconscious. 
Custom being a time-series, I forbore to treat of its 
relation to latent experience until I had treated of those 
series. All of us are cognisant of our own customs 
before they become objective to us, and many of the 
customs of the society we frequent are likewise un- 
consciously known before they are consciously known. 
Equivalents of ideas then are evolved in the unconscious 
part of the mind by latent experience. Analogy 
warrants a strong presumption that knowledge of the 
kind, custom, obtains unconsciously in advance of a 
concept of the kind. The discovery that knowledge of 
custom originates unconsciously gave a certain specious- 
ness to the thesis, that knowledge of such series as the 
tide, the succession of day and night, that of the 
seasons, is also at first unconscious, — a speciousness that 
detained and had wellnigh prevailed with me. These 
series first become known as objects in the field of 
retrospect, objects mirrored in expectation. Paradoxic 
and anti-paradoxic experience, helped by redintegration, 
modify the mind, qud organ of retrospect and expecta- 
tion, so that the organ generates an objective field 
consisting of such series. 



# 



156 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



CI. 



1. How superficially experience has been studied 
is evinced by the doctrine of Locke, that it is com- 
prised by the two species, sensational intuition and 
intuition of one's own consciousness, and it is evinced 
by the doctrine of Kant, that experience consists of 
sensational intuition. 1 Knowledge of the life and con- 
sciousness of others is not ascribable to sensational 
discernment nor to apperception, but the knowledge is 
universally allowed to originate in experience. Know- 
ledge of thickness originates in experience, yet thickness 
is neither tangible, visible, audible, testable, or smell- 
able. Temporal identity is not a thing to be objective 
to sensational intuition nor to intuition of one's own 
consciousness, but the knowledge of it is the product 
of experience. The symbol of it is the product of the 
mind borne upon by a certain degree of likeness. All 
who have treated of experience have overlooked that 
species of it which I denote by the name Mooking 
sensational perception. A thorough study of the genus, 
Experience, involving due attention to all its species, 
would probably have spared philosophy Hume's negation 
of the empirical origin of the idea of power, and Kant's 
negation of that of the ideas of time and space. It 
would have found that, in certain species of experience, 
causes totally dissimilar to their effects beget an im- 
mediate object that passes for a reality, — one which 
avows to scrutiny that it is purely a creature of the 

1 Kant teaches that intuition of one's own consciousness is sensa- 
tional, — a rude and needless effacement of an important and distinct 
boundary. 



j^agfc^a^Maiai— l^fc^^MiihA^Mfc^ i Vi ".'- ' ,"^ti 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 157 

mind, and merely a symbol of a possible or probable 
reality. This symbol may, as regards human inten- 
tional action, conveniently correspond to, without in 
the least resembling, the reality. 

2a. The error which takes for granted that sense- 
perception and apperception comprise experience, com- 
bined with impatience of ideas that tend to betray 
scrutiny into metaphysical maundering, and afford to 
calculation no prescient point of view, contributed to 
engender Positivism. Blazoning the sovereignty of 
Experience, Positivism behaves towards it as a mayor 
of the palace, discarding some of its most important 
data, e.g. that there is a concrete and durable subject 
of consciousness, the thing denoted by the name Mind, 
the thing which denotes itself by the pronoun, " I "; that 
there is a quality in virtue of which certain concretes 
are causes, the quality denoted by the name Power ; 
that life is a species of power, — a dynamic quality. I 
have already exposed what seems to me to be the 
error of Positivism as regards mind : let us see whether 
its doctrine respecting power, and the species of power 
termed life, be not even less excusable. 

26. Immediate objects symbolic of power are 
familiar to sense-perception. To the burned child 
burning-power seems to be a tangible thing, and when 
we are pushed the pushing power seems to be a tangible 
thing. Power is objective to apperception. We apper- 
ceive what seems to be power applied by ourselves. 
In these cases an immediate object symbolic of power 
(whether truly symbolic or the reverse I do not pretend 
to imply) seems to be tangible. There is a species of 
power that belongs to the kind, inapparitional attri- 



158 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

butes (§ lix. 2.). When the impact of one billiard- 
ball upon another then at rest is followed by the 
stoppage of the impinging ball and the motion of the 
other, our apprehension of the event involves an 
apprehension of the impinging ball as subject of an 
attribute such as is denoted by the name, force, and this 
attribute explains itself to scrutiny as being power active; 
the quality, Power, is raised for the time into the occasional 
attribute, Force. When we see water poured upon fire, 
and the apparent conversion of fire into cinders follows, 
the visual experience involves the apprehension of a 
quenching-power in the water. In these cases sense 
makes no pretension to perceive the power, — no such 
pretension as it makes in respect of burning or pushing 
power when the subject is burned or pushed, — but, 
nevertheless, experience is intuitive of the inapparitional 
or supersensible attribute, power. The existence of 
power and force, then, is a datum of experience, and, 
as reasoning depends upon data, the negation of the 
existence of those attributes is an arbitrary and cap- 
ricious undermining of the ground of Eeason. The 
effort of Positivism to emasculate objects as regards 
the attributes, power and force, is an enterprise 
against what is, for most minds, a necessity of thought, 
a necessity that is explanatory in respect of the most 
important part of events related to each other as ante- 
cedents and sequents. The attribute of mental con- 
stitution on which the necessity depends gives these 
antecedents and sequents as causes and effects. Abolish 
this datum and you make a part of the mind chaotic. 
The idea of necessary connection between antecedent 
and sequent contains only a part of what is contained 
in the idea of cause and effect. The first part of 
every hour is in necessary connection with the second 




J 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 159 

part ; it is its necessary antecedent, but not therefore its. 
cause. Something more than the idea of a necessary 
connection of antecedence and sequence is necessary 
to the idea of cause, viz., the symbol of power. Suppose 
the impinging billiard-ball to be coated with black 
paint and to impart a speck of the paint to the ball 
which its impact sets in motion. Here we have two 
antecedents of the motion of the second ball, both 
equally proximate as regards time and space, and one 
of them is held to have no bearing whatever on the 
motion. A countless multitude of events are proximate 
antecedents of every beginning of motion, and only 
one of them is accounted cause of the motion. Can it 
be supposed that this one, taken together with the 
concrete which it supposes, involves no attribute of a 
nature to necessitate the sequent. A necessity of 
thought excludes such a supposition ; it compels belief 
in such an attribute, and that attribute is something 
more than necessary antecedence ; it is what we denote 
by the name, power. It is true that the idea of power, 
like that of time, baffles scrutiny. When we consider 
power in relation to immediate effect it seems to vanish 
into nothingness, and then we are tempted to think 
that we mistook those effects, considered as means 
relatively to remote effects, for power. Power is no 
more prescindable than the colours of the rainbow, — at 
least it has not been hitherto prescinded. We fail to 
distinguish it from inertia, and from susceptibility. 
But we have no more right to deny its existence on 
that account than we have to deny the existence of 
the colours of the rainbow. The idea of power has 
not been developed out of the confusion in which the 
difference between causes and mere occasions-dynamic 
conditions, and what may be termed " adynamic " con- 



160 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

ditions — is still in part immersed. The shadow at 
which one starts is a condition of the start, but certainly 
not a dynamic one. Is it a cause, or a part of the 
cause, or is it a mere occasion of the start ? The cir- 
cumstances, minus emotion, which give occasion for 
an indeliberate intentional act, are conditions of the 
act, but not dynamic. Are they, in respect of the act, 
causes or parts of causes, or are they mere occasions ? 
According to Mill, a cause is the sum of the conditions. 1 
If this be true, time and space are parts of, at least, 
all natural causes, for they are conditions sine qua non 
of all natural events. It seems to me that only dynamic 
conditions should be accounted causes, the adynamic 
being ranked as mere accessories. - But, in spite of these 
embarrassments, the confusion from which the idea of 
Power exempts us vastly exceeds what the idea involves; 
and we should no more think of rejecting the idea 
because of its defects than of plucking out our eyes 
because they sometimes deceive us. We should regard 
it as an embryo which culture is in process of matur- 
ing, and hope perfect explanatoriness from the maturity 
of the idea. If we abolish the idea of power we 
abolish that of cause; for the idea of an adynamic 
condition, or a sum of adynamic conditions, is not the 
idea of a cause. If there be no such thing as power 
the thesis, ex nihilo nihil fit, is untrue ; every event 
springs from nothing; antecedent events are as im- 
potent in respect of the sequents that seem to be their 
effects as antecedent in respect of sequent parts of 
time; the impact of the billiard-ball that seems to 
cause the motion of the ball impinged upon has no 
more to do with the apparently consequent motion 
than any of the infinitude of events simultaneous with 

1 A System of Logic, Book III. chap. v. § 3. 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 161 

the impact : that electric action ceases if, in connection 
with an electric battery, we substitute twine for wire, 
does not suppose an aptitude in the wire that does not 
exist in the twine ; events follow in the one case that 
do not in the other, but not at all because of an 
attribute— a power— in the wire that is not in the 
twine : the uniformities of events are causeless ; they 
occur by chance ; the order of our thoughts is not an 
effect of our nature; there is no reason why the 
thoughts and their order should not, as Hume imagined, 
obtain without the existence of a man : indeed, with 
power and cause we abolish nature, for nature is 
power. 

2c. Experience gives life as being a quality, — a 
quality proper to animals, not common to animals 
and plants. Philosophic inference has pronounced it 
to be quite a different thing, a thing not proper to 
animals, but proper and common to animals, plants, 
and certain of the parts of these, 'e.g. the cells of 
which animals and plants are composed. Moreover, 
it repudiates the datum of experience, that life is a 
quality, and holds it to be a series of events, viz. the 
series constituting nutrition, reproduction, and generally 
what are known as vital acts. Even Stahl, who main- 
tained that life depends upon the soul, held it to be a 
series of events. " life," he says, " is the result of the 
conservative action of the soul," — which supposes it 
to be a series of events resulting from a series of 
psychical acts. By modern biologists life is held to 
be a series of events known as vital. In his Principles 
of Biology Mr. Spencer defines life, "the continuous 
adjustment of internal to external relations." An 
examination of the genesis of the idea of life finds 

M 




162 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

that experience puts it as a quality. The kind, 
animals, is a primary kind. Latent experience begets 
in the unconscious region of the mind an equivalent 
of an idea of the kind, animals, before the idea obtains. 
Death elucidates the specific attribute of the kind. 
When, for the fiist time, one makes acquaintance with 
death, perhaps seeing a body that was the body of his 
father, brother, wife, or child, and is a corpse, the con- 
trast informs him that something has departed from 
the body, something which an exposition of the dis- 
coveiy would describe as being characteristic of animals 
and a condition sine qnd ncn of their peculiar motions. 
The rigidity of death is given as excluding not merely 
the suppleness and the motions characteristic of 
animals, but also a dynamic quality on which the 
motions depend. The experience ignores the events 
that are proper and common to animals and vegetables, 
e#. nutrition, reproduction, etc, events which are 
knowable only through inference; and, accordingly, 
life, as at first discriminated and as it is commonly 
apprehended by children and the illiterate adult, is 
given as being proper to animals Children, and 
the illiterate adult— all those who know respecting 
life only what experience teaches — always learn 
with surprise that plants have life. The idea of the 
fijfinmim of life, as given by experience, includes a 
symbol of essential connection between life and sensi- 
bility. Such, on the avouch of experience, is life — 
the dynamic quality manifested by the intuhahle 
notions proper to animals* Science iefenned the idea 
of life given by experience and subsequently sub- 
stituted fer it an ittai that be*r> to it scarce an v 
nrwiiManuu finding that there are events which are 
«fti aauton to animals and Tt^getafcfes* and 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 163 

that these are of much greater importance than those 
which exhibit life to experience, science discarded 
from the idea of life given by experience the symbol 
of astriction to animals, reforming it into the idea of 
quality on which depend events proper and common to 
animals and vegetables. In logical language, it dimin- 
ished the comprehension and increased the extensidh 
of the idea. In depriving the idea of the symbol of 
astriction to animals, it deprived it also of that of 
essential connection between life and sensibility ; for 
common sense could not be brought to allow that 
plants are capable of consciousness, and evolution, 
nutrition, and reproduction are unconscious events. 
So far science merely reformed the idea of life given 
by experience, but now it was to substitute quite 
another idea, according to which there are as many 
lives as cells and organs in an animal or vegetable. 
Every organ, every cell, has a life of its own, and the 
life of the animal or vegetable is either the sum of the 
lives of its cells and organs, or a life begotten of that 
sum. An obvious animal or vegetable is an aggregate 
of unobvious animals or vegetables. According to 
this hypothesis, the idea of a swarm of midges or a 
hive of bees being compacted into an animal is not 
altogether unworthy of serious entertainment. Fis- 
siparous generation, and the fact that mechanical 
division can convert a part of a polype into a polype, 
are the pretext for this affront to the authority of 
experience. A decent regard for that authority would 
have put up with the explanation that, when a part of 
an animal or vegetable converts into an obvious animal 
or vegetable, a new life begins. I venture to say that 
biology cannot adduce a fact which is not as satis- 
factorily explicable in this way as by the revolutionary 



164 THE ALTERNATIVE. , book i. 

hypothesis. The growth of hair and nails in a corpse, 
and the behaviour of the corpse under certain currents 
of electricity, should have excluded, or at least post- 
poned, the hypothesis. The growth of hair and nails 
in a corpse proves that growth, although proper to 
organisation, is not necessarily a vital event — much 
less is the series of events which evolve the additions 
to hair and nails an individual of the kind, life. There 
are qualities that depend upon antecedent, but not 
on present, life ; such is the quality that evolves hair 
and nails in lifeless bodies and makes the prodigious 
reaction to the electric current of an organism which 
survives life. This by the way. — life and organisa- 
tion are not interdependent. The amoeba protests that 
life is possible without organisation, and the hair- 
growing corpse, that organisation without present life 
is possible. If, according to the Darwinian theory, 
the more complex forms of living things proceed from 
the simpler, unorganised living things must have been 
the primordial ancestors. We are the offspring of the 
amoeba or of some other unorganised animal Life is 
the precursor of organisation. 1 To return, — as regards 
the question, What is life ? Positivism heads an insur- 
rection against experience. 

2d. But granting that parts of the animal or vege- 
table have lives proper to them, respect for experience 
requires us to believe that the life is a quality, not a 
series of events, and that it is a power, — the power to 
cause certain vital events. 

1 Bichat, and those who hold with him that life supposes organs, 
are rebuked by the amoeba ; and growth in a corpse refutes the assertion 
of Mr. Lewes that a corpse is not an organism. — Physical Basis of 
Mind, p. 9. 




chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 165 

2e. Has not the aversion of Positivism to meta- 
physics a deeper cause than mere aversion to squaring 
circles ? Certain minds may be incapable of the idea 
of the inapparitional attribute, as the colour-blind are 
incapable of discernment of certain colours. To such 
a mind the name, Power, could denote nothing more 
than invariable antecedence in respect of certain 
sequents. I cannot imagine how it could apprehend 
the antecedence as being necessary, although Hume, 
the great spokesman of those "who give occasion for 
the hypothesis, allows a nexus, which he terms neces- 
sary-connection, between events related by invariable 
antecedence and sequence. I shall show (§ cxii. 2d) 
what gulfs yawn between different orders of mind as 
regards the ideas of Time and Space, and it seems to 
me not improbable that we are now in the way of 
discovering another. Perhaps, as giving more reason 
for intellectual humility and agreement to differ, the 
discovery should not be an occasion of regret. But 
let me not be understood to imply in this suggestion 
or in any contention with Positivism disparagement of 
the splendid abilities of Comte or of the notable men 
who have upheld his doctrine. If it were proved that 
there are minds which exclude intuition of inappari- 
tional quality, the conclusion would not involve a 
corollary that those minds are inferior. For aught we 
know the exclusion might be an advantage, not a defect. 
It has not prevented Positivism from being in the van 
of science. The evolutionary thinking of the race has its 
course, like that of a river, determined by opposition ; 
it is dashed by headland to headland, and the mental 
structure of the Positivist is one of the great headlands ' 
that give direction to philosophy. It is infirmity, not 
strength, that is prone to depreciation of opponents. 



166 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



OIL 



Experience begets opinion, and doubt, as well as 
knowledge, but it is essential to it to beget knowledge, 
and accidental to beget opinion and doubt. Percep- 
tion sometimes involves an inchoate action of the 
faculty of identification, and therein an opinion and 
doubt, or a pure doubt, respecting an identity. This 
experience, it might be thought, is one that does not 
beget a knowledge. But it does beget a knowledge, 
viz. a knowledge of the existence of the thing of which 
the identity is in question. 



era. 

1. Experience occasions a kind of knowledge which 
philosophers have altogether ignored, viz. knowledge of 
what the subject is not experiencing (knowledge which 
memory converts into knowledge of what has not been 
experienced), e.g. that I am not beholding an elephant 
or a mountain, that I have not seen the Andes. It 
also occasions the knowledge that its real field does 
not include certain things, for example, that there is 
not an elephant or a mountain in the real field of vision. 
It occasions a third kind of negative knowledge, viz., 
that what has not been experienced by any man nor 
inferentially discovered does not exist. The genus of 
these three kinds of knowledge is differentiated by 
what may be described as derivation from empirical 
negation, and the knowledge may be termed empirically 




chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 167 

negative knowledge. It may be divided into two sub- 
genera, which may be termed, the one internal, and 
the other external, empirically negative knowledge. The 
former is knowledge of what is not or has not been expe- 
rienced, the latter comprises two species which may be 
distinguished, the one as extravagant, the other as 
non-extravagant, empirically negative knowledge. The 
product of the law of belief which obliges men to 
assume that the humanly known exhausts the know- 
able, although of great utility, is certainly extravagant. 
Knowledge that what is not now being experienced 
is not now here— not now within the real domain 
corresponding to the symbolic domain of experience, — 
although far from indefectible, is not extravagant. 
Internal empirically negative knowledge is all but 
indefectible. The knowledge is internal as being con- 
fined to the field of immediate objectivity. 

2. Empirically negative knowledge is a good 
example of the kind of knowledge of which the 
differentia is that it obtains unconsciously, — is, in its 
inception, unconscious — also of unconscious knowledge 
to which no conscious knowledge ever corresponds. 
How many have lived and died unconsciously know- 
ing, and never consciously knowing, that they had 
never seen the Andes. 



CIV. 



The relation of experience to time has not been 
profoundly studied. Its objects are given as being 
of the present, but the part of time referred to by the 



168 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

datum is a very different thing from the conterminus 
of the past and future which philosophy denotes by the 
name Present. The present to which the datum refers 
is really a part of the past — a recent past — delusively 
given as being a time that intervenes between the 
past and the future. Let it be named the specious 
present, and let the past that is given as being the 
past be known as the obvious past. All the notes of 
a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in 
the present. All the changes of place of a meteor 
seem to the beholder to be contained in the present. 
At the instant of the termination of such series no 
part of the time measured by them seems to be a past. 
Time, then, considered relatively to human apprehen- 
sion, consists of four parts, viz, the obvious past, the 
specious present, the real present, and the future. 
Omitting the specious present, it consists of three ultra- 
entities — not to say nonentities, — viz. the past, the 
future, and their conterminus, the present. The 
specious present is a fiction of experience. 



CV. 



By the way, — how much respect has been had to 
the endowment of man with an adequate faculty of 
knowledge is evinced by the idea of Erne. The idea 
is a fundamental one, being the hinge of the idea of 
Event, and nevertheless is stigmatised by various in- 
consistency. As symbol of what consists of the past, 
the present, and the future, it is a symbol of a putative 
entity composed of the three nonentities, the past 
which does not exist, the future which does not exist, 




chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 16d 

and their conterminus the present : the faculty from 
which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the 
specious present. Have we indeed reason to rely that 
human fallibility is not radical ? 



CVI. 



Experience and judgment are sometimes so in- 
timately combined as not to be distinguishable without 
scrutiny, and in such cases experience seems to be in 
essential connection with question. Columbus' first 
perception of transatlantic land, being connected with 
question whether such land did or did not exist, was 
combined with the judgment " transatlantic land exists;" 
and the perception has at first sight the air of being 
dependent on question, — essentially connected with it. 
The connection is merely accidental. 



CVII. 

What is denoted by the term, experiment, is not 
limited to experience. A mathematician may, with- 
out use of sense, experiment with and upon mere ideas 
of numbers and mathematical diagrams, so as to dis- 
cover properties of numbers and figures and invent 
rules, e.g. the rule of three or the rule for making an 
equilateral triangle. 



170 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



CVIIL 

• 

Human skill is given as being the effect of an 
interaction of man and his environment, an interaction 
that pretends to be a species of experience. In so far 
as the interaction originates knowledge, — knowledge 
how to perform — it is certainly experience, but, as 
there is a kind of skill that does not seem to be in- 
volved with knowledge how to perform, all interaction 
that begets skill does not present a good title to be 
accounted experience. Skill unrelated to the knowing 
faculty by a rule of performance without which it is 
not in the province of art and is not verbally com- 
municable by one man to another, e.g, skill in hitting 
a mark with a stone, is not involved with knowledge, 
and the interaction that begets such skill fails to make 
good its pretension to be accounted a species of expe- 
rience. An operative, by his skill in compounding 
certain chemicals used for dyeing, achieved for his 
employers a great success, but was quite incapable of 
discerning the rule according to which his skill pro- 
ceeded. Here we have an example of skill uninvolved 
with knowledge, and of an interaction of man and his 
environment which, although productive of skill, does 
not fall within the kind hitherto denoted by the name 
experience. If we enlarged the idea and comprehen- 
sion of the kind so as to make room in it for the 
interaction that begets skill, the proceeding would 
demand of us a still greater enlargement, whereby the 
kind should accommodate, as a species, the latent bodily 
processes that transmit to offspring faculties acquired 
by an ancestor. Philosophers have already taken this 



chap. xiv. EXPERIENCE. 171 

liberty ; a bold way of philosophising due to the dis- 
regard and even contempt * of the deductive spirit and 
method which has resulted from the great success of 
induction. If the philosophers who have thus inno- 
vated upon the kind, experience, had undertaken to 
define the kind, it is probable that they would have 
encountered difficulties which would at least have 
cooled their precipitation. To undertake to define, 
tends to arrest and allay the temper of indiscreet 
rapidity in philosophy, ll brings J book and tends 
to beget a humbler intellectual temper. I do not see 
my way to a definition of Experience accommodating 
so great an innovation and conformed to the rule of 
eschewing assumption, especially of begging vexed 
questions. It seems to me not impossible that one 
day, owing to an advance of knowledge, the interaction 
which begets skill and the processes of hereditary 
transmission of acquired faculty may be found to be 
species of a genus entitled to the name, experience ; 
but at our present stage of knowledge we are not pre- 
pared for a definition affording legitimate accommoda- 
tion to the new candidates. The verbal communi- 
cation to one man of knowledge originated by the 
experience of another, is not an experience ; it is the 
offspring of, but not, an experience. How then should 
we account the processes whereby a faculty, whether 
of intuition or skill, acquired by an ancestor, is trans- 
mitted to his progeny, an experience ? The laxity of 
the inductive spirit as regards definition — its tendency 
to overlook differences which are not as near to obvi- 
ousness as they are important, — has begotten an idea of 
experience according to which knowledge derived from 

1 The author of Philosophy Without Assumptions sneers at deduc- 
tion, — at reasoning that pretends to infer what "must be." 



172 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

one's own experience is not distinguished from verbally 
imparted knowledge originated by the experience of 
another. My knowledge that there is a country named 
China is indeed the offspring of experience, but not of 
my experience. It is guaranteed to me, not by expe- 
rience, but by the law of confidence in the assertions 
of others; whereas they may err or lie. I have 
defined experience without assuming the existence of a 
material human body or a material environment, mak- 
ing the term as available to the idealist as to the 
materialist. This advantage must be forfeited if the 
comprehension of the kind be enlarged so as to 
embrace event that originates skill not founded on 
knowledge of rule. 







CHAPTEE XV. 



NO KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. 



CIX. 

All guaranteed knowledge, including knowledge of 
axioms and knowledge that originates in guaranteed 
inference, is accounted it priori. According to Kant, 
knowledge of time and space is h priori. Allowing 
these three kinds of knowledge to be a priori, what is 
the differentia of knowledge it priori ? Not the being 
congenital or unacquired, for guaranteed knowledge that 
originates in inference, e.g. Mathematics, is acquired. 
Not origination outside of experience, for the knowledge 
achieved by what is known as the inductive leap 
originates outside of experience, and it is not accounted 
a priori; it is separated from experience by a gulf 
which the leap traverses. There seems to be no other 
attribute that is proper and common to the three kinds 
of knowledge in virtue of which they could be reason- 
ably supposed to comprise a genus denotable as know- 
ledge it priori. But, if we eliminate guaranteed 
knowledge that originates in inference, it may, without 
flagrant inconsistency, be held that knowledges of the 
two remaining kinds are congenital, the antecedence 
referred to by the adverb it priori being that of con- 



174 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

genital knowledge in respect of experience. This 
indicates the history of the term, knowledge d priori. 
Axiomatic knowledge w$s at first the only knowledge 
denoted by the term ; then the signification of the term 
was extended so as to embrace all deductive or guar- 
anteed science, and was finally stretched by Kant so as 
to include knowledge of time and space. Now if it be 
shown that axiomatic knowledge and the ideas of Time 
and Space are the creatures of experience, we destroy 
the foundation of the pretension of guaranteed science 
to be knowledge d priori, and so prove that there is no 
such knowledge. This I proceed to show. 



CX. 



Axiomatic knowledge is divisible into knowledge of 
discoverable, and knowledge of undiscoverable, axioms. 
The axiom The sum of the parts is equal to the whole 
is an example of undiscoverable axioms ; the axiom, a 
limit is the conterminus of two beyonds, of discover- 
able axioms. Knowledge of undiscoverable axioms 
begins unconsciously. The process by which experience 
supplies the pertinent cognitive complement to the per- 
tinent thesic affection (§ xviii.), converting an incom- 
plete thesic affection into a complete one, is latent. 
The latency excludes the possibility of discovery prior 
to a late development of philosophy. On the other 
hand, question and effort to make the contrary an 
object of knowledge are needed to convert the incom- 
plete thesic affections that refer to discoverable axioms 
into complete ones, — into knowledges. It is obvious 
that knowledge of undiscoverable axioms originates in 



chap. xv. NO KNOWLEDGE & PRIORI. 175 

the experience which supplies the pertinent cognitive 
complements, but it is not obvious that knowledge of 
discoverable axioms so originates. This, however, 
admits of proof. The kinds that are the subjects of 
discoverable axioms, e.g. limits, beginnings, events, 
causes, are made known by experience, and the 
mental symbols of them are so fashioned by the 
experience in which they originate that scrutiny must 
needs find in them the attribute which the axiomatic 
proposition predicates. The experience makes essen- 
tial to the subject the condition of a complete seem- 
ing of necessity in virtue of which scrutiny intui- 
tively sees in the pertinent thesis an axiom, — sees 
inconsistency in the opposite* thesis. For example, it 
inserts into the idea of a limit the condition of the 
complete seeming of necessity that a limit is between 
two beyonds ; into the idea of a beginning the complete 
seeming of necessity that a beginning is an effect. The 
property of experience whereby it generates the con- 
ditions of deductive discovery of the infinite and the 
absolute were hidden in our ignorance of the possibility 
of unconscious knowledge and of the latent operations 
of experience. This will be further illustrated by the 
exposure of the empirical origin of the ideas of Space 
and Time. 

CXI. 

Kant holds that knowledge of space and time is 
& priori. He grounds the doctrine on the following 
arguments ; — a. The idea of Space cannot be a product 
of external experience, or that which has for object the 
universe external to the mind or any part of it, because 
that experience presupposes an idea of space, an idea 



176 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

of an extended thing without one of space being impos- 
sible : &. The idea of Space involves an idea of non- 
contingent existence, for space is given as existing of 
necessity, a consistent notion of the non-existence of 
space being impossible ; but experience takes no cog- 
nisance of the non-contingent ; it is confined to cognis- 
ance of the contingent : c. The idea of Space is the idea 
of an infinite monad ; the symbols of infinity and of a 
unity that excludes separableness of parts are essential 
to it, so that it could not be the offspring of an addition 
of part to part, but springs complete into being; it 
cannot, therefore, be accounted a collective or general 
idea ; to hold that a part of space is first apprehended, 
and that then other parts are successively added and 
finally a complement of infinity, is inconsistent. 



CXII. 

1. Now it is true that a sense-perception of an 
extension supposes a discernment of a void, (whether of 
an infinite and absolute void may for the present be 
left an open question), but it does not presuppose such 
a discernment. It is not only conceivable but it is 
highly probable that an impression made by a solid 
upon a tactile afferent has the property of causing a 
sense-perception that has for object both a solid and 
a void. 

2a. The second argument begs the question whether 
it be competent to experience to beget knowledge of 
the non-contingent, and, more generally, of Necessity. 
We might alter the meaning of the term Experience, so 




chap. xv. NO KNOWLEDGE 1 PRIORI. 177 

that it should denote a kind of mental events of a 
nature to initiate knowledge of the contingent. It 
might be a most expedient arrangement, but the philo- 
sopher who makes free to do this should give us notice 
of the change, and define the kind to which he applies 
the term. Kant does neither. Following Leibnitz he 
asserts, as though it were a self-evident truth, that 
what all the world understands by the term, experience, 
does not give cognisance of the non-contingent, of what 
could not not-be. He thereby implies, or seems to 
imply, that it is not cojnpetent to a latent encephalic 
event consequent to a ; tactile impression to cause a 
discernment of both a solid and a non-contingent void. 
If it have this property, it is idle to pretend, as Kant 
pretends, that it produces the two objects of the discern- 
ment in different ways, one & priori, and the other 
& posteriori, — as idle as to pretend that the friction of 
the lucifer match elicits the consequent light from the 
match, and the consequent heat from the substance 
against which the match is rubbed. The speciousness 
of the doctrine, that certain ideas originate with, but 
not in, experience, covers just so much emptiness. It 
is true that space is given as a thing which could not 
be tactilely discerned, but physiology annulled the 
datum when it ascertained that the proximate cause of 
a sense -perception is an event occurring in a nerve 
centre, and not at the periphery. So long as belief is 
determined by the datum, that the immediate object of 
sense -perception is real, and that its relation to the 
percipient is the proximate cause of the perception and 
the immediate object of the inlooking sensational dis- 
cernment which attends the perception, so long it is 
also determined by the datum, that space, as being 
intangible, is not discernible by means of the tactile 

N 



178 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

sense. But when it is known that the relation of the 
perceived reality to sense, e.g. the contact of a solid 
with the hand, is only a remote cause of the perception, 
that a series of latent nerve and cerebral changes inter- 
vene between that and the proximate cause, that the 
latter is extremely unlike the object of the discernment 
which is its immediate effect, and that, in all proba- 
bility, the object is unreal and a mere vicar of the 
reality with which the perception puts its subject in 
cognitive relation ; when, also, it is considered that a 
tactile impression could not beget the idea of a solid 
without a concurrent idea of a void, the principle of 
parsimony demands (and the demand encounters no 
reasonable objection) that impressions on tactile afifer- 
ents have the property of causing discernment of space. 
The discrimination between mental events that beget 
knowledge of the non- contingent and those that 
acquaint us with only the contingent, is one of great 
importance, but, to secure it and elicit from it all its 
significance, it is not necessary to innovate upon the 
common idea of experience. If the mental organism 
be such as to yield after a little practice to a tactile 
impression the idea of an absolute void, then experience, 
according to the common notion of what the name 
denotes, acquaints us with the non -contingent, — with 
the absolute void termed Space. 

26. We have ideas of contingent and mobile voids, 
e.g. the apparent void in the cabin of a moving ship. 
Of course the apparent void is really a succession of 
the parts of space filled with air, but our concern at 
present is with the idea> not with the reality. Now, 
according to Kant, there must be two sources of ideas 
of voids, one & priori for the idea of Space, the other 



chap. xv. NO KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. m 

& posteriori for ideas of contingent voids ; ideas of 
places, like those of voids, comprehend ideas of non- 
contingent places, e.g. the parts of space, and ideas of 
contingent places, e.g. a ship's cabin or hold, a pocket, 
the squares of a chessboard. To accommodate to Kant's 
theory we must allow two sources of ideas of Place, one 
a faculty of cognition & priori, the other a faculty of 
cognition & posteriori. Kant holds that the idea of 
Time, like that of Space, is d, priori. But we discern 
musical intervals that seem at first sight to be con- 
tingent, and avow to scrutiny that they are parts of 
time and therefore absolute. Are our ideas of these 
& posteriori, and our ideas of obvious parts of time 
& priori f The offence to the principle of parsimony 
involved in such a multiplication of faculties is obviated 
if we consent that experience takes cognisance of the 
non-contingent as weU as of the contingent, and that it 
is the source of the ideas of Space and Time. It is 
probable that, at first, all void and matter not given 
as beginning, ending, or in motion, is given as non- 
contingent and unsusceptible of change, but that 
experience of the change of place and of the apparent 
becoming and annihilation of bodies undoes the datum 
as regards matter, whereas there is nothing to disturb 
its empire as regards space. The idea of Place would 
not be possible without experience of determining 
material limits, and the determining matter was prob- 
ably apprehended as being an absolute boundary when 
the place was apprehended as absolute. The aversion 
to the idea of the earth's motion which resisted the 
theory of Galileo not improbably had its root in this 
law of experience. 

2 c. Space is given as involving a non- contingent 



180 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

44 up-and-down," until the relativity of the latter and its 
dependence on gravitation are discovered. That gravi- 
tation determines our intuitions of " up-and-down * is 
proved by a very simple experiment. Put into a 
stereoscope a photograph of a projecting beam : apply 
the stereoscope to the eyes so as to exclude all visual 
objects save the photograph: look at first downward, 
then forward, and then upward ; when you look down- 
ward the beam appears to project from a floor, when 
forward from a wall, when upward from a ceiling. The 
relation of the eye to the object is the same in the 
three cases, so that the differences of the intuitions 
must be owing to those of the relation of the head to 
the line of gravity. The idea of" up-and-down," then, 
and of its non- contingency, depends upon gravitation, 
and therefore upon experience. In respect of this 
idea gravitation is a mould of experience. The pre- 
tension, therefore, that it is not competent to experience 
to be cognisant of the non-contingent, is unfounded. 

2d. According to Leibnitz and Kant intuitive know- 
ledge & pi*iori is differentiated by necessity, i.e., the 
tiling known A priori seems to be necessarily true. 
Tried by this criterion, knowledge of space and time is 
not d priori. Descartes and Leibnitz are conspicuous 
examples of a species of mind to which space and time 
are given as being contingent. To the mind of Locke 
time was given as contingent, — as being a mere attribute 
of event — and space as being infinite and absolute. To 
the writer space was given as absolute before he dis- 
cerned its infinity. By the way, these facts, though 
they refute Kant's doctrine respecting the origin of our 
knowledge, make for another important part of his 
doctrine, namely, the dependence of knowledge on 



chap. xv. NO KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. 181 

mental moulds. They show us these moulds deterr 
mining opposite seemings of necessary truth, making it 
seem to one mind necessarily true that time and space 
are infinite and absolute, and to another that they are 
finite and contingent. They reprove dogmatism, and 
prick its pretence that, as Jacobi holds, we grasp the 
Absolute in immediate knowledge. The poor conceit, 
that the circumstances contribute one constituent of 
knowledge and the mind another, loses countenance in 
their presence. They explain that we have mistaken 
a seeming of necessary truth for necessary truth, and 
that demonstrative science has no better endorsement 
than the seeming. They chasten us with the humili- 
ating conviction that the mind is radically fallible, and 
admonish us to take refuge in lowly trustful scepticism. 
If the evidence drawn from profound differences of 
mental structure be too recondite to be convincing, 
proof of a homelier kind is at hand. Experience 
.acquaints .us with contingent things that are opposites, 
e.g. light and darkness, sound and silence, opacity and 
transparency, and in respect of these, begets such 
axiomatic knowledge as that no light is dark, no silence 
is sonorous, no opaque thing is transparent. Kant's 
pretext, that such knowledge is determined by the 
principle of contradiction, avails nothing, the principle 
being, not a source of knowledge, & priori, but, a mould 
of experience. 

2e. The doctrine that experience excludes cognis- 
ance of the non-contingent emanates from a teeming 
cause of error, viz. the mistaking certain conspicuous 
species for their genus, — in other words, oversight of 
obscure species. Experience, of itself, begets only two 
knowledges of the non-contingent, viz. those of time 



182 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

and space, 1 objects which it gives for the most part as 
indistinct accessories of other objects, and never as 
objects of attention. All other objects of experience 
unassisted by inference are given as contingent, — 
none of them as exhibiting a complete seeming of 
necessity. 

3. The third argument breaks upon the fact that 
certain men discover of themselves the infinity of 
space long after space had been given to them as a 
void between the sky and the earth. One of the most 
conspicuous events in the childhood of the writer was 
this discovery (§ xxxviii). It seems that the idea of 
a limited absolute void precedes,, at least in certain 
cases, that of the infinity of the void, and that we 
acquire the idea of Space piecemeal That we acquire 
it deductively from the axiom, A boundary is surrounded 
by a region, I have shown in my argument against the 
LawoftheConditioned(§xxxviii.,xliL). Kant's doctrine, 
that necessary truth is proper to knowledge d, priori, 
translated into the doctrine that seeming of necessary 
truth is proper to knowledge & priori, is refuted by 
two data, viz. there is a non- contingent "up-and- 
down," and, falling is the alternative of support,— data 
that are the offspring of an experience determined by 
the latent bearing of gravitation on consciousness. It 
is also refuted by the datum, I exist, a seeming of 
necessary truth of such importance that it has been 
made the foundation of a dogmatic philosophy. The 

1 Knowledge of First Cause is the remote offspring of experience 
and the immediate offspring of an inference. It depends on the datum, 
Except the parts of time, what begins is effect. It takes an inference 
to elicit the knowledge from the datum. The part of experience in 
the generation of the knowledge is the generation of knowledge of 
beginnings and effects. 



chap. xv. NO KNOWLEDGE 1 PRIORI. 183 

existence of the Ego is contingent, and, according to 
Kant, the contingent is not knowable d priori. There- 
fore, the seeming of necessity of the existence is the 
offspring of experience. Geometry refutes the doc- 
trine ; for geometry is a science of the properties of 
figures indifferent whether they be contingent or non- 
contingent, whether parts of space or extended things. 
If it be true that it originated as an instrument for the 
ascertainment of the boundaries of land, it at first re- 
lated exclusively to the contingent. That it grounds 
nothing on the non-contingency of space is proved by 
the certitude which it elicits in minds to which space 
is given as being contingent, e.g. those of Descartes and 
Leibnitz. In so far as it builds on problems it builds 
on the contingent, for problems have to do with the 
factitious, e.g. with a made circle, and the factitious is 
contingent 



CXIII. 

1. No knowledge is antecedent to or independent 
on experience; but familiar species of experience — 
those which have hitherto seemed to comprise all 
experience— have so small a share in the origination 
of the kinds of knowledge accounted d, priori (the 
kinds comprising guaranteed knowledge) that even 
now, in view of the reasons of the opposite doctrine, 
the mind of the writer tends to revolt to the doctrine 
of knowledge d, priori. The arguments on which its 
opponents have hitherto pretended to found the oppo- 
site theory are fallacious. Mr. J. S. Mill especially, a 
conspicuous opponent of the doctrine, is amenable to 
the reproach of having derived a true conclusion from 



1&4 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

a false reason* — one that had not even the excuse of 
being specious. He held that we derive our know- 
ledge of axioms from experience of instances, — in- 
stances so numerous and of such binding force, that 
the syntheses they caose* although accidental, exhibit 
a complete seeming of necessary connection. We are 
concerned to expose the fallacy of his argument, to 
ascertain what an instance is* and to lay bare a species 
ef experience of instance but for the latency of which 
there wvhzM not hive been room for the coittrover^y. 

2&. An. example is * p*r$Mr&^xr wZferfra*ra tf t& 
&•£. cc ctf tie trash of a gesNzai thesis.. An exaELpfce 
SEhnscraar** 1 ei the smath e£ a general sheas 2s an 
imgtomGL I: to» stake kamewm to- a c£3i the IkfswL 
bcm I skew 15* a bSSt. I taw reraise to- a marc 
eaaettjik : :£. to n*le fcwn t* iis: tie exptagreres* 
>rf 4g£ xrexrewoar. I sxpikoe sccw- rr iis zraaanae. I 
tar* wafers* t^ ix eTgrrjiif- siua is- ijr Tn^CKnifc. In 
die tfH£ sas* I ik*. ir ibe *fch*c I 5^ u:jl. LJiucase lihe 
$n&k rf 4 xstttfcil itesis isosfc as ib* ibssR. JLH £im- 

2?.. Th«re is * ^snwass « ixKCfiuses x: wiich ir 5s 
ss$t«ttw£ to >* &*&in&. 3?wr insaoisf must tairibir 

wnajwea: to inaiKiw^s rf * wcarit Vina, it is *nat 

-WtlfiJ^WtW T-0 tftitflR. IT TtiMC ilufeCTltf^T ill- Xht TTTTT»r| 

It is jmflgKtttitfl to th*> Toltttiro: oc wihiususe xo xhe 
jfthsr jtisritafte* of the swwi u> Inear iniiisciiixsiJy nn il** 
mind : in &«,. tho indistiiuq Ivssrmc IwnnijT Tkecrat xhe 
*tmm&ra$ Vnwtailgfc. Tina «iH swwis «r -wimfe. Bm 
il is *w* «tmrpottiiti to thr ^citatum, srotdiry of xhe snzn 
**f th* :j«fcs to th* "wJuilc. to ho iaii jscmrihr objective. 



chap. xv. NO KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. 185 

Accordingly, the indistinct objectivity of the relation 
of whiteness to swans made every observed swan an 
instance relatively to the false thesis, All swans are 
white, whereas it is impossible that the equality of the 
parts to the whole should be indistinctly objective and 
so make the whole an instance relatively to the general 
thesis, The sum of the parts is equal to the whole. 
It needs extraordinary occasion, such as the circum- 
stances that originally led to the discovery of mathe- 
matics, or those that engage the mere pupil in the 
study of that science, to make such a relation objec- 
tive. 

2c. According to Aristotle, whose doctrine has been 
lately revived by Mill, axioms are the offspring of in- 
duction; and by induction both Aristotle and Mill 
meant experience of instances. They imply that there 
is a period in the mind of every individual in which, 
though the terms be understood, the individual could 
not assent to the truth of the axiom, the sum of the 
parts is equal to the whole ; but, after several occasions 
of seeing sums of parts denuded of the appearance of 
totality and comparing them with themselves qud 
clothed with that appearance, and intuitively discerning 
their equality to one another, he inductively infers that, 
in all cases, the sum of the parts is equal to the whole. 
Now it seems to me highly probable that the violence 
of this hypothesis would have been spared had its 
advocates distinguished the species, instances to which 
it is essential to be distinct. Neglecting this species, 
and aware that the indistinct objectivity of certain 
instances causes general knowledge, they judged, I take 
it, that knowledge of axioms might be the effect of a 
like objectivity, that the infant mind could be as indo- 



186 THE ALTEENATIVE. book i. 

lently instructed by the one as by the other. But, 
allowing this apology, it does not exempt from reproach 
incurred by oversight of the fact, that, from the time 
memory begins to record experience to the commence- 
ment of the study of mathematics, the mind never 
encounters such a distinct object as equality of a sum 
of the parts to the whole ; whereas the doctrine that 
axiomatic knowledge derives from induction requires 
that equalities of sums of parts to their wholes so 
haunt the discernment of the infant as not only to 
establish certitude of the truth of the pertinent general 
thesis but also to impart a seeming of inconsistency to 
its opposite, — a seeming of which no skill of the most 
enlightened can divest it. No one, I presume, will 
entertain the idea of the prodigious discourse which 
this doctrine of Aristotle imputes to the infant mind. 
It is clear that the advocates of knowledge & priori 
were right in so far as they denied that the knowledge 
in question is the offspring of experience of instances, 
although wrong in denying that it is the offspring of 
experience. The doctrine, that the aspect of necessity 
to be true exhibited by axioms results from experience 
of instances of exceptional frequency and intimacy, 
splits on the fact that the negation of the reality of the 
not-me does not exhibit a seeming of inconsistency. 
The thesis, I am all that exists, although extremely 
absurd seems perfectly consistent ; yet the instances of 
synthesis of what is given as the not-me with reality 
surpass all others as to frequency and intimacy. The 
thesis that men's heads are above their shoulders, 
although pressed upon the synthetic faculty by excep- 
tional frequency and intimacy, makes no pretension to 
be an axiom. 






chap: xv. NO KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. 187 

CXIV. 

To hold that experience is the source of all know- 
ledge entails no necessary divergence in any other 
respect from the theory of Mind of those who believe 
that a part of human knowledge originates away from 
experience. What Kant distinguishes from all other 
knowledge as knowledge&^wwi the writer distinguishes 
as guaranteed knowledge. The writer agrees with 
Kant that a complete seeming of necessity guarantees 
one of these kinds of knowledge, and not the other. 
As regards the word " transcendental/' the agreement is 
nominal as well as real That very knowledge which 
Kant denominates transcendental knowledge the writer 
denominates transcendental knowledge. According to 
Kant it is pure knowledge & priori, according to the 
writer it is guaranteed knowledge of the non-contingent ; 
in the view of both pure mathematics exemplifies 
transcendental knowledge, and applied mathematics 
guaranteed knowledge that is not transcendental. 
Kant allows that all knowledge begins with experience, 
but claims that what he terms knowledge & priori does 
not arise in experience. The writer holds that Kant 
overlooked a species of latent experience, viz. that 
which generates axiomatic knowledge, and, mistaking 
the obvious part for the whole of experience, correctly 
held that what he terms knowledge & priori does not 
arise out of what he took to be the whole of experience. 
A notable difference distinguishes the experience that 
generates the axiomatic part of guaranteed knowledge 
from all other experience, viz. that the knowledge cannot 
be forgotten. It is so grounded in as to be inseparable 
from the structure of the mind. No wonder, in view of 
the latency of its origin and its inseparableness from the 
mind, that it was taken to be independent of experience. 



188 THE ALTERNATIVE, book i. 



CXV. 

1. Experience comprehends and is comprised by 
the following six species : — 

Apperception. 

^Reflection. 

Inlooking sensational Perception. 

Sense-perception. 

Emotive Perception. 

Latent Experience. 

Of these, apperception and reflection have always been 
more or less confounded. Even Leibnitz does not 
completely distinguish between them. Two of them, 
viz. inlooking sensational perception and latent experi- 
ence, have been altogether overlooked. In limiting 
Experience to the operations of the external senses and 
what he terms the internal sense, Kant quite overlooks 
the empirical character of emotive perception. As to the 
comprehension and extension of experience he follows 
Locke, from whom he borrows the term, internal sense. 

2. The operations of the supersensuous faculty, 
being always subsidiary to those of the other empirical 
faculties, e.g. the faculties of apperception and sense-per- 
ception, do not constitute a species of experience. They 
contribute to experience two kinds of immediate objects, 
viz. those that are symbolic of the contingent, e.g. the 
symbols of identity, durability, power, thickness, etc,, 
and those that are symbolic of the non-contingent or 
absolute, e.g. the symbols of time and space. Let the 
latter be distinguished as transcendent, and the former 
as non-transcendent. Let knowledge of transcendent 
objects be distinguished as transcendent. 






^■fc^M^alfc i 1 ■ it JU^m. !■■ i 



CHAPTEE XVI. 

RECOGNITION. 

CXVI. 

1. There are immediate objects that are differentiated 
by an attribute significant of objectivity to former 
discernment, — significant either that the object was 
formerly discerned, or that its like was formerly dis- 
cerned. Recognition is the* common name of the dis- 
cernments supposed by those objects. .Let the 
differentia of the object of recognition be termed 
recognitional attribute. 

2. Familiarity is a species of recognitional attribute. 
It signifies that the object has been either object of 
many discernments, or the like of objects of many dis- 
cernments. When the object of recognition has been 
discerned but once before, its recognitional attribute 
tends to be the hinge of a remembrance of the former 
discernment. Objectivity void of the recognitional 
attribute, or of all but some faint tincture of it, is what 
is known by the name " strangeness." By the way, it 
is highly probable that the mind is not susceptible of 
wonder until it has become accustomed to the familiar, 
— that infants at first experience no surprise, but need 



190 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

to be for some time exclusively conversant with familiar 
objects to be susceptible of that emotion. 

3. A recognition either is or is not an identification. 
Let recognitions that are identifications be termed 
recognitive identifications, and those that are not 
" non-identific " recognitions. 

4. Identification differs according as it has or has 
not reference to identity in time, e.g. the identity of a 
present with a former object of vision. When one 
notices that the acclivity and declivity of the same 
incline are but different aspects of the same thing, he 
identifies, but the identification has not respect to a 
temporal identity. Accordingly, identification is divi- 
sible into temporal and non- temporal identification. 
The former is either recognitive or irrecognitive, recog- 
nitive when it is caused by the likeness of a present 
to a former object of discernment, otherwise irrecogni- 
tive. When the constituents of water known to have 
been in a given place convert into ice, and the water 
is consequently given as having become ice, a temporal 
identification obtains (viz. of the ice with the water), 
but the identification is not recognitive, — it is caused 
not by a likeness but by a bearing of sameness of place 
on the mind. 1 By the way, the identification is delu- 
sive, for the water has not become ice ; certain of its 
constituents, through annihilation of the constituent, 
liquidity, and substitution of the constituent, hardness, 
have become constituents of ice. An analogous error 

1 This kind of intuition has been ignored by philosophy. If classed 
at all, it would probably be classed as an inference, as though it were 
involved in a discourse wherein the idea of the place is given as evi- 
dence from which the identity is inferred. Perception is not more free 
from discourse, assertion, and the intervention of evidence. 




chap. xvi. RECOGNITION. 191 

of the faculty of identification has begotten the doctrine, 
that water is a compound of oxygen and hydrogen. 
Note that identification by means of evidence, as of 
one's hat by evidence of the place in which it was 
deposited, is not recognition. 

5. The knowledge involved in recognition is for the 
most part unconscious. One knows, but not consciously, 
the identity of familiar objects of perception while he 
perceives them, and also their likeness to other things 
formerly perceived. If the identity of a perceived 
familiar object be in question, the knowledge of it is 
conscious, but circumstances of a nature to put identity 
in relief are rare. 

6. ^Recognition involved in experience I distinguish 
as empirical, all other as non- empirical The visual 
recognition of an object as being a man, is an example 
of empirical recognition. The train of ideas consists 
of objects of non-empirical recognition. Eemembrance 
of an object not present to sense involves non-empirical 
recognition. 

7. Empirical recognition is the effect of a latent 
action of likeness on the mind. To show this it is 
necessary to distinguish and name two species of like- 
ness which philosophy has overlooked. 



CXVII. 

1. Likeness of and above a certain degree has a 
remarkable property, viz. tendency to cause several 



192 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

things to pass for a single thing. For example, it 
causes the several things constituting a crowd, a swarm, 
a flock, a galaxy, a regiment, to pass for a single thing ; 
it causes the several parts of a stone to pass for a single 
thing. Likeness of a lower degree has no such tendency. 
Men and insects resemble each other as to many im- 
portant bases of likeness, e.g. life, organs of sense, etc., 
but the resemblance has no tendency to gather them 
into a unit before the eye of intuition. Let the unify- 
ing tendency of likeness of and above the degree referred 
to be termed " unitiveness, ,, and let likeness differentiated 
by unitiveness be distinguished as " unitive." Likeness, 
accordingly, is divisible into unitive and non-unitive 
likeness. 

2. The higher degrees of unitiveness tend to hide, 
and the lower to leave exposed, the plurality of the 
object the aspect of which it contributes to determine, 
e.g. to hide the plurality involved in a perceived stone, 
to leave exposed that of a crowd. Our debt to unitive 
likeness is so great that one wonders how the creditor 
should have so long remained unknown. Without its 
help perception could have no objects but least-per- 
ceptible things such as minima visibilia. The idea of 
Cosmos would not be possible. An indefinite severality 
would distract consciousness and hold it in worse than 
brute impotence. We should be void of ideas of 
plurality, number, kind, whole, and part. Such is the 
dependence of intellection on unitive likeness. 

3. The law according to which unitive likeness 
operates may be termed the law of e pluribus unum. 

4. The function of unitive likeness is not confined 



chap. xvi. RECOGNITION. 193 

to what is regulated by the law of e pluribus unum ; 
it has a property whereby it also causes empirical 
recognitive identification, and empirical non-identific 
recognition, and its action on the mind in this causa- 
tion is latent. The identification involved in a visual 
perception that has an acquaintance for object is due 
to the unitive likeness of the acquaintance as object 
of a former perception to himself as object of the 
present perception. If the likeness be reduced by 
certain disguises below the unitive degree, identification 
does not obtain, and, if a counterpart of the acquaint- 
ance be perceived and no extrinsic circumstance such 
as the simultaneous presence of the acquaintance or a 
knowledge of the extraordinary resemblance interfere, 
identification obtains. Such facts are conclusive that 
empirical recognitive identification is effect of an action 
of unitive likeness on the mind : that the action is 
latent is a negative datum of remembrance, for we all 
remember that our identifications involved no reference 
to likeness. The likeness acts without exhibiting 
itself : the action is such that it supposes an uncon- 
scious part of the mind that is its theatre, and an un- 
conscious modification of that part of the mind, a 
modification which is the proximate cause of the know- 
ledge of identity. In empirical non-identific recogni- 
tion, the mind does not consciously refer to likeness. 
The recognitional attribute exhibits no likeness to the 
empirico-recognitive discernment to which it is objective : 
its significance is addressed to a different discernment, 
— one that is not empirical It is objective to the 
former, but not as a sign : it is significant only to the 
latter. The discernment to which it is significant must 
be a comparison, and recognition excludes comparison. 
I am aware that this statement has an air of inconsist- 

o 



194 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

ency, but it will be redeemed by an example. I see a 
dog which I never saw before, and, nevertheless, he 
exhibits to me an aspect of familiarity, his appearance 
being unitively like many canine appearances that were 
formerly objective to me. I do not think of the like- 
ness, I make no comparison between the present appear- 
ance and former appearances, the familiarity is an 
extremely indistinct part of the object of my vision, 
and to my present discernment signifies nothing ; but 
I have unconscious knowledge of which it is the con- 
dition that I have seen many such appearances before, 
and, if I interrogate the familiarity, it manifests itself 
as a sign of frequent prior objectivity. The discern- 
ment to which it unfolds its signification is not an 
experience, and it involves a comparison. It follows, 
that the action of likeness on the mind which causes 
empirical non-identific recognition is latent. It is 
essential then, to empirical recognition, to be effect of 
a latent action of likeness on the mind. 

5. An important difference distinguishes empirical 
recognition caused by unitive likeness from empirical 
recognition caused by non-unitive likeness. Let us 
consider an example of this difference. One sees in 
the distance a thing which is given as being a solid of 
a certain shape and size. He recognises in it the 
qualities, colour, solidity, shape, and size, and nothing 
more. This recognition, if he attend to the object, is 
unsatisfactory. As he approaches the thing it assumes 
more and more the appearance of a man and finally 
makes the observer certain that it is a man. The re- 
cognition is now satisfactory. The observer rests in it. 
The first of these two recognitions tends to make the 
subject aware of an ignorance, the second to make bitn 



chap, xvl RECOGNITION. 195 

aware of a knowledge. The first excites, and the 
second satisfies, curiosity. Let recognition of a nature 
to content the intellect with what seems to be know- 
ledge of knowledge be distinguished as sufficient, and 
all other recognition as insufficient. 

6. It is probable that the action of unitive likeness 
on the recognitive faculty, if nothing extrinsic to the 
likeness and the faculty interfere with it, would always 
cause identification, that non-identific recognition is 
always due to a cause extrinsic to the likeness and the 
faculty. When experience does not inform us that 
there are several individuals of a given type, our recog- 
nitions of an individual corresponding to that type are 
always identifications. All recognitions relative to the 
type to which the face and figure of Napoleon corre- 
spond are identifications ; but, if nature had regularly 
and abundantly produced individuals corresponding to 
that type, knowledge of the fact would cause the re- 
cognitions to be non-identific. If all human males 
were counterparts of Napoleon, and all human females 
of Josephine, recognitive identifications of human beings 
would be impossible, — all recognitions having man for 
object would be non-identific. That the appearances 
which cause recognitions of the sun and moon cause 
identifications and not non-identific recognitions, attests 
the tendency of unitive likeness to cause identification 
rather than non-identific recognition. The appearances 
present a better title to be regarded as appearances of 
several like things than as several appearances of the 
same thing ; for, until the rotundity of the earth was 
discovered, it was inexplicable how the sun got back to 
the east or the moon to any of its visible starting points. 
The more verisimilar interpretation of the appearances 
was that they appertained to the several, not to the same. 



1*6 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 



CXVHL 

1. The individuals that constitute a kind resemble 
not only each other but also an ideal type, i~g~, indivi- 
duals of the kind, mankind, resemble a mental image 
of * Man. The type may be appaiitional or inappari- 
taonal ; that of mankind is appaiitional, that of policy, 
emit, negotiation, or virtue, inappaiitionaL The type 
is really any one of a species of types, e^„ there are as 
many ideal types of mankind as there are occasions on 
which mankind is objective, but it is convenient to the 
habit of thought and, if not to the veiy structure of 
the mind, at least to that of language, to pretend that 
the type is a durable unique, — an archetype, 1 — one 
which somehow exists in eveiy mind cognisant of the 
kind it typifies The name, Idea, is supposed to have 
bean o^ginatod by Plato *s the common name of such 
types* and Plato regarded them, not only as durable 
things, but* as tagmningless and everlasting appanages 
of the mind of God. But though it be discreet and 
ptifcaps indtsfwusahle to adopt the fiction, ve should 
gwod oursehvs gainst the sublime and pious error of 
MaMranbhtk JaoohL and Schelling. thai ve are imme- 
diafe^y* becians* of parckapauon in divine consciousness, 
OMNWSMft with the Absolute* Let erckftgpt be the 
wane of ideal types of kinds. 



* Al■li^^^*^fc^^^^^1**Vi•**«7^l« txiAs; uniques we 
MVA^pwit w WHANMliif^i^ tait weiMc Vcdagr dmr xkst do 
ni %kfr wait' w^w vma wik ♦8p? , *ini* {iNMitPMiss rf 
Aawn«Mi^twd»%» bfe ftfi fr» *P » fe^ »I <aW mm*» is «r 




chap. xvi. RECOGNITION. 197 

2. Non-identific recognitions of which the objects 
resemble a given archetype constitute a kind which 
may be held to be determined by that archetype, e.g. 
recognitions that have horses for objects constitute a 
kind of non-identific recognitions, which, as having for 
objects what resembles the mental image of a horse, 
may be held to be determined by the archetype of the 
kind, horse. There are kinds of recognitive identifi- 
cations as well as kinds of non-identific recognitions, 
and, like the latter, they may be held to be determined 
by type. The type is not general, because nature has 
produced at the time only one antitype, but it does 
not intrinsically differ from a general type. If nature 
should regularly and abundantly produce corresponding 
antitypes, it would be general Indeed, if we suppose 
that real counterparts of the face and person of Prince 
Bismarck are occasionally though rarely and irregularly 
produced, the supposition implies that the type which 
the Prince resembles is a general one. Empirical 
recognitions are divisible into kinds determined by 
types which, according to circumstances, are general or 
non-general, being intrinsically fit to be either. 



CXIX. 

In recognition the mind does not consciously refer 
to the kind to which the things recognised may belong. 
The immediate object of the recognition resembles the 
archetype of the kind, but involves no symbol of the 
kind. When, upon nearing an object that was distant 
and vague, it assumes the appearance of a man, our 
curiosity is satisfied by sufficient recognition ; the re- 



198 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

cognition involves no notice of the kind, men. When 
the burned child recognises the next luminous thing, 
he sees and apprehends it as subject of a burning 
quality; the recognition involves no notice of the kind, 
luminous things, or of the kind, fire. The symbols of 
luminosity and ardent heat are paramount constituents 
of his idea of the thing recognised, but it involves no 
symbol of the kind, fire, nor of any kind whatever. 



cxx. 

There is a species of recognition of which the 
differentia is that it is the effect of redintegration. 
The species may be distinguished as redintegrative, 
and the opposite species as non-redintegrative The 
infant's recognition of the flame before experience has 
taught him that it is the subject of a hurtful quality, 
is an example of non-redintegrative recognition. It 
includes no constituent caused by redintegration. 
Afterwards it always includes such a constituent, and 
is partly redintegrative and partly non-redintegrative. 
Before concurrent visual and tactile experience have 
connected a symbol of solidity with colour, recognition 
of visual objects includes no symbol of solidity ; it is 
non-redintegrative. Afterwards redintegration con- 
tributes that symbol as regards certain colours, so that 
we visually recognise solids. The recognition is partly 
redintegrative and partly non-redintegrative. The 
recognition of clouds is an example of purely non- 
redintegrative recognition. Eedintegration so depends 
upon, that it cannot obtain apart from, non-redin- 
tegrative recognition. ^Recognition of both kinds is 



AllPMiL 



chap. xvi. RECOGNITION. 199 

a normal part of all consciousness except that of the 
new-born infant. Eedintegrative recognition is the 
source of a knowledge that is erroneously ascribed to 
Eeason and the faculty of generalisation ; for example, 
Mr. Mill, in proof of the doctrine that we reason from 
particulars to particulars, instances the knowledge of 
symptoms and remedies which the village nurse derives 
from observation of individual cases without any 
corresponding discourse or generalisation, whereas 
reasoning has nothing to do with the acquisition of 
her knowledge. Experience had exhibited to her 
certain appearances as a face, so to speak, of a disease, 
and when she recognises tjie appearance, redintegration 
connects with them the symbol of a like disease. Ex- 
perience had likewise exhibited to her the imbibing of 
a certain liquid as a cause of cure, and redintegration v 
suggests that a like antecedent will be followed by a 
like sequent. The suggestion, obtains without question, 
— spontaneously — as a link in the chain of ideas, — not 
at all as a discovery, — perhaps without conscious 
reference to the previous case, riot apprehending it as 
evidence. The knowledge is as little the effect of 
reasoning as the burned child's intuition of a burning 
quality in the next luminous solid he sees. The 
operations of the faculties of recognition and redinte- 
gration extend, without the intervention of Eeason, or 
of the faculty of generalisation, to things new to 
experience, — to objects perceived for the first time — 
the like of attributes which experience had intuited in 
like concretes ; and intentional action proceeds for the 
most part on knowledge thus begotten and extended 
without the intervention of judgment or of general 
ideas. 



*00 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



CXXL 

It may be thought that I have been needlessly 
circuitous in my definition of Recognition. I was at 
pains to expose the differentia of certain immediate 
objects, and to explain that recognition is the discern- 
ment supposed by an object so differentiated. Why 
not define recognition as discernment either of what 
was previously discerned, or of the like of what was 
previously discerned : this, apparently, would be more 
direct Now, my definition is shaped so as not to 
express or imply that recognition supposes prior dis- 
cernment I have no doubt that such discernment is 
always the antecedent of recognition, though fact 
seems to dispute its pretension to be so. Mimicry 
often exhibits to the eye of recognition the like of 
what seems, at first sight to have been previously 
discerned, but which memory, when fully roused, pro- 
tests had never been discerned by its subject Actors, 
painters* sculptors and graphic delineators excel and 
give u*ore delight in proportion as they make distinct 
to recognition more of detail that, on the avouch of 
memory* had never been noticed by its subject On 
the other hand, it can be alleged that the detail had 
been abditivelv indistinct As for the thesis that 
recc^nition $*}!¥***$ prior i&c^rnmenc it is baseless. 
It a latent action of likeness on the mind can beget a 
kaowted^e of identity that often proves to be erroneous, 
*ftd when tree is only accidentally tree, why should 
not that or son* other cause be^et a iwognitiocxal 
attribute Ik^tXH&sly sagnitk^nt of prior discernment 
It *$ <oft$kt«ttttr cocK^ivabie. ai*l not remote from 




chap. xvi. RECOGNITION. 201 

probability, that the repetition of a cerebral process 
serving as proximate cause of a perception might 
deliver more into consciousness than its original 
delivered, and with it a recognitional attribute signify- 
ing that the excess of object over the former deliver- 
ance had been discerned. Certainly it is not the 
immaculateness of the mental constitution as regards 
truth, nor its poverty of resource as regards the 
origination of figments, that should prevent us from 
entertaining such a hypothesis. But even granting 
prior discernment; it is not, on the showing of modern 
physiology, a cause relatively to recognition. On this 
showing, we owe recognition to a modification of the 
brain by a previous cerebration manifested by the prior 
discernment. The modification is one of the effects of 
the cerebration, and the prior discernment another. 
But the prior discernment is a nullity as regards the 
causation of the recognition. The durable modification 
which the cerebration left behind receives no help from 
it when causing the recognition. It may be in neces- 
sary connection as being another effect of a part of the 
train of causes of which the recognition is effect, but 
in no case does it seem to occupy the relation of cause 
relatively to recognition. This being so, there seems 
to be no overwhelming evidence against the hypothesis 
that the significance of the recognitional attribute is 
not always true. The hypothesis is corroborated by 
certain facts that expose a remarkable irresponsiveness 
of the faculty of consciousness to corporal events by 
which it is ordinarily excited. Men have received 
severe and even mortal wounds in battle without being 
aware of them. The faculty of consciousness absorbed 
by other events seems to have had no susceptibility to 
spare to events by which, under ordinary circumstances, 



SOS THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

it is vividly affected. It may very well happen then, 
that only a part of the cerebration caused by a given 
external cause of perception excites consciousness, 
whereas the whole of the cerebration reacts upon the 
brain, so as to construct in it an organ of Recognition, 
not only in respect of what was originally discerned, 
but also in respect of what was not 




CHAPTEE XVII. 

WILL AND INSTINCT. 

CXXII. 

1. Intention is a bent of the mind to act according 
to a present guiding idea. Let action that depends 
upon intention be distinguished as intentional The 
species, choice, is a species of intentional action. A 
choice is an intentional act that consists of two acts, 
first, study of two opposite motives intent upon a pre- 
ference of one of them, second, a preference. It may 
be defined, a study of two opposite motives intent upon 
and resulting in a preference of one of them. The 
study is the affair of an instant. It is important to 
distinguish the two acts ; for one of them is, and the 
other is not, an effect : the study is, and the preference 
is not, an effect. The preference is not determined by 
any antecedent : the person choosing is not necessitated 
to prefer either of the motives : therefore, as not having 
a pre-determining antecedent, the preference is an un- 
caused event. The idea of Choice supposes that the 
involved preference is not predetermined, — is not the 
offspring of necessity,— in short, necessity being essen- 
tial to cause, is uncaused. Will is pov:er or faculty of 
choice. He who denies the freedom of the will denies 



204 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

the possibility of choice. He who affirms that an 
event presupposes a cause, denies the possibility of 
choice. My definition of choice does not imply that 
choice is possible : it merely expresses what is sym- 
bolised by the idea of choice. The terms Volition and 
Choice are synonyms ; they differ only as connoting 
different aspects of the same thing. 

2. Intentional action that involves choice I dis- 
tinguish as optional; that which does not, as un- 
optionaL 



CXXItl 

1. The greater part of perceptible human intentional 
actions are unoptional ; they are not the offspring of 
choice, nor are they in any way noticed by the faculty 
of choice. Customary actions, such as eating at regular 
meal-times, doing the details of business in the accus- 
tomed order, taking at the accustomed hour customary 
recreation, retiring to rest at the accustomed hour, — 
with such acts the faculty of choice has nothing what- 
ever to do. In ordinary conversation between people 
who do not distrust one another, no one chooses to say 
what he says, nor is his mind in such an attitude 
towards the spontaneity of speech that he can be said 
to permit the words which flow from him. It is 
essential to a cJwice that the mind refer to a binary of 
opposite motives, one a motive to do, the other a motive 
to forbear from doing, a certain act : the binary has been 
termed a practical alternative. Such a reference is also 
a condition sine qua non of a permission of an intention 
by the faculty of Choice. Now, the record of experi- 



chap, xvil WILL AND INSTINCT. 205 

ence in memory attests that no practical alternative 
precedes or attends the great bulk of human intentions 
and human intentional actions. It is clear that Will 
has nothing to do with intentions and acts unconnected 
with a practical alternative. The idea of the kind, 
Instinct, should be modified so as to enlarge the com- 
prehension of the kind, making room for the two 
species, involuntary intention, and involuntary inten- 
tional action. 

2. In the genesis of the idea of Instinct we find a 
justification of the proposed enlargement. All actions 
of animals were at first taken to be voluntary. When 
it became manifest, or seemed to become manifest, 
that they are incapable of varying means to suit differ- 
ences of the circumstances, that they apply means of 
such wonderful complexity and aptitude as could not 
be imputed to the invention of the agent, and that the 
ends related to these could not be made known by 
experience, nor reasonably supposed to be otherwise 
made known, it was inferred that the means were 
applied without knowledge, without intention, and 
applied by an animal attribute to which was given the 
name Instinct. Instinct, accordingly, might be defined, 
an animal attribute which applies means that seem to 
be, but are not, voluntary. In a word, the differentia 
of instinct may be said to be " quasi-voluntariness." 

3. Experience gives us familiar examples of in- 
tentional action that obtains in spite of the agent. 
Quasi-attention which resists the utmost efforts of the 
agent to undo it is an example. When anger, which 
the subject is interested and strongly minded to dis- 
semble, breaks from his control into expression, the 



206 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

expression is involuntary, — an example of involuntary 
intentional action. Those who undertake a life of 
conduct opposed to their propensities find themselves 
at once in conflict with the principle of involuntary 
intentional action. It may be termed intentional 
instinct. If such a person have been habituated to 
affectation, affectation will sometimes obtain in him in 
spite of his utmost effort to prevent it : in respect of 
it, intentional instinct prevails against will. 



CXXIV. 

Instinct is divisible into intentional and blind 
instinct, the latter being that which causes quasi- 
voluntary action that, unknown to the subject, is a 
means, e.g. the first sucking of the infant. There are 
instincts that may be distinguished as partially blind. 
They are intentional in respect of a subordinate end, 
and blind in respect of a superior one. For example, 
children eat as a means of appeasing hunger, ignorant 
that the act is a means relative to the end, nutrition. 



cxxv. 

The datum, that every beginning has a cause, con- 
flicts with the datum that a volition is not an effect. 
But this is by no means a fatal objection to free- 
agency. The former datum has to humble its preten- 
sions to another exception, viz. that a beginning of 
this or that part of time, e.g. this or that hour, day, 



._.- __ — — _^j 






chap. xvir. WILL AND INSTINCT. 207 

year, or century, is uncaused. But even though it had 
not to lower its pretensions to another exception, 
Beason would require it to come to an accommodation 
with the datum of free-agency. As mariners, to pre- 
vent the ship from foundering, have sometimes to 
repair her bottom at sea, so it is . the function of 
Beason to correct and harmonise the data which 
constitute its very foundation ; and in this delicate 
operation accommodation is always to be preferred to 
uprooting. 



CXXVI. 

1. Deliberation has been correctly defined, study 
what to do. It supposes a momentum of the mind 
towards action. The consideration of what is feasible 
by the subject, without a pertinent momentum towards 
action, is not deliberation. Deliberation may be either 
expectant or selective, the former when it looks for an 
idea of an acceptable agendum, the latter when it is a 
constituent of choice. Selective deliberation is only 
another name for the study of motives essential to 
choice. 

2. There are counterfeits of selective deliberation. 
A man may instinctively look for a satisfactory idea 
of action, — one competent to make up his mind for 
him, one which, if it had presented itself contempo- 
raneously with his first discernment of the occasion of 
action, would, by at once making up his mind for him, 
have excluded the deliberation. Four or five ideas of 
agenda, none having the instinctive property that con- 
tents and decides the mind, may occur to him; at 



208 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

last, a fourth or fifth, having this property, presents 
itself, and, at once, makes up his mind for him, 
imposing upon him the delusion that he has made up 
his mind for himself, — has chosen. Such counterfeits 
it is important to distinguish from Choice. The dis- 
crimination exposes a characteristic of Volition, viz. 
that the subject makes up his mind, — has not his mind 
made up for him. 



CXXVII. 

1. The office of will is conduct, — conduct of the 
propensities. This office is not proper to will. In- 
tentional instinct is also capable of conduct. It is 
competent to enlightened prudence to steer the life 
without the interference of will. It instinctively 
adopts and proceeds upon rules of conduct, generating 
conformable ideas of agenda which have the property 
of making up the subject's mind for him. Ambition 
or cupidity conjoined with craft sometimes instinctively 
exercises conduct, managing the subject with great 
skill, in order, thereby, to manage others. The reasons 
of voluntary conduct are duty, dignity, love of the 
divine. Not but what the mental attributes which 
generate the sentiment of duty, affection to dignity, 
and the love of God, are capable of determining 
instinctive conduct ; and doubtless, in making himself 
the way, the truth, and the life, and causing himself to 
be lifted up that he might draw all men unto him, 
Christ counted upon eliciting instinctive conduct which 
would lead, in certain cases, to voluntary conduct ; 
but as, in the bulk of men, the attributes in question 
are short of instinctive force, there would be room for 



>*__—-- 



chap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 209 

the intervention of will, — for choice, — for voluntary 
conduct. 

2. The office of will is to steer, not to propel. What 
wind or steam is to the action of the helmsman, that 
propensity is to will. This truth is sometimes brought 
home in painful intuition to people suffering from the 
disorder of which melancholy is the chief symptom, — 
especially to the philosophic patient The ebb of 
force from the propensities threatens to strand them 
on apathy. I mean by apathy, not privation of all 
emotion, for horror replaces motive, but, privation of 
motive. The ebb of motive seems to them to be the 
ebb of voluntary power. It is only when wisdom, 
and possibly prudence and craft, demand painful resist- 
ance to propensity, that will has opportunity. Pro- 
pensity is competent, without the aid of will, to 
transact, and does in fact transact, all the ordinary 
business of life. Even conflict of motives occasions 
but rarely the interference of will ; for the most part, 
the strongest motive prevails and instigates ; it makes 
up our mind for us. Ignorant that the subversion of 
propensity involves the subversion of will, Stoicism 
proposed to found an empire of Will on the ruin of 
propensity. Asceticism tends to fall into the same 
error, and, sometimes, in a passion of propitiatory 
obsequiousness, would fain efface both will and pro- 
pensity, and substitute an adoring godliness. Mummies 
of worshipping bulls are found in Egypt, the knees 
bent and the eyes turned adoringly upward. The 
asceticism to which I refer would fain evacuate created 
conscious being of all but the animus thus symbolised ; 
no movement of intellect, no variety of emotion, should 
disturb the eternal monotony of the worship it affects. 

p 



110 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

A right understanding of the dependence of volition on 
propensity rids Christian practice of ascetic distortion, 
and restores the Christian life to the largeness and ease 
enjoined by the example of one who professed that he 
came eating and drinking, — who frequented marriage 
feasts and all manner of innocent festive gatherings. 

3. Conduct is either regular or irregular, the former 
when the agent refers to a rule extending through a 
kind of occasions, the latter when his view is confined 
to the present occasion. According to Christianity, 
regular conduct has for its chief end the reformation 
of the propensities, (" sanctification ") the subordinate 
end being the conformity of the practical life to moral 
dignity l and the welfare of society. Perhaps the 
most momentous difference between Borne and Protest- 
antism is, Uiat Rome clings to the trust which expects 
sanctification to result from Christian conduct, whereas 
Protestantism has drifted into the belief that the hope 
is Vtopian. 



CXXVIII. 

I have incidentally referred to permissions of the 
will. I now proceed to explain exactly what they axe. 
A voluntary being is responsible, not only for his, voli- 
tions, but also, for voluntary omissions. He may 
detect the culpability of an instinctive intention pre- 
vious to ivvivspouding performance, and not arrest it. 
This is wlua has beam happily termed a * permission 

the will" It is not an act. it is not a volition. 

iti-xnn.1 tfetftna "wom:di^it^"M4gnrt*tketfC|fenBfwof 




chap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 211 

We have therefore to distinguish volitions from per- 
missions of the will. A free agent is as responsible 
for his permissions of the will as for his volitions. 



CXXIX. 

1. It must be acknowledged that the argument of 
the Necessarian presents a potent plausibility to those 
to whom induction has displayed the immensity of the 
domain of law. This is amply attested by its success 
with men of science. Philosophers who hold to the 
existence of will have no better ground than the 
datum, that it exists. If their opponents could show 
that the datum is inconsistent, they would be obliged 
to surrender. This, happily, the necessarian has failed 
to show; but nevertheless, the advocates of freedom 
find it difficult to keep their ground against the torrent 
of evidence that necessity, under the form of law, 
determines all event, — evidence backed by proof that 
instinct counterfeits the aspect of will, and, under that 
seeming, transacts nearly the whole of the practical life 
of man, that data are at the best a pis atter, and that 
belief in free agency is itself a transgressor of a datum, 
viz. the datum that Event is effect. Now what be- 
hoves if the evidence beget doubt? Belief, or some 
equivalent of belief, in will, is the pivot of virtue. 
Self-denial is essential to virtue, and, to believe that 
necessity determines all our acts, is to believe that we 
are incapable of self-denial. A thorough conviction, a 
heart-conviction, that we are without power of choice, 
carries with it moral paralysis.- Although doubt does 
not paralyse, it makes us weak against temptation. 



212 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

And in proportion as temptation prevails, it diminishes 
our power of resistance and enfeebles our moral 
faculty. Has the faculty of intentional action no 
resource in this emergency ? — Is it challenged by no 
duty ? An arbitrium is possible, — a decree that Will 
exists, that we are responsible. A man may pledge 
himself to act for ever according to this decree, and, by 
his conduct to the^end of life, justify the pledge. Taking 
Christ for his model he might, by ordinate self-denial, 1 
improve his instincts and make probable the possibility 
of man becoming Christlike. Think of it, a world of 
Christs ! — Christlike lovers, — Christlike husbands and 
wives,— Christlike parents and children,— Christlike 
citizens ! Humour, mirth, sport, festivity, aesthetic 
enjoyment, of Christlike men ! To abandon a chance 
of contributing to such a promotion of his race, to 
abandon the cause of human dignity and happiness — 
the cause of wisdom, — rather than interfere with the 
impotence of doubt, to drift upon doubt into moral 
perdition, — is not this as unmanly as it is unwise ? 
And what though the arbitrium cleave to an error, if 
it achieve for man the greatest possible dignity and 
happiness ? By making him master of himself, it 
augments his mastery over Nature, and mastery over 
Nature is the paramount end of science. Truth, 
or the agreement of belief or assertion with what is 
and what is not, is also an end of science, but subordi- 
nate, and of infinitely less importance. Wisdom, com- 
mon sense, prudence, and purity (the principle of our 
nature that is averse to the opposite of dignity) concur 

1 Ordinate self-denial excludes the application of bodily pain and all 
mental pain save what is incident to the avoidance of evil and needful 
for growth in wisdom. It is compatible with innocent mirth and inno- 
cent enjoyment of every kind. 




MkrfM*«l_aM««— MMtal 



chap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 213 

that it is unworthy to rot in doubt, being free to lift 
ourselves, by an arbitrium, out of the mire. And to 
this we are incited by the consideration that the main 
argument of the necessarian is a petitio principii. He 
sets up as an axiom, as though the opposite were 
inconsistent, that preference of one of two opposite 
motives supposes the preferred motive to be the 
stronger. It does not. The idea, that a man is free 
to prefer the weaker member of a practical alternative, 
is perfectly consistent and has the sanction of a 
datum. Dignity or duty may be opposed in the 
alternative to strongest desire, and, for the sake of it, 
the weaker member of the alternative may be pre- 
ferred. Induction finds it probable that the weaker 
motive is sometimes preferred. A man in middle life 
may turn from doing wrong, pledge himself to live for 
the future according to Christian principles, and live 
accordingly to the end of his days. Is it to be sup- 
posed that he is never solicited after his conversion by 
a bad motive stronger than the Christian one which he 
prefers ? This I maintain is not probable ; experience 
of temptation by the religious attests the contrary. 

2. The necessarian alleges that predictableness 
of human action proves the empire of necessity over 
all human action. It proves no such thing. Eegu- 
larity of conduct would be characteristic of a reign of 
will, and the regularity would be a condition of pre- 
dictableness. Human intentional action, however, has 
been predictable not because the agents were free, but 
because they were instinctive; for will has meddled 
but little with human action. 



!214 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 



cxxx. 

When an emotion that is the effect and manifesta- 
tion of a propensity is more than a mere velleity, and 
is not held in the condition of mere motive by the 
opposition of an emotion caused by any other propen- 
sity, it tends to become an intention, and to be con- 
verted into one, needs only to be united with the 
needful idea of an agendum. If it refer to what can 
be presently done, it necessarily causes present per- 
formance ; if to performance after a certain interval, it 
assumes the air of being the offspring of deliberation, 
and commonly passes for that with its subject. We 
are on the way to discover for ourselves how copiously 
nature uses delusion when we detect her making us 
her dupes in this respect If the reader will be 
vigilant for the detection of this imposture, I engage 
that it will not be long before he discovers strong and 
important intentions that pretend to be but are not the 
offspring of deliberation. He will find that his mind 
is made up for him without his participation. Eesent- 
ment is apt at this kind of imposture. 



CXXXI. 



Allowing what I shall prove by-and-by, that a body 
either comprises or is a part of the mind, is the body 
the apperceptive agent supposed by Choice ? Does it 
by its unconscious action make itself a subject of con- 
sciousness, and so fit itself to be a choosing agent, or 




chap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 215 

does it by that action capacitate a non- corporal thing 
— a soul — to be such an agent ? If the latter hypo- 
thesis be true, volition is distinguishable from all other 
mental event as being purely psychical, — as being 
neither an unconscious action of the corporal part of 
the mind nor an effect of one. That action contributes 
the indispensable occasion and circumstances of volition, 
the needful apperception and practical alternative, but 
it contributes nothing as cause to the act constituting 
the preference. If the opposite hypothesis be true, and 
if, nevertheless, volition be possible, then the uncaused 
act involved in choice is distinguishable from all other 
mental event as one that is neither an unconscious 
mental action nor the effect of one. Every other mental 
event either is, or is the effect of, an unconscious action 
of the corporal part of the mind. This, by the way, is 
a fact with which it is important to familiarise the 
mind in order to break up and altogether destroy the 
native and habit -rooted error, that such events as 
attention, speculation, judgment, reasoning of every 
kind, are purely psychical acts and indeed volitions. 



CXXXII. 

1. Attention is not volition. It is not the immedi- 
ate sequent of a practical alternative. It is no more a 
volition than the muscular contraction which in obedi- 
ence to intention lifts the hand. Whenever one looks 
or listens he attends, but looking or listening is not 
choosing. If it were correct to say of acts consequent 
on volition that they are voluntary, attention conse- 
quent on volition is voluntary ; but the distinction I 



216 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

have made between will and instinct calls for a corre- 
sponding alteration of the adjective, voluntary. 

2. There are degrees of emotive impulse that put 
will in abeyance. It is only in the temperate zone of 
emotion that man is voluntary and responsible. Ignor- 
ant of this truth society has exposed the individual to 
inordinate risks, and exacted of him impossible for- 
bearance. 




CXXXIIL 

1. A free agent must either be, or involve, a souL 
To prove that man has not a soul would be to prove 
that he is not a free agent. Modern physiology has 
been discrediting the doctrine of the soul by evidence 
that the soul is a supernumerary in the economy of 
life, that it has no office, that things which cannot be 
supposed to possess a soul manifest both life and con- 
sciousness. Has it thus made good that man does not 
possess a soul ? Has it annulled the datum, that a 
man is a durable thing ? Has it shown that, like the 
projected part of a fountain, he is a mere series both as 
to matter and form ? If it have, it has emptied Being 
of dignity. But happily we are still able, in the name 
of dignity and common sense, to hold to the negative. 

2. When physiology showed that the human body 
is a mere series, philosophy, tenacious of the funda- 
mental datum that man is a durable thing, judged and 
taught, and common sense universally'accepted, that the 
durable constituent of man — the soul — is the subject 
of conpcionfmess and the principle of life. Death was 



chap. xvn. WILL AND INSTINCT. 217 

regarded, not as the annihilation of the soul nor of a 
mere bodily attribute, but as the cessation of a relation 
between soul and body on which life depends. If 
physiology should succeed in showing that life does not 
depend upon a soul, common sense would not there- 
fore be driven to surrender the datum of a human 
temporal identity that measures at least the interval 
between birth and death : it could still hold that the 
durable constituent of man is the subject of conscious- 
ness. Indeed, the author once found himself so 
pressed by the besieging physiological evidence that he 
was obliged to retire into this citadel ; but at last a 
successful sally cleared the town of the enemy. Though 
all be not lost by such a retirement, yet so much is lost, 
because of the intimacy of the relation between life and 
consciousness, that it behoves the party of wisdom to 
be tenacious of the dependence of life upon the soul. 

But to hold our ground, we must humble ourselves 
to an alliance with the lower animals, and even the 
vegetable kingdom. This was obvious to Bishop Butler, 
who therefore rebuked the human arrogance that denied 
souls to the lower animals. Let us allow that whatever 
has life has a soul, and that the rank of the soul 
depends upon that of the connected body ; that in the 
vegetable kingdom, and perhaps throughout a consider- 
able part of the animal kingdom, the body has not the 
wherewithal to make the soul conscious, and that all 
the action in that region which seems to manifest con- 
sciousness and intention is reflex. In connection with 
a human organism a soul acquires the possibility of 
becoming a free-agent and a subject of wisdom. We 
may even sanction an eclectic reconciliation between 
spiritualism and materialism. We may adopt the con- 
sistent hypothesis, that Certain atoms are qualified to be, 



218 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

in certain relations, subjects of the quality, life, and, in 
others, of both the quality, life, and that on which de- 
pends the occasional attribute, consciousness. The 
quality of the atom on which life depends may bear such 
a relation to life as inactive power bears to force. 
In certain relations the power, combustibility, is 
inactive, in others it is active and thereby becomes 
force. So, apart from the relation in which an atom 
is the cardinal atom of an organism its quality on 
which life depends is not life, but is life when the atom 
is in that relation. Outside of the relation in which 
an atom is qualified to be a subject of life it may be 
part of an inanimate thing, e.g. a stone. This hypo- 
thesis is the reverse of prepossessing. It has no grace 
to compensate, in the view of common sense, the repug- 
nancy of its novelty. It has nothing to recommend it 
but its consistency and the fact that it is the only visible 
plank within reach of the drowning datum, that animals 
and plants are durable things. Before we surrender to 
the monstrous and degrading thesis, that our father, wife, 
child, or friend, is nothing more than one or other of u 
series of bodies formed out of food, common sense 
demands that we shall either hold to the datum against 
the rebutting evidence, on the ground that deduction 
is not good against so fundamental and important a 
datum, or adopt any consistent hypothesis, however im- 
probable, that saves the doctrine. For my own part, I 
employ the hypothesis as a mere measure of defence — 
a temporary intrenchment against the evidence that is 
for killing the soul. I confront the evidence with a 
consistent hypothesis, and so paralyse its pretension to 
be demonstrative. Note that our knowledge of matter 
is all but confined to knowledge of body, and that of 
atoms we know nothing directly from experience. For 



chap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 219 

all we know, atoms (if they exist at all) may not be 
even solid — may not have extension. Experience 
therefore has nothing to object to the large possibilities 
which the hypothesis claims for its " cardinal atom." 

3. Before presenting and refuting the evidence 
against the dependence of life upon the soul it is 
necessary to define the terms, life, nutrition, organ, and 
function, to show that there is such a species as non- 
vital functional action, and to augment the extension of 
the kind, reflex action, so that it shall embrace, as one 
of its species, non- vital functional action, and, as another, 
unintentional reaction proper to living things and things 
that have lived whether attended or not attended by 
consciousness. 

Life seems to be undefinable except on the condi- 
tion of regarding the kinds, animals and vegetables, as 
primary, (§ lxvi.) and assuming that our knowledge of 
them is scientifically sufficient without definition. On 
this condition Life may be defined the quality (§ ci. 2c) 
proper and common to animals and vegetables. 1 It is 
not definitively indicatable by nutrition nor by function, 
although Comte and Blainville held the former to be 

1 The invariableness of the connection between bioplasm and life 
and between bioplasm and germs has given rise to the notion that life 
is not proper to animals and plants, but belongs also to a material 
that is a matrix of animals or plants. According to this notion a seed 
in a grocer's shop, though not a plant, is a living thing. If the above 
definition be valid, a germ, as not being an animal or a plant, is not a 
living thing ; nor indeed is a part of an animal or plant a living thing. 
When such a part ceases to be an organ — loses the quality in virtue of 
which it was an organ — it is usual to say of it that it is dead. The 
predicate is untrue except it be regarded as metaphorical or determined 
by a secondary meaning of the terms, life and death. Death is not 
truly predicable of that which has not lived, nor, therefore, of a mere 
part of an animal or plant. 



220 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

the essential part of life, and Bichat held life to be a 
sum of functions. This will be obvious when we ascer- 
tain precisely what nutrition and function are. 

According to the common notion of nutrition it is a 
process which a single durable body undergoes and in 
respect of which the body is at once agent and patient. 
The notion is erroneous. Not a single body, but a 
series of bodies, is the agent and patient concerned in 
nutrition. It causes a series of bodies each of which 
save the last is a part of the cause of the succeeding 
one. Nutrition is a process of concurrent decomposition 
and recomposition that causes a series of bodies which 
tend to pass for a single durable body, each body of the 
series, save the last, being an agent in respect of the 
process. The movement of water projected from a 
fountain is a partially analogous process. It causes a 
series of bodies that tend, only in a less degree than 
the series caused by nutrition, to pass for a single 
durable body; but no unit of the fountain series is 
agent in respect of the process that causes the series; 
The cause of the movement is altogether extrinsic to 
the units of the series, whereas each unit of the series 
caused by nutrition, save the last, is, in respect of the 
nutrition, agent. Growth is a species of nutrition, viz. 
nutrition that makes the dimension of each succeeding 
body greater than that of the preceding one. Now, if 
it be true that the hair of a corpse has grown, it is not 
true that nutrition depends on and is a definitive sign 
of present life — is what can be correctly termed a vital 
event. The evidence for post-mortem nutrition may 
not be conclusive, but it suffices at least to postpone 
the dogma, that life and nutrition are inseparable. 

When the sarcode refuted Bichat's definition of life 
those who were tenacious of the mutual commensurate- 




ft-MMMhMiaMMMiaiiHIbvMtWMiMiMkA^^M^^u 



chap. xvn. WILL AND INSTINCT. 221 

ness of life and organisation were for reforming the idea 
of organ so that it should no longer symbolise a correla- 
tive of an organism, (a complement of organs) and, 
accordingly, we are taught in the Physical Basis of 
Mind (page 7) that — " There are organisms that have 
no differentiated organs. Thus a microscopic formless 
lump of semi-fluid jelly-like substance (Protoplasm) is 
called an organism because it feeds itself and repro- 
duces itself." This is a needless and perplexing inroad 
upon the ideas of organ, organism, and function. Accord- 
ing to those ideas an organ is correlated to an organism, 
i.e. it is one of two or more organs of one and the same 
animal or plant; and function is proper to organs. 
Science is not a gainer by the substitution of an idea 
of the organ which admits that an animal or vegetable 
may consist of but one organ. Ideas and language 
may be made convenient to biology without such 
violence. An organ is one of two or more parts of an 
animal or vegetable body, parts differentiated by difference 
of aptitudes in respect of kinds of acts which compose the 
natural history of the body. A function is an act or a 
series of acts of the kind in respect of which an organ is 
apt. 

Aptitudes that differentiate organs may* be dis- 
tinguished as functional. An organ supposes a func- 
tional aptitude, but not a function. The hand, eye, and 
ear of the new-born infant, because of their functional 
aptitudes are organs, though they have never functioned 
and might never function. Vital acts — acts dependent 
on present life and on which the continuance of the 
life of the subject depends — may be either functional 
or non-functional Those of the sarcode, as not having 
organs for agents, are non-functional. Functional acts 
may be either vital or non-vital. The growth of hair 



222 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

or nails in a corpse is an example of non-vital func- 
tional acts. The behaviour of a corpse under voltaic 
stimulus, the contraction of the pupil in response to 
the impact of a beam of light when the eye is one 
detached from a recently-killed animal, are examples of 
non- vital functional action. 

The increase of extension of the kind, reflex action, 
by the addition of the species, non-vital functional 
action, calls for a new definition of the former. Reflex 
action is unintentional reaction proper to living things 
and the remains of living things. This definition en- 
larges the extension of the kind so that it embraces not 
only non- vital functional action but also unintentional 
reaction of which the agent is conscious, such as the 
counterpoising lifting of the leg when one has slipped 
and is falling backward. The term, reflex action, 
commonly signifies reflection by an efferent nerve of 
an impression conveyed to a nervous centre by an 
afferent nerve. According to the altered signification 
this kind of action may be distinguished as efferent. 
Keflex action comprehends the species vital action, e.g. 
nutrition, reproduction, etc. According to the late Mr. 
Lewes {Physical Basis of Mind, page 354), " The 
reflex theory once admitted, a rigorous logic could not 
fail to extend it to all animal actions." Although I 
have restricted reflex action to unintentional action, I 
think that it might be advantageously extended to all 
action proper to living things and the remains of living 
things, volition excepted. In that case the terms, 
reflex action, and instinctive action, would with a mere 
difference of connotation denote the same thing. The 
contrastive opposition of reflex action and volition 
would illuminate the great office of will during the 



chap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 223 

first era of human development, namely, the transfer- 
ence of man from one kind of reflex action to another, 
from primary automatism, which makes him puppet, 
dupe, and victim, to a secondary automatism conform- 
able to wisdom, bearing to it the relation of a well- 
equipped ship to its master, and, together with will, 
constituting wisdom. 

4. Two hypotheses respecting the nature of life 
dispute human belief: one of them may be denomi- 
nated the psychical and the other the anti-psychical 
hypothesis. According to the former, life depends 
upon a relation of a single durable part of a living 
thing to its other parts, a relation in virtue of which 
the single part is cardinal in respect of its whole, and 
constitutes the whole a durable individual. Each of . 
the non-cardinal parts of what are known to human 
experience as living things is a series, not a durable 
individual: the duration of the cardinal part of the 
living thing compensates the instability of the non- 
cardinal parts, and, in spite of their incessant changes, 
constitutes the whole a durable individual. According 
to the anti-psychical hypothesis life does not depend 
upon such a relation : an animal or plant is at any 
given moment comprised by atoms or molecules that 
serve it as constituents for only a brief part of its 
duration, and certain of the parts of the obvious animal 
or plant are really unobvious animals or plants, having 
lives of their own independent of their respective 
wholes, lives capable of persisting if the parts be de- 
tached: the life of the obvious animal or plant is 
either the sum of the lives of its parts, or a life some- 
how begotten of, and dependent upon, these. The 
psychical hypothesis has the support of two funda- 



224 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

mental data, one, that animals and plants are durable 
things, the other, the datum involved in a man's 
apprehension of himself as being the same throughout 
time of which he has remembrance. To whatever in 
man affects human dignity the hypothesis is com- 
mended as sacred. If there be no soul, volition is 
impossible and moral goodness has no rational support. 
The opposed hypothesis grounds its right to credit on 
the effects of fissiparous generation, mechanical division 
of animals and plants, and the behaviour of fragments 
of mutilated animals. A cutting develops into a plant 
like its whole. The tail part of a worm cut in two 
evolves a head, and the head part a tail, and both 
become perfect worms. Granting that in these cases 
the plant or animal contains a durable part, one or 
other of the divided parts must be separated from it 
and, nevertheless, both not only manifest life but 
develop into perfect plants or animals : hence the 
conclusion that the life of at least one of the parts 
could not have depended on any thing in the whole 
answering to the idea of a soul. The conclusion is a 
non sequitur. Let A and B signify the divided parts 
and C the cardinal part. Suppose the division to 
leave C with A. It may now be the cardinal part of 
A as it was before of A B, and an atom of B may be- 
come its cardinal part, originating a new life and a 
new living individual. It is more convenient to 
common sense to put up with this explanation than to 
throw overboard the temporal identity of its subject. 
As for the behaviour of fragments of mutilated animals, 
its evidence is refutable without taxing common sense 
to make itself at home with a pis alter. I have shown 
that owing to the attributes, orderly and disorderly 
concurrence of attributes, substance is all but omnipo- 




OftttiMita^tfte 



1 



<:hap. xvii. WILL AND INSTINCT. 225 

tent for good and evil By virtue of the former it is 
the unconscious cause of evolution, of the order about 
which astronomy is conversant, of the processes by 
which the earth has become what it is, of the produc- 
tion of the conditions of life and of the mind of man. 
Its unconscious power is the undesigning cause of all 
design, of all ratiocination, of poetry, music, eloquence, 
wit, craft, emotion, in fact of every event whatever 
except volition. In view of this wealth of resource 
we should not presume to judge that, in the domain of 
reflex action, it is incapable of mimicry of intentional 
action. When we see the parts of an earwig or Aus- 
tralian ant that has been cut in two turn upon each other 
and apparently fight to the death, or the trunk and legs 
of a headless frog behave as though they were furnished 
with sensibility and intelligence, we should not con- 
clude that mutilation can promote a rump into an 
intelligent animal: the opinion that in such cases 
non-vital reflex action mimics intentional action is less 
extravagant — more congenial to common sense. When 
the senseless polype seeks the light or seems to fight . 
for food with another polype, we should see in the act 
mere mimicry of intentional action. The mimicry of 
prescience and providence wrought by the instincts of 
the lower animals should teach us to forbear from 
setting bounds to the capability of reflex action in 
respect of mimicry. It is probable that the behaviour 
of the somnambulist is mere mimicry of intentional 
action — mere unconscious reflex action. 

The psychical hypothesis implies that death cannot 
be gradual — that there is no such thing as dying by 
inches — no such thing as the death of a part of an 
animal or plant. Death is the cessation of the rela- 
tion between soul and body on which life depends. 

Q 



226 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i, 

« 

For aught we know to the contrary asphyxia might 
involve a cessation of all function without causing 
death. The distinction between somatic and molecular 
death is groundless. There is no such thing as mole- 
cular death : loss of functional aptitude of a part of 
the body is not a death of the part. A thing that is 
part of an animal or a plant may be made by detach- 
ment a living thing ; but qud part it is not a living 
thing and is therefore unsusceptible of death. 

As regards explanatorily the psychical hypothesis 
leaves nothing to be desired. It explains that certain 
corporal events affect the soul so as to make it a sub- 
ject of consciousness, that in the absence of such 
events the soul is unconscious, that, being made 
conscious and the consciousness involving a practical 
alternative, the soul is qualified to choose. This agrees 
with the data, 1st, That a man is a durable individual, 
2nd, That consciousness has a subject, 3rd, That man 
is a free agent, 4th, That consciousness excludes exten- 
sion—is not a corporal event. It confirms the credit 
of the datum-giving faculty, and therefore that of 
common sense. It exempts from the necessity of con- 
sidering such inconsistent hypotheses as the vibrati- 
uncles of Hartley, rebaptized by Lewes neural tremors 
— indeed from the convulsive dialectic that in any 
way strives to identify consciousness with corporal 
event. And how futile are the objections to the 
psychical hypothesis. Forsooth, it is inconceivable 
that soid and body could act upon one another! — 
anatomy had not been able to find the soul with its 
scalpel \ — the principle of parsimony objects that the 
soul is superfluous ! So conceivable is the interaction 
of soul and body that it has been matter of common 
belief to the bulk of men for ages. There is a false 



i 



— - — ■ - - i * ' ■ k. • . - - -^ 1 » .. L - v , 



chap. xvn. WILL AND INSTINCT. 227 

presumption abroad that, to know a cause, is to know 
how an antecedent operates ; and, as the idea of 
psychical causation in respect of corporal events affords 
no room for such a knowledge, it is held that reality 
cannot correspond to the idea. I have shown (§ lxiii. 
12) that, considered in respect of immediate effects, 
knowledge of cause is not knowledge how an ante- 
cedent operates. Betweeji a dynamic event and its 
immediate effect intervenes no event — no event the 
indication of which could be an answer to the question 
how the dynamic event causes. To those who are 
distinctly aware of this truth the idea of psychical 
causation is beset by no mystery or difficulty that does 
not equally embarrass that of corporal causation. If 
the anatomist have not found a soul with his scalpel, 
neither has he an atom nor even a molecule ; and as 
for the principle of parsimony, its pretension to abolish 
the soul deserves nothing better or worse than a 
smile. 




CHAPTEE XVIII. 

GENERAL IDEAS. 

CXXXIV. 

1. An idea of a Kind may symbolise the kind as 
a whole, or as a sum of the parts, — in the one case 
veiling the severality and enhancing the aspect of 
unity, in the other enhancing the aspect of severality, 
and obscuring that of the unity. The idea of all 
men congregated on the Day of Judgment symbolises 
a kind as a whole; that denoted by the term, all 
men, in the proposition, all men are mortal, sym- 
bolises a kind as a sum of the parts. What is pre- 
dicated of a kind symbolised as a whole is not 
supposed by the predication to be true respectively of 
its individuals, whereas what is predicated of a kind 
symbolised as a sum of the parts is supposed by the 
predication to be true respectively of its individuals. 
An idea of a kind symbolised as a sum of the parts is 
supposed by the predication to be true respectively of 
its individuals. An idea of a kind that symbolises 
the kind as a sum of the parts is general ; one that 
symbolises the kind as a whole is non-general. But a 
general idea is not therefore definable as one which 
symbolises a kind as a sum of the parts. There are 



t^^— Jfca^ i i . — ,.l« Jrfi 



chap. xvm. GENERAL IDEAS. 229 

ideas of kinds that symbolise the kinds neither as 
wholes nor as sums of the parts. The idea of solidity 
is such a one. It inconsistently symbolises the kind 
as a monad pervading a multitude of subjects, viz. 
solids. The plurality of the kind is hidden from 
ordinary discernment, and has been hitherto only 
vaguely discerned by philosophic scrutiny. Such 
ideas have been correctly classed as General Ideas or 
Concepts, but not hitherto under the sanction of a 
correct definition of such ideas. The classification 
obtains this sanction when we define a general idea to 
be an idea of a kind that does not symbolise the kind 
as a whole. This definition excludes from the kind, 
general ideas, such an idea as that of a congregation of 
all men, and makes room for ideas of kinds that hide 
the plurality of the respective kinds. 

2. The terms " general idea " and " concept " are 
synonymous. The 7 term Conception has two meanings; 
first, discernment of which the immediate object is a 
general type, second, the faculty of that kind of dis- 
cernment. A concept is the immediate object of a 
conception. 

3. Concepts are either abditive or inabditive; the 
former being those that do, and the latter those that 
do not, hide the plurality of the kind they symbolise. 
Concepts symbolic of the concrete, e.g. concepts of men, 
horses, circles, angles, are inabditive; those symbolic 
of the inconcrete, e.g. of solidity, weight, justice, 
dignity, are for the most part abditive. General ideas 
of the inconcrete attributes, figure, colour, odour, heat, 
cold, although symbolic of the inconcrete, are inabditive. 
The abditive concept has overlaid the plain face of 
concrete and attribute with confusion and mystifica- 



230 THE ALTERNATIVE. hook l 

(ion. Besides hiding the plurality of the kind it 
pretends to symbolise, it occasionally and not rarely 
symbolises the kind as a concrete which somehow 
penetrates, and, so to speak, inhabits, a multitude of 
concretes, transforming into a concrete what experi- 
ence for the most part gives as a sum of attributes. 
Take for example the abditive concept symbolic of 
Solidity. There are as many solidities as solids, and 
there are such species of solidity as hard, liquid, and 
aeriform solidity. If this severality be hidden the 
kind must be conceived as a monad, and, as this 
monad cannot be conceived as depending on this or 
that solid as attribute upon subject, it tends to pass 
for a concrete pervading a multitude of concretes ; and 
such in fact is the common notion of Solidity when 
not brought to book. Thus what is given by experi- 
ence as an attribute is represented by the abditive 
concept as a concrete. The stone, the lead, the lake, 
the gas, are so many concretes that are pervaded by 
the " monadic " concrete, solidity. Its deceitfulness is 
probably helped by the proper name which the lingual 
instinct annexes to the kind it symbolises. Proper 
names are for the most part applied to concretes, and, 
the names of kinds symbolised by abditive concepts 
; proper, habit will have it that the thing denoted 
* concrete. But it is probable that, as regards the 
f of the mind to mistake attributes for con- 
as, the abditive concept is not the only culprit. 
i to be minds to which experience gives as 
i are commonly apprehended as attri- 
i abditive concept does not seem to be 
thu ideas of forces as being concretes, 
I originators of the theory 
s, — Mayer and Colding.l 
d Mind, pogo 160. 




chap. xvm. GENERAL IDEAS. 231 

Positivism is a revolt against the tendency, but not a 
temperate one : it assails not only the concreteness, but 
also the reality, of attributes that are not appearances 
(§ ci. 26). A flash of intuition revealed to the writer 
that experience itself is capable of involving the in- 
abditive concept. While for the first time in the 
gallery of the Louvre, after he had seen perhaps three 
or four pictures of Claude Lorraine, on seeing a fourth 
or fifth there sprang into the view of his mental eye 
an appearance that seemed to be a monad pervading 
all the Claude pictures. It was their style, — the 
style of Claude, — but the writer did not then know 
that this dazzling novelty was not a unique, that it 
was a species of the genus, Style. On seeing in the 
distance a fifth or sixth picture of Claude, he divined 
it, by its participation of the putative monad, to be a 
Claude. He did not infer, he intuited, its relation to 
the other pictures and to Claude. In this instance a 
visual intuition involved an abditive concept symbolic 
of the differentia of a species of pictures, — the species, 
Claude's pictures. By the way, — the intuition refutes 
Nominalism as against Conceptualism. 

4. Concepts are either mediate or immediate. A 
mediate concept is one that symbolises a kind by means 
of an individual serving as type of the kind. An 
immediate concept is one that symbolises a kind with- 
out the mediation of such an individual. The idea 
corresponding to the term, a triangle, in the pro- 
position, The three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles, is an example of mediate concepts. 
The idea corresponding to the term, mankind, in the 
proposition, Mankind is a species of the genus Verte- 
brata, is an example of immediate concepts. It* 



i 



232 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

symbolises a kind without the mediation of an indi- 
vidual apprehended as type. Mediate concepts may 
be, but are scarcely ever, and never spontaneously, 
symbols of inapparitional kinds. Those that symbolise 
apparitional kinds, e.g. mathematical figures, consist of 
an image and an inapparitional constituent in virtue 
of which the image is a type, — is analogous with a 
sample. Let the individual serving as type in a 
mediate concept be known as the " nucleus " of the 
concept, and let mediate concepts relative to appari- 
tional kinds be known as " apparitional." The nucleus 
of an apparitional concept may be either an ideal 
image or an image given as being a reality, e.g. the 
triangle A B C on the blackboard. The discovery of 
the method of constructing an equilateral triangle must 
have been by means of an ideal image; for nature 
affords to observation no such figure as the mutually 
intersecting circles and contained triangle without an 
image of which the method is unknowable. A real 
figure of the kind must be the offspring of invention, 
and must therefore have been preceded by an ideal 
pattern. When a geometrical discovery elicited the 
cry of evprj/ca! the discoverer was in a bath, not before 
a blackboard. 1 But although original geometrical dis- 
covery is not possible without the ideal image, the 
nucleus of the pupil's first geometrical concept serving 
as pivot of a deduction is always though not neces- 
sarily a percept,— a reality,— a diagram. The diagram 
is apprehended as general type, — as a sample of a 
kind, — and is thereby qualified to distribute to all its 
antitypes, not as Mr. Mill held, by a second effort, but 

1 The dependence of original geometrical discovery on the purely 
ideal concept refutes Mr. Mill's doctrine that it results from experi- 
ment on a diagram. 



1 



chap. xvm. GENERAL IDEAS. . 233 

at once, the like of whatever deduction finds in the 
type. Accordingly, mediate concepts are divisible 
into those that have, and those that have not, a reality 
for nucleus. Let the former be known as realistic, and 
the latter as purely-ideaJL The purely-ideal mediate 
CQncept refutes a part of the negation of Nominalism. 

5. Purely-ideal mediate concepts are familiar 
things. Design is a process of constructing such a 
concept or pattern, e.g. that of the kind, steamboats, 
which obtained in the mind of Fulton before he con- 
structed the first real individual of the kind. Our 
needs suggest to us ideal images of the things needed, 
— images that bear to certain things external to the 
mind the relation of type to antitype, of sample to 
that from which it is drawn,— images through which 
we somehow refer to a kind, store, or scattered supply, 
containing an individual that may be separated and 
appropriated. The ideal type may not perfectly re- 
semble any one of its types, and these may differ from 
one another as much as a war-horse from a Shetland 
pony, a St. Bernard dog from a village cur ; but the 
differences do not hide the likeness that makes the 
mental image a type. The ideal type evinces mental 
thaumaturgy in another way. The inventor's ideal 
type of the forthcoming kind is never accompanied by 
an image of several antitypes given as being the kind 
or a part of the kind. When with his mind's eye he 
sees antitypes, the type is not objective. Judging in 
advance of the pertinent experience, one would sup- 
pose that an object could not possess the quality of 
type without the presence of other objects given as 
being the correlated antitypes, or as being symbolic of 
the correlated antitypes, but memory protests that a 



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al/ihrrhlj zsnvansi- and wiga i^iEtcIt v ;be sjiseix, 
»ac« angle*, it is eater eafna c* fsab emr^ r in- 
disdcet. The idea erf the tod, assies, el^k prtoExle 
ideas of acme, tight, and ebGase, angks- tad, thai, as 
ettl!»1 of acmeneas, reeiiicce, or obtcseness. bxcsS be 
^nrtmtly indistinct. I say it esk pmede; far 
angular aeoteneas, recnuide, and obtcseness. are not 
distinctly disoemible in advance of the light which 
they contrastivcly reflect upon each other, and it is 
extremely improbable that this contrast always occurs 
in the <trwrie»e» which first begets, in this or that 
person, his idea of an angle. The opposite supposition 
iVlimniln that we never come by the idea of an angle 
ltd we hare seen at least three angles of different 
i together. 




e concepts, like the objecta 



chap. xvih. GENERAL IDEAS. 235 

of fancy, are mere figments; but the former are so 
put that they passed with the Realists for realities, 
whereas the latter impose no such illusion. The 
utility of the concept is none the less that the concept 
is a figment. It mediates as usefully between the Ego 
and all beside as though it were reaL It is vicarious 
of reality, and a condition sine qua non of a large part 
of human power. 



cxxxv. 

1. Concepts are commonly supposed to depend 
upon a mental process termed Abstraction. I contend 
that the mental process termed abstraction is not fitly 
denotable by that name; that what are termed Abstract 
Ideas are mere terms which substitute and do duty for 
ideas ; that, therefore, concepts do not depend upon a 
process fitly denotable by the name " abstraction," and 
are not abstract ideas. The doctrine of Abstraction 
seems to imply that there are three species of abstrac- 
tion. When bodies are objective, either to perception 
or to imperceptive discernment, their qualities are, for 
the most part, indistinct ; but they are sometimes dis- 
tinct, e.g. the weight to a man staggering under a heavy 
burden, the burning power to the burned child, the 
hardness to one who has a stone for a pillow, the mo- 
mentum to a man struck by a missile, the colour to 
one who is surprised by a remarkable change of colour, 
the motion of a body in unaccustomed motion. From 
these experiences, constituting what I term analytic 
sense -perception, we derive ideas of qualities which 
become familiar objects. The discernments involved 
in these experiences presuppose, it is held, a mental 



236 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

process which, by obscuring the symbols of other 
qualities of an objective body, promote into distinctness 
one of its qualities ; and to this process philosophers 
have assigned the name Abstraction, distinguishing as 
abstract the ideas of qualities which it generates. 
Again, discernment of kinds seems to presuppose dis- 
cernment, not only of general likeness between the in- 
dividuals of each kind, but also of parts or relations in 
respect of which the individuals are perfectly like one 
another, these parts or relations being promoted into 
distinctness by the obscuration of the parts or relations 
in respect of which the individuals differ from one 
another. The putative relief thus given to the basis 
of general likeness whereby attributes that are usually 
indistinct are raised into distinctness, is imputed to a 
mental act which is accounted a species of abstraction, 
viz. detection of an attribute consequent to scrutiny in 
quest of the thing found. For example, I look for the 
attribute in virtue of which this coin belongs to the 
species Wealth, and discover that it consists in an 
importance determined by utility and scarcity. The 
putative abstraction on which analytical perception 
and, in respect of primary kinds, generalisation, are 
supposed to depend, is not attended by nor consequent 
on such scrutiny. Now, if the name, Abstraction, be 
fitly applicable to these three kinds of mental event, 
there are three species of abstraction, viz. — 1st, sense- 
perceptive abstraction or analytic sense-perception, 2nd, 
spontaneous general abstraction, 3rd, abstraction con- 
sequent on scrutiny. It is pretended that abstraction 
generates ideas of the inconcrete unconnected with a 
symbol of the concrete, e.g. an idea of solidity uncon- 
nected with any ideal symbol of a solid, an idea of 
virtue unconnected with an ideal symbol of a virtuous 



chap, xviii. GENERAL IDEAS. 237 

person. Such ideas, accordingly, are termed Abstract 
Ideas. It is not pretended that when these ideas 
obtain the mind is abstracting, but merely that by 
virtue of former abstraction they are withdrawn from 
connection with a symbol of the concrete. This sup- 
poses an important diiference between ideas of the in- 
concrete when the mind abstracts, and abstract ideas. 
The former are, and the latter are not, connected with 
symbols of the concrete.. When abstracting we are 
supposed to see the concrete envelope, whereas abstract 
ideas are altogether detached from the concrete. 
Here then is a need of explanation that has been 
overlooked. The ideas of the inconcrete contemporary 
with abstraction are not abstract ideas. They differ 
from their putative offspring, abstract ideas, as being 
connected with symbols of the concrete. 

2. The metaphor which pretends to exhibit the pro- 
motion of an object from indistinctness to distinctness 
as a species of abstraction is false and a source of error. 
Analytic sense-perception does not withdraw from the 
concrete the inconcrete which it discerns. When we 
discover a basis of general likeness of concretes, whether 
as a result of scrutiny or otherwise, the basis is dis- 
cerned as being in connection with the concrete, the 
total object of the discernment being a concrete or sum 
of concretes, e.g. the value with the coins. Then, in 
so far as the metaphor has contributed to beget the 
theory of Abstract Ideas, it has deluged philosophy with 
fiction. We think of, and reason about, such attributes 
as virtue, cause, love, anger, violence, dignity, without 
having in view the concretes, apart from which they 
could not subsist. Have we then corresponding ideas 
of these constituents, — ideas symbolic of them, not as 



MF 



» i- 



238 



THE ALTERNATIVE. 



BOOK I. 



distinct elements of contemporary objective concretes, 
but as though they respectively existed per se, — were, 
so to speak, independent denizens of space and time ? 
Try. Summon such an idea before you. Only words 
and concrete instances answer your summons. Heed- 
less of the protest of Nominalism, you mistook what 
are named abstract terms for abstract ideas. You in- 
advertently assumed that the terms supposed corre- 
spondiBg contemporary ideas. You were Vrong as to 
the degree of correspondence and as to the simultaneity. 
The ideas corresponding to abstract terms symbolise the 
inconcrete as being involved in the concrete, and they 
are but rarely excited by the terms. Indeed, so suffi- 
ciently do the terms function without them, and so 
much does the indolence of the mind avail itself of this 
utility, that the production of them is commonly a 
reluctant, slow, and difficult operation. There are few 
things that interest man more than Wealth, and yet 
its differentia is so hidden that many of the keenest 
minds of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have 
searched for it and given up the search baffled. Even 
secondary kinds exhibit for the most part only a part 
of their essence, viz. their specific difference, concealing 
the part in virtue of which they belong to their respec- 
tive genera. The species, oak, for example, does not 
expose the part of essence in virtue of which it belongs 
to the genus, tree. Indeed we have no exhaustive 
knowledge of any natural and important essence save 
that of mathematical figures. 

3. The term, Subtle Discrimination, correctly denotes, 
though not so as to prescind, the mental event that 
has been incorrectly denoted by the name "abstraction." 
We subtly discriminate, in complete appearances, the 



I 



mmm 



j.- .. ... 



fcu*MM 



majtmm 



--*■ 



chap. xvm. GENERAL IDEAS. 23d 

inchoate appearances that constitute them, or the in- 
apparitional objects that belong to them : for example, 
we descriminate in the complete appearance termed 
« triangle," the inchoate appearances triangularity and 
triangular magnitude, whereby we know that the 
triangularity determines the equality of three angles of 
a triangle to two right angles ^respective of the magni- 
tude, so that a difference of magnitude could not be 
reasonably supposed to have the property of excluding 
the equality. 1 We remember no such discrimination, 
but it is deducible from the concurrent knowledge (the 
unconscious knowledge of which it was the condition) 
that the magnitude does not contribute to determine 
the equality, — that it is determined exclusively by the 
triangularity. What are termed Abstract Ideas are 
merely immediate objects determined by Subtle Dis- 
crimination. 

4. Signs frequently supplant and substitute ideal 
images, and they for the most part supplant and sub- 
stitute ideas of the inconcrete. Before this function of 
signs was noticed, and while yet it was taken for granted 
that they could not be intelligible without concurrent 
ideas, when it was found that signs of the inconcrete 
are not, for the most part, attended by ideas of the 
concrete, it was inferred that they are attended by 
ideas void of a symbol of the concrete, ideas of so 
delicate a texture that they leave no trace behind them 

1 The evidence of the equilaterality of the typical triangle" causes 
unconscious knowledge that differences of magnitude in the antitypes 
are impotent to exclude the equilaterality. "When question obtains, 
why difference of magnitude should not have the property of excluding 
the equilaterality, we find ourselves already provided with intuitive 
knowledge that such difference is as impertinent, as regards the 
equilaterality, as difference of time or space. 




240 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

such as ideal images leave. The inference invented an 
hypothesis as needless as it is ^verisimilar. We dis- 
cover the inconcrete by means of ideas which symbolise 
it as part of the concrete; we give it a name and 
then the name takes its place as immediate object of 
almost all discourse that refers to it. We discern, 
once for all, a certain proprium in a geometrical figure, 
say, the equality of the three angles of a triangle to 
two right angles; we give it a name and then the 
name exempts the mind from the cost of reproducing 
a symbol of the concrete circumstances of the proprium 
when we have occasion to think of it. Owing to this 
economy we do most of our thinking and intellectual 
intercommunication without the intervention of ideas. 
All general ideas, like that of the equality of the three 
angles of a triangle to two right angles, are either ideas 
of the concrete, or ideas of the inconcrete involved 
with a symbol of the concrete. Wherever we discern 
the general without the help of a symbol of the con- 
crete, it is because general terms are doing duty for 
general ideas. There are no such things as abstract 
ideas. So far Nominalism is justified. But an abstract 
idea is one thing, and a concept another. Nominalism 
is true as regards its negation of abstract ideas, but not 
as regards its negation of concepts. 

5. That we discern what are not appearances, e.g. 
the relation whereby such or such a parcel of sugar is 
a sample, that, in other words, we have inapparitional 
ideas, imparted plausibility to the theory of abstraction. 
But it is one thing for an idea to be inapparitional, 
and quite another to be abstract. The immediate 
object of my discernment when I am thinking of a 
parcel of sugar as being a sample of a cargo 



chap, xviii. GENERAL IDEAS. 241 

involves an ideal symbol of a concrete, viz. the parcel, 
and an ideal symbol of a connected inapparitional thing, 
viz. the relation in virtue of which the parcel is a 
sample. The ideal symbol of the relation is inappari- 
tional, but not abstract. Inapparitional ideas, or ideal 
symbols connected with symbols of the concrete, 
abound ; but outside that connection there are none. 
When we think of inapparitional things outside that 
connection, we think by means of signs, not of ideas. 

6. We sometimes contemplate with a lively senti- 
ment of approval an ideal of emotive character uncon- 
nected with an image of a subject. The few whose 
Christianity has enamoured them of Wisdom, and who 
are earnestly occupied about their own moral develop- 
ment, frequently think of charity, patience, fortitude, 
generosity, and their opposites, apart from an ideal 
image of a subject, and with such sentiments of ap- 
proval or disapprobation as are , excited by living 
instances. Are the objects they contemplate concepts, 
or are they mere signs of concepts ? One might allege 
improbability that a mere sign could make itself an 
object of emotion, and conclude that the objects are 
concepts. Cardinal Newman, in his Grammar of Assent, 
dwells on the parching influence of abstract religious 
ideas, and, if the objects denoted as abstract ideas be 
really mere signs, his remarks apply against signs, — 
against their inefficiency to kindle the intelligence of 
the heart. It is true that when the consideration of 
religious topics involves intricate reasoning and laborious 
effort of subtle discrimination, it tends to exclude 
emotion, so that " theologising " tends to parch the 
heart ; but familiar general terms serving as substitutes 
for concepts have no such tendency. Words and 



THE ALTERS ATIYTL book h 

phrases, from being connected with emotions by their 
respective ideas, acquire a virtue whereby, without the 
help of the ideas, they excite the emotions. Hence 
the magic of a liturgy, a parry cry. a proverb, and the 
superlative words of poets which certain emotions 
always suggest. There are objectless emotions. 1 Such 
is the emotion of solemnity excited by an organ peat 
sach the emotion styled by Lord Karnes the sympathetic 
emotion of virtue. They do not inform as that they 
are tmcczmecsed. and we take for granted that they 
are CGineeted. wiih ideas. Such emotions mere words 
have the p'roperty of awakening. 

7. Ideas of ~ q^esits ~ <§ lxix. 1} tend to pass far 
Absira.cs Ideas, and to Troisier the doctrine of Abstraction. 
Soch objects are not primarily discriminated in the 
ooDcre&e. and then exhibited apart from the concrete. 
The idea of Possibility cannot be supposed to have such 
an CEgin. \Hiat it symbalises is not an attribute of 
the or-ocrec*. and. therefore, does not admit of abstrac- 
tion. The idea of the absolute necessity indicated by 
arygn* and all guaranteed theses, considered as holding 
thcF^zL z>3±inr existed save space and time, is not the 
idea of what o:cM be an attribute of a concrete. The 
idea of the moral imperative symbolises it as a thing 
thai is independent cf the contingent, a thing which 
the oiT.trr.gent may inntite b« not originate ; which, if 
God bs, is no less a law to God than to His creatures 2 : 
of what concrete can this be supposed :o be an attri- 

1 lit Truer flBwe s=rar»sc ir >7asnp^f is c^x«i 



2 lie imss. lim iz» 2>3nZ =t*k*2:t* » si* w=Z cf God in the 

Tfrrr. if H* sbccjd erwr^a^i win ti* mrnl *za* irccA e nds at 



chap. xvni. GENERAL IDEAS. 243 

bute so as to be amenable to abstraction? Clearly 
abstraction has nothing to do with such ideas. 

8. The Moral Imperative, although a quesit, is a 
thing of transcendent importance. In this respect it 
has no rival but the animus which moves us to comply 
with it, — the' animus, wisdom. The idea by which it 
is symbolised bears powerfully iipon the practical life 
of man, and is the product and sign of what is divine 
or nearest to divine in him. It bears to human nature 
and conduct a relation analogous to that which the use- 
ful figment termed " concept " bears to the realities it 
symbolises, — a figment that serves as a hinge of science. 
We cannot too carefully enshrine, protect, and in every 
way make much of, a thing so holy and momentous. 
If we reduce it to the category of nonentity, we tend 
to impair its dignity and influence, and to help a 
demoting argent, *, that moral law is a mere 
fiction of minds of a certain order, and that, apart from 
minds of that order, there is no such thing as good and 
evil, — an argument which confounds moral law with 
discernment of moral law. 



CXXXVI. 

Philosophers have been so engrossed by the relation 
of the concept to judgment that they have quite over- 
looked its relation to memory. When we remember a 
custom, the immediate object of the remembrance is a 
concept, an idea of an event serving as type of a kind 
of events. One may remember the customary temper 
of his youth in a concept having for nucleus an ideal 



244 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

image of his young self smiling or laughing, or in some 
other way evincing an ebullition of pleasure, the image 
being apprehended as sample of events that made up 
the greater part of his youthful waking life. Concepts 
of this kind may be distinguished as mnemonicaU 



CXXXVIL 

The primitive source of ideas of Kinds is a latent 
action of unitive likeness on the mind. We simultane- 
ously or successively, or in part simultaneously and 
in part successively, perceive and otherwise experience 
several individuals of a kind, and their unitive likeness 
latently fecundates the mind, so that, without the 
intervention of any consciousness whatever, an idea of 
the Kind comes into existence. No comparison, no 
discernment of general likeness or of a basis of general 
likeness, nothing that could be accounted a conscious 
selection and synthesis of essential qualities, intervenes 
between the consciousness constituting the experiences 
and the birth of the idea. The bearing of the fecundat- 
ing likeness is as remote from objectivity as that of the 
likeness which begets recognition. The idea thus 
begotten is the idea of a primary kind, one that excludes 
a symbol of the differentia of the kind, and, so, testifies 
that the kind does not owe its existence to discernment 
of a basis of likeness. One of the most toilsome and 
least remunerative offices of Season is study in quest of 
the discovery of the differ entice of primary kinds, e.g. of 
Mankind, or Wealth; and yet philosophers pretend that 
the idea of a kind supposes discrimination of its basis 
of general likeness, and that the idea was somehow 




chap. xviu. General ideas. 245 

composed by the mind at the suggestion of a comparison 
contemplative of that likeness. The likeness, they 
hold, abetted by difference, sheds a light upon the essence 
and upon the accidents of its subject, which enables 
the mind to distinguish between them ; and the condi- 
tion of the putative discrimination they named Abstrac- 
tion. The equivalent of such an operation is wrought 
by the latent action of unitive likeness. 



CXXXVIII. 

Evidence is not wanting that experience of several 
individuals of a kind is an indispensable antecedent of 
the existence of the idea of the kind. In the case of 
twins, our experience of two antitypes of the same type 
does not suffice to make the type, in our view, a specific 
difference, and the twins a kind. If nature should 
regularly and abundantly produce counterparts of Prince 
Bismarck, what is now unique in the appearance of the 
Prince would convert into a specific difference. If 
nature produced but one or two specimens of every 
kind of tree, what are now the specific differences of 
the trees would be mere individual differences. 



CXXXIX. 

The writer has surprised his mind vibrating with 
the birth -throe of the idea of an obvious secondary 
kind, — not in the act originating the idea, but in the 
consequent motion. The clearing of a throat was 



246 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

apprehended by him as a sign of a certain moral state 
or disposition, and as sample of a kind of physiognomi- 
cal signs. 1 The sound was a pro-concept. To this suc- 
ceeded a complete appearance symbolic of such a sound 
and typical of the kind of signs of which the sound was 
apprehended as sample. This appearance was a new- 
born concept. like appearances passing for one and 
the same appearance, as though they were a single 
durable thing that occasionally rose into the view of 
discernment and then betook itself out of sight into 
some dark recess of the mind, — like appearances, I say, 
have served ever since as concepts typical of that moral 
state or disposition. The unconscious mental process 
that begot the idea of a kind begot in it a knowledge 
of a relation of cause and effect. The frequent simul- 
taneity of the sounds with the natural language of the 
disposition, a language intelligible to primitive intui- 
tion, so affected the mind, but without the interference 
of consciousness, that the sound was apprehended as an 
effect as well as a sign of the disposition. Much that 
is imputed to discourse is, in like manner, elaborated 
outside the sphere of consciousness. 



CXL. 

1. I have explained (chap, vii.) that the term 
general synthesis denotes the mental act which generates 
a beginning of knowledge, whether conscious or uncon- 
scious, that the individuals of one kind are to those of 
another in the relation of subject to attribute, e.g. that 

1 We need a term of greater etymological latitude to denote what is 
now denoted by the term, physiognomy, and its cognates. 




chap. xvhi. GENERAL IDEAS. 247 

the individuals of the kind, diamonds, are, respectively 
to those of the kind, combustibilities, in the relation of 
subject to attribute. Now that we definitely know 
what Kind, Essence, and General Ideas, are, the explan- 
ation is a definition. 

2. It is important to distinguish from general- 
synthesis the synthesis of symbols of qualities constitut- 
ing the essences of individuals of primary kinds, a 
synthesis which, from its relation to the generalisations 
that beget ideas of those kinds, might seem to be general 
To form the idea of the primary kind, gold, one must 
have seen two or more things composed of gold ; the 
perception supposes a synthesis of the qualities that 
constitute gold, its colour, solidity, specific weight, etc., 
and as this synthesis is extended in the idea of the 
kind, gold, to all individuals of the kind, it might seem 
to be general The synthesis differs from that to which 
I have assigned the name, general -synthesis, as not 
being a putting together in the relation of subject and 
attribute. I might show, if there were need, that it is 
not general It is enough to show that, although it 
unites symbols of qualities, the union is not that of 
subject and attribute. The confusion of the two kinds 
of synthesis tends to confound Induction with General- 
isation. For example, it tends to make room for the 
error, that the belief of the essentialness of whiteness 
to swans, which was a product of generalisation, was a 
product of induction. The error assumes that swans 
were at first apprehended as things accidentally related 
to whiteness, and that many instances of the connection, 
undiscredited by a contrary instance, begot at last the 
belief, that the connection is necessary and universal 
It might as well be held that gold was at first distin- 



248 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

guished from its yellow, and that it took an induction 
to discover their essential connection. But, if it take 
induction to discover the essential connection of gold 
with one of its qualities, why not its connection with 
all of them ? only here one is at a loss for a subject 
which induction should endow with essential qualities. 
The symbol of the whiteness of the swan was at first 
a semi-distinct constituent of what bore on the mind as 
essence of the swan, and remained so until the appear- 
ance of a bird having all the qualities of the swan save 
the whiteness dislodged it from that relation, raising the 
idea of the kind, swans, into a genus, and lowering the 
symbol of the whiteness into a specific attribute, — the 
differentia of white-swans. Primary generalisation — 
that which begets ideas of primary kinds — never 
involves a general-synthesis. 



«■* 



CHAPTER XIX. 

QUANTITY AND NUMBER. 

CXLI. 

1. We have now to look for a definition of number. 
When money collected in a public assembly is handed 
to the treasurer, he receives a sum of the number of 
which he is ignorant. To ascertain the number he 
must count. He apprehends the thing received as a 
sum and a quantity. He unconsciously knows that it 
is greater than two pounds, and vastly less than a 
million. But this vague knowledge of a plural quan- 
tity — one that consists of two or more units — is not a 
knowledge of a number. When by counting he defi- 
nitely ascertains the quantitative relation of the sum 
to a pound, and to other sums consisting of pounds, he 
ascertains its number. If the sum consist of many 
units, it exhibits no recognisable trait such as is exhi- 
bited by sums under five : a few coins secretly with- 
drawn from the heap would not be missed. Supposing 
the treasurer's count to ascertain that the sum consists 
of a hundred pounds, what has it added to his know- 
ledge ? Merely, that the sum exceeds by one pound 
every sum consisting of ninety-nine pounds, is less by 
one pound than every sum consisting of one hundred 



±5*) THZ ALTZH>TArrrZ. 3tH.^Ki - 



.uia :me ^oiinits. :s etiiiai ro aie uuuue ji everv- sum 

vmffs nnt; .if dftv OtUinds. Ulii jl> "iie i-'iif jf fvssrr * Tim 

/■jnsisiini: .'f rxn juniired pounds : mti so in. Li 
•swto-.t if ill $nms -m.<is rhnj if pounds ind parrs 
if pounds "je ioes our. ir :iie ime. jonstrLouair- reaer 
:u uiy »f riiese relations. He ii:ilrpg no ^mparisoiL 
•voarev^r '.lerreeii :iie *um< lie "jus .'■junied. md. Jiiits: 

flUlLS. lire -.nmr:Titr fcijis nn rriiTu; ro Jis " ms*^im s 

£^ow : .e-.ii2* \uir inowle-.u^ if rie name. Tne ?:mimuf 
pounds . "jut x "ja& "irtjiUKi Ji liim iiui'>i*Lri/H6 Lvk/Jf- 
ttf'w if .ul tiiese reanons. ind Thar. "r*~ ne'ini* if ± 

Uld :iie fne.ie5 if tmnrmtr - pm^ i irH-iTn^ rri' ^ *m 

fcw.'^rrain i munrude if .cier xanLenLiL tMatfimg- 
x *ems then, diar "re "ja^e ideas jf sums uni if 
plural luanczT diar ne our tings if nimiiesi- Inr 
:xvd5unsr* jifca »f ±e =um sbkst^l "jv- nm ^ sut ; i ul 
jittt x dso UTDtsoa :iiar iur^siye jr anxnbss- 
*XL'-**nn*: jDut or or* iesenkis. jl jgram jasts. idojl 
ire ilt jprnri * -nrnnii " — ul sit bBendtar xtmil 
fii^Ls :£iiis-r Tsble ir .uidmLe. 3«sde riir^ jidiL-a- 
z-jxxs. nir frudr" jl nirK" »r i ie T tnirrLtiL c Yrmii^a: 
t-ujuLl ikkt i? :iie aifEsisiL'? "jcTTCtu mninss- "tt»t 
jn* jia iumuc^s "har im olc jinnrauir, .-. i^.o^zustLiiii 
T*iiiL»;ir .vnimxxsi. ^h* n r m e y T^'ssisaiiii um. iii* juxec 
"jrim: -niiiuiir ; T^rj^znsabie ^xah x iSL/iiLX iisi 
:kk: ix :iie difeKiL^ ".vrro-ra. iitt inrmy "cxjwa_ & 
rtntiiTai unnivzs. vy. aei ^m. iire*?, iam «l.. ani" 
iik»s»- irar it5iLC& 3hlr .a iuuiiir. "rrs.'ir. lUSAanniifc 
taih, innL D^nxn. X s- f=swinLa. ^ x-.3c^ g: tat 

TOisraas .aniixiaL "unmi^ uttnv.r c-'wiu^u ir.<w?. isi**- 

vwrr:ri«s=a: £r icr- tat- v xr tttic 
xrcac stcreTrr tafi- * :=:;- a.- %b .. 3as;bc 




chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER. 251 

tions. Taking our direction from these indices, we are 
likely to fall upon a true, definition of Number. 

2. There is a species of quantity of which the 
differentia is that its individuals are discernible without 
reference to plurality. To name these and their 
opposites, I am driven to coin two words, viz. the 
adjectives " plurive " and " implurive," the - former 
signifying, undiscernible without reference to plurality, 
the latter, discernible without reference to plurality. 
It is essential to sums and units qud subjects of quan- 
tity to be plurive. All other subjects of quantity/ e.g. 
pain, pleasure, heat, vividness, are implurive. 



CXLII. 

1. The genus, sums, comprehends an infinitude of 
species the individuals of each of which are equal to 
one another and greater or. less than those of all the 
other species, e.g. the species twos, threes, fours, etc. 
These species and the kind Units are related to each 
other as degrees of a scale of which each superior 
degree consists of sums that respectively exceed by 
a unit a sum or unit of the next lower degree. These 
species, as constituting the degrees of a scale, may be 
distinguished as climactic, — as climactic "plurive" 
species, and the attributes by which they are differen- 
tiated as climactic plurive attributes. A number is an 
individual of a climactic plv/rive species. The scale of 
which the degrees are climactic plurive species may be 
termed the plurive scale. 



252 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

2. A Number might be defined a subject of plurive 
quantity, but this definition omits the climactic or 
scale relation in virtue of which a subject of plurive 
quantity is a number. An object may exhibit the 
aspect of numerical plurive quantity without present- 
ing the aspect of a number. It may be apprehended 
as being greater or less than another subject of plurive 
quantity without being apprehended as a number. To 
be apprehended as a number its climactic relation 
must be either vaguely or determinately objective. To 
one who is about to count, the climactic relation of a 
sum or unit is vaguely objective; after counting, 
determinately. By the way, the symbol of this rela- 
tion is not such as to make the plurive scale objective, 
or even to make the climactic attributes of the rela- 
tion distinct. What corresponds in the symbol to this 
attribute is abditively indistinct, and, accordingly, the 
notion of number as being a subject of climactic rela- 
tion is a stranger to the popular mind. 



CXLIII. 

1. Ratio is undefinable. It is either an equality 
or a quantity of " greaterness " or " lessness," i.e. a 
quantity of which the subject is a " greaterness " or 
K lessness." It is denoted by such examples as double, 
triple, quadruple, half, third, fourth, but could not be 
made known by any description to one who had never 
intuited an object signified by one or other of those 
terms. There are kinds of quantities of " greaterness " 
and " lessness " that are not ratios, e.g. " greaterness " by 
two, as that of 11 in respect of 9, or of 102 in respect 



chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER. 253 

of 100. What distinguishes ratio from this kind of 
quantity of greaterness is no more definable than the 
property that distinguishes red from blue. 

2. Proportion is equality of ratios. 



CXLIV. 

1. The history of the genesis and development of 
numerical discernment is the best possible exposition of 
Number and of the idea of number, and, happily, we 
are not without data from which it is possible to deduce 
the history. The first numerical sign that obtained 
amongst men must have been preceded by an immediate 
object symbolic of a number, and the first object of the 
kind that obtains in any individual must be one sym- 
bolic of an intuitable number ; for an unintuitable num- 
ber is not discernible without counting, and counting 
depends on signs. Therefore the First epoch of numer- 
ical discernment must have been a discernment of at 
least two intuitable numbers; It is not difficult to 
imagine how the numerical aspect of a sum was first 
engendered in the mind of primitive man. A savage, 
we will suppose, had provided himself with three 
portions of food, of which two are abstracted during a 
brief absence, and, because of the balked hunger, are 
acutely missed. The sum of portions he expected to 
find, the sum purloined and the remaining unit, would 
be now apprehended by him in their numerical relation. 
If upon another occasion he dropped four flints and 
after considerable search recovered them, one by one, 
the experience would tend to put in relief the numerical 




254 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

aspect of the first unit recovered and of each of the 
three successive sums determined by the successive 
additions of recovered units. By the way, was this 
aspect involved in a contrast of images ? Did the 
immediate object symbolic of number in the first epoch 
of numerical discernment differ in that respect from the 
immediate objects symbolic of number in our time ? 
For my own part I fail when I try to discern a number 
by means of a contrast, of images. Make the experi- 
ment. Endeavour to think the number of a sum of 
three guineas by means of three images, one of the 
three guineas, one of two, and one of one. The 
experiment convinces that discourse about number does 
not proceed on images. Is it possible that this is owing 
to an alteration of the mental structure by the use of 
signs; that, whereas number was exhibited to primitive 
man antecedently to t\e use of signs in a contrast of 
images, we are no longer capable of discerning it in 
such a contrast ? The sufficiency of signs as substitutes 
for images, and the surpassing aptitude of the system 
of numerical signs, considered together with the tend- 
ency of the mind to curtail its immediate objects, to 
make portions do duty for their wholes, and to part 
with unused instincts and faculties, gives some counte- 
nance to this hypothesis. On the other hand, the hypo- 
thesis that an immediate object symbolic of a number 
involves an inapparitional constituent, is verisimilar, 
and to the writer seems preferable. 

2. Three epochs of numerical discernment, of which 
the order is dubious, follow the first; one the origination 
of a numerical sign, another the first denotement of a 
like number by the same sign, and the other the first 
discernment of an unintuitable number. The numerical 



4M«M* 



■MMta 



chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER 255 

sign is not a condition sine qua non of the discovery of 
an unintnitable number, and, although it is probable 
that signs of intuitable numbers obtained in advance of 
discernment of the unintuitable (a probability confirmed 
I believe by modern observation), we are not shut in by 
conclusive evidence to a solution of the question. Let 
us, for convenience' sake, assume that the origination of 
a numerical sign constituted the Second epoch. The 
evidence for the thesis that natural language, including 
pantomime, was the precursor and in part the mould of 
artificial language, leaves little room for a contrary 
opinion, and it is highly probable that number was 
discerned before articulate sound became a part of 
language. It is highly probable therefore, considering 
how much mimicry contributes to mould human ex- 
pression, that the first signs of numbers were digital 
imitations of intuitable numbers. The fact that the 
common name, Digit, is the common name of numer- 
ical signs, and that the Eoman numerals are imitations 
of the raised fingers, the numeral V being an imitation 
of the outline of the open hand, and the numeral X an 
imitation of a display by both hands, favours this 
hypothesis. The prevalence of the decimal system 
also testifies in its favour. 1 

3. The Third epoch was the denotement of a like 
number by the same sign. This began the process 

x I have not yet read the Australian Aborigines of Mr. James 
Dawson ; but, in a notice of the work in Nature, 6th October 1881, I 
find that in the language of certain of the Aborigines a name compounded 
of the words " one " and "hand " denotes five, and a name compounded 
of the words, two and hand, denotes ten, and that the signs of certain 
numbers consist of words followed by digital gesture, the sign for twelve, 
for example being the word, two-hand, followed by a display of two 
fingers. 



256 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

whereby a numerical sign was made common to the 
individuals of a plurive species, e.g. the sign, Two, to all 
pairs, and was thus adapted to be a general sign, i.e. 
the sign of a number viewed as type of all like num- 
bers, e.g. the numerical signs in the proposition, As a 
two is to a four a five is to a ten. The lingual instinct 
that made Two a common name thereby adapted it to 
be a general name, — the name of a concept. 1 The 
concept consists of an imaginary individual of a plural 
species exhibiting the aspect of type of the species. It 
is, for the most part, substituted by its name, and the 
substitution has greatly assisted, if indeed it did not 
originate, the error of the extreme Nominalists, that 
discernments of the general have nothing but names for 
immediate objects. The promotion of numerical signs 
into general names was a preparation for the discernment 
of number, which is commonly held to be a product of 
abstraction, — to have for object what is termed abstract 
number, the numerus numerosus of the schoolmen. 

4. The first discernment of an unintuitable number 
constituted the Fourth epoch of numerical development. 
Counting could not as yet have obtained, because it 
was excluded by intuition of such numerical relations 
as were then objective ; therefore the discernment was 
not due to counting. There is but one other way in 
which it could have obtained, namely, by notice of 
addition of a unit to the highest intuitable number. 
Accordingly, the first unintuitable number discerned 
must have been the lowest of its kind, probably a five, 

h A concept symbolic of a kind of perceptible things has two faces, 
according to one of which it seems to be an idea, and according to the 
other a something external to the mind and symbolised by the idea. 
Its name is also the name of the species it typifies. 



chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER. 257 

the second a six, the third a seven, and so on upwards, 
notice of additions of a unit to a sum of the next 
lower number being the condition of each discernment. 
Thus were begotten ideas and signs of objects that are 
destitute of a recognisable trait, and no small per- 
plexity ensued in consequence to philosophers who 
undertook to study and explain our knowledge of 
unintuitable number. Such a one looks for an idea 
corresponding to a sign of an unintuitable number, say 
a hundred, and finds none: he has the idea of a sum, — 
of a plural quantity — but no idea of its number ; he 
has instead the sign of the number ; he is bewildered 
by what seems to be conclusive evidence that the 
immediate objects of the greater part of his numerical 
discernments are mere signs to which no ideas corre- 
spond. He finds it impossible to construct a corre- 
sponding idea. How are signs of things of which we 
have no idea possible ? He is humbled by the incon- 
sistencies that discredit so many of our fundamental 
ideas to put up with this inconsistency also, and then 
he will have it, that all discernments of the general 
have nothing but general signs or names for immediate 
objects. But he is mistaken in supposing that there 
are no ideas corresponding to signs of unintuitable 
numbers. To the sign, hundred, for example, there 
corresponds the idea of a plurive quantity which 
counting has found and would always find to corre- 
spond to the sign. This idea he overlooked because 
he was looking for one symbolic of an intuitable 
feature like the features of the four lowest numbers, 
or, at least, of some equivalent of such a trait. If the 
sum signified consist of perceptible units, the idea of it 
is, as it were, a labelled image, the label being the 
numerical sign. What the recognisable face of an 

s 



I 



258 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

intuitable number is to its subject, that the numerical 
sign is to the unintuitable number. Imagine prisoners 
masked by a labelled covering that hides all peculi- 
arity of human form, and distinctly known to their 
keepers only by their respective labels. The imme- 
diate objects symbolic of these prisoners in the minds 
of the keepers are analogous with our ideas of unin- 
tuitable numbers. Both sets of ideas connect with a 
great deal of unconscious knowledge that is prone to 
convert, on the least pertinent occasion, into conscious 
knowledge. 

5. The invention of counting is the Fifth epoch. 
As I remarked above, counting is necessarily posterior 
to the discernment of an unintuitable number, because 
there is no occasion for it beforehand. It is suggested 
by the notices of additions of units that are conditions 
of the discovery of unintuitable numbers. When the 
primitive savage saw a sum of which the number was 
unintuitable, a sum which he was concerned to ascer- 
tain, it would occur to him to withdraw from it a sum 
of the highest intuitable number, withdraw from the 
remainder a unit, and add it to the sum withdrawn, 
denoting the number of the augmented sum by its 
sign ; withdrawing and adding in like manner another 
unit, and denoting the number of the augmented sum ; 
and so on to the last unit of the remainder ; the sign 
of the number of the sum augmented by the last unit 
being the sign sought. The end and reason of counting 
is the ascertainment of an unintuitable number. 

6. The first denotement of a number by successive 
exhibitions of fingers constituted an important numeri- 
cal epoch, — the Sixth. Whether the first discernment 



chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER. 259 

of an unintuitable number was or was not abetted by 
signs of the intuitable numbers, it is certain that but 
very few of the unintuitable, and those the lowest, 
could be otherwise discerned. The discernment of 
those in excess of ten depended upon the discovery of 
a system of signification whereby a few signs might be 
made to denote a vast multitude of numbers. Now, 
on the supposition that numerical signification is, at 
first, digital, we can see how a shift, well within the 
scope of savage originality, might have begotten such 
a system. It only needed to occur to some one to 
denote a number in excess of ten by two successive 
exhibitions of fingers. The further development of 
numerical signification by addition to the succession 
of digital denotements does not deserve to be regarded 
as an epoch, being a mere copy of the model furnished 
by the first succession. Once the lingual instinct 
applied succession of digital exhibitions to denote 
number, the limitation of the digital instrument to 
ten indices secured the decimal system of notation; 
it would ever after, so long as digital expression of 
number should last, apply the method of successive 
exhibitions of all the fingers for the denotement of 
multiples of ten. 

7. The remaining epochs may be more cursorily 
treated. The Seventh was the substitution of vocal 
for digital numerals. Numerical concepts, it is prob- 
able, began subsequently to the use of vocal numerals, 
e.g. the idea of a two as type of the kind twos: if 
so, the first of them constituted the Eighth epoch. 
The first numerical judgment other than that which 
results from counting, e.g. a two and a two are a 
four, constituted an important epoch. It probably 



260 THE ALTERNATIVE. book i. 

obtained as a curtailment of the process of counting. 
It prepared the last epoch which we are here con- 
cerned to notice, the Tenth, viz., the substitution of 
numerical signs for numerical ideas as the sole imme- 
diate objects of arithmetical discourse. 



CXLV. 

The evidence that pantomime, including every form 
of natural language, was the precursor and parent of 
speech, is cogent. Pantomime includes mandatory, 
precatory, affirmative, and negational signs, either 
sounds or gestures, all of which are commonly applied 
in the most advanced societies as adjuncts of speech, 
and two of which, the mandatory and precatory sounds, 
are, as regards command and prayer, indispensable 
accessories of speech. 

Pantomimists show us how much is communicable, 
without speech, by natural language ; so also the inter- 
course of deaf-mutes and that of people who do not 
speak the same tongue. Instinct sets us upon the use 
of natural language, and it is intuitively understood. 
We have no reason to suppose that it did not suffice 
for the intercourse of primitive man, and, as the sup- 
position that it was the primitive language affords the 
explanation of the origin of speech without recourse to 
the supernatural, the principle of parsimony recom- 
mends it to belief. The digital signification of number, 
of which we have irresistible evidence, corroborates 
the theory that natural language is the parent of 
speech. This mode of denotement is still employed by 
savages. For instance, we learn from the Australian 



chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER. 261 

Aborigines of Mr. Dawson that the group of tribes 
between Portland Bay and Cape Ottaway, denoting 
five by their name for one hand, ten by their name for 
two hands, and multiples of ten correspondingly, but 
not having named numbers under ten, signify these by 
gesture— by exhibitions of the corresponding number 
of fingers ; " one of the most remarkable examples," 
remarks Mr. Tylor in Nature of October 6, 1881, "of 
the way in which numerals have been developed from 
counting on the fingers." Whether digital signs did 
or did not obtain in advance of all speech, it is ex- 
tremely probable that they obtained in advance of all 
numerical names, and certain that they did so in ad- 
vance of some of them ; for it is absurd to suppose 
that a society able to denote all numbers by names 
would employ digital signs to denote any. If digital 
signs could coexist with numerical names, how comes 
it that we do not now employ them? The ante- 
cedence of digital to verbal signs of numbers proves 
that at least an important part of language, viz., that 
consisting of numerical names, is of natural origin, and 
it rids our inquiry of the hypothesis that the numerical 
scale and the verbal signs of its degrees were super- 
naturally imparted to man. 



CXLVI. 

In all languages derived from the Aryan the names 
of numbers consist of ten nondescriptive names, and 
descriptive names composed of the former. The de- 
scriptive names are determined by a method significantly 
analogous to that of decimal digital notation, numbers 
exceeding ten and under twenty being denoted by 



262 THE ALTERNATIVE. book l 

names consisting of the name ten and the name of the 
excess over ten, the name twenty consisting of the 
names two and ten put as factors, the name thirty of 
the names three and ten put as factors, and so on np 
to a hundred. But how came it that the lingual in- 
stinct followed the method of decimal digital significa- 
tion in the generation of verbal numerical signs ? 
Why did it not begin descriptive naming with eight or 
nine or with eleven or twelve ? What determined it 
to begin with ten ? The answer to this interesting 
question is not obvious, and the end I have in view 
does not require me to look for it. I am led to re- 
mark by the way with reference to this question, that 
a theory of the genesis of words which supposes words 
begotten in the infancy of the race to have been in- 
tentionally invented, i.e. f articulately copied from a type 
discovered in and selected from the train of ideas by 
attention purposely applied in quest of a word, assumes 
a ripeness of faculty that experience of human nature 
does not warrant. Man must be already a philosopher 
when it is possible for him to premeditate the inven- 
tion of a word. 



CXLVIL 

We owe to the lingual instinct not only words but 
also rules for making words. As regards number, we 
owe to it an art of name-making whereby we are 
enabled to fashion out of ten sounds an indefinite 
number of names so corresponding to the things they 
denote that an operation upon the words or their 
various signs enables us to evolve the sign of an un- 
known number and thereby to acquire knowledge of 



chap. xix. QUANTITY AND NUMBER 263 

the number. One of the rules of this art enables us 
to convert names of numbers, 1st, into names of what 
are known by the common name, ordinal number, 2nd, 
into names of units which connote the ratios of the 
units, and 3rd, into names of ratios. The rule for 
making the name of an ordinal number is, except as 
regards the numbers, one, two, and three, to affix the 
letters th to the names of the corresponding number, 
e.g., fowth, filth, sixth. To make the name of a unit 
that connotes a ratio of the unit, utter the adjective, 
" one," before an ordinal, e.g., one fourth, one fifth. 
To make a name that shall denote two or more units 
and their respective ratios, affix ths to an ordinal and 
utter before the word so made, as adjective, the name 
of the number of the units, e.g., thxee-fovxths, four-fiftAs. 
Now, names of units that connote ratios of the units 
consist of two constituents, one a numerical adjective, 
the other the term qualified by the adjective : the for- 
mer is termed numerator, the latter denominator. A 
term composed of a numerator and a denominator 
serves to denote as well as connote a ratio, e.g., the 
term, three -fourths, serves equally to denote three 
units by connoting their ratio to four, and to denote 
the ratio of that number to four. 



• / 



?* 



BOOK IL-REASONING. 



■ p 



* 



r~\ 



CHAPTEE I. 

JUDGMENT. 

CXLVIII. 

The study of the faculty, Eeason, belongs to psychology ; 
but the study is incomplete until logic has exposed to 
it those offices of the faculty about which logic is 
conversant. The study of the faculty, eloquence, 
belongs to psychology; but it is incomplete until 
rhetoric has exposed to us all the offices of the faculty 
about which rhetoric is conversant The study of the 
faculty, wisdom, belongs to psychology ; but it is in- 
complete until moral philosophy has exposed to it all 
the relations and offices of the faculty about which 
moral philosophy is conversant. My subject, psycho- 
logy, therefore requires me to investigate Eeason in the 
domain of logic, and "Wisdom in the domain of moral 
philosophy. 



CXLIX. 

1. Judgments are either augmentative or unaug- 
mentative, the former being those that do and the 
latter those that do not augment knowledge. Unaug- 



268 THE ALTERNATIVE. book n. 

mentative judgment is not necessarily (though Kant 
implies the contrary) analytic and explicative. There 
is nothing of analysis and explication in the judgment 
that I exist, or that a person whose identity is in 
question and whom I recognise is John or James, or 
in any judgment merely corroborative of experience, 
e.g., that I am conscious. The judgment connected 
with Columbus' first view of trans-Atlantic land, viz., 
that trans- Atlantic land exists, was an unaugmentative 
judgment : it added nothing to knowledge, being merely 
corroborative of the knowledge added by perception. 

2. Augmentative judgment is either intuitive or 
inferential The judgment, that a boundary is con- 
tained in a region, is an example of intuitive augmen- 
tative judgment. This kind includes a species that 
has never been adequately distinguished and never 
explained, viz., judgments involving discovery of unob- 
vious essences of known kinds,— discoveiy of essences 
of primary kinds. Judgments of this spedes, as being 
discoveries of real definitions, I distinguish as definitive, 
and those of the opposite species as non-definitive. 
Definitive judgment and the scrutiny on which it 
depends constitute one of the most important and 
arduous of the functions of Eeason. The ideas in 
different minds corresponding to a given general name 
are not always symbolic of the same kind, and the 
idea corresponding at one time in a given mind to a 
general name is not always perfectly like the idea 
corresponding to the name in the same mind at another 
time. In other words, the signification of a general 
name is not always the same for different persons, nor 
even for the same person at different times. The ideas 
chiefly vitiated by this source of confusion and error 



chap. i. JUDGMENT. 269 

are those symbolic of kinds of which the essences are 
not known ; and the discovery of the essence elimi- 
nates the vice. When men are agreed respecting the 
essence connoted by a given general name, the ideas 
corresponding to the name in the different concurring 
minds become like one another, and likewise the ideas 
corresponding to the name at different times in the 
same mind : the name acquires the same signification 
relatively to all the concurring persons and to the 
same person at different times. The change is a sine 
qua non of correct predication as regards the kinds to 
which the rectified general ideas refer; it enables a 
distribution of the predicate according to the intention 
of the predicator without which a common understand- 
ing respecting certain questions is impossible. Such 
is the importance of definitive judgment. Its arduous- 
ness cannot be thoroughly known but to those by whom 
it has been successfully applied in the solution of long- 
vexed questions. Some notion of it may be inferred 
from the antiquity of questions which have reached 
a solution only in modern times, and from the length 
and violence of controversies that have been terminated 
by the conversion of indefinite into definite ideas. 
Over two thousand years ago philosophers were in 
quest of the differentia of the kind, Man, some of them 
contenting themselves with such a pis oiler as the 
definition, A two-legged animal without feathers : later 
philosophy took refuge in the definition, Eational animal, 
overlooking the irrationality of idiots. If the author's 
definition be true and terminate a secular quest, it is 
worth while to say of it that it was not achieved with- 
out long, fatiguing, and often baffled labour. The 
failure of the political economist to achieve a true 
definition of Value is a notable instance of the difficul- 



270 THE ALTERNATIVE. book il 

ties which the faculty of definitive judgment has to 
encounter. The controversy respecting the relation 
of knowledge to experience demanded an exhaustive 
study of experience to ascertain what the disputants 
should allow to be its differentia, but, antecedently to 
the present work, there is no sign of such a study, and 
it is not improbable that the disputants preferred to 
risk the defectibility of indefinite ideas rather than 
incur the long postponement incident to such a study. 

3. The definitions of geometry are good examples 
of the products of definitive judgment. Points and 
lines were given by experience as perceptible things, 
and, under the scrutiny of Eeason, they resolved into 
imperceptible things manifested by the perceptible, — 
points into dimensionless positions, lines into lengths 
without breadth. The definitions were achieved by 
mere scrutiny, without evidence, without inference. 
The scrutiny pierced the confusion which palmed off 
things of two dimensions for lengths without breadth, 
and minima visiMlia of two or three dimensions for 
points. 

4. Definitive judgment, and the scrutiny by which 
it is for the most part if not necessarily preceded, 
constitute a species of reasoning that has been over- 
looked by Logicians, who restrict the name Eeasoning 
to inference. 

5. Judgment is either general or non-general. It 
is either synthetic or disjunctive, the former when it 
affirms, the latter when it denies, that one of the 
terms of its thesis is to the other in the relation of 
subject. 



chap. i. JUDGMENT. 271 



CL. 



1. Infer met consists of a discernment of evidence, 
and a consequent conclusion. By some the term, 
inference, is understood to be synonymous with the 
term, conclusion ; but authority seems to sanction the 
other signification. The Logicians, in holding syllogism 
to be the form of inference, endorsed the latter. Let 
the first of the two constituents be known as in- 
ferential antecedent, and the second as inferential 
consequent 

2. Inference is divisible into Deduction and In- 
duction. Deduction is inference from evidence that 
elucidates a complete seeming of necessity, and Induction 
is non-deductive inference. These definitions are not 
likely to pass unchallenged. Although the highest 
philosophic authority from Aristotle downward op- 
poses Induction to Deduction, modern thought confines 
the name to inferences from the particular to the 
general, and to certain mental acts which it mistakes 
for inferences : it does not rank inferences respecting 
particulars, e.g. the juryman's verdict that the defend- 
ant is guilty, as inductions. Then, Logic has so inti- 
mately connected the idea of deduction with inference 
from the general, that a definition of deduction which 
does not expressly exhibit this relation has a question- 
able air : yet reference to the general is a mere acci- 
dent of deduction, — an accident so unimportant that 
the French are now teaching mathematics without the 
axioms, and the omission, I understand, is sanctioned 
by the Academy. 



U7i THE ALTERNATIVE. uook il 

8. Deduction is either general or non-general, the 
fonnor when the deduced thesis is general, otherwise 
the latter. The evidence on which general deduction 
depend* is proper to mediate concepts. This contri- 
buted to l>oget and maintain the notion, that perfectly 
guaranteed deduction derives nothing from experience. 

4. Induction differs from induction in the respect 
that its evidence does not consist in, or derive from, 
an experience other than that which begets the ideas 
of the things to which it refers> whereas inductive 
evidence either consists iu or derives from such experi- 
ence. IVductive evidence is proper to — is implicit in 
— ideas formed in advance of the operation of the 
evidence, and is valid for all persons who possess those 
ideas, whereas inductive evidence is valid only for 
those who undergo, or have contidence in the testimony 
of those who undergo, experience over and above what 
begets the ideas of the things to which the evidence 
refers* brom :his wine of view also we descrv* an 
explanation of :he opinion, that deduction is judgment 
i i«n«^ : the experience on which it depends was 
overlooked, and that which it excludes seemed to 
v.viuprise all experience. 

■>. reduction is divisible into that which is wholly. 
and daac which is uartiailv. ^uaranceed. Waen the 
evideuce shows that, >f such jr such in uncertain 
diesis be :rue. the thesis in question mux be true, the 
teuueuou is only partially juaranceed : when the 
evidence binges m an axiom, die ieducciou is wholly 
guaranteed. 

o. It is assencial :u deduction :o iiueniace i <■ 



chap. i. JUDGMENT. 273 

ing of inconsistency of the opposite, — inconsistency of 
the thesis opposed to that one whose truth is deduced* 
Inference from evidence that merely elucidates dbsm* 
dity of the opposite is not deduction. Euclid deviates 
from his ostensible method when he has recourse to 
this kind of evidence, — a mode of proof known as 
Indirect demonstration. The evidence does not hinge 
upon an axiom. The extreme absurdity of the op* 
posites elucidated by his indirect demonstration, 
although it does not satisfy Eeason like demonstration, 
causes what is almost an equivalent of a complete 
seeming of necessity. It is almost demonstrative. 
But it must be acknowledged to its discredit that the 
criterion of absurdity graduates into repugnancy deter- 
mined by prejudice and conservative of error. 

7. Inference is divisible into — 1st, inference of 
which the knowledge, antecedently to the inference, 
is so nearly within the knowledge of the person 
inferring that, to bring forth the conclusion, he only 
needs to be reminded in connection with the inferential 
question ; and 2nd, inference of which a part of the 
evidence is, antecedently to the inference, unknown to 
the person inferring. The following are examples of 
inference of the first of these two kinds. Experience 
has convinced a man that delicacy of conscience 
excludes success in politics, and nevertheless he appre- 
hends A , a person known to him to be a success- 
ful politician, as a man of delicate conscience : being 

reminded of the general judgment and also that A 

is a successful politician, he at once concludes that he 
was mistaken in the character of A . A material- 
ist who believes in his own personal identity and in 
that of all men from birth to death, and knows that 

T 



274 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ii. 

the supposed durability is not of the body, the body 
being a mere series of organic aggregates, on being 
reminded of his beliefs in connection with question 
of their truth, discerns their inconsistency, and, infers 
the existence of an immaterial subject of the identity, 
— a souL Every geometrical inference is an example 
of inference of the second kind. Inference of the first 
kind, as being supplementary to mental operations 
which, but for mental indolence, would have resulted 
in the knowledge they originate, may be distinguished 
as supplementary ; and that of the second kind as non- 
supplementary. Supplementary inference evinces men- 
tal defect : in minds of the highest order the rectitude 
and completeness of the mental operations which, in 
lower minds, it is its function to supplement, exclude 
occasion for its interference. When, in such a mind, 
a general induction obtains, all individuals of the kind 
to which the induction refers are apprehended in con- 
formity with the induction. If, for example, the in- 
duction be that success in politics is incompatible 
with delicacy of conscience, no one known to that 
mind as a successful politician is ever apprehended by 
it as a person of irreproachable morality. In such a 
mind there is no room for the inconsistency of the 
materialist who believes in his own temporal identity, 
and that his body is a mere series. The room for 
inconsistency which the great bulk of human minds 
afford is a sine qua mm of supplementary inference. 




chap. i. JUDGMENT. 275 



CLI. 



Evidence may exhibit to those whom it fails to 
convince an air of sufficiency even for demonstration, 
—a seeming of what I shall make free to term proof- 
sufficiency. Of this most thoughtful men have had 
experience. It is noticed by Cardinal Newman in his 
Grammar of Assent} " And as assent," he remarks, 
" sometimes dies out without tangible reasons sufficient 
to account for its failure, so sometimes, in spite of 
strong and convincing arguments, it is never given. 
... I have already alluded to the influence of 
moral motives in hindering assent to conclusions which 
are logically unimpeachable. . • . Argument is not 
always able to command our assent though it be de- 
monstrative." Unconvincing seeming proof-sufficiency 
sometimes gives occasion for an intentional act that 
bears a certain resemblance to a judgment, — an arbi- 
trium. 

CLIL 

1. A thesis which supposes the truth of another 
thesis may be said to imply the other. Implication, 
thus understood, is either recondite or non-recondite. 
The definitions of geometry imply its theorems, but so 
as to hide them : they are examples of recondite impli- 
cation. The thesis that a body is in a place different 
from that which it previously occupied implies the 
thesis that the body has moved, but not so as to hide 
it. This is an example of non-recondite implication. 

1 Grammar of Assent, p. 161. 



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chap. i. JUDGMENT. 277 

have been known, "but not the whole. Whately's 
error was probably in part due to one arising from the 
etymological meaning of the term, "premiss." The 
priority which the term connotes tends to pass for 
priority in respect of the inference, whereas it is 
merely priority in respect of the conclusion. This 
error I shall have occasion to expose when I treat of 
Syllogism (§ clxi.) I shall show that what in non- 
supplementary inference corresponds to the minor 
premiss is itself a conclusion from a part of the evi- 
dence involved in the inference. 



CHAPTER II. 

INDUCTION. 

CLIII. 

1. The division of inference into deduction and in- 
duction implies, as I have already remarked, that 
induction is non-general as well as general. A verdict, 
or the judgment that rain is imminent, is an example 
of non-general induction. Mental habit has so exclu- 
sively connected the idea of induction with general 
theses that some shyness of the novelty, Non-general 
induction, is to be looked for ; but this will not long 
resist the great convenience of the classification which 
assigns the name induction to non-deductive inference, 
completing the familiar opposition of Deduction and 
Induction. 

2. BakewelTs induction, that all cattle of a certain 
make tend to fatten rapidly, is an example of general 
induction. Every general induction supposes the pos- 
sibility of a multitude of non-general inductions from 
the evidence on which the general induction depends ; 
e.g., the general induction, that all men are mortal, 
supposes the possibility of a multitude of such particular 
inductions as, John is mortal, James is mortal, I my- 



chap. ii. INDUCTION. 279 

self am mortal, — all, both general and particular, from 
the same evidence. One tends at first sight to take 
for granted that the particular inductions are dependent 
on and presuppose the general one. This is not true. 
They presuppose the ordinary law of belief on which 
the general induction depends, but not the general 
judgment. The first savage who inquired about man's 
liability to death not caused by overt violence might 
have been occupied with the question, not whether all 
men be mortal, but, whether he himself be mortal, and, 
viewing the many deaths resulting from disease which 
experience and report had made known to him as 
evidence, also that the life of no living man had 
measured that of many generations of men, he might, 
without reference to the mortality of all men, infer 
that he himself is mortal. The law under which 
inductive belief obtains has no need to bring the 
general into view in order to determine a particular 
belief. The induction, I am mortal, as depending on 
the evidence from which we infer the mortality of all 
men, is so suggestive of the general inference, that it 
disposes one to believe that it is a corollary of the 
general inference ; but not so the great bulk of parti- 
cular inductions. When, from the indication of the 
clock, a man infers the imminence of some customary 
event, or, from the testimony the juryman infers the 
guilt of the accused, the induction neither owes nor 
seems to owe anything to reference to the general. 



CLIV. 

1. Three kinds of mental event not easily distin- 
guishable from inference have been confounded with it 



280 THE ALTERNATIVE. book il 

If the first diamond seen by a child were, when seen, 
in a state of combustion, the perception would cause 
a proximate thesic affection relative to the thesis, 
All diamonds are combustible. The affection could 
not be complete, could not be knowledge, the child 
being without the idea of the kind, diamonds. But it 
passes for knowledge of the general truth, and the 
putative knowledge is supposed to originate in infer- 
ence ; as being inference from experience of instance 
it passes for induction. A person acquainted with the 
kind, diamonds, but without a prejudice against their 
combustibility, sees a diamond burn, and the percep- 
tion begets in him an unconscious knowledge that all 
diamonds are combustible. The occasion provokes 
no question of the relation of combustibility to all 
diamonds. The third kind was instanced in the 
discovery of the combustibility of diamonds, — - an 
inference from the combustion of a single diamond. 
The second and third kinds differ only in the respect, 
that an individual of the former originates uncon- 
sciously and out of connection with question, whereas 
one of the latter originates consciously, under question, 
in view of evidence, and involves non * significant 
assertion. It was inevitable that the latter knowledge 
should, antecedently to the discovery of unconscious 
knowledge, be ascribed to inference, and, as being 
inference from experience of instance, to induction. 
An unconscious beginning of knowledge caused by 
experience of instance is not induction ; and a proxi- 
mate thesic affection so caused is not induction. As 
I have already explained when treating of Experience 
(chap. xiv. Bk. I.), a thesis which experience has made 
known without the intervention of question — without 
that of the judging faculty — is a datum. 



chap. n. INDUCTION. 281 

2. Data that obtain unconsciously may be dis- 
tinguished as non-judicial. They are either general 
or non-general. The non-general are either individual 
or unique. The thesis, implicit in a visual perception 
of a tree, The object of my vision is a tree, is an 
example of non-judicial data that are non-general and 
individual. The thesis, All unsupported bodies fall, is 
an example of general non-judicial data. The thesis, 
Nature operates uniformly, exemplifies unique non- 
judicial data. Nan-judicial data are either guaranteed 
or unguaranteed: the former are exemplified in the 
datum, Things equal to the same, etc., the latter in 
the datum, Nature operates uniformly. 

3. Guaranteed data are the only ones that have 
hitherto occupied attention, and therefore a certain 
distrust of the novelty, Unguaranteed data, is to be 
looked for; but it cannot survive a little scrutiny. 
To allow them to be data, is to allow that every expe- 
rience involves a datum, and to imply that all un- 
guaranteed general data are pure products of experience, 
— pure in the sense that thdy are not the joint off- 
spring of experience and judgment. 

4. General unguaranteed non-judicial data com- 
prehend a species which, as having the air of being 
inference, may be termed quasi-4nferential data. All 
general syntheses that obtain without question, e.g., 
that food relieves hunger and water thirst, the child's 
synthesis of combustibility with coal or wood, the syn- 
thesis of falling with unsupported -bodies, determine 
quasi-inferential data. The confusion of these data 
with the products of inference — of the latent mental 
processes which engender the data with the conscious 



282 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ii. 

discourse that constitutes inference — has greatly re- 
tarded the evolution of philosophy. 



CLV. 

1. General induction is divisible into two kinds, 
one of which may be appropriately characterised as 
accidental, and the other as non-accidental. General 
induction that originates in knowledge which might 
obtain without the intervention of judgment — might 
obtain as knowledge of an empirical datum — is acci- 
dental ; all other induction is non-accidentaL The 
physicist's induction from the single instance of diamond 
combustibility is an example of accidental induction, 
that of Bakewell of non-accidental induction. 

2. Non-accidental induction is separated from the 
opposite species by a difference so great that it tends 
to discredit the classification which makes them con- 
geners. The difference hinges on one that determines 
two opposed kinds of series. A series is a succession 
in time or space, e.g., a succession of days, a colonnade. 
A series of which the units resemble each other in a 
unitive degree that does not hide the plurality, is 
regular ; one of which the units are not unitively like 
each other or of which the plurality is hidden, is irre- 
gular. Now, when the units of a non-factitious regular 
series exceed a certain number, say five or six, it is 
impossible to regard them as fortuitous. A law of 
belief obliges us to impute them as effects, either to 
volition or a necessity in nature. A non- factitious 
regular series consisting of as many units as bring it 
under the operation of this law, may be distinguished 



chap. n. INDUCTION. 283 

as considerable, and one of the opposite kind as w- 
considerable. Substituting the word "natural" for 
non-factitious, we get the following definition : — A con- 
siderable, natural, regular, series is one that excludes 
presumption of fortuitousness. A non-accidental general 
induction is one that has for evidence a considerable, 
natural, regular, series. It is obvious that the know- 
ledge it involves could not originate unconsciously, 
apart from question or apart from a non-significant 
assertion. Accidental general induction obtains under 
a law that has nothing to do with non-accidental 
induction, — the law of " Wee appearance, like inherence." 



CLVI. 

The property of excluding a presumption of for- 
tuitousness is not confined to considerable natural serial 
regularity : it belongs also to another species of order, 
viz., orderly concurrence of aptitudes, — which insists 
with axiomatic force not only that the concurrence is 
not fortuitous, but moreover that its cause is intelligent 
and first cause. Order seems to be comprised by three 
species, viz., Kegularity, Concurrence of Aptitudes, and 
Beauty, and the property in question seems to be con- 
fined to the two former. It does not seem to attach to 
mere beauty disconnected from regularity and concur- 
rence of aptitudes. The power of regularity to suggest 
and insist that its subject is not fortuitous — that it is 
the effect of a cosmic cause — was first instanced to the 
writer by the impression made upon him by a cloud 
of which the symmetry consisted in a regularity. 



284 THE ALTERNATIVE. book n. 



CLVII. 

Causes of unguaranteed beliefs have been stigma- 
tised as blind. The epithet seems felicitous as serving 
to anchor in intimate knowledge the reason of scep- 
ticism. Theses that cause guaranteed certitude exhibit 
to scrutiny an intelligible efficiency, whereas those of the 
opposite species avow to scrutiny that their efficiency 
is unintelligible. The efficiency of a latent bearing of 
likeness on the mind whereby it causes an identifica- 
tion, e.g. t of an acquaintance, is no more intelligible 
than the efficiency of friction which causes electricity. 
When the bearing causes a true identification it does 
so accidentally. If the acquaintance were a twin the 
identification might be false. All unguaranteed data, 
e.g., that of the prior and subsequent existence of the 
object of perception ; that the Universe is a durable 
thing, not a mere series of things each of which exists 
but for an instant; that the future fundamentally 
resembles the past, implying the uniformity of the 
action of Nature ; that there are realities other than 
the Ego ; are products of blind causes of belief. 
Inductions are effects of such causes. The gulf 
traversed by the inductive leap is one which the in- 
ferred thesis does not intelligibly span — does not 
explain. Science, when it bursts the shell of dogma- 
tism and carries none of the fragments on its back, has 
to live by faith — faith in a thing which, according to 
experience, has been for the most part blundering along 
the line of progress. 



chap. n. INDUCTION. 285 



CLVIII. 

1. The difference between deduction and induction 
is put in strong relief by two modes of proof of the 
equilaterality of a triangle constructed as prescribed 
by Euclid, one mode consisting of demonstrative, the 
other of undemonstrative, evidence. On any straight 
line (let it be the line A B) construct a triangle as fol- 
lows ; — applying one point of the compasses at the point 




A, at the distance of the point B describe a circle BCD, 
and, applying a point of the compass at the point B, at 
the distance A describe another circle ACE; from 
one of the points of intersection of the two circles 
draw two lines, one to A the other to B. The triangle 
ABC thus formed can be shown by two kinds of 
evidence, one demonstrative, the other undemonstra- 
tive, one compelling a deduction, the other an induction, 
to be equilateral. The demonstrative evidence consists 
of two things essential to a figure so constructed, viz. 
that two of the sides, A B, A C, are radii of the same 
circle, and that one of these, A B, and the third side, 
B C, are radii of the same circle. These essentials sup- 
pose the mutual equality on the one hand of A B, A C, 
and, on the other, of B A, B C, and this supposes the 



286 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ir. 

equality of the sides, A C, B C to the same, viz. the 
side A B, and therefore their mutual equality. The 
evidence shows first, that the three sides are equal, 
second, that they could not but be equal, third, that 
no triangle so constructed could have its sides unequal. 
A complete seeming of necessity elucidated by the 
evidence makes the evidence demonstrative and the 
inference deduction. The evidence consists of what is 
essential to the subject of the demonstrative thesis. 
The inference is explicative. The undemonstrative 
evidence consists of compass measurement applied to 
the triangles contained in several diagrams constructed 
as prescribed. The several instances of equilaterality 
undiscredited by a contrary instance compel belief that 
the method of construction somehow necessitates equi- 
laterality of the triangle. The evidence elucidates not 
a complete but an incomplete seeming of necessity; 
it is undemonstrative, inexplicative ; as regards the 
subject of the thesis to be proved it is accidental ; and 
the inference it causes is inductive. 

2. Our geometrical example illustrates more than 
the difference between Deduction and Induction, — more 
which it concerns us to make as plain as possible. It 
is obvious that the diagram may be employed to prove 
demonstratively or undemonstratively either a par- 
ticular or a general thesis, either that the triangle on 
. the blackboard is equilateral, or that all triangles 
constructed according to the same method are equi- 
lateral. In the one case the diagram is, and in the 
other is not, used as a type or concept. The particular 
thesis might be proved first, and then, by merely pro- 
moting the diagram into a type, the truth of the general 
thesis would be manifest; or, by presenting the diagram 



chap. ii. INDUCTION. 287 

from the beginning as a type, the general inference 
would obtain at once. Mr. J. S. Mill held that the 
first of these two modes of proof is the only possible 
one, 1 and certain geometrical treatises employ a Ian- 
guage which fails to exhibit the diagram as type, and 
nevertheless pretends to elicit a general inference. 

3. Another thesis on which the example throws a 
strong light is that Deduction does not depend on 
objectivity of the general To assent to what is 
proved by the compass measurement needs no refer- 
ence to the thesis, All things equal to the same are 
equal to one another; nor does the demonstrative 
evidence of the same truth; nor does that of the 
equality of the sides, AC, B C, to the same, and of 
their equality to one another, require such a reference. 

4. The example instances the truth of the thesis that 
there are Inapparitional Objects. There is nothing 
apparitional in the diagram but what is visible ; but 
its typical aspect, when it is employed to prove the 
general thesis, is not visible, — is not apparitional. 
The symbols of equality involved in the demonstration 
are inapparitional objects; the symbol of method of 
construction is inapparitional. The immediate object 
corresponding to the universal ad libitum connoted by 
such indefinite terms as « any straight line " in the 
prescription, " on any straight line construct," involves 
an inapparitional constituent. The constituent signi- 
fied by the adjective, "any," is inapparitional. The 
ad libitum, by the way, is a sine qud non of the uni- 
versality of the conclusion, as serving to exclude the 
supposition that differences of dimension, place, and 

1 Logic, Bk. II. chap. v. 



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contained in an eighty-one, that an eighty-one divided 
into parcels of nine (divided by a nine) contains nine 
such parcels, that nine veiled sums (§ liv.) each con- 
sisting of nine units consists of eighty-one units, that 
a nine withdrawn from an eighty-one leaves a seventy- 
two : On such unguaranteed data are partly based the 
science and art of Arithmetic, and, in so far as Mathe- 
matics is based upon number, the science of Mathe- 
matics. Yet Kant will have it that Arithmetic is 
exclusively the product of synthetic judgment & priori; 
— that the proposition, 7 + 5 = 12, is such a judgment. 
That it was possible for Kant to build on the error 
which our elaborate study of number has exposed 
evinces the density of the confusion that enveloped 
the idea of number. 1 Arithmetical conchcsions are 
inductions, the evidence being the operation on signs 
which gives the numerical sign sought. Errors of 
calculation are not wanting to show that the know- 
ledge resulting from the operation is not guaranteed. 
The rule of three is not, like Euclid's rule for making 
an equilateral triangle, guaranteed by inconsistency of 
the opposite. The thesis, that Euclid's rule is not 
indefectibly apt, is inconsistent; not so the thesis, 
that the rule of three is not indefectibly apt. The 
latter rule has the utmost guarantee of induction, but 
its aptness is neither self-evident nor demonstrative. 
In so far as scientific judgments are results of applica- 
tions of the rule, they are not guaranteed by incon- 
sistency of the opposite. 

1 Critique of Pure Reason, Section v. 



U 



CHAPTEE III. 

SYLLOGISM. 

CLX. 

1. As a needful preliminary to an exposition of the 
relation of syllogism to inference let us revise our 
notions of Law, imperative and natural law and laws of 
belief, and acquaint ourselves with a new aspect of 
axioms in which they figure as exponents of laws 
of belief. The primary meaning of the term, law, 
is command, backed by authority or penal power, to 
act on occasions of a certain kind according to a 
pattern put by the command. The term has a second- 
ary meaning which is metaphorical, denoting a pre- 
tended command which a secondary cause tends to 
obey by copying in its successive effects a pattern 
put by the command. Let what the term, according 
to its primary meaning, denotes, be named imperative 
law. What it denotes according to its secondary 
meaning is known by the name, law of nature. It is 
essential to law, whether imperative or natural, to refer 
to conformity to a pattern on successive occasions of a 
certain kind. A command to perform a single act or 
several acts on a single occasion is not a law. If a 
secondary cause necessarily incapable of more than 



^ 



chap. hi. SYLLOGISM. 291 

one effect were possible, its action, as not being re- 
lated to several successive occasions of conformity to a 
pattern, would not be according to a law. The tide, 
the succession of day and night, that of the seasons, 
the regular recurrences of the positions of the heavenly 
bodies, systole and diastole, inhalation and expiration, 
the regular recurrences of appetite, are examples of 
events — of regular series of events — that manifest 
natural law. All secondary causes do not operate 
according to law. Unique effects resulting from com- 
binations of secondary causes, e.g % the lighting of a 
flake of snow on such or such a part of the earth's 
surface, abound. The combination is a secondary 
cause that does not act according to a law. Such 
effects or events are by the vulgar imputed to chance. 
An eccentric sum of events, e.g. a given eruption of 
Vesuvius, the birth of Caesar, and the discovery of 
gravitation, may be regarded as a single event, and the 
causes of these events as a single secondary cause. 
The event is a unique and its secondary cause one 
that does not operate according to a law. Let 
causes that operate according to law be distinguished 
as regular and those that do not as irregular. I may 
observe in passing that the discovery of irregular 
secondary causes abolished all that knowledge of 
natural law had left of the putative domain of chance. 
Natural laws comprehend the species, laws of belief. 

2. Certain theses bear to others a relation analogous 
to that of genus to species, e.g. the thesis, things equal 
to the same are equal to one another, to the thesis, 
lines equal to the same are equal to one another, 
circles equal to the same are equal to one another, the 
lines A B C D equal to the line E F are equal to one 



292 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ii. 

another. Let a Kind of theses comprising all so related 
be accounted a family of theses, and let beliefs cor- 
responding to a family of theses be accounted a family 
of beliefs. 

3. The most general tliesis of a family of theses is 
an exponent of the corresponding law of belief e.g. the 
thesis, things equal to the same are equal to one 
another, is an exponent of the corresponding law of 
belief. Every law of belief has two exponents, one a 
proposition that is a dictum de omni, the other a pro- 
position that is a dictum de mtllo, e.g. the proposition, 
things equal to the same are equal to one another, and 
the proposition, no things equal to the same are un- 
equal to one another. The dictum de omni may be 
termed the obverse and the dictum de nullo the reverse 
exponent. It is obvious that an exponent of a law of 
belief may serve as major premiss. 

4. Laws of belief manifested by beliefs common to- 
all men or to the bulk of men, e.g. beliefs in the 
axioms of mathematics, may be distinguished as com- 
mon, — all others as uncommon. Uncommon laws of 
belief are divisible into laws of eccentric belief and 
laws of morbid belief. The belief that time is finite, 
held by many of the ablest minds, is an example of 
laws of eccentric belief, and beliefs that evince insanity 
exemplify laws of morbid belief. 

5. The exponents of certain laws of belief are axioms. 
Such exponents and laws may be distinguished as 
guaranteed, and all others as unguaranteed. 




^■»_k»- 



1 



chap. in. SYLLOGISM. 293 



CLXI. 

1. Experience acquaints us with no wholly guaran- 
teed deduction that does not depend upon a guaranteed 
law of belief. Effort to imagine an instance of such 
a species of deduction is abortive ; but inconsistency 
does not discredit the idea of such a species. There- 
fore the dependence, although attested by the strongest 
inductive evidence, is not guaranteed. If it were ; if 
the thesis, Deduction depends upon a guaranteed law 
of belief, were an axiom or were demonstrable, then, 
the dependence of guaranteed deduction on what 
syllogism expresses would be demonstrable. The 
following would be a demonstration of the depend- 
ence : — A guaranteed deduction supposes a triad of 
"beliefs, viz. — 1st, belief that the, exponent of the guaran- 
teed law on which the deduction depends is true ; 2d, 
belief that the first ineniber of the conclusion (hitherto 
known as the Subject) is an individual of a kind consti- 
tuting when the exponent is obverse and connotatively 
indicating 1 when the exponent is reverse the first member 
of the exponent ; 3d, belief either that the first member 
of the conclusion has such an attribute as the exponent 
ascribes to all individuals of its hind or has not such an 
attribute as the exponent denies to every individual of its 
kind : a syllogism is the expression of these three beliefs, 
the major premiss of the belief expressed by the exponent, 
tJte minor of the second belief, and the conclusion of the 

1 In the axiom, No limit excludes a beyond, the kind Limits conno- 
tatively indicates by community of name the first number of the 
proposition, making it known as being an individual of the kind 
Limits. 



294 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ii. 

third. But although syllogism be necessarily connected 
with, it is not ordinarily the form of, wholly guaranteed 
deduction. On the contrary, the relation is so recon- 
dite that it needed the genius of Aristotle to bring it 
to light, and this, as we see, he did only partially, so 
that it was possible for Locke to deny the utility of 
the syllogism as an instrument of Eeason. To infer 
the equality of two lengths of cloth which have been 
applied to, and found coincident with, a yard-stick, it 
is not necessary to refer to the axiom, things equal to 
the same are equal to one another. It is precious to 
the scientific mind to know that its reasonings are 
founded on, and guaranteed by, axioms ; but reference 
to these in the very act of deduction, if it were 
possible, would not in the least degree contribute to 
the production of the conclusion. The supposition 
that syllogism pretends to be the form of deduction 
tends to ruin its credit. 

2. The evidence which causes the conclusion of a 
supplementary inference consists of two theses which 
bear to each other the relation of major and minor 
premiss. Conscious knowledge of the truth of these 
theses supposes knowledge of the truth of the thesis 
constituting the conclusion, and therefore excludes 
possibility of inference in respect of that thesis : it is 
only when the knowledge is unconscious and slow that 
it affords room for the discovery essential to inference. 
A reminder couples the two theses in the view of 
conscious knowledge, and so makes them evidence in 
respect of the third. But as regards non-supplement- 
ary inference nothing in syllogism represents, or in 
any way corresponds to, the evidence. The office of the 
evidence is to elucidate the relation of what is denoted 




chap. in. SYLLOGISM. 295 

by the middle term as individual to its kind, e.g. that 
two pairs of the sides of a triangle constructed as 
prescribed by Euclid belong to the kind, radii of the 
same circle, and that two of the sides belong to the 
kind, things equal to the same. (See diagram annexed 
to § clviii. 1.) The consideration, that, as regards non- 
supplementary inference, syllogism includes no symbol 
of evidence, and that the office of evidence is to inter- 
vene between the major and the minor premiss, showing 
that the first member of the conclusion is an individual 
of the kind constituting or connotatively indicating the 
first member of the major premiss, is of capital import- 
ance. What seemed to be the futility of syllogism 
disappears when we consider that it is merely part of 
an instrument of which evidence is the complement — 
that what, in relation to non-supplementary inference, 
is termed minor premiss, is really a conclusion, and 
that the parts of syllogism would be more fitly named 
if named 

The premiss. 

The minor conclusion. 

The major conclusion. 

3. We have conclusive evidence for the induc- 
tion that all deduction depends upon beliefs expres- 
sible by syllogism ; but the triad of beliefs on which 
a partially guaranteed deduction depends does not 
include an axiom. Does not induction as well as 
deduction depend on beliefs expressible by syllogism ? 
No : the laws of belief on which induction depends 
have not a tincture of truth-likeness. The causes of 
belief which they regulate must have operated and 
begotten experience of their own efficiency in order to 
render the laws credible, and the inductions that estab- 



296 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ii. 

lish the credit of the laws cannot be supposed to depend 
upon that credit. Take for example the law of non- 
accidental induction, the exponent of which is here for 
the first time correctly formulated The like of any 
one of the subjects in a considerable natural regular series 
wherein the units are instances of a relation of subject 
and attribute, is subject of an attribute of the kind 
instanced} Now this exponent unaccredited by ex- 
perience of the power of the causes of belief which 
the law it expresses regulates, has not a tincture of 
truth-likeness. It takes a non-accidental induction to 
ground it in belief. The evidence on which the need- 
ful induction depends consists of a considerable natural 
regular series of instances of non-accidental induction 
experienced by the person inferring. Without this 
evidence it would be impossible to assent to the ex- 
ponent. But the induction that grounds the exponent 
in belief antecedes the credibility of the law and there- 
fore owes nothing to belief in the truth of the exponent 
of the law. Its conclusion, being also the exponent of 
the law under which it obtains, admits of no more 
general proposition bearing to it the relation which a 
major premiss bears to a corresponding conclusion, nor 
does it admit of one bearing to it the relation which a 
minor premiss bears to a corresponding conclusion. 

4. The error that syllogism is the form of deduction 
begot the error that deduction is inference from the 
general It begot the erroneous notion that, in deduc- 

1 According to Archbishop Whately, the following proposition is 
the major premiss of all induction — " What belongs to the individual 
or individuals we have examined belongs (certainly or probably as the 
case may be) to the whole of the class under which they come." 
— Elements of Logic, Book iv. chap. i. § 1. 




chap. in. SYLLOGISM. 297 

tion, the subject adverts to the connected major premiss, 
and that the latter contributes, by a bearing of which 
the subject is conscious, to cause the conclusion. So 
little has discernment of premisses to do with the 
majority of deductions that it taxes the most expert 
logicians to translate their deductions into syllogisms. 

5. The end of Logic qud art is to fasten the stigma 
of contradiction on detected inconsistency. It is not 
an art for the detection of inconsistency. The end is 
as disproportioned to the means as the killing of a fly 
by a park of artillery. But the psychological know- 
ledge evolved by the invention of the art amply com- 
pensates the industry bestowed upon it. Psychology 
is the offspring of Logic. 



BOOK in. 

DEPENDENCE OF PERSONALITY ON 

SELF-DENIAL. 



s~\ 



CHAPTER I. 

SCIENCE. 

CLXIL 

1. What chiefly connects this chapter with the remainder 
of the essay is its exhibition of the fact that a Science 
is an unconscious knowledge. 

2. A science is a knowledge. It is a knowledge 
either of a system of theses, e.g. the theorems of geometry, 
or of a system of practical rules, e.g. the rules of painting. 
A knowledge of a single thesis or of a single practical 
rule is not a science. A system of theses supposes the 
theses to be related to each other as parts of an obvious 
whole, and a system of rules supposes the rules to be 
similarly related. The thesis to which a science refers 
must refer to the necessary, to either absolute or con- 
tingent necessity. In so far as geometry refers to the 
propria of figures that are parts of space, its theses refer 
to absolute necessity, to absolutely necessary relations ; 
in so far as it refers to material figures they refer to 
the contingently necessary. All the sciences conver- 
sant about Matter, e.g. chemistry, physiology, geology, 
refer to the contingently necessary. The system of 
theses to which a science refers must be of a nature to 



302 THE ALTERNATIVE. book hi. 

be of public importance. What geometry demonstrates 
generally of the antitypes of its diagrams might be 
demonstrated of diagrams considered without reference 
to their kinds. The system of theses so demonstrated, 
although agreeing in all other respects to systems to 
which science refers, yet as not being of a nature to be 
of public importance, is not one competent to determine 
a science. It is conceivable that one might study and 
acquire a knowledge of the anatomy of an individual 
without reference to that of its kind. The knowledge 
would not be a science because the system of theses to 
which it would refer would not be of a nature to be of 
public importance. A science is necessarily an uncon- 
scious knowledge ; for it is impossible to be simultaneously 
conscious of all the theses to which a science refers, and 
a discernment of the truth of a single thesis, although 
it be scientific, is not a science. A knowledge of a 
system of practical rules determined by a law of nature 
and therefore referent to the necessary is a science, 
e.g. a knowledge of ethics, of rhetoric, of arithmetic. 
Dependence on evidence other than the belief of others 
is also an attribute of science. One might commit to 
memory the propositions of geometry, and infer their 
truth from the belief of others : such a one would have 
knowledge respecting geometry, and inferred knowledge, 
but the knowledge would not be scientific. Accordingly, 
a science is a knowledge inferred from evidence other than 
the belief of others. But what differentiates science from 
philosophy ? At first the significations of the terms 
Philosophy and Science made them all but synonyms. 
The term Philosophy never applied to the practical 
sciences, e.g. arithmetic, but until lately every theoretic 
science was accounted a philosophy. Within the last 
forty years the development of the physical sciences 



chap. i. SCIENCE. 303 

has brought to bear on the mind an undiscriminated 
differentia of Science which divorces it from its old 
extensive coincidence with Philosophy. All men of 
science will be sensible of this when it is proposed to 
them that philosophy is the " mother-lye " of science. 
This metaphorical definition so agrees with the kinds, 
philosophy and science, as they are indefinitely appre- 
hended in our day, that every cultivated man must feel 
it to be pregnant with a true literal definition. And 
so it is. When speculation achieves a knowledge of a 
system of explanatory 1 general theses short of being 
satisfactory to common sense its product is a philo- 
sophy, and when it achieves a knowledge of a system 
of explanatory general theses or a system of practical 
rules satisfactory to common sense its product is a 
science. Philosophy is the pioneer, the matrix, and 
science the discovery or offspring approved by common 
sense. Common sense does not always demur to 
explanation that does not satisfy it. Until the splendid 
results of modern physical research began to make 
common sense impatient of the bewilderments of meta- 
physics common sense was civil and even deferential to 
that putative science. Now, under the form of Posi- 
tivism, it treats metaphysics as a sham and a nuisance. 
In respect of philosophy it has become haughty and 
unfiliaL But after all it is a tractable spirit, and will, 
no doubt, recover modesty, piety, and patience. A 
Science then is a knowledge inferred from evidence other 
tlian the belief of others, of a system of theses or practical 
rules referent to the necessary, a system that tends to be 
of public importance and is satisfactory to common 
sense. 

1 An explanation is a knowledge that seems to the subject to improve 
another knowledge. 



304 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

3. The unconsciousness essential to a science is not 
expressly enunciated because it is implied by the 
definition. To affirm of a science that it is a know- 
ledge of a system of theses is to imply that it is 
unconscious. Besides, to characterise a . knowledge of 
a system of theses as being unconscious would be to 
imply the possibility of conscious knowledge of such a 
system. Note in this connection that whereas discern- 
ment of the truth of a thesis to which a science refers 
is scientific, a discernment that has a science for object 
is not a scientific discernment. When one is thinking 
of mathematics he is not thinking mathematically — 
scientifically; it is important to notice this, because, 
when the mind is engaged in scientific discourse, it 
unconsciously knows that it is so engaged ; and, as this 
knowledge easily converts into conscious knowledge 
which involves discernment of a science and makes 
plausible pretence to have measured the whole of the 
discourse to which it refers, it might be held that we 
have in view the whole of a science when we are con- 
sidering any part of it. 

4a. When the science of geometry first obtained it 
existed only in the mind of the discoverer. Yet it is 
repugnant to the common notion of science to consider it 
as a thing existing only in a single mind. We commonly 
think of it, not as a sum of attributes, not as a sum of 
knowledges respectively inherent in scientific men, but, 
as it is symbolised by the abditive concept, as a vague 
concrete inhabiting scientific men. The fiction is not 
altogether devoid of utility: it enables us to apprehend 
all knowledges of the same subject matter, however 
numerous and scattered be the individuals in whom 
they respectively inhere, as a unit, to denote them by 



chap. i. SCIENCE. 305 

a single name, to recognise them, to discourse about 
them. This would be impossible if the severality 
were not veiled or hidden by unitive likeness. 

4b. Science is either theoretic or practical. A 
theory is an explanation — an explanatory thesis or a 
system of explanatory theses. Theoretic science is 
science that is explanatory, e.g. geometry, geology. 
Practical science is knowledge of a system of rules 
respecting means available to man. Arithmetic, logic, 
rhetoric, and the sciences of painting and shoemaking, 
are examples of practical science. Certain sciences are 
compounds of theoretical and practical sciences. Logic 
is such a compound, and has consequently occasioned 
controversy as to whether it be a theoretic or a 
practical science. Practical science has never been 
adequately discriminated from art, nor art from skill. 
These it is necessary to define in order to rescue 
the idea of science from partial confusion. Skill is 
power to do felicitously what the agent intends. It is 
either congenital or acquired. Congenital skill is 
strikingly manifested in the insect world. Acquired 
skill is either regular or irregular, the former when it 
does, the latter when it does not, consciously proceed 
on rule or result from such proceeding. Skill in hitting 
the mark is an example of irregular skill. It results 
from practice unaided by rule. It is incommunicable 
by words. A certain dyer endowed with extraordinary 
skill in compounding his ingredients was ignorant of 
the rule according to which his acquired skill proceeded. 
Irregular skill whether congenital or acquired is the 
source of all regular skill. Homer working according to 
unknown rules produced in the Iliad manifestations of 
poetic rule which contributed to engender the art of 

x 



306 THE ALTERNATIVE. book hi. 

poetry and enabled Virgil to apply regular skill in the 
production of the jEneid. Art is regular skill developed 
by practical science. 1 Practical science is essential to art, 
but the converse is not true : art is not essential to 
practical science. One might know every rule in 
arithmetic and be unable to do a sum. Paralysis might 
deprive a painter of his skill and not of knowledge of 
the rules of his art. Note that explanatoriness, not 
privation of action, is the differentia of theoretic science. 
In its conscious state practical science no more involves 
action than theoretic science. An arithmetician re- 
volving in his mind the rules of his science without 
applying them in calculation is as purely contemplative 
— as absorbed in discernment unconnected with action 
— as the geometrician revolving his theorems. Neither 
the skill nor the action of which a practical science is 
the condition is essential to its conscious state : the 
ideas of the skill and the action are essential to it, but 
neither the skill nor the action. Practical science is 
practical not in the sense that its discernment, like 
that of looking, listening, or scrutiny of any kind, is 
involved with action, but that its cognitum — what it 
discerns — consists of practical rules. A reference to 
the seventh of Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on 
Metaphysics will show that the ground or reason of my 
division of science into theoretic and practical is different 
from that of Aristotle ; that I charge the word " theo- 
retic" with a meaning which Aristotle ignored, viz. 
explanatoriness, and that I bring to the front a face o 

1 Dr. Whewell mistakes irregular skill for art. " Art," he says, " is 
the parent, not the progeny of science. " Irregular skill is indeed the 
parent, not of all science but, of practical science, and through science 
of art : it is the parent of practical science and the grandfather of art. 
See History of the Inductive Sciences, Book iv. chap. v. 



chap. i. SCIENCE. 307 

the connotation of the word " practical " which he had 
not in view. The change puts in bright relief the 
difference between science and art which, had it been 
visible to Seneca, would have exempted him from the 
error, that philosophy is active as well as contempla- 
tive. PhUosophia et contemplativa est et activa : spectat 
simulque agit} It is art, not science, that is active — 
that has action involved with discernment. The con- 
fusion of art with science, by the way, has been 
favoured by the ambiguity of the names of practical 
sciences : they denote not only the sciences, but also 
the corresponding arts. 



CLXIII. 

Scientific knowledge may be either thorough or short 
of thoroughness. It is thorough when it is knowledge 
of all that is humanly known respecting its system of 
theses. Thoroughness does not suppose absence of 
defect. Every science is defective. When the mind 
is so related to geometry that it can, at will, bring 
before it the evidence of every geometrical proposition, 
its geometrical knowledge is thorough. But thorough 
geometrical knowledge is rare, even among mathemati- 
cians. The rungs on which they scale the mathematical 
heights tend to give way when they are no longer used. 
But that mathematicians are not able to muster geome- 
trical evidence at will, does not suppose them to be 
ignorant of geometry. Their knowledge of geometry 
is not thorough but it is scientific, and, in spite of the 
defect of thoroughness, it is sufficient as a foundation. 

1 Seneca, Epist. xcv. 



s 



THE ALTERNATIVE. 



A young physician fresh from the schools usual 
n better knowledge of anatomy and physiology th 
and able practitioners. His knowledge of those sc 
may be thorough and theirs is not 



CLXIV. 

Certainty objective to scientific discernment si 
thoroughness seems to differ intrinsically from cei 
caused by authority or by inference from the be 
others. Contrast the certainty whieh a geom 
thesis exhibits to one who has studied, but h 
gotten, the demonstration, with that which it e: 
to a person who has inferred its truth from the 
of others. Both discernments refer to the same 
and to nothing beside ; neither refers to the ev 
from which it sprang ; yet one of the certainties 
to differ from the other so as to make its discei 
scientific, to impart to it an aspect of certitude, v« 
the other confers no such aspect It is true tht 
certainties, in spite of their seeming simplicity 
differ from one another as to quality, and that ti 
responding certitudes differ in like manner. 



CHAPTER II. 

DEDUCTION OF AN UNCONSCIOUS PART OF THE MIND AND 
OF UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 

CLXV. 

That the human mind includes an unconscious part, — 
one of which it is unintuitive,- — that unconscious events, 
occurring in that part and partly determined by its 
structure, are proximate causes of consciousness, that 
the greater J>art of human intentional action is an effect 
of an unconscious cause, — the truth of these propositions 
is deducible from ordinary mental event, and is so near 
the surface that the failure of deduction to forestall in- 
duction in the discovery of it may well excite wonder. 
And of what transcendent importance is the fact which 
familiar events were importunate to signify to deduc- 
tion, — no less than this, that an unconscious part of 
the mind bears to a part of consciousness such a 
relation as the magic lantern bears to the luminous disc 
which it projects, that the greater part of intentional 
action, the greater part of what is mistaken for volition, 
in fact, the whole practical life of the vast majority of 
men, is an effect of event as remote from consciousness 
as fermentation, vegetable growth, or the motions of the 
planets. Coupled with physiological induction, it 



310 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

establishes by overwhelming proof that all consciousness 
is the effect of unconscious event, and that, except in 
the few instances of men who, at the cost of self-denial, 
endeavour to live according to wisdom, all human in- 
tentional action is the effect of unconscious unintuitable 
event. Let us examine the evidence. 



CLXVI. 

1. The acquisition of a durable knowledge supposes 
the mind to have undergone a durable modification, one 
on which the relation constituting the knowledge hinges, 
a modification serving as a mould of consciousness but 
not itself a consciousness. It exists when conscious- 
ness is suspended by coma or dreamless sleep, and when 
the mind, though conscious, is not conversant about the 
thing known. This modification is such thkt if it were 
of a nature to be perceptible it would be an organ 
having for function the generation, on pertinent occa- 
sions, of the certitude that determines the knowledge. 
When visual perception involving a certain degree of 
attention begets in the perceiving mind the power of 
recognising the thing seen, it must impose upon the 
mind a durable modification involving the power. The 
mind cannot be in precisely the same state as when it 
was incapable of the recognition, and the modification 
resulting from the event must be durable, since it 
enables many successive recognitions, including identifi- 
cations and remembrances. The modification is liable 
to decay and to become extinct through mere desuetude; 
for we are often slow to recognise those whom we rarely 
see, and, sometimes, the power ceases to exist. When 




chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 311 

we recognise, the object the recognition must be an im- 
mediate effect of an action of the modification. Now, 
the modifications and the part of the mind modified are 
not objects of intuition, nor is it possible for them to 
be objective to a human mind until inference makes 
them remote objects. All acquired knowledge must 
hinge on such acquired modifications of the mental 
substance, and when an acquired knowledge is con- 
scious the consciousness must be an immediate effect 
of an action of the modification, i.e. of an event as 
remote from consciousness as the circulation of the 
blood. 

2. Incidents of human intercourse frequently give 
rise to unconscious equivalents of interpretations and 
theories of which many involve equivalents of mis- 
understanding and set people at cross purposes. The 
interpretations and theories become objective for the 
first time when the jostling caused by their respective 
equivalents occasion discussion; but it is taken for 
granted that they were beforehand at least obscurely 
in the mind. Corresponding of late by cable respect- 
ing the sale of a property, my behaviour was more or 
less determined by an unconscious equivalent of the 
theory that my correspondent and I were merely 
sounding each other's minds, not interchanging binding 
communications. I assented to certain conditions of a 
contract, but as these were only a part of the matter 
calling for mutual agreement, as there were other 
important terms that were not and could not well be 
even alluded to by cable, I unconsciously assumed that 
my words committed me to nothing binding. The 
equivalent of the theory by which my behaviour was 
determined was also founded on the unconscious belief 



312 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

that telegraphic correspondence is not yet known to 
the law as evidence of contract Not one of these 
theses was objective to me, but equivalents of them 
bore on my correspondence, and it was only when my 
correspondent pretended to bind me without giving me 
opportunity to stipulate respecting other terms that the 
reasons corresponding to the equivalents came to the 
front. Common experience attests that a large part of 
our intentional action is determined by such equivalents 
of theory, and that most of the misunderstandings of 
well-intentioned people are caused by them. I was 
waiting a few days ago for one of the little steamers 
that ply on the Thames between different parts of 
London. A boat apparently going in the direction I 
intended to take landed a part of its passengers at a 
certain point of the platform appropriated to this ser- 
vice. I was about to go on board but was informed 
that the boat was not for the destination indicated by 
my ticket. I resumed my seat on the platform await- 
ing the right boat. The incidents begot in me an 
unconscious equivalent of an assumption that the 
landing at which I attempted to board was the sole 
landing of that platform, and this cost me the loss of 
another ten minutes, for a boat making for my desti- 
nation passed that landing and discharged and received 
passengers at another point of the same platform, while 
I, presuming that she would drop back to what I took 
to be the sole landing, lost my opportunity. Experience 
of such deceptive equivalents is not uncommon. 
Sometimes acquired unconscious beliefs determine our 
apprehensions and judgments. An unconscious false 
knowledge of the plan of a house caused me to appre- 
hend one and the same man as two men and as twins. 
He was a waiter who twice entered a room in which I 



^ 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 313 

was breakfasting by the same door and made his exit 
by another. My unconscious knowledge of the plan 
of the house excluded the supposition that he could 
re-enter the room without re-entering by the door 
through which he had gone out, and this split him in 
my apprehension into two men, who on account of 
their extraordinary likeness I mistook for twins. My 
unconscious knowledge of the plan of the house had 
never been a conscious knowledge. It was the off- 
spring of my perceptions of two sides of the house, 
viz. the front bounded by one street, and a gable 
bounded by another, and also of several parts of the 
interior. When I studied the question, Why I had 
taken the man to be two men, it was at once obvious 
to me that my erroneous knowledge of the structure 
of the house was the cause. 

The grounds of our judgments are often knowledges 
so remote from consciousness that we are not always 
able to bring them promptly into view, and yet, without 
them, the judgments would have been impossible. Un- 
conscious knowledges are either quick, slow, or mori- 
bund ; the quick being those that exclude the possibility 
of a conscious knowledge incongruous with them, the 
slow those that admit such a possibility but when we 
look for them are not prompt to present themselves, 
the moribund those that need extraordinary stimulus 
to elicit in them a sign of life, such a stimulus, for 
example, as the re-reading of a half -forgotten book. 
The moribund bear only in extremely rare instances 
upon the formation of apprehension and judgment, the 
slow sometimes do and sometimes do not bear upon it, 
the quick always contribute to the determination of 
pertinent apprehension and judgment. Seasoning, 
according to Archbishop Whately, consists in remind- 



314 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

ing. 1 There is an overstated truth in this remark : 
argument frequently refers the disputant to a slow un- 
conscious knowledge the tardiness of which gave room 
for an incongruous judgment. The possibility of 
entertaining two mutually contradictory knowledges is 
due to the inertness of a part of the unconscious 
mental modifications on which knowledge depends. 
Without it there would be no room for supplementary 
inference. If a man be challenged to give his reasons 
for a judgment determined by unconscious knowledge, 
he at once assigns the thesis unconsciously known as 
his reason, as though it had been objective and truly a 
reason. It was not a reason, but a mere equivalent of one. 
Not only our judgments, but all our indeliberate acts, 
are caused by the bearing of unconscious equivalents 
of reasons upon instinct, which equivalents, when we 
have occasion to explain our behaviour to ourselves or 
others, pretend to memory to have been conscious and 
therefore true reasons. Our behaviour is more or less 
influenced by unconscious equivalents of assumption 
respecting our own social and intellectual rank and 
those of the person with whom we are in intercourse, 
equivalents that for the most part work well but 
sometimes betray. We tend when in company, for 
example, as member of a company that, like parliament, 
has a public function, to differ as organ of sentiment 
from what we are when alone, and in serious com- 
panies from what we are amongst the convivial, or in 
the relaxation of the family circle. When cognisant 
of ourselves as co-operative with an important social 

1 "Now to remind one, on each occasion, that so and so is referable 
to such and such a Class, and that the class which happens to be 
before us comprehends such and such things, — this is precisely all that 
is ever accomplished by Reasoning" — Elements of Logic, Book i. § 4. 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 315 

body, we apprehend as though the company had 
usurped a part of our mental faculty and participated 
all our sentiments that relate to its ends and means, 
especially apprehending in us its own importance and 
its superiority to all mere individuals. But the dif- 
ference is not due to a consciousness of being a part of 
the company: the knowledge on which it does depend 
is always unconscious, for I do not here refer to any 
inflations of pride or vanity caused by consciousness 
of being a member of an important body. I have 
shown that our knowledge of customs originates 
latently: the unconscious knowledge thus originated 
determines equivalents of assumptions, which in turn 
determine routine intentions and plans. An uncon- 
scious equivalent of an assumption that his servants 
are at work at their usual avocations contributes to 
determine the intentional action of the master. He 
proceeds upon the unconscious equivalent of a conscious 
belief that his cook has prepared his breakfast, that it 
will be served to him at the customary time in the 
customary place, that editors and printers have been at 
work to provide him with his morning newspaper, that 
mail-carriers, postmasters, and post-office clerks have 
been busy in expediting his morning mail, that bankers 
and bank clerks are at their accustomed post to honour 
his cheques, that shopkeepers are in their shops and 
will give him of their wares whatever he needs at 
customary prices, that, in fine, the whole social routine 
is in operation ready to concur with his intentional 
action. He does not think of any of these things. 
He no more thinks of them than of the sufficiency as 
support of the untried part of terra firma to which 
when walking the impending step is about to commit 
his weight. 



316 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

Note in this connection that tardiness of knowledge 
does not exclude, nor does its opposite always co-exist 
with, a high degree of intellectual power. All the 
knowledge of a weak mind may be alert and much of 
the knowledge of a strong one slow. A mind may be 
massive, profound, acute, constituted to give out its 
knowledge in the best literary form if there be due 
pressure of knowledge in the fountain, yet embarrassed 
by tardiness of knowledge and concomitant incapability 
of erudition. Such a mind was that of Montaigne. 
He says of himself in his essay on Pedantry — " I go 
here and there culling out of several books the sen- 
tences that best please me, not to keep them (for I 
have no memory to keep them in) but to transplant 
them into this work, where, to say the truth, they are 
no more mine than in their first places." The leaked 
knowledge is not altogether lost to the mind ; it falls 
into the reservoir of slow unconscious knowledge from 
which it may be sometimes laboriously pumped up 
into consciousness. The defect did not frustrate the 
faculties that have made Montaigne a classic. Amongst 
other achievements they originated the famous argu- 
ment against miracles accredited to Hume. Another 
important consideration which our argument suggests 
is that all tardiness of knowledge is erroneously 
ascribed to defect of memory. According to the strict 
meaning of the term, remembrance, to which our 
definition of Eemembrance adheres, Montaigne's defect 
was not of memory, but of a faculty not hitherto dis- 
criminated, — an important branch of the faculty of 
redintegration. The name, recollection, if it had not 
been otherwise appropriated, would befit, as common 
name, the consciousnesses which it is the function of 
the branch faculty to generate. I have thought of the 



% 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 317 

• 

word, " rassemblance," from the French word, rassembler, 
as a suitable term. Such a mind may excel at 
analysis and discrimination, and, as regards expatiation, 
be a cripple. It is obvious, I take it, that the uncon- 
scious knowledges in respect of which redintegration 
behaves so variously are durable modifications of an 
unconscious part of the mind. 

3. Consciousness includes intimations which enable 
us to count upon the promptness of certain unconscious 
knowledges, and warn us of the tardiness of others. I 
was about to qualify the intimations as inexplicable, 
but I am reminded that an emotion of confidence some- 
times intimates to invention that the mind is pregnant ; 
also that a consciousness analogous to sensation some- 
times intimates to memory that it is a clue to a remem- 
brance (§ x. 5). If, at the suggestion of the analogue 
of sensation, one apply himself to recollect, and if the 
analogue intensify, it makes him aware that he is ap- 
proaching remembrance, but if, on the other hand, it 
grow faint, it plainly signifies to him the contrary. To 
the literary man the emotion seems to say, — " Now is 
the time to write," to the mathematician, " I am about 
to solve the problem for you," to the poet, " Your muse 
is about to sing." These are distinct intimations, and 
may differ only as to distinctness from those which 
ordinarily enable us to count on the promptness of 
knowledge not at the time conscious. This intimacy 
of connection between consciousness and its proximate 
unconscious causes establishes that the concrete subject 
of the modifications constituting or serving as hinges 
of unconscious knowledge, is either a mind or a part of 
a mind, and if it be proved that this concrete is a 
brain then it must be acknowledged that the brain is 



318 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

• 

a part of the mind. Admitting that there is an im- 
material and durable subject of consciousness, and that 
consciousness is the result of the action of the brain 
upon this subject, it is not admissible that the subject 
is exclusively the mind ; as subject of the modifications 
on which unconscious knowledges hinge, — knowledges 
on which consciousness counts and which it mnemoni- 
cally mistakes for conscious knowledges and reasons, — 
the brain must be reckoned a part of the mind. Thus 
far I have demonstrated that the human mind includes 
a part which is an unconscious concrete, or sum of con- 
cretes, and that modifications of this part are hinges of 
knowledge. 

4. It is impossible to discern at a glance all the 
reasons constituting the demonstration of a theorem 
which, like the following theorem, The square of the 
hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two 
sides, depends on demonstration of many other theorems. 
The unconscious knowledge caused by the antecedent 
demonstrations bear upon consciousness conversant 
about the final demonstration as though they were 
conscious knowledges. They do so without the inter- 
vention of memory. When the conclusion is flashing 
upon certitude the student is not remembering that he 
had assented to the truth of the antecedent theorems. 
The antecedent demonstrations prepare the mind to be 
convinced by the final one without the aid of their 
contemporary objectivity. They leave behind them 
mental modifications — unconscious knowledges — which 
are unobjective auxiliaries of the final demonstration, 
as the antecedent sounds of a melody leave behind them 
inaudible mental modifications which impart to the 
present sound a significant sweetness. Cardinal New- 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 319 

man's analysis of Inference into formal and informal 
inference all but penetrates to the bearing of unconscious 
knowledge on inference. He finds that inference syllo- 
gistically expressible is valid only for discovery of the 
abstract, and that, to penetrate and embrace the con- 
crete, the illative faculty must apply itself in a way 
with which logical formula is incommensurate. " For 
genuine proof in concrete matter," he says, "we 
require an organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic 
than verbal argumentation ; . . • thought is too keen 
and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, 
its path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject 
matter too various and intricate, to admit of the 
trammels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of 
whatever compass. . . . And to this conclusion he 
comes, as is plain, not by any possible verbal enumer- 
ation of all the considerations, minute but abundant, 
delicate but effective, which unite to bring him to it ; 
but by a mental comprehension of the whole case, and 
a discernment of its upshot, sometimes after much 
deliberation, but, it may be, by a clear and rapid act 
of the intellect; always, however, by an unwritten 
summing up, something like the summation of the 
terms of the algebraical series. . . . such a process 
of reasoning is more or less implicit, and without the 
direct and full advertence of the mind exercising it." 1 
We have seen that even in demonstration unconscious 
knowledges — unconscious mental modifications — con- 
tribute to cause certitude. Are not these the motives 
or moving powers which, without the direct and full 
advertence of the mind, (it is but a step from partial 
to complete inadvertence) contribute to cause the 
certitude essential to the conclusion. It seems then 

1 Grammar of Assent, pp. 264, 285. 



320 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

that the guaranteed certitude consequent to evidence 
of which all the parts are not simultaneously dis- 
cernible is in part an effect of unconscious mental 
action, — action of an unconscious part of the mind ; 
if the brain be, as I shall prove it to be, either the 
whole or a part of the unconscious part of the mind, 
the certitude is more or less an effect of cerebration. 
This supposes that material events, as unlike discourse 
as fermentation is unlike it, contribute to fashion the 
greater part of even our guaranteed certitudes, which 
of course casts a shadow on the guarantee. 1 So long 
as we were under the delusion that a guaranteed certi- 
tude is an immediate effect of an instantaneous con- 
spectus of the evidence, the guarantee might pretend 
to be irreproachable, but not when it is found to be 
the offspring of a corporal event. Sometimes, in dream, 
cerebration engenders an emotion of the kind essential 
to intuition of wit, and therewith glorifies a platitude, 
as the glamour cast by Puck upon Titania glorified the 
ass ears of Bottom. If it can dupe us as regards wit, 
why not as regards certitude ? 

5. Whence comes the train of ideas or rather the 
train of mental events, which, besides ideas, includes 
emotions and involuntary intentional actions, e.g. quasi- 
attention, and the impulses to speech in those who are 
given to think aloud, especially in the insane ? We 

1 The shadow should serve to humble our intellectual pretensions, 
not to destroy our faith in the faculty of knowledge. Happily such 
shadows do not usually destroy the certitude on which they fall, and 
common sense protests that to keep ourselves, if the certitude give 
way, from tumbling into the Pyrrhonic ditch, we should put faith, — 
faith in the mental constitution, or, at the worst, an arbitrium, — in its 
stead. 



chap. n. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 321 

are not conscious parties .to the generation of the train 
of mental events. We have some power to determine 
the channels in which it shall flow, but none to origi- 
nate or arrest it as a whole. In respect of it we are 
like the helmsman who has power to give direction but 
not motion to the ship. Even our directive power 
over it is often in abeyance, — always in dream — and 
often we are barely able to make head against it. It 
strives with us in what is termed " distraction," alter- 
nately vanquishing and succumbing. It presupposes 
an underlying train of unconscious events occurring in 
an unconscious part of the mind, — a train that, accord- 
ing to induction, is started, and during waking life for 
the most part niore or less ordered, by the action of 
our environment upon the organs of sense, and when 
not so ordered, as in dr earn, gambols off into inveri- 
similitude and incongruity. From this train of un- 
conscious events underlying and causing the stream of 
consciousness known as the train of ideas, proceeds 
remembrance, reasoning, poetry, eloquence, music, in- 
vention technically so called, and discovery of every 
kind, the devices of the crafty, and the beginnings of 
all intentional action, volition excepted. From this 
source emanates design, The train of ideas or rather 
of mental events often undergoes a notable enhance- 
ment consequent to great increase of knowledge. It 
presents to deliberation fewer unsatisfactory suggestions, 
and more frequently excludes deliberation by yielding 
at once, spontaneously, without question, to occasions 
of action, satisfactory ideas what to do. Napoleon on 
the field of battle, I take it, had less occasion to deli- 
berate as experience modified the unconscious part of 
his mind. Need to deliberate is inverse to experience 
and to native mental power. The change thus wrought 

y 



3» THE JILTED ATITE. book m. 




hj ezpmsonst m hxea&z f& supposes an unccaiaEUHBS 
port rf sJus-mmri, & part wfraem itoecms. 

<5, Dream supposes she acriuii of an voransdHms 
fieQc&rr. We seen so osEaeivfs in dream to ^ natmas e 
with real men ami women, and to acquire frgam their 
worc&i ideas t&ac. had no tnaaiot in our mjaa&s pan- 
to the SCTtflfeanft action of tie words. Yet hmiomi 
eqmimLrmX* <tf the Has* must ems in our minds ante- 
cedently to the woods, and contribute to the ^efartirm 
and eolkeatiou of these. An unconscious past of the 
mind nidified by such equivalents must cause in 
another port a consciousness of what seems to be speech, 
and, br means of the phantasm of speech, the ideas 
eoiTgd$tia&ng to the equivalents. The equivalents and 
the causing .action cannot reasonably be held to be 
event* extrinsic to mind Thev must be allowed to be 
unconscious mental events. Xot onlv does the unom- 
scions part of the mind which originates dream invent 
what seems to be conversation, but also, on occasion, a 
long series of verisimilar events all tending with drama- 
tic fitness to a dhwumtmL The action of this uncon- 
scious faculty is not confined to dreams. Thackeray 
tells us that sometimes, when composing dialogue, the 
words of the imaginary interlocutor would obtain in his 
mind in advance of the idea of what they signified, and 
impart to him that idea. The words would seem to be 
uttered by the imaginary character to whom they were 
ascribed, and the idea they expressed was sometimes so 
unexpected and surprising that Thackeray would turn 
upon the phantasm and ask " How the deuce did you 
come by that idea !" On this kind of action depends 
doubtless a great deal of what in spiritualism is not 
impoatuie . This faculty in poets has glorified their 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 323 

dreams with verse, for example, those of Goethe and 
Coleridge ; it has in dreams solved problems for the 
mathematician. Goethe distinguished his intellectual 
yield into two kinds, viz. that originated not only in 
but by his mind, and that originated in, but not by, his 
mind. The latter consisted of what came to him from 
the unconscious part of his mind, unexpected and un- 
sought. The idea of the Muse is probably due to such 
a discrimination. Latent experience is continually en- 
gendering in waking minds, and for the most part 
during sleep, unconscious knowledge of the quantity of 
the time between some past event and the present. 
The knowledge is for the most part vague, is often wide 
of the truth, but it is sometimes very near what is in- 
dicated by the clock. Most people know on waking 
about how long they have been asleep. Many persons 
have the power of so affecting themselves by a resolution 
to awake at an unusual hour that they awake at that 
hour or thereabouts. The instances of the efficacy of 
this kind of resolution are so numerous as to preclude 
the supposition of chance coincidence. What gives 
effect to the resolution ? Is it a part of the mind, or 
merely the nerve and muscular apparatus, which, as 
regards action presently consequent to intention, is 
commonly held to be the automatic instrument of in- 
tention. But is it credible that this apparatus could 
be efficient as regards an intention that is to take effect 
after an interval of five or six hours and during sleep ? 
The awakening force must, it would seem, be mental. 
Whatever it be, it co-operates in a most mysterious way 
with an unconscious equivalent of an intuition of a quan- 
tity of time. It does not necessarily follow that this equi- 
valent is a mental modification, but that it is, seems 
to be conclusively though indemonstratively proved. 



324 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

7. Unconscious mental events alter our beliefs. 
The events suppose an unconscious part of the mind, — 
a part in which they occur. Mr. Lecky, in his History 
of Nationalism in Europe, gives striking instances of 
this operation. The Grammar of Assent treats of it as 
follows : — " Again ; sometimes assent * fails while the 
reasons for it and the inferential act which is the 
recognition of those reasons are still present, and in 
force. Our reasons may seem to us as strong as ever, 
yet they do not secure our assent. Our beliefs, founded 
on them, were and are not ; we cannot perhaps tell 
when they went ; we may have thought that we still 
held them, till something happened to call our attention 
to the state of our minds, and then we found that our 
assent had become an assertion. Sometimes of course 
a cause may be found why they went ; there may have 
been some vague feeling that a fault lay at the ultimate 
basis or the underlying conditions of our reasonings ; 
or some misgiving that the subject matter of them was 
beyond the reach of the human mind ; or a conscious- 
ness that we had gained a broader view of things in 
general than when we gave our assent ; or that there 
were strong objections to our first convictions, which 
we had never taken into account. But this is not 
always so ; sometimes our mind changes so quickly, so 
unaccountably, so disproportionately to any tangible 
objects to which the. change can be referred, and with 
such abiding recognition of the force of the old argu- 
ments, as to suggest the suspicion that moral causes, 
arising out of our condition, age, company, occupations, 
fortunes, are at the bottom. However what once was 
assent is gone; yet the perception of the old argu- 
ment remains, showing that inference is one thing and 
assent another." . . . " And as assent sometimes dies 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 325 

out without tangible reasons sufficient to account for 
its failure, so sometimes in spite of strong and convinc- 
ing arguments it is never given." 1 The latent decay 
and death of beliefs suppose an unconscious change of 
an unconscious part. of the mind. This change, or 
metamorphosis, presupposes a cause, and the cause, 
according to induction, can be no other but experience, 
study of the results of the experience of others and 
exercises of Eeason in every way, — in short, experience 
and discourse. By latent processes experience and dis- 
course modify the unconscious part of the mind so as 
to alter the character of the train of ideas, to dispose to 
belief to which the mind was previously indisposed, 
and the reverse, and to undermine beliefs of which the 
reasons persist in exhibiting to the subject an aspect of 
proof-sufficiency. The development of what is termed 
the historical sense by a thorough study of history is 
an instance of this latent operation. This sense in- 
stinctively detects certain kinds of historical fiction. 
Being still in its primitive phase, its experiences do not 
yet afford the generalisations from which it gives us 
reason to expect an art of historical criticism, but what 
it has done in the way of demolition has abundantly 
proved its existence and validity. 

8. Pictorial illusion is due to a latent action of 
unitive likeness on an unconscious part of the mind. 
The pictured surface reflects light upon the retina 
unitively like the light reflected by a scene in three 
dimensions, and the latent action of the former on the 
mind causes visual apprehension of the surface as being 
a scene in three dimensions. The illusion is greater 
or less in proportion as the likeness is greater or less. 
It is at a maximum in the stereoscope, because an im- 

1 Grammar of Assent, page 160. 



326 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

portant difference is excluded, and is enhanced when we 
look at a picture with only one eye, because that very 
difference is then also excluded. The proximate ante- 
cedent of the illusion must be an event occurring in 
an unconscious part of the mind. Visual recognition, 
like pictorial illusion, depends upon the latent bearing 
of unitive likeness, through the eye, upon the mind. 
The recognition connects with no intuition of likeness, 
— carries with it no knowledge that it owes its existence 
to likeness. We learn with surprise that recognition 
is caused by likeness. The likeness must act upon an 
unconscious part of the mind and so modify it as to 
cause it to engender the recognition. This mental 
event — the proximate antecedent and cause of the 
recognition — is unintuited, — an unconscious action of 
an unconscious part of the mind. When the unaccus- 
tomed causes surprise, we do not first perceive the 
unaccustomed thing and then undergo surprise: the 
perception from the first involves the surprise, so that 
prior to the perception the thing must have acted upon 
an unconscious part of the mind and begotten in it an 
action constituting a proximate antecedent and cause 
of perception involving surprise. 

9. Consciousnesses determined according to the law 
of redintegration presuppose unconscious events that 
occur in an unconscious part of the mind, events pro- 
ductive of unconscious durable mental modifications 
that are equivalents of organs relatively to the con- 
sciousnesses. After a certain visual experience of the 
exteriors and interiors of houses, a wall of a house 
cannot reflect light upon the retina of the subject with- 
out causing an image, not of a wall merely, but, of a 
house. Prior to the experience light reflected by the 



chap. n. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 327 

wall of a house excites no such image. After the ex- 
perience the mind must be in a state different from 
that in which it was before, — a state by virtue of 
which it generates under the stimulus of the light an 
image which it was previously incapable of producing. 
Now the events in which the state originated are such 
as are never objects of intuition, and are doubtless un- 
intuitable: they occur in an unconscious part of the 
mind, and they impose upon it a durable modification, 
serving as. equivalent of an organ that has for function 
the production, under due stimulus, of the image of a 
house. All knowledge augmented by sense-perception 
depends upon mental modifications so caused, and 
every emergence of a part of that knowledge from the 
unconscious to the conscious state, proceeds from the 
latent functioning of one of those modifications. The 
eccentric action of redintegration is perhaps more tell- 
ing as evidence of unconscious mental processes than 
its regular operation. Instances are familiar to most 
minds. I knew a child who when asked what the 
letters c. a. r. t. spell would reply " waggon," and when 
asked what the letters d. o. g. spell would reply, " cat." 
An eccentricity of redintegration sometimes perverts 
our orthography in writing. 

10. Latent experience (§ xcv.) consists of uncon- 
scious mental event. It supposes an unconscious part 
of the mind on which the event imposes durable 
modifications serving as equivalents of organs. The 
knowledges it generates are at first unconscious, and it 
might very well happen that some of them might never 
emerge into consciousness. These knowledges include 
knowledges of primary kinds, also quasi -inferential 
knowledge, such as that coal, wood, and turf, are 



328 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

combustible, that all swans are white, that certain 
appearances are weather signs, others symptoms, that 
nature acts uniformly, (§ cL 3) etc. This kind of 
experience sometimes begets unconscious knowledge of 
the characters of those with whom we have intimate 
intercourse, and instinct unconsciously accommodates 
us to the unconsciously divined character* This un- 
conscious divination of character contributes to the 
grouping and segregation of people referred to by the 
proverb, " birds of a feathef flock together." 

11. Negatively-empirical knowledge supposes an 
unconscious part of the mind, and durable modifications 
of the part constituting a corresponding memory. 

12. Deviations from the ctistomary tend to excite 
surprise, and in certain cases surprise contemporaneous 
and united with, not subsequent to, the discernment of 
the deviation. A condition of this discernment must 
in such cases occur in an unconscious part of the mind, 
and there generate a co-operative condition of the sur- 
prise in such wise, that both conditions cause at the 
same time and in union the discernment and the sur- 
prise. A violent unaccustomed sound excites surprise 
that is not subsequent to, but contemporaneous and 
united with, the hearing. Surprise tends to be con- 
temporaneous with discovery of a stranger in one's 
bed-chamber. If on a working day one should see a 
familiar thoroughfare of traffic deserted, or on a Sabbath 
thronged, surprise would be contemporaneous with his 
discernment of the fact. Now it might be objected 
that in these cases the discernment precedes and causes 
the surprise, but so rapidly and with such excitement 
that memory fails to acquire a record. But if this be 



chap. n. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 329 

true it is also true that when we recognise, discernment 
of the thing recognised precedes the recognition, and 
that when one sees a friend he at first sees only so 
much of the friend as is imaged on the retina, — a 
part of a surface — ^and then, by the aid of redintegra- 
tion, annexes to the visual image the unseen bulk and 
the remainder of the surface ! 

13. It sometimes happens that a man bent upon 
conduct accoi*ding to Wisdom is urged by indignation 
to a behaviour to which his conscious mind does not 
object, yet he neither purposes compliance with the 
urgency nor does it make up his mind tot him : he is 
held in suspense for a time, and, then, there appears 
in his mind an idea of a behavioui* opposed to that 
which the indignation suggests, — a behaviour conform- 
able to peace and carrying on its face the sanction of 
wisdom* With this he complies, in spite of reluctance 
to refuse the indignation* Now what held him in 
suspense during the Urgency of the indignation and 
prior to the appearance of the idea ? On the avouch 
of memory, not a consciousness. No reason discredit- 
ing the suggestion of his anger appeared in him. On 
the contrary, the suggestion was Recommended by the 
sanction of justice, — justice endorses all the suggestions 
of indignation. He was held in suspense by an un- 
conscious equivalent of a motive. He had had experi- 
ence of the treachery of violent counsels apparently 
sanctioned by justice, and the experience had founded 
in the unconscious part of his mind an indisposition to 
yield to them, — an equivalent of a prudential reason. 
This it was that constituted the vis inertia which re- 
sisted the pressure of indignation. Events in which 
scrutiny may detect unconscious equivalents of con- 



330 THE ALTERNATIVE. book hi. 

scious restraining prudence are common. I say con- 
scious prudence, implying that there is such a thing as 
unconscious prudence, — such a thing as unconscious 
equivalents of motive. 

14. Design, or the 1 formation or generation of an 
ideal type, pattern, or plan, (§ cxxxiv. 5) supposes the 
existence of an unconscious part of the mind and of 
unconscious mental event. No one could intend to design 
until he had experience of power to design ; therefore 
a first design must be as unintentional as the growth 
of a tree: unconscious mental processes occurring in 
and evincing an unconscious part of the mind must 
have engendered the pattern or plan. By the way, to 
ascribe design to the omniscient is inconsistent. The 
idea of such a being supposes his ideas of what he 
would do to be co-eternal with him, whereas it is essen- 
tial to design to begin and end ; which obliged Plato to 
judge that creative design, and the archetypes or ideas 
of all things, were co-eternal with the Creator. This 
reduces the Creator to a mere subject of fateful ideas, 
— to a personification of fate. It seems then that 
the marvellous concurrence of aptitudes displayed by 
Cosmos does not presuppose design, — that the datum 
which is the pivot of natural theology is delusive. 

15. What recalls us to the resumption of inter- 
rupted work when the cause of the interruption has so 
absorbed the mind as to leave no room for an intention 
to resume? It must be an unconscious somewhat 
that is an equivalent of an intention to resume. In 
discussion, whether with oneself or with another, the 
operation of this equivalent whereby we are made to 
revert to the question, is familiar. We differ from one 



.ij.„ 



chap. ii. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENT. 331 

an other and at different times the same man differs 
from himself as regards the efficiency of the mental 
attribute on which this equivalent depends. It is 
more efficient in abler minds and in the stronger 
states of the same mind. It is for the most part 
feeble in the insane, and in idiots, if it exist at all, 
extremely feeble. It is not resolvable into habit, for 
it is as efficient in respect of strange as of familiar 
work. Is it identical with the unconscious force 
which, in compliance with a purpose to awake at a 
given hour, awakes us at that hour ? Both are 
equivalents of intention to do something after a certain 
time, one to awake after the lapse of a given time, the 
other to resume a certain work on the termination of 
a certain other work. They differ only in two respects, 
1st, that one does and the other does not operate during 
sleep, 2nd, that the one is and the other is not inter- 
dependently coupled with an equivalent of an appre- 
ciation of a certain quantity of time and of an intuition 
of its completion. 

16. An unconscious approximative knowledge of 
the weight of a thing which one is about to lift de- 
termines the amount of effort which he applies. Some- 
times the thing proves to have more or less weight 
than the knowledge counted on, and we experience an 
emotion of surprise. 



CHAPTEE III. 

THE BRAIN A PART OF THE MIND. 
CLXVII. 

1. We have irresistible evidence for the induction, that 
the unconscious part of the mind is corporal, and that 
the brain is either a part or the whole of it : the evi- 
dence makes it highly probable that the corporal part 
of the mind consists of the encephalon, spinal marrow, 
afferent and efferetit nerves* and the peripheral parts 
of the organs of sense. As regards the latter we 
have the sanction of a datum for the belief that they 
are subjects of the sensations and sense -perceptions 
proper to them. It is true that when experience de- 
velops belief in a spiritual subject of consciousness 
this datum is discredited, (it has been proved to be in- 
consistent) and then the organs of sense are accounted 
mere accessories or instruments of the mind, bearing 
to it such a relation as a telescope bears to the visual 
faculty ; but when the mental effects of concussion of 
the brain and cerebral lesions and disorders otherwise 
caused expose the relation of cause and effect that exists 
between cerebral event and consciousness, such that 
the brain can no longer be considered a mere accessory 
but must be allowed to be a part of the mind, the 



chap. ra. THE BRAIN A PART OF THE MIND. 333 

credit of the datum respecting the organs of sense is so 
far restored that it is no longer easy to refuse to rank 
those organs as parts of the mind. 

2. That all knowledge and skill depend upon modi- 
fications of the brain caused by experience and mental 
exercises of every kind, is proved by the fact that a 
concussion of the brain may deprive one of all know- 
ledge and skill without impairing the power of the 
mind to recover both ; the former from new experience, 
the latter from new interaction of the Ego and its en- 
vironment. Certain cerebral lesions deprive the mind 
not of all knowledge, but of a considerable part, and 
others- of a minute part so oddly selected that, as some 
one has remarked, it would seem as though Puck had 
been sporting with the brain. These facts shut us in 
to the conclusion that the extinction of knowledge or 
skill, or of both, is due to an effacejaent or impairment 
of durable cerebral modifications. They are conclusive 
that conscious knowledge and skill active are effects of 
an action of those modifications, that a series of unin- 
' tuitable corporal events underlies, as cause and con- 
dition sine qua non, all such consciousness and activity 
of skill as cerebral lesion has the property of destroying 
or suspending. Concussion of the brain has been some- 
times followed by a remarkable enhancement of mental 
faculty. General paralysis often begins its terrible 
work by an enhancement of mental faculty; idiotcy 
and bodily impotence are always the accompaniments 
of its regular final stage. The psychical effects of other 
diseases, like those of concussion, attest the dependence 
of mental faculty on corporal constitution, and of con- 
sciousness on corporal event. A servant girl whom 
disease had reduced to idiotcy was temporarily restored 



334 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ni. 

to mental integrity by a fever such as ordinarily causes 
delirium. 1 A beginning of insanity has raised the 
mind of a person bordering on idiotcy to the ordinary 
level of ordinary intelligence. 2 An abscess formed 
under the scalp has converted a violent headache into 
spectral illusion. 8 Impending apoplexy is sometimes 
wonderfully prophetic, predicting truly the time of the 
death of the subject. 4 It is sometimes a source not 
only of prescience but also of melodramatic invention 
explanatory of the expected event. A patient who 
suffered from an excess of blood in the brain, expect- 
ing an imminent effacement of consciousness, used to 
undergo a melodramatic hallucination put as explaining 
the event. A witch seemed to rush upon him and 
strike him on the head with a stick. The effects of 
hanging and drowning sometimes corroborate the testi- 
mony of concussion and disease as regards the depend- 
ence of consciousness on cerebral event. A gentleman 
who in great depression of mind attempted to hang 
himself but was cut down in time to save his life, re- 
lated that the strangulation plunged him into ecstasy 
in which he re-lived his childhood and boyhood. 5 
Drowning has sometimes occasioned a panoramic dis- 
play of the past. 6 The mental effects of narcotics, 
anaesthetics, and stimulants, such as opium, hashisch, 
chloroform, and alcohol, add their testimony to the de- 
pendence of consciousness on corporal event. We have 
striking instances of the dependence of the moral 
faculty on bodily states. Certain disorders, e.g. uterine 
changes, transform honest people into thieves. Com- 

1 Physiology and Pathology of the Mind. Maudsley, p. 260. 
8 Obscure Diseases of the Brain. Winslow, p. 273. 
• Ibid. p. 457. B Ibid. p. 440. 

4 Ibid. p. 812. • Ibid. p. 442. 




chap. m. THE BRAIN A PART OF THE MIND. 335 

mon and familiar facts prove the causative and moulding 
bearing of bodily states upon consciousness. Sleep 
bears in this way on the consciousness, dreaming. 
Coma is a bodily state that excludes consciousness. 
The feeling of well-being, and the pride of life incident 
to health and a favourable atmosphere, are conscious- 
nesses that result from bodily states. The differences 
of consciousnesses characteristic of youth and of age 
are effects of bodily states, 



CLXVIIL 

It follows from the foregoing evidence that, as re- 
gards man, every consciousness except volition is an 
effect of an unconscious corporal event, and that every 
consciousness including volition depends upon an un- 
conscious corporal event. Had psychological research 
begun with, or early achieved this knowledge, it would 
have been spared much error. It would have been 
exempted from the error, that discernment of primary 
Kinds supposes discernment of their differentia. It was 
obvious that generalisation depends upon likeness and 
difference and that likeness supposes a somewhat in 
respect of which the like things are like. Psychol- 
ogists therefore seemed to be shut in to the conclusion 
that knowledge of a differentia is a sine qua non of 
knowledge of a kind. It did not occur to them that 
the differentia might, by a latent bearing on the mind, 
cause, or contribute to cause, knowledge of the kind — 
that it might have the property of causing an uncon- 
scious corporal event of which knowledge of a kind 



336 THE ALTERNATIVE. book hi. 

might be an immediate effect ; in which case know- 
ledge of a kind might obtain without knowledge of its 
differentia. Here we have $n instance of mere privation 
of hypothesis conferring upon a thesis an air of necessary 
truth. So much did the thesis, Discernment of a kind 
supposes discernment of its differentia, seem to be a- 
necessary truth, that the error persisted in spite of the 
incompatible fact that tbe differentia of many primary 
kinds eluded scrutiny, e.g. that of mankind. Had the 
dependence of consciousness on corporal event been 
known the incompatibility would have suggested the 
explanation thq,t the. corporal event which causes dis- 
cernment of a primary kind does not cause discernment 
of its differentia. This knowledge, it is probable, would 
also have prevented the error that analysis of con- 
sciousness is incapable of discovery, — incapable of 
augmenting knowledge — that to be known is essential 
to the constituents of consciousness. The greater part 
of the wealth with which psychology enriches man 
is, with slow toil, quarried out of the records of con- 
sciousness. 

The knowledge would have deprived of plausibility 
the reason of the scepticism of Hume, viz. that power 
is not perceptible, and it would probably have prevented 
Kant's doctrine of knowledge it priori ; for, when it is 
allowed that the consciousness constituting an experience 
is an effect of a corporal event, consistency makes no 
objection to the competence of the cause to impart to 
the object, in certain cases, a symbol of power or one 
of absoluteness, and parsimony demands that all know- 
ledge which can be consistently accounted the offspring, 
either immediate or remote, of experience, shall be so 
accounted. Privation of the knowledge put us under 




chap. m. THE BRAIN A PART OF THE MIND. 337 

the necessity of imputing to discourse the genesis of 
the knowledge which I have termed quasi-inference, 
and of explaining the fact, that neither apperception 
nor memory is cognisant of any such discourse, by the 
hypothesis that, owing to its delicacy and rapidity, the 
discourse eludes experience. 



z 



\ 



CHAPTER IV. 



WISDOM. 



CLXIX. 

I am not aware that psychology has hitherto under- 
taken to answer the question, What is Wisdom ? It 
seems to have ignored, as lying wholly without its 
province, the most precious of mental qualities. Who 
can at once say what is the differentia of Wisdom, — 
what distinguishes it from knowledge, what from the 
sagacity of "the unjust steward"? Christ seems to 
refer to it as though it were mere sagacity. " The 
children of this world," he says, " are in their generation 
wiser than the children of light." But the word " wise" 
in this connection does not refer to the wisdom which 
St. John probably denotes by the word \0709, — the 
wisdom that is at once an imperative and an alacrity 
to obey, — the wisdom that incurs the cross to save 
mankind. The nature of this wisdom I now proceed 
to explain. It is so related to Virtue or Moral Good- 
ness that I must first explain what the latter is, — a 
task by no means made easy by actual public know- 
ledge. 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 339 



CLXX. 

In proportion as the progress and spread of science 
makes words more frequently and exclusively the im- 
mediate objects of thought, violations of etymological 
connotation become more sensibly obstructive. The 
perfection of language makes etymological and received 
connotation identical. We are approaching a time 
when experience of obstruction will directly acquaint 
the learned with the full meaning and importance of 
the deliverance of Condillac, TJn science est une langue 
lien faite, and that it behoves a French Institute to add 
to the humble office of registering and promulgating 
the enactments of the lingual instinct the higher one of 
conforming language to a rule that may be termed the 
rule of right connotation. This law, I take it, was 
descried by Leibnitz when he imagined his scheme of 
a universal language, — that of forming the whole of 
language, as the lingual instinct had already fashioned 
the numerical part of it, out of a few elemental signs 
combinable into terms connotative of the composition 
and general places of the things they denote. Chem- 
istry has of late conformed its language to this law. 

Now the word " Moral " and its cognates have been 
wrenched out of the order of right connotation and 
loaded with incompatible meanings. The primary and 
etymological meaning of the adjective " moral " is " per- 
taining to manners ;" as qualifying the term " Science" 
it is applied in this sense, Moral Science being science 
that is conversant about manners. If this were the 
sole meaning of the adjective, the cognate term " Mor- 
ality " should signify the specific attribute of manners. 



340 THE ALTERNATIVE. book hi. 

But as qualifying the term, "sense," the adjective 
imports very differently. Its reference to manners in 
this connection is remote, and makes the name of which 
it is a constituent connote an attribute which may, for 
the nonce, be named " conversantness about virtue and 
vice." It is still more warped from its primary mean- 
ing when it qualifies the term " man." To say of a 
man that he is moral is to say that he is good. In 
this connection the word " moral " implies the identity 
of morality and goodness. As constituent of the term, 
« moral apprehension," it implies that all apprehension^ 
of manners are not moral, but only those that ap- 
provingly refer to virtue and disapprovingly to vice; 
whereas there are bad approvals and reprobations of 
manners ; approvals and reprobations which, according 
to the primary meaning of the word « moral," are 
moral The word "immoral" does not signify, as a 
law of language requires, the opposite of the word 
" moral " applied according to its primary meaning. 
The word "immoral" means "bad," and its cognate 
term "immorality" means "badness." 

Such being the tangle of incompatible meanings in 
which the words moral, immoral, morality, immorality, 
are involved, I trust I am warranted to help myself to 
an instrument of exact expression by the coinage of 
even so uncouth a barbarism as the word " moralness" 
My need requires the coinage of still another word, but 
happily not one of such barbaric repugnancy, — the 
word " preter-moral" 



CLXXI. 



We say of agreeable and of what seem to be useful 



chap. iv. * WISDOM. 341 

things that they are " good." Does' this imply that 
goodness is the differentia of the agreeable and seem- 
ingly useful ? Shall we not rather say that goodness 
is the differentia of what is innocently agreeable and 
what is useful ? This being allowed, goodness is divi- 
sible into two species, one differentiated by the property 
of eliciting a peculiar kind of approval, known as moral 
approval, the other not so characterised. Moral ap- 
proval is undefinable. If the reader have not experi- 
enced it I am unable to make myself intelligible to him 
in respect of it. The species of goodness that is of a 
nature to elicit moral approval may be distinguished 
as Moral goodness, the opposite species as "preter- 
moral" goodness. The term "badness" denotes the 
differentia of what is hurtful. It is divisible into the 
two species, hurtful things that are, and hurtful 
things that are not, of a nature to elicit the peculiar 
kind of reprobation known as moral reprobation : the 
former may be distinguished as moral, the latter as 
preter- moral, badness. What moral goodness and 
moral badness have in common is the property of 
eliciting moral discernment. Moral discernments are 
individuals of a genus which comprehends and is com- 
prised by the two species, approbatory and reprobatory 
moral discernments. 

Now, by what name sonorously as well as signifi- 
cantly cognate to the word, Moral, shall we denote the 
property of eliciting moral discernment ? Not by the 
name, Morality ; for that is unchangeably committed to 
an incompatible meaning. Let "moralness" be the 
name, a name to which I annex a primary and a 
secondary meaning. According to the first, the term 
Moralness denotes the attribute by virtue of which an 
cunimus, or what passes for one, elicits moral discern- 



\ 



342 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

ment either approbatory or the reverse : according to 
the second, it is the specific difference of the moral 
faculty or faculties. Let the contradictory opposite of 
The Moral, viz. what is without Moralness, be known 
as the " preter-moral" An animus that per se is in- 
capable of eliciting moral discernment is "preter- 
moral, ,, e.g. Prudence, the mental quality that dis- 
poses us to provide for future exemption from pain. 



CLXXII. 

Moralness is divisible into that which does, and 
that which does not, interest the faculty of remorseful 
apprehension, — Conscience. It is essential to the 
apprehensions of this faculty to refer to the imperative 
termed obligation, so that moralness which interests 
conscience might be correctly defined as moralness 
determined by the sentiment of obligation. This 
species of moralness I name impero -moralness, and the 
opposite species, as referring not to obligation but to 
a species of beauty, e.g. that of Generosity, Courage, 
and Fortitude, I term pulchro-moralness. Accordingly, 
moral goodness is either " impero-moral " or " pulchro- 
moral ;" and moral faculties are either " impero-moral " 
or " pulchro-moral." 



CLXXIII. 



. Obligation is a species of imperativeness. It mani- 
fests itself as; a. : pojamand, — for the mpst part as a 
command of God; sometimes as ipipersonal. It is 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 343 

essential to the command to be intuited in a senti- 

i 

ment involving a momentum towards obedience. This 
pressure or momentum causes it to be regarded as a 
species of compulsory force, and has procured for it 
the name, Obligation. Obligation is comprised by 
the two species, duty, and obligation in respect of 
what is not due. 



CLXXIV. 

Duty is for the most part confounded with obliga- 
tion. It differs from one species of obligation as sup- 
posing something due, and therefore a relation of debtor 
and creditor between two or more persons. Obligation 
to conform to purity does not suppose such a relation. 
Duty and Eight are correlatives, but not so Obligation 
and Right. No right corresponds to obligation to con- 
form to purity. The confusion of obligation and duty 
is owing to this fact, that experience has been largely 
conversant about duty, and very little about obligation 
respecting what is not due. Eight is the differentia of 
the meum and tuum determined by duty. It supposes 
that something morally belongs to its subject, e.g. 
land, money, a certain degree of immunity, — that there 
exists a free agent able to deprive him of what morally 
belongs to him, and that, if the free agent undergo a 
temptation to make use of the power, he owes a recu- 
sant volition to the owner. If a thing be owned by 
one person and possessed by another, the right of the 
owner supposes a duty in the possessor to restore the 
thing when required. 



344 THE ALTERNATIVE. 'book iii. 



CLXXV. 

1. Let us now examine the mental qualities — the 
qualities or elemental parts of mental structure — on 
which depend the affections and emotions that are of a 
nature to elicit moral approval 

2. Language is indebted to Comte for the useful 
term, Altruism. Eegarding it as public property, I 
restrict it to a less comprehensive meaning than that 
annexed to it by Comte. I use it as denoting dis- 
position to confer benefit on another. We may be 
sordidly disposed to confer benefit on another, as when 
a slave-owner, with venal self-regard, is disposed to 
promote the health of his slaves ; or we may be dis- 
interestedly disposed to confer benefit on others, as 
instanced in the good Samaritan. But disinterested 
altruism is not the contradictory opposite, it is merely 
the contrary, of sordid altruism. There is an altruism 
that is about equally remote from sordidness and dis- 
interestedness, e.g. that of parental love, and that of 
patriotism. Knowledge of the relation of such or such 
a human being as " child " to the Ego is the pivot of 
parental love. An alien infant fraudulently presented 
as her own to a newly-made mother as soon as relief 
from the pain of parturition enables her to nurse, will 
elicit parental love, and her own might become to her 
an object of aversion. In like manner egotism is the 
pivot of patriotism. Knowledge, whether true or false, 
that such or such a country is in the relation of" native 
land" to the Ego, is the nucleus of patriotism. A love 
of country founded on a false knowledge might make a 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 345 

man the enemy of his native country. Both affections 
are equally remote from sordidness and disinterested- 
ness. Both are of great, one of indispensable, utility. 
Both are teeming sources of self-sacrifice and injustice. 
Accordingly, Altruism is divisible into sordid and non- 
sordid altruism, and the latter into egotistic and non- 
egotistic altruism. 

3. Heterogeneous sympathy is proper to non-sordid 
altruism. It tends, when it instigates or is the motive 
of behaviour that evinces extraordinary self-denial, to 
commend its subject to moral approval, but much 
more when it seems to proceed from that which is 
non-egotistic. 

4. Non- sordid altruism is either reverential or 
benevolent. 

5. The mental quality, Benevolence, is the incom- 
er etc subject of non- sordid altruism, and, therein, of 
heterogeneous sympathy (§ xcii. 1). Its action is de- 
pendent on ascriptive emotion (§ xcii. 2). Owing 
to this dependence its sympathy is at first, for the 
most part, confined to objects of affection, such as 
those of the parental, filial, fraternal, conjugal, friendly 
affections ; but it is capable of expanding beyond the 
sphere of affection, of developing into philanthropy ; 
and finally of embracing all conscious being. Let 
benevolence that is a constituent of affection be dis- 
tinguished as " affectionate " and that which generates 
sympathy independent on affection as " super-affection- 
ate." Sympathy with a stranger in distress is an 
emotion of super -affectionate benevolence. I mean 
the term, " super-affectionate " benevolence, to connote 



I 



346 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

not only non-dependence on affection, but also supe- 
riority, in the view of the moral faculty, over affec- 
tionate benevolence. The latter frequently incites to 
injustice in favour of its object; the former has no 
such tendency. 1 Nearly nineteen hundred years ago 
a conspicuous example of what may be termed " adult " 
benevolence appeared in Palestine. In it was com- 
bined affectionate and super-affectionate benevolence, 
the latter in such ascendency, we must presume, as to 
exclude, at least under ordinary circumstances, tempta- 
tion to be unjust. Let benevolence of this degree of 
development be distinguished as adult, and all beside 
as either embryonic or adolescent. 

The division of Benevolence into "affectionate" 
and " super-affectionate " detaches a species of bene- 
volence from a connection that tends to hide disin- 
terestedness or at least to prevent its appearing in 
sharp relief. The pretension of egotistic benevolence 
to be disinterested is not beyond reasonable question : 
that of non-egotistic affectionate benevolence, e.g. the 
benevolence involved in friendship, though in view of 
the moral faculty it excel the former, is not above 
suspicion : that of super-affectionate benevolence does 
not admit of reasonable question. It is not reasonable 
to doubt the disinterestedness of pain caused by ap- 
prehension of a stranger's pain. Such an emotion, 
fraught with longing to relieve, excludes room for 
self-regard. I do not refer to any self-denying act 
which the sympathetic pain might instigate, because 
this would give opportunity for a sophistical rejoinder, 
whereas the example I propose paralyses the opposite 

1 Christ exacts super-affectionate benevolence capable of embracing 
enemies, and makes small account of affectionate benevolence, as being 
a virtue not wanting even to Publicans. 



.A« * - - . 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 347 



i 



contention. If I should cite what seems to be a self- 
denying act for the relief of the stranger, it would be 
answered that the agent had a self-regarding motive, 
viz. to relieve himself of the sympathetic pain or to 
acquire sympathetic pleasure. By putting the sym- 
pathetic animus, and not an act which it might incite, 
as the subject of disinterestedness, I cut off space for 
sophistical evasion. I do not imply that egotistic and 
affectionate non-egotistic benevolence are not disin- 
terested, I merely contend that disinterestedness is 
essential to " super-affectionate " benevolence. 

The quality, Benevolence, is at once a faculty and 
a propensity, a faculty as being intuitive, a propensity 
as being the matrix of beneficent motive and intention. 
As intuitive faculty it unites with ascriptive emotion 
in the apprehension of the object of its sympathy. 
The discernment of a given emotion of another is quite 
different when it is involved in ascriptive emotion only 
and when it is involved in a sentiment partly deter- 
mined by ascriptive emotion and partly by benevo- 
lence. The intuitive function of benevolence embraces 
moral intuition involving moral approval and reproach: 
in other words, it is a moral faculty. Grateful moral 
approbation tends to swell the heart of the benevolent 
observer of any striking instance of benevolent self- 
sacrifice, and compassion for pain believed to be caused 
by the cruelty of a free-agent is a matrix of moral 
reprobation of the agent. 

6a. The mental quality, Eeverence, is, qu& faculty, 
the source and subject of the sentiment of the sacred, and, 
qu& propensity, the source of deferential behaviour, — 
whether worship or mere unaffected politeness. It 
may bs .a source, of altruism, but not of that which 



"* 



348 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

involves heterogeneous sympathy. It exists at first 
in the germinal state, and, to germinate, needs to be 
quickened by the bearing on it of a personal object 
that presents to it an aspect of sacred dignity and 
authority. A good and judicious father presents to it 
such an aspect. It is because fathers are, for the most 
part, the first and most imposing of the objects of 
reverence, that God is apprehended as " Father." The 
filial sentiment is the pivot of godliness. But' when 
reverence is so developed as to have become a domi- 
nant habit of the mind, it is capable of surviving faith 
in the Personal divine, and of seeing sacredness in 
man however flagitious or imbecile. All conscious 
being may, in this widowed state of the faculty, be 
sacred in its view; not in such wise as to protect 
noxious forms of life, or prevent one from complying 
with the predatory system on which the existence of 
certain races of men has been made to depend, but so 
as to make one recoil from the infliction of useless 
pain. Man, above all, may rank in its view as a 
being of inalienable sacredness, but not to the pre- 
judice of needful austerity ; not so as to exclude its 
sanction of the civil surgery which relieves both society 
and the criminal of a life or liberty that can only be a 
nuisance. The sentiment of sacred duty — I shall 
show that there is a sentiment of duty which discerns 
no sacredness in its object — is proper to reverence. 
It originates as sentiment of obedience due to personal 
authority, primarily to that of the parent, especially 
the father ; subsequently, when belief in God obtains, 
to the authority of God. According to a very rare 
experience it is capable of surviving faith in a Creator 
and Providence, and then it is a sentiment of obedience 
due to an impersonal authority. The few who have 






chap. iv. WISDOM. 349 

experienced the Impersonal imperative have not found 
that its force is less than that which they apprehended 
as being the command of God. I have the hope that 
amongst the good and able of those whose faith in 
a Creator and Providence has been extinguished by 
science and by their experience of the infernal in 
nature there are some who can bear witness to £he 
existence and force of the impersonal imperative, and 
that this testimony will sufficiently corroborate me. 

6b. That reverence is incapable of heterogeneous 
sympathy is a truth which it peculiarly concerns the 
Christian, and more peculiarly the Christian of interior 
life, to know. What chiefly differentiates the religion 
of Christ is that it enjoins Charity, and charity is 
super-affectionate heterogeneous sympathy, — not that 
which pities and disposes to succour one's own children 
in pain, or those who are agreeable to us, but that 
which knows no distinction of persons, which goes out 
to a man in pain whether he be or be not of our blood, 
country, or religion, whether he be repugnant or 
agreeable, — the love of the neighbour enjoined in the 
eleventh commandment How potently the human 
mind is influenced by reverence is shown by the 
history of religion, and how feebly by benevolence the 
flagrant history of " man's inhumanity to man " attests. 
To apply the hot-house ardour of godly reverence for 
the development of the feeble germ of benevolence so 
as to enrich human nature with adult benevolence, is 
the intention of the eleventh commandment, and, if my 
Christianity do not deceive me, was the main motive 
of Calvary. Thus far the divine intention has been 
in some degree baffled by an error which mistakes 
a counterfeit of charity for charity. The counterfeit 



350 THE ALTERNATIVE. book hi. 

describes itself as love of the neighbour for God's sake. 
A man of passionate godliness which disposes him to 
obey the eleventh commandment is liable to be duped 
by the idea that he is fulfilling the intention of the 
commandment when, at cost of self-denial, he succours 
his neighbour for GocFs sake. Benevolence has nothing 
to do with the act. It contributes no constituent to 
the motive. The agent is moved only by reverence. 
The direct nutritive value of the act serves only to 
enhance godliness. Heterogeneous sympathy admits 
of no intervention between it and the symbol of the 
ascribed emotion which is its proximate cause; — it 
cannot be roused by the idea of God's sake soliciting it 
to come into existence and embrace the subject of the 
ascribed emotion. Whatever pretends to he charity and 
is not the counterpart of what a benevolent infidel would 
experience under the same circumstances, is not charity. 
An Epicurean motive avails itself of the error and 
nurtures it. A peculiar pleasure attends the exercises 
of godliness when the subject is not in what is known 
as the "dry" state. The pleasure varies from a mini- 
mum to ecstasy. Its inconsistent tendency to move 
one to violate duty is not unfamiliar to the religious 
of the Eoman Catholic Church. Madame Guyon 
detected it moving her to neglect her husband and 
household duties for the luxury of prayer. Viauney, 
the Cur6 of Ars, whom popular authority has already 
canonised, deserted on his way to the camp to which 
the conscription had called him, although, but a few 
days before, he had declared to his cousin that he 
understood the call to be from God. The conscrip- 
tion disappointed his passion for priesthood which his 
desertion enabled him to gratify. According to Mont- 
alembert, St. Elizabeth, Queen of Hungary, to satiate 




rtfti 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 351 

her passion for ministering to the loathsomely diseased, 
used to disregard the prohibitions of her spiritual 
director. The pleasure of godliness is at once the 
motive and reward of martyrdom, of ascetic self-torture, 
and of missionary zeal. This pleasure tends to absorb 
one in God, to magnify Him at the cost of all beside, 
to strip the rest of being of importance except in so far 
as it serves to glorify God. It would fain efface all 
other pleasure and make worship the eternal occu- 
pation of the blessed. The bigotry begotten of this 
pleasure distrusts benevolent emotion because it is not 
the love of God, and will have charity to be the love 
of God with a human distress stuck in it. If bene- 
volence interfere, people of vocation 1 think that it is a 

1 The ascetic, natural priest, or man "of vocation," is a natural 
species ; and this species Christ made the key-stone of Christendom. 
The apostles belonged to it. The young man who kept the command- 
ments from his youth upwards, but could not sell all he had, give to 
the poor and follow Jesus, did not belong to it. He was a good 
natural layman, not a natural priest ; he was without vocation. In 
the natural priest the Christian Spirit was to be first and most fully 
realised. To him it is possible to reckon his power and be reasonably 
resolute to advance against the hostile king, — to count the cost, and 
be sure he has wherewithal to complete the tower. To this species 
corresponds another, viz. a kind of man of which tendency to lean 
upon the priest is the differentia, I have seen Protestant members of 
this species, when they came in view of a truly sacerdotal religion, 
rush with instinctive impetuosity to their specific place. Of these two 
species Christ constructed His Church, making himself the head of 
the priesthood, — the great high priest. His religion, at least in its 
first (the actual) epoch, is essentially sacerdotal. That asceticism is a 
natural differentia determinative of a natural human species is proved 
by conclusive evidence. Its manifestations are as old as history, and 
have been so opposed to one another, so capricious, and, in many ways, 
so repugnant to wisdom, that they could not be reasonably imputed to 
an influence wholly divine. Even within the domain of Christianity 
they give irresistible proof of a source that is at least partially the 
reverse of divine. The spirit it evinces has outraged modesty by 
sending fanatics naked into churches. It occasioned the Epicurean 



352 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

solicitation of the natural heart — of the " old man," — 
that, in helping others from this motive, they are 
gratifying self, — that they have descended from the 
supernatural, from grace, — that their animus is such 
as might actuate a good-natured fawn. 

An important truth underlies the error. Because 
of man's poverty as regards benevolence, Christ set 
Christendom upon behaving for Christ's sake as though 
it were benevolent, — to the end that the practice might 
ultimately bring home to human intuition the beauty 
dignity and utility of benevolence, and so lead to an 
intentional culture of true charity, — a direct culture 
of benevolence. I say a direct culture ; for, the 
vicarious charity or counterfeit of charity which Christ 
set in motion was a means of indirect culture of bene- 
volence, and has operated to such good effect that 
Christian charity is now, according to the intention of 
Christ, extinguishing the fires of hell, protesting that 
the apprehension of Eetribution as justice is the off- 
spring of ferocity, — a devilish thing so intrenched in 
human nature that even Christ could not take it by 
assault, one which, if not slowly sapped, must for ever 
pervert the moral sense. Charity alone could disabuse 
the mind of this error. Now, if, before science had 
exposed the baselessness of natural theology and Chris- 
tian charity had protested against the immorality of 

and culpable relish of prayer referred to in the text. It has begotten 
a psalmody bordering on the obscene. Witness the Song of Solomon 
adopted by Christendom. Even the Imitation of Christ is not free 
from the indecency. "Enlarge thou me," it exclaims, "that I may 
learn to taste with the interior mouth of the heart how sweet it is to 
love and to be dissolved and to bathe in love" (Book iii. chap, v.) 
The affection of this spirit to immolations, massacres, and inquisitorial 
tortures, is notorious. Such is the pis alter to which Nature restricted 
Christ as regards an instrument of salvation. 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 353 

Christian theology, 1 a real charity had become the 
characteristic sine qua non of the Christian, at least of 
Christians constituting the core of the Church ; if, 
instead of having a Gorgon of Inquisitions, Crusades, 
coercions into the fold of Christ, and other outrages 
upon liberty, hung upon its breast like the dead alba- 
tross on that of the Ancient Mariner, the history of 
the Church were aglow with works of genuine charity 
and exhibited nothing incompatible with that spirit, 
then infidelity, though negative in respect of a Creator 
and an Omnipotent Providence, would hardly be 
tempted to deny the divinity of the work of Christ, 
however at a loss to explain it, and, if rash enough to 
attack Christian faith, would find itself shouting to a 
Christendom deafened by the love of Christ. Contrast 
the physiognomy of benevolence with that of ascetic 
austerity, the one beaming true promise of prompt 
efficient sympathy with every joy or sorrow that has 
not a taint of depravity, the other the reverse. Which 
of these fruits signifies the Christian spirit ? If the 
former were characteristic of devout Christians, it would 
not be easy for common sense to doubt, however diffi- 
cult to explain certain seeming inconsistencies of the 
gospels, that the originator of such a divine fellowship 
is the way, the truth, and the life. 

6c. The development of Eeverence by Christianity 
is the development of what may be fitly named moral 
purity. Moral purity is distinguishable by its aver- 

1 Christianity is one thing and Christian theology another. 
Their co-existence, in scientific minds, as objects of faith seems to be 
no longer possible. It is to be hoped that the demolition of the 
theology by science is merely the demolition of the scaffolding with 
which the temple of Christ has been built. 

2 A 



354 THE ALTERNATIVE. Hook in. 

sions. It is averse to inordinate sensuality and to all 
impulse and eagerness incompatible with power of con- 
duct, — with the self-mastery essential to wisdom. 
Eagerness, in its apprehension, savours of palsy. To 
be susceptible of urgent temptation to violate prudence 
for the sake of what is, under ordinary circumstances, 
an innocent pleasure, seems to it an infirmity allied to 
the spirit of inordinate sensuality. Its aversion eradi- 
cates the loathsome appetites that beget what are 
known as crimes against nature. When, in respect of 
one of these appetites, we compare Pagan and Christian 
civilisation, the eradicating influence of Christ-developed 
reverence is obvious. Moral purity is averse to scorn. 
The words " raca !" and " thou fool !" are an offence to 
its lips. It is not inclined, like some modern moralists, 
to make virtue a shilelah and the world of bad men 
a Donnybrook, counting it a privilege to smash the 
wicked. It is averse to fierceness, including anger of 
every kind and degree, and to the violence they inspire : 
its aversion to fierceness is aversion to indignation, i.e. 
to anger caused by moral evil ; but this aversion only 
obtains when moral purity is approaching its adult 
state, — when the purity protests that the story of 
Christ's recourse to violence in the temple is a fiction. 
Moral purity is the subject of impersonal authority, 
the " still small voice " that utters the impersonal im- 
perative. When imperfect, as it is for the most part, 
it yearns for its own perfection, — a yearning analogous 
with that of the chrysalis to be quit of its larva. 1 

1 This yearning is either the instigator or motive of what may be 
termed pure asceticism, — that which, void of fear and incapable of 
imputing a healing virtue to self-inflicted bodily pain, strives to de- 
tach its subject from moral impurity. The members of a religious 
order subject to St. Francois de Sales applied to him for permission to 
dispense with shoes. He answered, "Change your brains and keep 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 355 

Politeness is the least of its graces : reverence is the 
source of politeness ; the aesthetic faculty merely adopts, 
it does not beget, politeness. 

Moral purity sees strength and dignity in meekness. 
No quality of the Christian spirit is so misunderstood 
as its humility, of which meekness is a species. 
Humility is privation of fierceness and self-love. Meek- 
ness is humility qu& privation of fierceness. Humility 
is either noble or abject, noble when its charity is 
modified by an intrepid aversion to wrong-doing, an 
aversion that is prompt to prevent by violence the 
evil that cannot be otherwise prevented, abject when it 
consists in moral idiotcy or tolerant cowardice. The 
confusion of noble with abject humility has discredited 
Christianity in the view of the pulchro-moral faculty, 
whereas it consists with an adamantine manliness in 
comparison of which fierce manliness is mere pottery. 
Calvary made conspicuous a sublime example of ada- 
mantine manliness. Noble meekness is a species of 
fortitude : it is fortitude that excludes convulsions of 
fierceness, compelling quietude when pain tends to 
make fierceness frantic. In the querulousness of Job 
we have an example of defect of noble meekness. 
The discrimination of this attribute elucidates a kind 
of obstacle in the way of Christianity which, so far as 
I know, has not been hitherto noticed, and also the 
method which Christ applied against such obstacles. 
As regards noble meekness Christ had to enjoin con- 
duct conformable to a quality of which men had pre- 
viously no experience and for which language therefore 
had no name. He was not free to coin a word or 

your shoes." The spirit of this injunction is, as regards the pretension 
to climb to heaven on rungs of bodily pain, the spirit of pure asceti- 
cism. 



356 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

define. A Gospel to philosophers might admit of 
coined words and definitions, but not a Gospel to the 
poor. Such a message must be put in the familiar 
language of the poor. There was but one resource, 
namely, to substitute the name of the quality that 
most resembled what he would indicate, relying on the 
engine of sanctification which he constructed in human 
hearts to make noble meekness an object of Christian 
experience when his precise meaning would become 
intelligible. Abject meekness is what most resembles 
noble meekness, and it is familiar to human experi- 
ence. It served as a pis alter for the ultimate indica- 
tion of noble meekness. 



6d. Dignity is proper to reverence and what is of 
a nature to merit reverential approval. 1 Besides being 
the faculty by which we intuite dignity, reverence is a 
basis of dignity. Men are respectable in proportion 
as they respect. A society void of respect is void of 
dignity. An eternal bliss of profane men would be 
as contemptible as an eternal bliss derived from eternal 
dancing or such as might obtain in a sea-anemone. 
Eeverence and the dignity of which it is a basis is a 
condition sine qua non of a life worth living. To deny 
this is to imply that there is no rank in pleasure, — 
that if equal as to quantity the pleasure of the wise 
man does not excel that of the maggot. 

1 Analogy gives a secondary meaning to the term Dignity, accord- 
ing to which dignity is predicable of other things, e.g. the inanimate 
sublime. The quality denoted by the term according to the secondary 
meaning is no more a congener of what the name primarily denotes 
than a lily is a congener of the moral purity which it symbolises. 
Otherwise 1 should distinguish the dignity to which I refer as moral, 
and the other as preter-moral. 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 357 

6e. Authoritative superiors are at first the sole 
objects of reverence ; no sacredness is then discernible 
but what authority involves. Later, development 
expands the view of reverence so that equals present 
to it an aspect of sacredness. The few in whom this 
enhancement first obtains are distinguished from the 
profanum vulgus by a habit of respectful politeness in 
their intercourse with one another. A later advance 
enables reverence to see sacredness in human inferiors, 
and finally in all conscious beings. The development 
of reverence is capable of giving it such an ascendency 
over its subject that to violate by injustice the sacredness 
of the neighbour must cause a remorse which no advan- 
tage achievable by the injustice could compensate. Kever- 
ence of this degree I distinguish as " adult." 

6/. Eeverence is a faculty of moral intuition ; for 
reverential intuition of authority supposes that a 
suggestion of disobedience must present to the subject 
a morally bad aspect, and intuition of such an aspect 
is moral : it involves moral reprobation. A man 
otherwise destitute of moral discernment might be of 
quick susceptibility as regards violations of the will of 
God. 

7. There is a faculty which apprehends custom- 
ary measures of immunity, including liberty, as morally 
belonging to those who enjoy them, and, therefore, 
under the sanction of right and duty. The moral 
faculty contributes nothing toward the determination 
of these measures. So far as that faculty is concerned, 
they obtain accidentally. The faculty which appre- 
hends them as being under the sanction of Eight 
intuites no sacredness in its object, and its spirit is as 



358 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

remote from tenderness as from piety. It influences 
the hard and impious as well as the humane and 
devout. Let us distinguish the moral faculty in which 
custom elicits the sentiment of right and duty as con- 
suetudinal. If we believed in creation and final causes, 
consistency would require us to believe that the con- 
suetudinal moral faculty is merely provisional, one 
intended to be superseded by reverence and benevo- 
lence when these should attain a certain degree of 
development ; for ' adult ' reverence and benevolence must 
intuite in every man a right to the largest liberty — the 
largest immunity — compatible with the welfare of the 
race. From this point of view it is intelligible why 
Christ, in his summary of the commandments, made 
no account of the consuetudinal source of moral intui- 
tion. He addresses his commands exclusively to 
reverence and benevolence. When these attain the 
adult degree, they exclude room for the operation of 
the consuetudinal moral faculty. The dispositions, 
emotions, and behaviour which have their source in 
the consuetudinal moral faculty have the property of 
eliciting, under certain circumstances, moral approval 
and reproach. 

8. The specific difference of the pulchro- moral 
faculty is that it is conversant about the contraries, 
magnanimity and pusillanimity. What it apprehends 
as magnanimity differentiates the objects of its approval, 
and what it apprehends as pusillanimity those it dis- 
approves. It is the source of hero-worship and of the 
imitation of heroism by self-love intent upon honour. 
Its tendency to feed self-love, to adulterate magnani- 
mity with self-approbation and complacency in " the 
honour that cometh of man/' and to exercise vanity in 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 359 

the simulation of heroism (as instanced in chivalry), 
tends to arrest the moral development which, at first, 
it contributes to promote. Self-love, like the umbilical 
cord, is indispensable to one era of development, and 
an obstacle to another. 

9. Our survey has now exhausted the mental 
sources of all moral approval. It finds that they are 
comprised by the mental qualities, Eeverence, Bene- 
volence, the Consuetudinal moral faculty, and the 
pulchro-moral faculty : of these the three first consti- 
tute what may be termed the impero-moral faculty ; 
in other words they are the sources of all impero- 
moral intuition. The fourth we have not decomposed : 
it is probably simple. The consuetudinal moral faculty 
we have found to be merely provisional. Outside the 
intuitional scope of adult reverence and benevolence 
on the one hand, and of the pulchro-moral faculty on 
the other, there is no moral goodness, — at least none 
known to human experience. Our research has scaled 
a height from which all varieties of moral goodness are 
discernible. 

10. Moral goodness is divisible into the two kinds, 
impero-moral and pulchro-moral goodness. Another 
important division separates moral goodness that con- 
sists of mental qualities, e.g. the qualities reverence 
and benevolence, from that which consists of moral 
events, e.g. intentions manifested by good behaviour. 
The former may be distinguished as structural, the 
latter as non-structural. Structural moral goodness is 
either impero-moral or pulchro-moral. The latter is 
as useful as it is beautiful, but its importance is slight 
compared with that of structural impero-moral good- 



360 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

ness. This may consist of one or more of the three 
mental qualities, reverence, benevolence, and the con- 
suetudinal moral faculty. Of these, two are essential 
to impero-moral perfection, viz. reverence and bene- 
volence. When reverence and benevolence become 
"adult," when they dominate or exclude fierceness, 
self-love, and moral impurity, and are united to a 
sagacity that is " a learned spirit of human dealings," 
they constitute, as far as man is concerned, impero- 
moral perfection. But, though short of righteousness, 
they may have ascendency. This structural impero- 
moral goodness I distinguish as " adolescent," regard- 
ing all lower states and degrees as embryonic. The 
division gives three kinds of structural impero-moral 
goodness, viz. the perfect, the adolescent, and the 
embryonic. The adolescent is, in all probability, the 
highest that has obtained amongst men, — Christ ex- 
cepted. It graduates through an infinitude of degrees 
from embryonism to perfection. 

11. It appears then that after it has passed one 
of the earlier and ruder epochs of its development, 
the impero-moral faculty, having shed its provisional 
accessory, the consuetudinal moral faculty, consists of 
reverence and benevolence ; that reverence and bene- 
volence thus combined have two offices, one critical, 
the other dynamic; the former their office as moral 
faculty, the latter their office as propensity ; and that 
their main tendency, as moral faculty, is to promote their 
power as propensity. 

12. It is competent to Eeverence to acquire a 
great ascendency while Benevolence is but little de- 
veloped. The history of the Jews gives us a remark- 



chai*. iv. WISDOM. 361 

able instance of such an ascendency. Reverence in 
the Jew tended to promote the mental sources of 
egotistic altruism but not super-affectionate benevol- 
ence. To be humane to the seed of Abraham was the 
extent of the altruism exacted by the godliness of 
perhaps the godliest race on earth ; and it sanctioned 
hatred of the Gentile. It took Calvary to establish 
the vital connection between Reverence and Benevo- 
lence which more than all other influences has pro- 
moted philanthropy and charity, caused it to burst 
through the human limit and overflow all conscious 
being, and which promises to make it a basis, or part 
of the basis, of impero-moral perfection. This appli- 
cation of the ardour of godliness for the development 
of Benevolence is what chiefly differentiates the Christian 
from the Mosaic dispensation. I do not pretend to 
imply that the connection might not have ultimately 
obtained without such an intervention; but history does 
not seem to warrant an induction, that, without the 
bearing on reverence of a person apprehended as the 
way, the truth, and the life, and who exacted behaviour 
conformable to love of the neighbour, the connection 
could obtain. 

13 a. Perfect Impero-moral goodness includes 
what is commonly denoted by the name Generosity. 
What a man owes to his neighbour in the way of 
altruistic self-denial is what he believes to be useful 
relatively to the welfare of mankind. To give more is 
folly ; to give less, injustice. Generosity, therefore, is 
not, as men commonly believe, altruism in excess of 
what Duty exacts ; for altruism that is folly cannot be 
accounted Generosity ; but it is altruism in excess of 
what a stingy sentiment of duty assumes to be due. 



362 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

The idea of the altruism that constitutes Generosity 
varies with the breadth or narrowness of what the 
subject believes to be exacted by Duty. What seems 
to one man to be the mere payment of a debt seems 
to another to be generosity, — altruism in excess of 
what is due. If, as regards generosity, to get as near 
to the definite as the vagueness essential to what is 
merely comparative allows, we define Generosity to be 
" large altruism," Generosity is still within the domain 
of Duty. What the bulk of men regard as extreme 
generosity Christ accounted mere debt ; " and when ye 
have done all these things, say We are unprofitable 
servants, we have done that which it was our duty to 
do." Undoubtedly these words imply that Generosity 
is a kind of excess over what is due ; but this, I take 
it, was an accommodation to the moral ignorance and 
error of the age, — just the kind of accommodation that 
might be expected of a wisdom which excludes strain- 
ing at gnats, and has to make intelligible to the heart 
what could not reach it through the entanglements 
of Reason. Generosity, therefore, may be defined 
altruistic largeness ; and, as we owe to our neighbour 
and mankind whatever of altruism is short of folly, — 
whatever is approvable by Wisdom as being useful 
relatively to the welfare of mankind, — Generosity is 
essential to perfect moral goodness. 

136. Generosity depends upon the proportion be- 
tween altruistic and self- regarding principles. If 
Benevolence were in no degree opposed by self-love, 
appetite, or any other non-altruistic principle, altruistic 
extravagance would exclude generosity. So with rever- 
ence, parental and filial love, friendship, etc. In pro- 
portion as the altruistic principles are less checked by 



chap. nr. WISDOM. 363 

the opposite ones the disposition is either more gener- 
ous or nearer to Generosity. 

14. At a certain point of development Self-love 
becomes an offence to the moral faculty. Self-love 
comprehends, and is comprised by, two subgenera, viz. 
self-esteem and love of honour, and the latter compre- 
hends the two species, love of homage, and love of 
praise that is not homage. The mental quality on 
which the love of homage depends is termed Pride, that 
on which the love of mere praise depends is termed 
Vanity. The moral estimate of self-love has under- 
gone and is undergoing great change. Proud ambition, 
when supported by great faculties and not disgraced by 
flagrant crime, has been held in honour by the pulchro- 
moral faculty, — regarded as a species of magnanimity. 
Its utility, as supplying competent men for govern- 
mental function, has contributed to maintain its credit. 
But, when we scrutinise pride, and, separating it from 
the splendour of success, see in it a source of desire to 
subordinate others, it exposes its true aspect, that of 
pusillanimity. Then, by those who have faith in the 
possibility of moral perfection, it is regarded as a useful 
provisional propensity which forwards man during a 
certain phase of development, and hinders near its 
close. The moral credit of ambition has been supported 
by its seeming disregard of human opinion. As seeking 
homage, not mere praise, it seems to be above concern 
for human opinion, whereas vanity is not more weakly 
and meanly dependent. When deprived of the honour 
which homage manifests, a Napoleon pines and dies in St. 
Helena. The utility of the love of honour as a motive of 
good behaviour recommends it to the moral faculty until 
it is discovered that the behaviour evinces, not moral 



364 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

goodness but, a counterfeit of moral goodness, — not 
less a counterfeit for being indispensable to moral 
progress up to a certain phase of development. To 
behave well for honour's sake no more signifies good- 
ness than to love the neighbour for God's sake evinces 
benevolence. Behaviour that evinces both generosity 
and disregard of human opinion gives a rare satisfaction 
to the moral faculty. It excludes suspicion of the 
duplicity which turns one eye in the direction of a 
good motive and makes the other squint at honour. 
Self-love excludes sincerity. It detains us in the 
imitativeness of childhood^ — imitating manhood to win 
the consideration of the world, Alexander avowed it 
when he declared that he was incurring the hardship 
of conquest for the applause of the Athenians. A 
modern apostle of sincerity, after having detected a trick 
of self-love which had made him figure as a compound 
of play-actor and prophet, is made to sob in public 
over his failure to appreciate during her lifetime the 
devotion of a deceased wife, incensing himself mean- 
while with the perfume of the solemn sympathy which 
his tragic attitude is to evoke. Yet he was as much 
beyond us in the direction of sincerity as the embryo 
that begins to strike at the shell is in advance of one 
that has not yet developed a beak. To mature the 
human embryo into manhood — to promote him out of 
the pusillanimity, childishness, and charlatanism of self- 
love — is one of the ends of Christianity. The achieve- 
ment of Christian manhood is what is known to the 
spiritual members of the Eoman Catholic Church as 
" detachment." Privation of self-love and fierceness, and 
an enhancement of the faculty of love which excludes 
effeminacy, are the characteristics of detachment. It 
regenerates love. In unregenerate love men lean 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 365 

against each other like stacked guns, incapable of self- 
sustained erectness. In regenerate love they cherish a 
sympathy and mutual helpfulness with which they can 
painlessly dispense. To so formidable a manliness 
would Christian evolution promote us ! — and yet, quick 
fierceness, under the form of Indignation, being to 
vulgar view a sign of nobleness, and lack of it, under 
assault upon honour^ a sign of ahjectness, the tameness 
with which the detached endure such assaults is mis- 
taken for baseness. 

15. It should now he obvious that perfect impero- 
moral goodness includes all pulchro- moral goodness, 
courage and fortitude excepted. If the subject enjoy 
the physical bases of courage and fortitude it exacts 
exercises of those attributes ; but it does not aggravate 
by reproach the calamity of being without them. 

16. Moral badness, like moral goodness, is either 
structural or non- structural. Nan- structural moral 
badness is either culpable or inculpable, the former 
when the subject is, the latter when he is not, free to 
behave according to moral goodness. He may be 
devoid of moral discernment, he may be actuated by 
bad instincts whose vehemence excludes volition, — puts 
will in abeyance. The savage who when pressed by 
hunger devours his female without remorse, and the 
civilian who maddened by opportunity and sexual fire 
consciously but unoptionally violates moral law by the 
commission of adultery, are examples of inculpable 
moral badness. Non-structural moral badness inherent 
in what is permitted or performed by the will is cul- 
pable. Culpable moral badness is the contrary of non- 
structural impero-moral goodness. St. Paul refers to 



366 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

the inculpability of a species of moral badness in the 
deliverance, " but sin is not imputed when there is no 
law." 

17. The term, Conscience, denotes the mental 
quality on which depends the sentiment of one's own 
guilt. It belongs to reverence and benevolence to 
apprehend their subject as culprit when they apprehend 
him as having violated moral goodness. Is conscience 
then the moral faculty qud referent to one's own guilt, 
— the faculty composed of and comprised by reverence 
and benevolence ; or is it a faculty several 1 from, though 
dependent for its action on, these? This question I 
do not pretend to answer ; nor is it of present import- 
ance that I should do so. It seems to me probable 
that there is an accessory of the moral faculty bearing 
to it such a relation as fear bears to prudence, and that 
this accessory is what is denoted by the name Con- 
science. Fear intensifies the aspect which risk exhibits 
to prudence, and the putative accessory, my hypothesis 
pretends, intensifies the aspect which violation on the 
part of the subject tends to exhibit to his moral faculty. 
The mental attribute on which Eemorse depends is 
probably the offspring of fear of divine wrath, and it is 
not improbable that the attribute is capable of surviving 
the belief on which the generating fear depends ; so 
that, through the transmitting agency of heredity, 
remorse may obtain in men who do not believe in the 
divine or who regard retribution as vindictive. That 
conscience is an accessory, not a constituent, of the 
moral faculty, seems to be evinced by the fact that there 

1 This is an unusual use of the word " several," but one that is 
needed. Things that are perfectly like each other are " several," but 
not different. 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 367 

are men of fine and potent moral susceptibility who 
are incapable of the acute and profound sentiment of 
guilt termed Eemorse. 



CLXXVI. 

1. A shadow has been cast upon virtue by the 
doctrine that it is in the power of circumstances to 
promote vices into virtues and degrade virtues into 
vices. I now apply myself to the exposure of the 
fallacy of this mischievous and degrading doctrine. 
My argument will bring to light a species of goodness 
which the moral faculty has been hitherto reluctant to 
acknowledge. 

2. Deception is divisible into that which is moral 
and that which is preter-moral (§ clxxi.). Sportive 
deception is preter-moral ; all other deception is moral. 
Moral deception is either righteous or unrighteous. 
To deceive a madman with a view to relieve or heal 
his madness, is an example of righteous deception : 
perfidy, or the deception of one to whom the opposite 
of deception is due, is unrighteous deception. Plausi- 
bility is not wanting to the thesis that what I term 
righteous deception is preter-moral. What duty exacts, 
it might be held, though not agreeable, is not necessarily 
odious to the moral faculty, and, if not odious, should 
be ranked as preter-moral. But moral deception is 
essentially odious to the moral faculty, and, though it 
be exacted by duty, it is as doses of medical poisons 
are exacted in illness. It is important in this con- 
nection to disentangle two meanings of the term 



368 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

" truth," viz. the primary meaning of the term, accord- 
ing to which it denotes agreement of what is believed 
or asserted with what is or what is not, and its 
secondary meaning, according to which it denotes 
the opposite of deception. Untruth is preter-moral. 
This is manifest in the parables of Christ, and in 
poetry and romance. It is only in connection with 
perfidy, when it is a constituent of a lie, that untruth 
seems to intuition to be moral and morally odious. 
The frequency of these intuitions has begotten an 
erroneous general synthesis which puts truth as being 
essentially sacred or obligatory and untruth as essen- 
tially evil. It is the perfidy, not the untruth, in a lie, 
that is moral and morally evil ; untruth, in whatever 
connection, is preter-moral. Noble and reverential 
minds are averse to the idea of righteous deception. 
The repugnancy is aggravated by consideration of the 
abuses which threaten to inundate morality if a com- 
promise with deception allow the latter the least 
leakage. Priest-craft and king-craft have made right- 
eous deception a pretext for perfidy until they have 
all but rotted sacerdotalism and royalty : witness, as 
regards the former, the words " Jesuitry " and " Jesui- 
tical." The bulk of us have been taught to scorn or 
hold in pious horror the rule, Do evil that good may 
come. We must not be blinded by these causes of 
prejudice : righteous deception will not cease to be 
because we turn our back upon it. 

3. A moral animus is essential to a moral object : 
in other words, a moral object must either be a moral 
animus or have one as a constituent, e.g. the ani?nus, 
malice prepense, is essential to the moral object, 
murder, a perfidious animus is essential to the moral 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 369 

object, falsehood : mere homicide and mere untruth — 
homicide unconnected with malice prepense and untruth 
unconnected with a perfidious animus — are preter-inoral. 

4. A moral animus that makes an act a constituent 
of a moral object may have more than one intention : 
if it have two or more intentions one of them is for 
the most part paramount and the other or others sub- 
ordinate. For example, the moral animus essential to 
an act of righteous deception involves a paramount 
intention to confer benefit and a subordinate inten- 
tion to deceive. The paramount intention of a moral 
animus determines the moral character of the object it 
contributes to constitute, e.g. that of the moral animus 
involved in righteous deception determines the moral 
character of the act : the subordinate one is morally 
odious, but its essential repugnancy does not, in the 
view of wisdom, disgrace the act. It is conceivable 
that circumstances might determine a duty to practise 
moral impurity : if inordinate sensuality were a sine 
qua non of the exemption of mankind from eternal 
torment it would be the duty of a saint to live as a 
sybarite. In such a case the moral animus would 
involve a paramount and a subordinate intention, a 
paramount intention to confer benefit, a subordinate 
one to practise impurity. The moral character of the 
practice would be determined by the paramount inten- 
tion, and, in the view of wisdom, would be no more 
disgraced by the subordinate intention than one who 
should plunge into a cesspool to rescue a child would 
be disgraced by the incurred filth. 

5. Let moral goodness that involves what is morally 
odious be distinguished as " paradoxical" 

2 B 



370 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

6. Paradoxical goodness has contributed to occasion 
the error, that circumstances may promote vices into 
virtues and degrade virtues into vices. It seems to 
make a virtue of a vice, whereas it merely employs 
the less to stave off the greater of two moral evils. It 
give3 countenance to an error mainly caused — 1st, By 
what seems to be the caprice and self-contradiction of 
the moral faculty in respect of what it approves and 
disapproves ; 2nd, By oversight of the dependence of 
moral behaviour on a moral animus. The moral 
faculty seems to approve in one age or society what it 
disapproves in another, and in the same individual 
at one time what it disapproves at another. In the 
second place a certain behaviour tends, irrespective of 
an animus, to pass for a virtue, and a certain behaviour, 
irrespective of an animus, to pass for a vice. The 
habitual utterance of truth tends, irrespective of an 
animus, to pass for a virtue, and the habitual utterance 
of untruth, irrespective of an animus, to pass, for a 
vice ; behaviour consonant to respect for right of pro- 
perty tends, irrespective of an animus, to pass for a 
virtue, and contrary behaviour for a vice. Now, the 
moral faculty, though unchanging as regards moral 
animus, varies greatly as to mere behaviour, and so 
seems at one time to uphold as virtue what at another 
it condemns as vice. Of course paradoxical goodness 
tends to beget and nourish the error. The needle 
is not more constant to the pole than impero-moral 
approval to an animus that affects either justice or 
purity. It varies as regards the rights to which it 
refers ; for up to a late phase of moral development 
custom mainly determines our ideas of rights, and, of 
course, differently in different ages and societies ; but it 
always approves the animus, Kighteousness, — never its 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 371 

contrary. It varies as regards what constitutes purity ; 
for intuition of the higher forms of purity is not 
possible in advance of a late phase of the develop- 
ment of reverence ; but it never fails to approve what 
its subject apprehends as purity: it never approves 
what it apprehends as impurity. In so far as moral 
approval relates to beneficence, it is essential to it to 
approve what, according to the belief of the subject, is, 
relatively to mankind, beneficent, and to moral repro- 
bation to reprove what, according to that belief, is the 
reverse. Not that in moral discernment we have 
always or even commonly in view either beneficence 
or what relates to mankind. Moral intuition excludes 
such a reference, and of moral inferences it is only 
in those which consider a criterion of moral approval 
and censure that the subject refers to mankind and 
human welfare. But in so far as we approve right- 
eousness we necessarily, but for the most part inadver- 
tently, approve what, according to our belief, is most 
conducive to human welfare, and, in so far as we con- 
demn unrighteousness, we necessarily, but for the most 
part inadvertently, condemn what, according to our 
belief, is universally maleficent 

7. Those who are for fastening the stigma of caprice 
on the moral faculty hold it responsible for approval 
and censure that do not proceed from it. Depravity 
has its approvals and reprobations 1 as well as the 
moral faculty, e.g. those of the depraved, "who, knowing 
the judgment of God, that they which commit such 

1 Depraved approval and reprobation are not moral in the sense in 
which the word means "belonging to the moral faculty," but are 
moral in the sense in which it imports, "being of a nature to elicit 
moral discernment." 



373 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

tilings ure worthy of death, not only do the same, but 
have pleasure in those that do them." These being 
imputed to the moral faculty it is made responsible for 
savage approval of savage manners, for example, of 
parricide in one society, polyandry in another, theft in 
another, lying in another. We have been abused in 
respect of moral intuition by this confusion of ideas. 

8a. But the constancy of the moral faculty as 
regards the intentions it approves and those it dis- 
approves did not exempt it from a terrible error, — 
the error that Retribution is a species of justice. In 
this respect it has been the dupe of fierceness. In the 
view of fierceness retribution is compensation, and as 
in other respects when right is violated duty exacts com- 
pensation, punishment seemed also to be due compensa- 
tion. This cause of error was backed by the intimacy 
of the connection between reprobation and anger, an 
intimacy so great that the connection seemed to be 
essential To those who take for granted that indigna- 
tion is essential to moral reprobation, the pain which 
indignation desires to inflict seems to be a requital 
prescribed by the moral imperative, — by eternal 
Justice. The connection however is merely accidental. 
There is no more an absolutely necessary relation be- 
tween moral reprobation and anger than between 
aesthetic disgust and anger ; and, except as supplying 
the place of the courage needful for the prevention of 
wrong, anger is an impediment to the moral faculty. 
Imagine a man pre-eminent in wisdom and courage 
but void of irascibility. He cordially but without 
animosity apprehends the wrong-doer as a reprobate, 
is prompt to apply against him what preventive 
violence duty may exact, but is incapable of inflicting 



chap. iv. WISDOM* 373 

retributive pain. It would be difficult for him to 
conceive what is denoted by the terms " retribution " 
and " punishment," and, when made to understand 
them, he would regard as infernal the spirit they 
signify. His reprobation is modified by charity. By 
the way it must be acknowledged that to the illiterate 
Nazarene who founded Christendom belongs the credit 
of having elicited the conduct and experience which 
have detached animosity from reprobation, — -rescued 
the moral sense from fierceness. Is it possible that he 
intended the resulting charity to put out the fires of 
hell, — to extinguish the doctrine of Hell ? This would 
seem to be a necessary consequence, — one that Christ 
could not fail to foresee. 

8b. Let us pause a moment to consider the baleful 
source of our belief in Hell and of a great part of 
human misery. We have proverbially allowed that 
anger is a brief insanity, and nevertheless, under the 
form of indignation, it seems to be noble ; sometimes, 
as when it thunders in a philippic, even sublime. It 
is really a convulsion, an analogue of St. Vitus' dance. 
^Relatively to the ends of the short-sighted it may 
sometimes be useful; but it is always stultifying, 
always debasing. To have due moral apprehension of 
the evil in others and to be morally resolute, it is not 
necessary to go into convulsions. After all, as a con- 
dition of moral energy, a fit of anger is at most a fit 
of Dutch courage. In view of the fact that, with 
rare exceptions, men are worked by 'an unconscious 
force, there is no consistent room for anger ; for, even 
those who approve of the passion allow that it is 
illegitimate when provoked by irresponsible behaviout, 
e.g. by that of the insane. We are stultified by the 



374 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

cerebral process that makes us apprehend as culprit 
the puppet of cerebration. Nero, from this point of 
view, is a proper object of pity, not of anger, and 
sinners are more sinned against than sinning. There- 
fore anger always stultifies. It always debases ; not 
only because stultification is debasement, but because 
anger holds us at the level of the bad animus that 
provokes. One who cordially knows the optionless 
condition of man is above the reach of provocation. To 
be short of this superiority is debasement. Anger 
against a necessary agent, even though the agent be 
human, is about as worthy as the kicking of a stone 
that has stubbed the toe. Is it not time for man to 
set about relieving himself of this disgrace ? The 
enterprise is by no means a desperate one. He who 
endeavours to domesticate the apprehension of man as 
dupe, puppet, and victim of nature, will soon find that 
the sentiment has an allaying property. If the method 
of salvation had room for a philosophic reason, Christ, 
I am persuaded, would have applied this sentiment ; 
but until the preparation of heart-intelligence by child- 
like obedience has advanced a certain way, reasoning 
tends to precipitate religion. 



CLXXVII. 

The discredit cast upon the moral faculty on account 
of its seeming inconsistency and self-contradiction has 
been mainly urged against it by the Utilitarian. Uti- 
litarianism comprehends three species, of which one 
may be distinguished as sordid, another as historical, 
the third as disinterested. The first is that which 
denies the existence of disinterested - altruism ; the 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 375 

second, allowing disinterestedness, pretends that it is 
transmuted prudence ; the third allows the existence of 
congenital disinterestedness and differs from intuitionism 
in no important respect ; — Hume is its chief expositor. 
The intuitionist has no very grave cause of contro- 
versy with the historical utilitarian. He does not like 
the genesis which the latter ascribes to disinterested- 
ness ; but, seeing that the existence of the latter is 
conceded, can afford to overlook the disparagement. 
The historical utilitarian may be dismissed with the 
remark that, if he must needs have the sordid somehow 
connected with the origin of disinterestedness, why not 
as fosterer, rather than as embryo ? Against the sordid 
utilitarian the intuitionist has a good casus belli. It 
seems to me that I have sapped the speciousness which 
served as foundation for sordid utilitarianism, 1st, by 
my analysis of altruism into sordid and non-sordid, 
egotistic and non- egotistic, affectionate and super- 
affectionate altruism, enabling an appeal to the supreme 
court of common experience, 2nd, by displaying the 
constancy of moral intuition, the putative tergiversa- 
tions of which were certainly the great bulwark of the 
doctrine I have undermined. I have reduced the 
question at issue to one of fact, viz. Do we or do we 
not experience emotions of super-affectionate benevo- 
lence ? If we do, fact attests the existence of dis- 
interestedness. A sentiment of super-affectionate bene- 
volence excludes self-regard, and an act which it in- 
stigates or moves excludes self-regard. So long as no 
manifest difference breaks in our view the gradation 
from sordid to super-affectionate altruism, it is easy to 
believe that sordidness is commensurate with altruism. 
This seeming gradation my analysis has broken up, 
and no one endowed with super-affectionate benevolence 



376 THE ALTERNATIVE. book ni. 

who has considered it can acknowledge consanguinity 
between the behaviour of the good Samaritan and that 
of the slave-owner whose altruism has an eye on the 
market. Sordid utilitarianism is the offspring of able 
minds destitute either of benevolence or of super- 
affectionate benevolence. They undertook to explain 
altruism by what they found in themselves, and they 
saw in its variety mere variety of sordidness, as the 
colour-blind see in different colours mere variety of 
drab. 



CLXXVIII. 

1. Wisdom is heart-knowledge (§ xci. 2) determined by 
impwo-moral goodness, and combined with a knowledge 
of human nature that exempts the subject from im- 
posture. 

In the weak-minded and ignorant Eeverence and 
Benevolence make a sorry figure ; they constitute a 
pasturage for imposture. Christ refers to this fault in 
the parable of the "unjust steward," and commends 
the instructed and able sagacity on which Wisdom 
depends. 

In the " adolescent " state of Wisdom the heart- 
knowledge essential to it is intermittent : that of perfect 
Wisdom is the reverse. The species " intermittent 
knowledge" needs and in this connection deserves 
elucidation. To this end we may note that Delusion 
is discernment which completely deceives its subject, 
and Illusion is discernment that is only partially 
deceptive. Insane hallucination is an example of 
Delusion, discernment of the third dimension in pictures 
an example of Illusion. Now the " emotect " or dur- 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 377 

able part of the mind from which Emotion proceeds is 
a teeming source of delusion and illusion which in- 
volve either instinctive power or motive. For instance, 
anger commonly involves the delusion that the offender 
had option, that he chose to offend, that he is a culprit, 
that he deserves punishment ; and this delusion in- 
stigates retaliation. I say - commonly," for the great 
bulk of men, as I shall show in the next chapter, are 
puppets of unconscious force. Knowledge of this 
truth does not exempt from the delusion : it may show 
through anger of the milder degrees, and so substitute 
an illusive sentiment of the offender for the delusive 
one ; but an opposite knowledge leaps like lightning 
from the higher degrees of anger. To arrest the " in- 
termittency " of a species of heart-knowledge and make 
the latter a constant possession is one of the main ends 
of Christian conduct, — a discipline by the way as 
practicable for the peasant as for the philosopher. The 
causes of this " intermittency " are potent obstacles to 
growth in Wisdom, and chiefly as being obstacles to 
" detachment." How easy would " detachment " be to 
one enjoying a thorough and unintermittent heart- 
knowledge that men are, with rare exceptions, puppets 
of unconscious force ; for Ambition, the coxcombry that 
longs to figure before the World, must sicken in a 
heart possessed by that knowledge. Our liability to 
sane delusion points to our subjection to law and to 
the impossibility of becoming masters of ourselves 
except through art in the application of which we treat 
ourselves rather as things than persons. 

Wisdom involves a vigilance that is known to those 
who have tried to become perfect as "recollection." 
Let this vigilance be distinguished as Moral. Moral 
vigilance is a look-out for occasions of action in respect 



378 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

of which Instinct might steal a march upon Duty and 
Will It resembles Attention except as not involving 
effort or an appearance of effort. The brain keeps the 
soul vigilant without effort and for the most part with 
a pleasant feeling of self-possession. The vigilance 
tends to pass for a continuous action of Will : but it 
is not an act ; it is not a volition. 

2. Wisdom is the cardinal constituent of the Sum- 
mum Bonum. The other constituents are Generosity, 
Courage, Fortitude, and Circumstances that enable 
prudence and industry to exclude pain. Confining our 
view to nature, — excluding the supernatural and the 
aspirations which it evokes, — we can soberly imagine 
no human condition transcending as to dignity and 
happiness that of a society of perfectly wise men so 
equipped and circumstanced. Wisdom, Magnanimity, 
Health, and Beauty, constitute the perfect man, and the 
condition of a society of perfect men so prosperously 
circumstanced as to be able to exclude pain is the 
Summum Bonum. Though this happiness were un- 
attainable, it is of the first importance that it be 
well considered, — that it be regarded as determin- 
ing a direction in respect of which every advance is an 
enhancement of human nature, and every recession a 
victory of the Infernal in Nature. For it is necessary 
that the dignity of the humility of Wisdom be cordially 
known in order that Fierceness shall cease to make us 
enemies one of another : so long as fierceness, under 
the form of indignation, seems morally beautiful, so 
long we yield the devil the inch that enables him to 
take the ell. Consider the perfect man as member of 
an unwise society. Charity makes him invulnerable to 
insult and injury, — as unreachable by the missiles of 
wickedness as Jove by those of the Titans. He under- 



chap. iv. WISDOM. 379 

stands that in the intercourse of strength with in- 
firmity, strength owes all the submissive accommodation 
needful, without injustice to self or injury to public 
welfare, for the preservation of harmony and peace. 
In so far as his neighbours are qualified by moral 
goodness for companionship with the perfect, he is 
companionable to them, but otherwise his relation to 
them is that of the good physician to the insane 
patient. What good the circumstances commission 
him to do them he does with all his heart; what 
surgery they demand he executes with a hand made 
firm by charity as well as courage. Parents, brothers, 
sisters, children, friends, he loves abundantly. Beauty, 
humour, wit, delight him. He rejoices in the possession 
and increase of Knowledge. I refer to these things 
because the militant and hospital work of Christianity 
have begotten a belief that the mood of this work is 
essential to Wisdom, — that Wisdom prohibits Pleasure. 
" Man's inhumanity to man " is the alternative of 
Wisdom. Our propensities and circumstances make 
it the interest of every man to prey upon his neigh- 
bour. As though, like the Siamese twins, we were 
organically tied to one another, we are held by certain 
propensities in a vicinity and intercourse that enables 
us to envenom each other's life. It has been well said 
that War is the natural state of man ; the war to 
which Hobbes referred, that of tribe upon tribe, of 
nation against nation, may be said to be almost 
innocuous compared with the unremitting war of 
neighbour upon neighbour. The predatory scheme to 
which aU life conforms shows rife in the nature and 
history of man. Devoid of Wisdom the species preys 
upon itself,— is self-torturing, and incapable of its 
own distress. Philosophers have undertaken to make 



&80 THE ALTERNATIVE. book in. 

men wise by exhibiting to prudence the advantage 
which the race would derive from wisdom, and by 
showing the pulchro-moral faculty the beauty of wisdom. 
But there exists no prudential faculty that is concerned 
about the advantage of the race, and in the bulk of men 
occasions of self-denial put the pulchro- moral faculty 
in abeyance. It is strong as censor of the conduct of 
others and as an ally of self-love, but barren of self- 
denying motive. Prudence is concerned about the 
advantage of its subject, not about that of the race. 
What should the prudence of Tom, Dick, or Harry 
reply to a challenge to incur life-long pain for the sake 
of a possible resulting happiness to the race, to ensue 
in two or three thousand years if the race last so long ? 
For aught that experience and inference make known, 
there may be an impassable gulf between man and 
wisdom ; for aught they make known, resources in the 
womb of nature of which she has never yet given a 
hint might impart to the next or any future generation 
native conditions of a perfect wisdom needing for its 
development no more experience than that of child- 
hood ; but, limiting our view to probability discernible 
by legitimate induction, human nature affords no 
means for the acquisition of wisdom, if those of which 
Christ availed be inefficient 

3. The idea of goodness for God's sake is inconsist- 
ent. Bad men who are godly may behave for God's 
sake as though they were good, but the behaviour 
evinces godliness, not goodness. One who conducts 
himself perfectly for God's sake resembles a beautiful 
statue in clay. But it is probable that the good be- 
haviour for God's sake possesses a transmuting virtue 
capable of converting the atoms of the clay into atoms 



chap. iv. WISDOM;. 381 

of Parian marble. If Christ's enterprise succeed, such 
a transmutation will be accomplished in man ; — the 
tissue of godliness, by a kind of Talicotian transfer, will 
be converted into the tissue of Wisdom. 

4. If the reader have experienced the Christian 
spirit it should be obvious to him that, apart from the 
worship and the mysticism, Wisdom and the Christian 
Spirit are identical. Wisdom is the Christian Spirit 
self- apprehended as a plain, homely, sober part of 
Nature, — a type disappointing to hearts accustomed to 
the exaltations and intensities of supernaturalism. Can 
it survive godliness ? Science is washing away from 
its roots the soil of godliness : can it survive ? Experi- 
ence warrants hope and faith that it can. But is there 
any soil in which the seed of Wisdom could have ger- 
minated save that in which Christ planted it — the soil 
of godliness ? Sanctity — the quality in virtue of which 
sacredness is a paramount power — is essential to Wis- 
dom. Could the other conditions of sanctity have 
found their complement in a sacredness that does not 
depend on actual moral worth — the sacredness of mere 
humanity, — if Eeverence had not first climbed toward 
Heaven upon a symbol of the sacredness of a Creator 
and Providence ? Surely not. People of interior life 
know that companionable sympathy with those who 
grovel in the common spontaneity is incompatible with 
growth in Wisdom. " I never go amongst men," says 
the author of the Imitation, " but I return less a man." 
Unactuated by the devotion of godliness, who could 
incur the dreariness of the needful detachment? If 
conduct conformable to a dominant love of the neigh- 
bour, including painful abstinence from the satisfaction 
of what Nature gives as being righteous indignation, 



382 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

had not been exacted of godliness, how could vindictive- 
ness have been rooted out of the heart? Now that 
experience has made known to a considerable part of 
mankind the aptitude of the Christian Spirit for the 
conduct of life, so as to interest prudence and common 
sense in the pursuit of holiness, and that knowledge of 
the organic necessity which mainly determines the 
behaviour of the unwise exhibits a natural reason of 
charity, a raft is provided on which the Christian Spirit 
may save itself when the ark of godliness founders ; 
but human nature gives no ground for the supposition 
that, without godliness, the Christian Spirit could have 
embodied itself in human experience. 



CHAPTER V. 

MAN PUPPET, DUPE, AND VICTIM OF UNCONSCIOUS 

FORCE. 

CLXXIX, 

Since Consciousness is an effect of unconscious mole- 
cular change, and a sine qua non of the mental event 
known as Volition, is not volition an effect of uncon- 
scious molecular change ? No. The change supplies 
an indispensable condition of, but does not cause, 
volition. It makes the mind conscious and possesses it 
with a practical alternative, but it does not cause the 
preference which the alternative occasions. The prefer- 
ence is an uncaused act of the conscious mind. Is this 
susceptible of proof? It can no more be proved than 
a deliverance of experience can be proved, or an axiom, 
or any datum whatever, e.g. the existence of the Not- 
Self : it can no more be proved than the data presup- 
posed by proof. The existence of Matter — the existence 
of the molecules supposed by molecular change, which 
Materialism will have to . be the cause of volition, — is 
not susceptible of proo£ Yet one of the most eminent 
scientific authorities of the day is for reducing us all to 
automata, — denying a dynamic bearing of consciousness 
on human behaviour, — because the bearing is not sus- 



384 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

ceptible of proof, and because apart of human behaviour 
is automatic. 1 

1 I refer to the article in the Fortnightly Review of November 1874, 
entitled, The Hypothesis that Animals are Automata. "It seems to 
me," writes the author of this article, "that in men, as in brutes, 
there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change 
in the motions of the matter of the organism." . . . "If these pro- 
positions are well based it follows that ... we are conscious auto- 
mata." One of the propositions is that a part of human behaviour is 
automatic, the other, that "there is no proof that any state of con- 
sciousness is the cause of change in the motions of the matter of the 
organism. " By this kind of argument it may be proved that all things 
are chimeras, — that there is no reality — as follows ; — Certain things, 
e.g. the objects of dreams, are chimeras, and there is no proof that any 
thing is real ; therefore all things are chimeras. In so far as the argu- 
ment derives its conclusion from the second proposition it employs a 
kind of fallacy that was notorious when Logic was in vogue, namely, 
Affirmative conclusion from negative premiss. If it be allowed that 
sophism may be inadvertent, it is sophistical, as implying that nothing 
is credible, or at least above suspicion, but what is susceptible of proof; 
for instance, that the truth of the thesis, Things equal to the same are 
equal to one another, which is not susceptible of proof, is not above 
suspicion. Stilling his logical conscience with such a counterfeit of 
argument, Professor Huxley hurls his authority against the foundation 
of human dignity and morality. His exasperation against the " drum 
ecclesiastic" has to apologise for more than one error in this article. 
He tells us that molecular change is the cause of all consciousness, and 
then implies that molecular change is change of consciousness ; conse- 
quently that every consciousness is the effect of a change of conscious- 
ness ! "I am incapable," he says, "of conceiving the existence of 
matter if there is no mind in which that existence is pictured, " which 
is as much as to say that matter is a mental image ; not a remote 
object symbolised by a mental image, but the image or immediate 
object itself. Now, immediate objects are modifications of conscious- 
ness, and, if matter be a species of immediate object, it is a modifica- 
tion of consciousness, its molecules are modifications of consciousness, 
and molecular change is change of consciousness. Therefore, according 
to Professor Huxley, every consciousness is caused by a change of 
consciousness ! According to this self-contradictory doctrine conscious- 
ness is the basis of all entity save time and space, and, nevertheless, 
has no more to do with human behaviour than the steam-whistle with 
the motion of the locomotive ! The article has a subtler fallacy in the 
doctrine that Freedom is privation of extrinsic hindrance, — that the 



chap, v. FOOLS OF NATURE. 385 



CLXXX. 

But all other mental event either is, or is the effect 
-of, cerebration. The preference involved in instinctive 
selection, (wherein, instead of making up our minds, 
our minds are made up for us), — this and all indeli- 
berate intentions and acts are effects of cerebration; 
that is, they are effects of an unconscious force : and, 
since Volition is extremely rare, it appears that nearly 
the whole of the practical life of men is and has ever 
been transacted by an unconscious force, — that in 
respect of it they are, have been, and strongly tend to 
be, Impersonal agents ; for a conscious thing worked 
by an unconscious force does not correspond to the 
idea of a personal agent Personal agency is agency 
that consists in or is consequent to volition or is per- 
mitted by will. The behaviour of the somnambulist, 
whether he be or be not conscious of it, as not being 
volition nor consequent to volition nor permitted by 
will, is not personal agency. In respect of it he is an 
impersonal thing, as indeed a man is in respect of his 
daily motion around the centre of the earth, or of the 
circulation of his blood. When cerebration is the 
servant of volition, the behaviour it causes is personal 
agency. One may choose to behave in a given way 
on certain occasions, and cerebration, obedient to the 
volition, may, without any fresh intervention of will, 

freedom of the Will does not differ from that of water 'to flow if nothing 
extrinsic prevent. Freedom of the Will is privation, not of extrinsic 
but of intrinsic hindrance, or that which would exclude choice if every 
preference were an effect, — if the necessity involved in causation deter- 
mined what is known as Volition. 

2 c 



*\ 



386 THE ALTERNATIVE. book m. 

cause the purposed behaviour. Such behaviour, 
although the immediate effect of an unconscious cause, 
as being the remote effect of a volition, is personal. 
But behaviour caused by cerebration, and not volun- 
tarily purposed, is impersonal. The unconscious force 
by which man is for the most part worked, besides 
excluding personality, dupes its subject. When, in 
spite of our utmost effort to release ourselves, we are 
held in a painful, sometimes a maddening, quasi- 
attention, we are duped by cerebration. When, in 
daily intercourse, prudence, craft, or wisdom sets us 
upon stemming some mental habit, and the current 
sweeps us back, making our behaviour the opposite of 
what we are striving to make it, we are dupfed by 
cerebration. In ambush behind the urgent conscious- 
ness which, in such cases, we take to be the primum, 
mobile of our misbehaviour, operates its mental cause, 
an unconscious force. This kind of delusion has so 
far prevailed over Theology that theologians ascribed 
to voluntary power even the acts of intentional instinct 
which defeat the deliberate purpose and effort of the 
human agent, to whom they imputed as many wills as 
he has propensities. St Paul, with less obvious in- 
consistency, named the instinct, qud source of moral 
evil, sin. Considering the immensity and intensity of 
the misery from which the human race would be 
rescued by the achievement of wisdom, or even by 
universal conduct according to wisdom, it appears that 
we are victims as well as dupes of the unconscious 
force that mainly generates human behaviour. The 
few who, adopting an ideal of human character opposed 
to the type constituted by their propensities, have 
resolved at any cost of self-denial to live accordingly, 
and do actually compel the practical life to conform to 



chap. v. FOOLS OF NATURE. 387 

their purpose, — in these the conscious mind is indeed 
the master of that life. In respect of it they are 
personal agents. Nor does there seem to be any other 
issue from the abjectness of the opposite condition. 
To pass from the state of a conscious manikin, we 
must incur the self-denial involved in voluntary con- 
duct, — in regular volition determinative of behaviour 
according to Wisdom. 



THE END. 



Printed by R. & R. Clark, Edinburgh. 



* 

i 



4 



.j 



• 



,. 



Bedford Street, Covent Garden, London, 

September, 1 88 1. 



MaCMILLAN <5r- Co.'S CATALOGUE of WORKS 

in Mathematics and Physical Science; 
including Pure and Applied Mathe- 
matics; Physics, Astronomy, Geology, 
Chemistry, Zoology, Botany; and of 
Works in Mental and Moral Philosophy 
and Allied Subjects. 



MATHEMATICS. 

Airy. — Works by Sir G. B. Airy, K.C.B., Astronomer Royal :— 
ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL 
EQUATIONS. Designed for the Use of Students in the Univer- 
sities. With Diagrams. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 5*. 6d. 

ON THE ALGEBRAICAL AND NUMERICAL THEORY OF 
ERRORS OF OBSERVATIONS AND THE COMBINA- 
TION OF OBSERVATIONS. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 
6s. 6d. 

UNDULATORY THEORY OF OPTICS. Designed for the Use of 
Students in the University. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d. 

ON SOUND AND ATMOSPHERIC VIBRATIONS. With 
the Mathematical Elements of Music. Designed for the Use of 
Students of the University. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. 
Crown 8vo. gs. 

A TREATISE ON MAGNETISM. Designed for the Use of 
Sludents in the University. Crown 8vo. 9J. 6d. 

Alexander.— ELEMENTARY APPLIED MECHANICS. By 
Thomas Alexander, C.E., Professor of Civil Engineering in the 
Imperial College of Engineering, Tokei, Japan. Crown 8vo. 4*. 6d. 

5,000.9.81.] A 



SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Ball (R. S., A.M.). — experimental mechanics, a 

Course of Lectures delivered at t^e Royal College of Science for 
Ireland. By Robert Stawell Ball, A.M., Professor of Applied 
Mathematics and Mechanics in the Royal College of Science for 
Ireland (Science and Art Department). Cheaper Issue. Royal 
8vo. i or. 6d. 

Bayma.— THE ELEMENTS OF MOLECULAR MECHA- 
NICS. By Joseph Bayma, S.J., Professor of Philosophy, 
Stonyhurst College. Demy 8vo. ios. 6d. 

Boole. — Works by G. Boole, D.C.L, F.R.S., Professor of 

Mathematics in the Queen's University, Ireland : — 

A TREATISE ON DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS. Third 
Edition. Edited by I. Todhunter. Crown 8vo. 14*. 

A TREATISE ON DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS. Supple- 
mentary Volume. Edited by I. Todhunter. Crown 8vo. 
8i". 6d. 

THE CALCULUS OF FINITE DIFFERENCES. Third Edi- 
tion. Edited by J. F. Moulton, late Fellow of Christ's College, 
Cambridge. Crown 8vo. ior. 6d. 

Chalmers.— GRAPHICAL DETERMINATION OF FORCES 
IN ENGINEERING STRUCTURES. By James B. Chal- 
mers, C.E. With Illustrations. 8vo. 24s. 

Cheyne. — AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE 
PLANETARY THEORY. With a Collection of Problems. 
By C. H. H. Cheyne, M.A., F.R.A.S. Second Edition. Crown 
8vo. 6s. 6d. 

Clausius. — THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF HEAT. By 
R. Clausius. Translated by Walter R. Browne, M.A., 
late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo. ioj. 6d. 

Clifford. — THE ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC. An Introduction 
to the study of Motion and Rest in Solid and Fluid Bodies. By 
W. K. Clifford, F.R.S., Professor of Applied Mathematics and 
Mechanics at University College, London. Part I. — Kinematic. 
Crown 8vo. • 7s. 6d. 

dimming.— AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF 
ELECTRICITY. With numerous Examples. By LiNN.cus 
Cumming, M. A., Assistant Master at Rugby School. Crown 8vo. 
8j. 6d. 

CuthbertSOn.— EUCLIDIAN GEOMETRY By F. Cuth- 
bertson, M.A., Head Mathematical Master of the City of London 
School. 'Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. 



MATHEMATICS. 



Everett. — UNITS AND PHYSICAL CONSTANTS. By J. 
D. Everett, M.A., D.C.L., F.R.S., Professor of Natural 
Philosophy, Queen's College, Belfast. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4?. 6d. 

Ferrers.— Works by the Rev. N.M.Ferrers, M.A.,F.R.S., Master 
and Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge : — 

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON TRILINEAR CO-ORDI- 
NATES, the Method of Reciprocal Polars, and the Theory of 
Projectors. Third Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d. 

SPHERICAL HARMONICS AND SUBJECTS CONNECTED 
WITH THEM. Crown 8vo. ys. 6d. 

Frost. — Works by Percival Frost, M.A., late Fellow of St. 
John's College, Mathematical Lecturer of King'sColl. Cambridge: — 

THE FIRST THREE SECTIONS OF NEWTON'S PRIN- 
CIPIA. With Notes and Illustrations. Also a Collection of 
Problems, principally intended as Examples of Newton's Methods. 
Third Edition. 8vo. 12s. 

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON CURVE TRACING. 
8vo. 1 2 s. 

SOLID GEOMETRY. Being a New Edition, revised and enlarged, 
of the Treatise by Frost and Wolstenholme. Vol. I. 8vo. 16s. 

Godfray. — Works by Hugh Godfray, M.A., Mathematical 
Lecturer at Pembroke College, Cambridge : — 

A TREATISE ON ASTRONOMY, for the Use of Colleges and 
Schools. 8vo. 1 2 s. 6d. 

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE LUNAR 
THEORY, with a Brief Sketch of the Problem up to the time of 
Newton. Second Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. 5-r. 6d. 

Green (George).— mathematical papers of the 

LATE GEORGE GREEN, Fellow of Gonville and Caius 
College, Cambridge. Edited by N. M. Ferrers, M.A., Fellow 
and Master of Gonville and Caius College. 8vo. 15;. 

Hemming. — an elementary treatise on the 

DIFFERENTIAL AND INTEGRAL CALCULUS. For the 
Use of Colleges and Schools. By G. W. Hemming, M.A., 
Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge. Second Edition, with 
Corrections and Additions. 8vo. 9*. 

A 2 



SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Jackson.— GEOMETRICAL CONIC SECTIONS. An Ele- 
mentary Treatise in which the Conic Sections are defined as the 
Plane Sections of a Cone, and treated by the Method of Projections. 
By T. Stuart Jackson, M.A., late Fellow of Gonville and Caius 
College. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

Kelland and Tait.— an introduction to quater- 
nions. With numerous Examples. By P. Kelland, M.A., 
F.R.S., and P. G. Tait, M.A., Professors in the department of 
Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d. 

Kempe.— HOW TO DRAW A STRAIGHT LINE. A Lecture 
on Linkages. By A. B. Kempe, B. A. Illustrated. Crown 8vo. \s.6d. 

[Nature Series. 

Mcrriman.— ELEMENTS OF THE METHOD OF LEAST 
SQUARES. By Mansfield Merriman, Professor of Civil and 
Mechanical Engineering, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Penn., 
U.S.A. Crown 8vo. *]s. 6d. 

Morgan.— A COLLECTION OF PROBLEMS AND EXAM- 
PLES IN MATHEMATICS. With Answers. By H. A. 
Morgan, M.A., Sadlerian and Mathematical Lecturer of Jesus 
College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo. dr. 6d. 

Newton's Principia. — 4to. 31 s. 6d. 

It is a sufficient guarantee of the reliability of this complete edition of 
Newton's Principia that it has been printed for and utu/er the care 
of Professor Sir William Thomson and Professor Blackburn, 0/ 
Glasgow University. 

Parkinson. — Works by S. Parkinson, D.D., F.R.S., Fellow 
and Tutor of St. John's College, Cambridge. 

A TREATISE ON OPTICS. Third Edition, revised and en- 
larged. Crown 8vo. cloth, ioj. 6d. 

A TREATISE ON ELEMENTARY MECHANICS. For the 
Use of the Junior Classes at the University and the Higher 
Classes in Schools. With a Colkc.ion of Examples. Sixth 
Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. 9$. 6a\ 

Phear. — ELEMENTARY HYDROSTATICS. With Numerous 
Examples. By J. B. Phear, M.A., Fellow and late Assistant Tutor 
of Clare Coll. Cambridge. Fourth Edition. Cr. 8vo. cloth. $s. 6d. 

Pirie.— LESSONS ON RIGID DYNAMICS. By the Rev. G. 
Pirie, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Cambridge. 
Crown 8vo. 6s. 

Puckle.— AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON CONIC SEC- 
TIONS AND ALGEBRAIC GEOMETRY. With numerous 
Examples and Hints for their Solution. By G. Hale PUCKLE, 
M.A. Fourth Edition, enlarged. Crown 8vo. *]s. 6d. 



MATHEMATICS. 



Rayleigh.— THE THEORY OF SOUND. By Lord Rayleigii, 
F.R.S., formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. 
Vol. 1. I2J. 6d. ; Vol. II. 12s. 6d. [Vol. III. in preparation, 

Reuleaux. — THE KINEMATICS OF MACHINERY. Out- 
lines of a 'Theory of Machines. By Professor F. Reuleaux. 
Translated and edited by A. B. W. Kennedy, C.E , Professor of 
Civil and Mechanical Engineering, University College, London. 
With 450 Illustrations. Royal 8vo. 20J. 

Routh. — Works by Edward John Routh, M.A., F.R.S., late 
Fellow and Assistant Tutor of St. Peter's College, Cambridge ; 
Examiner in the University of London : — 

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS OF 
THE SYSTEM OF RIGID BODIES. With numerous 
Examples. Third Edition, enlarged. 8vo. 2U. 

STABILITY OF A GIVEN STATE OF MOTION, PARTI- 
CULARLY STEADY MOTION. The Adams' Prize Essay for 
1877. 8vo. &f. 6//. 

Tait and Steele.— dynamics of a particle. With 

numerous Examples. By Professor Tait and Mr. Steele. Fourth 
Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. \2s, 

Thomson.— PAPERS ON ELECTROSTATICS AND MAG- 
NETISM. By Professor Sir William Thomson, F.R.S. 
8vo. iSs. 

Todhunter. — Works by I. Todhunter, M.A., F.R.S., of 
St. John's College, Cambridge : — 

"Mr. Todhunter is chiefly known to students of mathematics as the 
author oj a series of admirable mathematical text-books, which 
possess the rare qualities of b*in\> clear in style and absolutely free 
from mistakes, typographical or 01 her " — Saturday Review. 

A TREATISE ON SPHERICAL TRIGONOMETRY. New 
Edition, enlarged. Crown 8vo. 41. 6d. 

PLANE CO-ORDINATE GEOMETRY, as applied to the Straight 
Line and the Conic Sections. With numerous Examples. New 
Edition. Crown 8vo. Js. 6d. 

A TREATISE ON THE DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS. 
With numerous Examples. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d, 

A TREATISE ON THE INTEGRAL CALCULUS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS. With numerous Examples. New Edition, 
revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo. ioj. 6d. 




SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Todhunter — continued. 
EXAMPLES OF ANALYTICAL GEOMETRY OF THREE 
DIMENSIONS. New Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. cloth. 4J. 

A TREATISE ON ANALYTICAL STATICS. With numerous 
Examples. New Edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo. 
cloth. 1 a;. 6d. 

A HISTORY OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF 
PROBABILITY, from the Time of Pascal to that of Laplace. 
8vo. 1 8 j. 

RESEARCHES IN THE CALCULUS OF VARIATIONS, 
Principally on the Theory of Discontinuous Solutions : An Essay 
to which the Adams' Prize was awarded in the University of 
Cambridge in 1871. 8vo. 6s. 

A HISTORY OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF 
ATTRACTION, and the Figure of the Earth, from the time of 
Newton to that of Laplace. Two vols. 8vo. 24J. 

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON LAPLACE'S, LAME'S, 
AND BESSEL'S FUNCTIONS. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. 

Wilson (W. P.).— A TREATISE ON DYNAMICS. By 
W. P. Wilson, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, 
and Professor of Mathematics in Queen's College, Belfast. 8vo. 
gs. 6d. 

Wolstenholme. — MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS, on Sub- 
jects included in the First and Second Divisions of the Schedule 
of Subjects for the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos Examination. 
Devised and arranged by Joseph Wolstenholme, late Fellow 
of Christ's College, sometime Fellow of St. John's College, and 
Professor of Mathematics in the Royal Indian Engineering College. 
New Edition, greatly enlarged. 8vo. i&r. 

Young.— SIMPLE PRACTICAL METHODS OF CALCU- 
LATING STRAINS ON GIRDERS, ARCHES, AND 
TRUSSES. With a Supplementary Essay on Economy in suspen- 
sion Bridges. By E. W. Young, Associate of King's College, 
London, and Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers. 8vo- 
7s. 6d. 




* k 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 

Airy (G. B.).— POPULAR ASTRONOMY. With Illustrations. 
By Sir G. B. Airy, K.C.B., Astronomer Royal. New Edition, 
fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. . 

Balfour.— A TREATISE ON COMPARATIVE EMBRY- 
OLOGY. By F. M. Balfour, M.A., F.R.S., Fellow and 
Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. With Illustrations. In 
Two Volumes. 8\o. VoL I. i&r. VoL II. au. 

Bastian. — Works by H. Charlton Bastian, M.D., F.R.S., 
Professor of Pathological Anatomy in University College, London, 
&c. : — 

THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE : Being some Account of the Nature, 
Modes of Origin, and Transformations of Lower Organisms. In 
Two Volumes. With upwards of ioo Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 2&r. 

EVOLUTION AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE. Crown 8vo. 
6s. 6d. 

Bettany.— FIRST LESSONS IN PRACTICAL BOTANY. 
By G. T. Bettany, M.A., B.Sc, F.R.S., Lecturer on Botany 
in Guy's Hospital Medical School. i8mo. is. 

Blake.— ASTRONOMICAL MYTHS. Based on Flammnrion's 
"The Heavens." By John F. Blake. With numerous Illustra- 
tions. Crown 8vo. gs. 

Blanford (H. F.).— RUDIMENTS OF PHYSICAL GEO- 
GRAPHY FOR THE USE OF INDIAN SCHOOLS. By 
H. F. Blanford, P'.G.S. With numerous Illustrations and 
Glossary of Technical Terms employed. New Edition. Globe 
8vo. 2J. 6d. 

Blanford (W. T.).— GEOLOGY AND ZOOLOGY OF 
ABYSSINIA. By W. T. Blanford. 8vo. 2U. 

Brodie. — IDEAL CHEMISTRY. A LECTURE. By Sir B. 
C. Brodie, Bart., D.C.L., F.R.S., Professor of Chemistry in 
the University of Oxford. Crown 8vo. 2s. 

Brunton. — Works by T. Lauder Brunton, M.D., F.R.C P., 
F.R.S., Assistant Physician and Lecturer on Materia Medica and 
Therapeutics at St. Bartholomew's Hospital. 

PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS ; or Medicine last 
and Present. The Goulstonian Lectures delivered before the 
Royal College of Physicians in 1871. Crown 8vo. 6s. 

THE BIBLE AND SCIENCE. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 
ior. 6d. 



8 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Bosanquet— an elementa ry treatise on musical 

INTERVALS AND TEMPERAMENT. Wi# an Account of 
an Enharmonic Harmonium exhibited in the Loan Collection of 
Scientific Instruments, South Kensington, 1876 ; also of an Enhar- 
monic Organ exhibited to the Musical Association of London, 
May, 1875. By R. H. Bosanquet, Fellow of St John's College, 
Oxford. 8vo. dr. 

Challenger. — Report on the Scientific Results on the Voyage of 
H.M.S. " Challenger," during the Years 1873.76. Under the 
command of Captain Sir Gkorgk Nares, R.N., F.R. S. f ar.d 
Captain Frank Turlk Thomson, R.N. Prepared under the 
Superintendence of Sir C. Wyville Thomson, Knt, F.R.S., &c. 
Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Edin- 
burgh ; Director of the Civilian Scientific Staff on board. With 
Illustrations. Published by order of Her Majesty's Government 

Volume I. Zoology. Royal. 37*. 6Y. Or, 

Part I. Report on the Brachiopoda, 2s. 6d. 

II. Report on the Pennatulida, 41. 

III. Report on the Ostracoda, 15*. 

IV. Report on the Bones of Cetacea, 2s. 

V. The Development of the Green Turtle, 4.*. 6//. 
VI. Report on the Shore Hshes, ioj. 

Volume IL Zoology. Royal. $os. Or, 
Part VII. Report on the Corals. 15*. 
VIII. Report on the Birds. 35*. 

Cleland. — evolution, expression and sensation, 

CELL LIFE AND PATHOLOGY. By John Cleland, M.D., 
F.R.S., Professor of Anatomy in the University of Glasgow. 
Crown 8vo. 5-r. 

Clifford.— SEEING AND THINKING. By the late Professor W. 
K. Clifford, F.R. S. With Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 3$ . 6d. 

[Nature Series. 

Coal : ITS HISTORY AND ITS USES. By Professors Green, 
Miall, Thorpe, RIjcker, and Marshall, of the Yorkshire 
College, Leeds. With Illustrations. 8vo. izs. 6d. 

Cooke (Josiah P., Jun.).— first principles of 

CHEMICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Josiah P. Cooke, Tun., 
Ervine Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy in Harvard College. 
Third Edition, revised and corrected. Crown 8vo. 12s. 

Cooke (M. C).— HANDBOOK OF BRTTTK" FUNGI, 
with full descriptions of all the Species, and Illustrations of the 
Genera. By M. C. Cooke, M.A. Two vols, crown 8vo. 24s. 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 



Crossley.— HANDBOOK OF DOUBLE STARS, WITH A 
CATALOGUE OF 1,200 DOUBLE STARS AND EXTEN- 
SIVE LISTS OF MEASURES FOR THE USE OF AMA- 
TEURS. By E. Crossley, F.R.A.S., T. Gledhill, F.R. A.S., 
and J. M. Wilson, F.R.A.S. With Illustrations. 8vo. 21s. 

CORRECTIONS TO THE HANDBOOK OF DOUBLE 
STARS. 8vo. is. 

Dawkins. — Works by W. Boyd Dawkins, F.R.S., &c, Pro- 
fessor of Geology and Palaeontology at Owens College, Manchester. 

CAVE-HUNTING : Researches on the Evidence of Caves respect- 
ing the Early Inhabitants of Europe. With Coloured Plate and 
Woodcuts. 8vo. 21s. 

EARLY MAN IN BRITAIN, AND HIS PLACE IN THE 
TERTIARY PERIOD. With Illustrations. 8vo. 25*. 

Dawson (J. W.).— ACADIAN GEOLOGY. The Geologic 
Structure, Organic Remains, and Mineral Resources of Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. By John 
William Dawson, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., F.G.S., Principal and 
Vice-Chancellor of M'Gill College and University, Montreal, &c. 
With a Geological Map and numerous Illustrations. 1 hird Edition, 
with Supplement 8vo. 21s. Supplement, separately, 2s. 6d. 

Fiske.— DARWINISM; AND OTHER ESSAYS. By John 
Fiske, M.A., LL.D., formerly Lecturer on Philosophy in Harvard 
University. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d. 

Fleischer.— A SYSTEM OF VOLUMETRIC ANALYSIS. 
By Dr. E. Fleischer. Translated from the Second German 
Edition by M. M. Pattison Muir, F.R.S.E., with Notes and 
Additions. Illustrated. Crown 8vo. Js. Cd. 

Flower. — FASHION IN DEFORMITY, as Illustrated in the 
Customs of Barbarous and Civilized Races By William Henry 
Flower, LL.D., M.D., F.R.S., &c, Hunterian Professor of 
Comparative Anatomy, and Conservator of the Museum of the 
Royal College of Surgeons of England. With .numerous Illus- 
trations. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. [Nature Series. 

Fluckiger and Hanbury.— PHARMACOGRAPHIA. A 

History of the Principal Drugs of Vegetable Origin met with In 
Great Britain and India. By F. A. FLttCKlGER, M.D., and 
D. Hanbury, F.R.S. Second Ldition, revised. 8vo. 21 s. 

Forbes.— THE TRANSIT OF VENUS. By George Forbes, 

B. A., Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Andersonian Univer* 

sity of Glascow. With numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 3*. Qa\ 

J [Nature Series. 




io SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Foster.— A 1 EXT-BOOK OF PHYSIOLOGY. By Michael 
Fostff, M.D., F.R.S., Praelector in Physiology, and Fellow of 
Trinity College, Cambridge. W ith Illustrations. Third Edition, 
revised. 8vo. 21s. 

Foster and Balfour. — elements of embryology. 

By Michael Foster, M.D., F.R.S., andF. M. Balfour, M.A., 
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. With numerous Illustra- 
tions. Part I. Crown 8vo. 7-r. 6d. 

Galloway.— THE STEAM ENGINE AND ITS INVEN- 
TORS. A Historical Sketch. By Robert L. Galloway, 
Mining Engineer. With numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 
ioj. 6d. 

Galton. — Works by Francis Galton, F.R.S. :— 

METEOROGRAPHICA, or Methods of Mapping the Weather 
Illustrated by upwards of 600 Printed LithographicDiagrams. 4*0. gs. 

HEREDITARY GENIUS : An Inquiry into its Laws and Con- 
sequences. Demy 8vo. 12s. 
The Times calls it " a most able and most interesting book" 

ENGLISH MEN OF SCIENCE; THEIR NATURE AND 
NURTURE. 8vo. 8r. 6d. 
" The book is certainly one of very great interest" — Nature. 

Gamgee.— a text-book of the physiological 

CHEMISTRY OF THE ANIMAL BODY. By Arthur 
Gamgee, M.D., F.R.S., Professor of Physiology in Owens College, 
Manchester. With Illustrations. In Two Vols. Medium 8vo. 
Vol. I. i8j. [Vol. II in the Press. 

Geikie. — Works by Archibald Geikie, LL.D., F.R.S., 
Murchison Professor of Geology and Mineralogy at Edinburgh : — 

ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY. 
With numerous Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. Questions, is. 6d. 

OUTLINES OF FIELD GEOLOGY. With Illustrations. Crown 
8vo. 3-f. 6d. 

PRIMER OF GEOLOGY. Illustrated. i8mo. is. 

PRIMER OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY. Illustrated. i8mo. is. 

TEXT-BOOK OF GEOLOGY. 8vo. [Immediately. 




PHYSICAL SCIENCE. u 



Gray.— STRUCTURAL BOTANY, OR ORGANOGRAPHY 
ON THE BASIS OF MORPHOLOGY. To which are added 
the principles of Taxonomy and Phytography, and a Glossary of 
Botanical Terms. By Asa Gray, LL.D , Fisher Professor of 
* Natural History (Botany) in Harvard University. With numerous 
Illustrations. 8vo. ior. 6d. 



Green.— A SHORT GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH 
ISLANDS. By John Richard Green and Alice Stopford 
GREEN. "With Maps. Fcap. 8vo. 3*. 6d. 

The Times says: — " The method of the work, so far as real in- 
struction is concerned, is nearly all that could be desired. . . . 
Its gnat merit, in addition to its scientific arrangement and the 
attractive style so familiar to the readers of Greens ' Short Histtny ' 
is that the facts are so presented as to compel the careful student to 
think for himself .... The work may be read with pleasw e 
and profit by anyone ; we trust that it will gradually find its way 
into the higher forms of our schools. With thisr. text-book as his 
guide, an intelligent teacher might make geography what it really 
is — one of the most interesting and widely -instructive studies" 



Grove.— A DICTOINARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 
(a.d. 1450 — 188 1 ). By Eminent Writers, English and Foreign. 
With Illustrations. Edited by George Grove, D.C.L. In 
3 vol?., 8vo. Parts I. to XIV. 3*. 6d. each. Vols. I. and II. 
21;. each. Vol. I. A to IMPROMPTU. Vol. II. IMPROPERI A 
to PLAIN SONG. 

Guillemin. — THE FORCES OF NATURE: A Popular Intro- 
duction to the Study of Physical Phenomena. By Ame*i>£e 
Guillemin. Translated from the French by Mrs. Norman 
Lockyer ; and Edited, with Additions and Notes, by J. Norman 
Lockyer, F.R.S. Illustrated by Coloured Plates, and 455 Wood- 
cuts. Third and cheaper Edition. Royal 8vo. 21s. 

*' Altogether, the work may be said to have no parallel, either in 
point of fulness or attraction, as a popular manual of physical 
science" — Saturday Review. 

THE APPLICATIONS OF PHYSICAL FORCES. By A. 
Guillemin. Translated from the French by Mrs. Lockyer, and 
Edited with Notes and Additions by J. N. Lockyer, F.R.S. 
With Coloured Plates and numerous Illustrations. New and 
Cheaper Edition. Imperial 8vo. cloth, extra gilt 21 j. 




12 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

" A book which we can heartily recommend, both on account of the 
w ; dth and soundness of its contents, and also because of the excel' 
lence of its print, its illustrations, and external appearance.*' — 
Westminster Review. 

Hanbury. — SCIENCE PAPERS : chiefly Pharmacological and 
Botanical. By Daniel Hanbury, F.R.S. Edited, with 
Memoir, by J. I NCR, F.L.S., and Portrait engraved by C. H. 
Jeens. 8vo. 14*. 

Henslow.— THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION OF LIVING 
THINGS, and Application of the Principles of Evolution to 
Religion considered as Illustrative of the Wisdom and Benefi- 
cence of the Almighty. By the Rev. George Henslow, 
M.A., F.L.S. Crown 8vo. dr. 

Hooker. — Works by Sir J. D. Hooker, K.C.S.I., C.B., 
F.R.S., M.D., D.C.L. :— 

THE STUDENTS FLORA OF THE BRITISH ISLANDS. 

Second Edition, revised and improved. Globe 8vo. ioj. 6d. 

" Certainly the fullest and most accurate manual of the kind that 
has yet appeared. Dr. Hooker has shown his characteristic industry 
and ability in the care and skill which he has thrown into the 
characters of the plants. These are to a great extent original, and 
are really admirable for their combination of clearness, brevity, 
and completeness." — Pall Mall Gazette. 

PRIMER OF BOTANY. With Illustrations. i8mo. ix. New 
Edition, revised and corrected. 

Hooker and Ball.— JOURNAL OF A TOUR IN MAROCCO 
AND THE GREAT ATLAS. By Sir J. D. Hooker, K.C.S.I., 
C.B., F.R.S., &c, and John Ball, F.R.S. With Appendices, 
including a Sketch of the Geology of Marocco. By G. Maw, 
F.L.S., F.G.S. With Map and Illustrations. 8vo. 2ls. 
" This is, without doubt, one of the most interesting and valuable 
boohs of travel published for many years." — Spectator. 

Huxley and Martin.— a COURSE OF PRACTICAL IN- 

STRUCTION IN ELEMENTARY BIOLOGY. By T. H. 
Huxley, LL.D., Sec R.S., assisted by H. N. Martin, B.A., 
M.B., D.Sc, Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
" This is the most thoroughly valuable book to teachers and students 

of biology which has ever appeared in the English tongue? — 

London Quarterly Review. 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 13 



Huxley (Professor).— lay sermons, addresses, 

AND REVIEWS. ByT. H. Huxley, LL.D., F.R.S. New 
and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. ys. 6d. 

Fourteen Discourses on the following subjects: — (1) On the Advisable- 
ness of Improving Natural Knoivledge: — (2) Emancipation — 
Black and White : — (3) A Liberal Education, and where to find 
it: — (4) Scientific Education: — (5) On the Educational Value of 
the Natural History Sciences: — (6) On the Study of Zoology: — 
(7) On the Physical Basis of Life:— (8) The Scientific Aspects of 
Positivism: — (9) On a Piece of Chalk: — (10) Geological Contem- 
poraneity and Persistent Types of Life : — (11) Geological Reform : — 
(12) The Origin of Species:— (13) Criticisms on the "Origin of 
Species: 11 — {14) On Descartes 1 " Discourse touching the Method 0/ 
using One's Reason rightly and of seeking Scientific Truth" 

ESSAYS SELECTED FROM "LAY SERMONS, AD- 
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CRITIQUES AND ADDRESSES. 8vo. ior. 6d. 

Contents: — 1. Administrative Nihilism. 2. The School Boards: 
what they can do f and what they may do. 3. On Medical Edu- 
cation. 4. Yeast. 5. On the Formation of Coal. 6. On Coral 
and Coral Reefs. 7. On the Methods and Results of Ethnology. 
8. On some Fixed Points in British Ethnology. 9. Paleontology 
and the Doctrine of Evolution. 10. Biogenesis and A biogenesis. 
II. Mr. Darwin 1 s Critics. 12. The Genealogy of Animals. 
13. Bishop Berkeley on the Metaphysics of Sensation. 

LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY PHYSIOLOGY. With numerous 
Illustrations. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

" Pure gold throughout." — Guardian. " Unquestionably the clearest 
and most complete elementary treatise on this subject that we possess in 
any language. 11 — Westminster Review. 

AMERICAN ADDRESSES: with a Lecture on the Study of 
Biology. 8vo. 6s. 6d. 

PHYSIOGRAPHY: An Introduction to the Study of Nature. With 
Coloured Plates and numerous Woodcuts. New and Cheaper 
Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 

" // would be hardly possible to place a more useful or suggestive 
book in the hands of learners and teachers^ or one that is better 
calculated to make physiography a favourite subject in the science 
schools. " — Academy. 

INTRODUCTORY PRIMER. i8mo. is. [Science Primers. 

Jellet (John H., B.D.).— a treatise on the 

THEORY OF FRICTION. By John H. Jellet, B.D., 
Senior Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin ; President of the Royal 
Irish Academy. 8vo. &r. 6d. 




14 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

Jones. — Works by Francis Jones, F.R.S.E., F.C.S., Chemical 
Master in the Grammar School, Manchester. 

THE OWENS COLLEGE JUNIOR COURSE OF PRAC- 
TICAL CHEMISTRY. With Preface by Professor Roscoe. 
New Edition. i8mo. With Illustrations. 2s. 6d, 

QUESTIONS ON CHEMISTRY. A Series of Problems and 
Exercises in Inorganic and Organic Chemistry. l8mo. 3*. 

Kiepert.— MANUAL OF ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY. Author- 
ised translation from the German of Heinrich Kiepert, Ph.D., 
Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, Berlin, &c. Crown 
8vo 5j. 

" Dr. Kiepert s l Atlas of Ancient Geography * is highly esteemed in 
this country. . . . And this volume, which is intended to serve as 
an explanatory text, will be welcomed accordingly. . . . Any one 
who will compare it with the text-books that have been commonly 
in use wiU see a greater precision and fulness given to the non- 
classical portion of the subject — a difference that corresponds to the 
*ccent development of our knowledge in this direction. He will 
also pet ceive that the distinctions and affinities of race are treated, 
not exhaustively of course, but adequately ; that natural features 
have given to them a prominent place ; the continuity of the present 
with the past, or, in rarer cases, the interruption of the two being 
noted ; that, generally, the geography of the ancient world is made 
to assume its proper place as the first part, so to speak, of the 
g'ography of the world in which we moderns are living. All this 
will make the volume very useful as a text-book for learners** — 
Pall Mall Gazette. 

"Altogether the English edition of the 'Manual* will form an 
indispensable companion to Kiepert 'j 'Atlas,' now used in many 
of our leading schools." — The Times. 

Kingsley. — Works By Charles Kingsley, Canon of West- 
minster. 
GLAUCUS: OR, THE WONDERS OF THE SHORE. 
New Edition, with numerous Coloured Plates. Crown 8vo. dr. 

SCIENTIFIC LECTURES AND ESSAYS. Crown 8vo. 6s. 

SANITARY AND SOCIAL LECTURES AND ESSAYS. 
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MADAM PIOW AND LADY WHY ; or, Lessons in Earth-Lore 
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Landauer. — blowpipe analysis. By j. landader. 

Authorised English Edition, by James Taylor and W. E. Kay, of 
the Owens College, Manchester. With Illustrations. Extra fcap. 
8vo. 4s 6d. 



\ 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 1 5 



Langdon.— the application of electricity to 

RAILWAY WORKING. By W. E. Langdon, Member of the 
Society of Telegraph Engineers. With numerous Illustrations. 
Extra fcap. 8vo. 45. 6d. 

" There is no officer in the telegraph service who will not profit by 
the study of this book" — Mining Journal. 

Lankester.— DEGENERATION. A Chapter in Darwinism. 
By Professor E. Ray Lankester, F.R.S., Fellow of Exeter 
College, Oxford. With Illustration?. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d, 

[Nature Series. 

Lockyer (J. N.). — Works by J. Norman Lockyer, F.R.S.— 

ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN ASTRONOMY, tyith nu- 
merous Illustrations. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 5s. 6d. 
" The took is full, clear, sound, and worthy of attention, not only as 
a popular exposition, but as a scientific * Index.' n — Athenaeum. 

THE SPECTROSCOPE AND ITS APPLICATIONS. By J. 
Norman Lockyer, F.R.S. With Coloured Plate and numerous 
Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 3*. 6d. [Nature Series. 

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOLAR PHYSICS. By J. Norman 
Lockyer, F. R. S. I. A Popular Account of Inquiries into the 
Physical Constitution of the Sun, with especial reference to Recent 
Spectroscopic Researches. II. Communications to the Royal 
Society of London and the French Academy of Sciences, with 
Notes. Illustrated by 7 Coloured Lithographic Plates and 175 
Woodcuts. Royal 8vo. cloth, extra gilt, price 31J. 6d. 

PRIMER OF ASTRONOMY. With Illustrations. l8mo. is. 

Lockyer and Seabroke. — STAR-GAZING: PAST AND 

PRESENT. An Introduction to Instrumental Astronomy. By 
J. N. Lockyer, F.R.S. Expanded from Shorthand Notes of a 
Course of Royal Institution Lectures with the assistance of G. M. 
Seabroke, F.R. A.S. With numerous Illustrations. Royal 8vo. 21s. 
" A book of great interest and utility to the astronomical student." 
— Athenaeum. 

Lubbock. — Works by Sir John Lubbock, M.P.,F.R. S., D.C.L. 

THE ORIGIN AND METAMORPHOSES OF INSECTS. 
With numerous Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 3J. 6a\ 

[Nature Series. 

ON BRITISH WILD FLOWERS CONSIDERED IN RELA- 

TION TO INSECTS. With Numerous Illustrations. Second 

Edition. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. [Nature Series, 

SCIENTIFIC LECTURES. With Illustrations. 8vo. &s. 6d. 

Contents : — Flowers and Insects — Plants and Insects — The 

Habits of Ants— Introduction to the Study of Prehistoric 

Archeology, 6v. 



16 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Macmillan (Rev. Hugh). — For other Works by the same 
Author, see Theological Catalogue. 

HOLIDAYS ON HIGH LANDS ; or, Rambles and Incidents in 
seirch of Alpine Plants. Globe 8vo. cloth, dr. 

FIRST FORMS OF VEGETATION. Second Edition, corrected 
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tions. Globe 8vo. dr. 

Mansfield (C. B.). — Works by the late C. B. Mansfield :— 

A THEORY OF SALTS. A Treatise on the Constitution of 
Bipolar (two-membered) Chemical Compounds. Crown 8vo. 14/. 

AERIAL NAVIGATION. The Problem, with Hints for its 
Solution. Edited by R. B. Mansfield. With a Preface by J. 
M. Ludlow. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. ior. 6d. 

Mayer. — SOUND : a Series of Simple, Entertaining, and In- 
expensive Experiments in the Phenomena of Sound, for the Use of 
Students of every age. By A. M. Mayer, Professor of Physics 
in the Stevens Institute of Technology, &c. With numerous Illus- 
trations. Crown 8vo. 3*. 6d, [Nature Series. 

Mayer and Barnard. — LIGHT. A Series of Sample, Enter- 
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the use of Students of every age. By A. M. Mayer and C. 
Barnard. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. [Ala 'ure Series. 

Miall. — STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. No. I, 
The Skull of the Crocodile. A Manual for Students. By L. C. 
Miall, Professor of Biology in Yorkshire College. 8vo. xs. 6d. 
No. 2, The Anatomy of the Indian Elephant. By L. C. Ml ALL 
and F. Greenwood. With Plates. 5*. 

Miller. — THE ROMANCE OF ASTRONOMY. By R. Kalley 
Miller, M.A., Fellow and Assistant Tutor of St. Peter's Col- 
lege, Cambridge. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 
8vo. 4-r. 6<l. 

Mivart (St. George). — Works by St. George Mivart, F.R.S. 
&c, Lecturer in Comparative Anatomy at St. Mary's Hospital: — 

ON THE GENESIS OF SPECIES. Second Edition, to which 
notes have been added in reference and reply to Darwin's "Descent 
of Man." With numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo. $s. 

"In no work in the English language has this great controversy 
been treated at once with the same broad and vi%oi m ous grasf of 
facts, and the same liberal and candid temper" — Saturday Review. 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 



Mivart (St. George)— continued. 

THE COMMON FROG. With Numerous Illustrations. Crown 
8vo. 3 s. (yd. (Nature Series.) 
" It is an able monogram of the Frog, and something more. It 

throws valuable crossliqhts over wide portions of animated nature. 

Would that such works were more plentiful" — Quarterly Journal 

of Science. 

Moseley.— NOTES BY A NATURALIST ON THE "CHAL- 
LENGER," being an account of various observations made during 
the voyage of H.M.S. " Challenger" round the world in the years 
1872—76. By H. N. Moseley, M.A.. F.R.S., Member of the 
Scientific Staff of the "Challenger." With Map, Coloured 
Plates, and Woodcuts. 8vo. 21s. 

" This is certainly the most interesting and suggestive book, descrip- 
tive of a naturalisfs travels, which has been published since Mr. 
Darwin 1 s 'Journal of Researches ' appeared, now more than forty 
years ago. That it is worthy to be placed alongside that delightful 
record of the impressions, speculations, and reflections of a master 
mind, is, we d* not doubt, the highest praise which Mr. Moseley 
would desire for his book, and we do not hesitate to say that such 
praise is its desert." — Nature. 

Muir.— PRACTICAL CHEMISTRY FOR MEDICAL STU- 
DENTS. Specially arranged for the first M. B. Course. By 
M. M. Pattison Muir, F.R.S.E. Fcap. 8vo. is. 6d. 

Murphy. — HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE: a Series of 
Essays on the Laws of Life and Mind. By Joseph John 
Murphy. Second Edition, thoroughly revised and mostly re- 
written. With Illustrations. 8vo. 16s. 

Nature.— a weekly illustrated journal of 

SCIENCE. Published every Thursday. Price 6d. Monthly 

Parts, 2s. and 2s. 6d. ; Half-yearly Volumes, i$s. Cases for binding 

Vols. is. 6d. 

" This able and well-edited Journal, which posts up the science of 
the day promptly, and promises to be of sigjial service to students 

and savants Scarcely any expressions that we can employ 

would exaggerate our sense of the moral and theological value of 
the work." — British Quarterly Review. 

Newcomb. — POPULAR ASTRONOMY. By Simon New- 
comb, LL.D., Professor U.S. Naval Observatory. W T ith 112 
Engravings and Five Maps of the Stars. 8vo. i8j. 
•' As affording a thoroughly reliable foundation for more advanced 
reading, Professor NewcomUs * Popular Astronomy ' is deserving 
of strong recommendation." — Nature. 
Oliver. — Works by Daniel Oliver, F.R.S., F.L.S., Professor of 
Botany in University College, London, and Keeper of the Herba- 
rium and Library of the Royal Gardens. Kew : — 

u 



18 SCIENTIFIC CA 1AL0GUE. 



Oliver — cnn:inuet. 
LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY BOTANY. With nearly Two 

Hundrel Illustrations. New Edition- Fcs.p. 8yo. 4s. 6d. 
FIRST BOOK OF INDIAN BOTANY. With numerous 
Illustrations. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d. 

* l It contains a well- digested summary of all essential knowledge 
pertaining to Indian Botany, ZL-rought out in accordance tvitk tke 
best principles of scientific arrangement '." — Allen's Indian Mafl. 

Pasteur.— STUDIES ON FERMENTATION. The Diseases 
of Beer ; their Caves and Means of Preventing them. By L. 
Pasteur. A Tran-htim of " Etudes snr la Biere," With Note*, 
Illustrations, &c By F. Faulkner & D. C. Robb, B. A. 8vo. 21s. 

Pennington. — notes on the barrows and bone 

CAVES OF DERBYSHIRE. With an account of a Descent 
into Eiden Hole. By Rooki Pennington, B.A., LLB., 
F.G.S. 8vo. 6s. 

Penrose (F. C)— ON A METHOD OF PREDICTING BY 
GRAPHICAL CONSTRUCTION, OCCULT ATIOXS OF 
STARS BY THE MOON, AND SOLAR ECLIPSES FO^ 
ANY GIVEN PLACE. Together with more rigorous methoc s 
for the Accurate Calculation of Longitude. By F. C. Penrose, 
F.R.A.S. With Chaits, Tables, &c. 4to. I2x. 

Perry.— AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON STEAM. By 
John Perry, B.E., Whi 'worth Scholar; Fellow of the Chemical 
Society, lecturer in Physics at Clif-on College. With numerous 
Woodcuts, Numerical Examples, and Exercises. New Edition. 
i8mo. +f. 6d. 

"Mr. Perry has in this compact littu zoiume brought together an 
im metis e amount of information, new told, regarding steam am- 
its application, not the least of its merits being that it is suited /«- 
the capacities alike of the tyro in engineering science or the belter 
grade of artisan" — Iron. 

Pickering.— ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL MANIPULATION. 
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chusetts Institute of Technology. Part I , medium 8vo. iqt. 6d. 
Part II., ioj. frl. 

" When finished 'Physical Manipulation' will no doubt be con- 
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which it treats ." — Nature. 

Prestwich.— THE PAST AND FUTURE OF GEOLOGY. 
An Inaugural Lecture, by J. Prfstwich, M.A., F.R.S., 4c.. 
Profes-or of Geology, Oxford. 8vo. 2s. 

Radcliffe.— PROTEUS : OR UNITY IN NATURE. By. C. 
B. Radcliffe, M.D., Author of "Vital Motion as a mode of 
Physical Motion. Second Edition. 8va 7j. 6d. 



^\ 



PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 19 

Rendu. — THE THEORY OF THE GLACIERS OF SAVOY. 
By M. le Chanoine Rendu. Translated by A. Wells, Q.C., 
late President of the Alpine Club. To which are added, the Original 
Memoir and Supplementary Articles by Professors Tait and Rus- 
kin. Edited with Introductory remarks by George Forbes, B.A., 
Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Andersonian University, 
Glasgow. 8vo. p. 6d. 

RoSCOe. — Works by Henry E. Roscoe, F.R.S., Professor of 
Chemistry in the Victoria University, the Owens College, 
Manchester : — 

LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY CHEMISTRY, INORGANIC 
AND ORGANIC. With numerous Illustrations and Chromo- 
litho of the Solar Spectrum, and of the Alkalis and Alkaline 
Earths. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4J. 6d. 

CHEMICAL PROBLEMS, adapted to the above by Professor 
Thorpe. Fifth Edition, with Key. 2s. 

*t iy e unhesitatingly pronounce it the best of all our elementary 
treatises on Chemistry" — Medical Times. 

PRIMER OF CHEMISTRY. Illustrated. i8mo. is. 

Roscoe and Schorlemmer.— a treatise ON che- 
mistry. With numerous Illustrations. By Professors 
Roscoe and Schorlemmer. Vols. I. and II. Inorganic 
Chemistry. 

Vol. I., The Non-metallic Elements. 8vo. 21s 

Vol. II., Part I. Metals. 8vo. i8j. 

Vol. II., Part II. Metals. 8vo. iSs. 

VoL III., Part I. Organic Chemistry. [Immediately. 

Regarded as a treatise on the Non-metallic Elements, there can be 
no doubt that this volume is incomparably the most satisfactory one 
of which we are in possession** — Spectator. 

" // would be difficult to praise the work too highly. All the merits 
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The arrangement is clear and scientific ; the facts gained by modern 
research are fairly represented and judiciously selected; and tlu 
style throughout is singularly lucid.** — Lancet. 

Rumford (Count). — THE LIFE AND COMPLETE WORKS 
OF BENJAMIN THOMPSON, COUNT RUMFORD. With 
Notices of his Daughter. By George Ellis. With Portrait, 
Five Vols. 8vo. 4/. 14J. 6d. 

B 2 



ao SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

Schorlemmer.— a manual OF the chemistry of 

THECARBON COMPOUNDS OR ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. 
By C. Schorlemmer, F.R.S., Professor of Chemistrr in the 
"Victoria University, the Owens College, Manchester. Svo. 14*. 
"It appears to us to beets complete a manual of the metamorphoses of 

carbon as could be at present produce J, and it must prove e mine n t ly 

useful to the chemical student. 11 — Athenaeum. 

Shann.— av elementary treatise on heat, in 

RELATION TO STEAM AND THE STEAM EXGIXE. 
By G. Shaxx, M.A. With Illustrations. Crown Svo. 4s. 6d. 

Smith.— HISTORIA FILICUM : An Exposition of the Nature, 
Number, and Organography of Ferns, and Review of the Prin- 
ciples upon which Genera are founded, and the Systems of Classifi- 
cation 01 the principal Authors, with a new General ArrangeTient, 
&c. By J. S.\nTH. A. L.S., ex-Curator of the Royal Botanic 
Garden, Kew. With Thirty Lithographic Plates by W. H. Fitch, 
F.L.S. Crown 8vo. \zs. 6d. 

** No one anxious to work up a thorough knowledge of ferns can 
afford to do without it" — Gardener's Chronicle. 

South Kensington Science Lectures. 

Vol. I. — Containing Lectures by Captain Abney, F.RS., Professor 
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Crown 8vo. dr. 
Vol. II. — Containing Lectures by W. Spottiswoode, P.R.S., Pro£ 
Forbes, H. W. Chisholm, * Prof. T. F. Pigot, W. Froude, 
F.R.S., Dr. Siemens, Prof. Barrett, Dr. Bl-rden-s Ander- 
son, Dr. Lauder Brunton, F.R.S., Prof. McLeod, Prof. 
Roscoe,F.R.S., &c. Crown 8 vo. dr. 
SpottiswOOde.— POLARIZATION OF LIGHT. By W. 
Spottiswoode, President of the Royal Society. With numerous 
Illustrations. Third Edition. Cr. Svo. 3/. 6d. (Nature Scries.) 
" Tlie illustrations are exceedingly well adapted to assist in makinj 
the text compre/iensible" — Athenaeum. "A clear, trustworthy 
manual, " — Standard. 
Stewart (B.)- — Works by Balfour Stewart, F.R.S., Professor 
of Natural Philosophy in the Victora University, the Owens 
College, Manchester: — 
LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY PHYSICS. With numerous 
Illustrations and Chromolithos of the Spectra of the Sun, Stars, 
and Nebulae. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4J. 6d. 
The Educational Times calls this the beau-ideal of a scientific text" 
book, clear, accurate* and thorough." 
PRIMER OF PHYSICS. With Illustrations. New Edition, with 
Questions. iSmo. is. 




PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 2 i 



Stewart and Tait.— the unseen universe: or, 

Physical Speculations on a future State. By Balfour Stewart, 

F.R.S., and P. G. Tait, M.A. Sixth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 

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religious readers. . . . It is a perfectly sober inquiry, on scientific 

grounds, into the possibilities of a future existence" — Guardian. 

Stone.— ELEMENTARY LESSONS ON SOUND. By Dr. 

W. H. Stone, Lecturer on Physics at St. Thomas' Hospital. 

With Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo. 3^. 6d. 

Tait— LECTURES ON SOME RECENT ADVANCES IN 
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Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Second edition, 
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TURE, [/n the press. 

Taylor.— SOUND AND MUSIC : A Non-Mathematical Trea- 
tise on the Physical Constitution of Musical Sounds and Harmony, 
including the Chief Acoustical Discoveries of Professor Helm- 
holtz. By Sedley Taylor, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity Col- 
lege, Cambridge. Large crown 8vo. $s. 6d. 
"In no previous scientific treatise do we remember so exhaustive and 

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Thomson. — Works by Sir Wyville Thomson, K.C.B., F.R.S. 
THE DEPTHS OF THE SEA : An Account of the General 
Results of the Dredging Cruises of H.M.SS. "Porcupine" and 
"Lightning" during the Summers of 1868-69 and 70, under the 
scientific direction of Dr. Carpenter, F.R.S., J. Gwyn Jeffreys, 
F.R.S., and Sir Wyville Thomson, F.R.S. With nearly 100 
Illustrations and 8 coloured Maps and Plans. Second Edition. 
Royal 8vo. cloth, gilt. 3U. 6d. 

The Athenaeum says: " The book is full of interesting matter, and 
is written by a master of the art of popular exposition. It is 
excellently illustrated, both coloured maps and woodcuts possessing 
high merit. 1 * 



22 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



Th O m S on — continued. 

THE VOYAGE OF THE " CHALLENGER."— THE ATLAN- 
TIC. A Preliminary account of the Exploring Voyages of H. M.S. 
"Challenger," during the year 1873 and the early part of 1876. 
With numerous Illustrations, Coloured Maps & Charts, & Portrait 
of the Author, engraved'.byC. H.Jeens. 2 Vols. Medium 8vo. 45*. 

The Times says : — " The paper ; printing, and especially the numerous 
illustrations, are of the highest quality. . . . We have rarely, if 
rser, seen more beautiful specimens of wood engraving than abound 
in this work. . . . Sir Wyvillt Thomson's style is particularly 
attractive ; he is easy and graceful, but vigorous and exceedingly 
happy in the chnce of language, and throughout the work there are 
touches which show that science has not banished sentiment from 
his bosom.** 

Thudichum and Duprg.— a TREATISE ON THE 

ORIGIN, NATURE, AND VARIETIES OF WINE. 
Being a Complete Manual of Viticulture and CEnology. By J. L. 
W. Thudichum, M.D., and August Dupre, Ph.D., Lecturer on 
Chemistry at Westminster Hospital. Medium 8vo. cloth gilt. 25J. 

**A treatise almost unique for its usefulness either to the wine-growet , 
the vendor, or the consumer of wine. The analyses of wine are 
the most complete we have yet seen, exhibiting at a glance the 
constituent principles of nearly all the wines known in this country" 
— Wine Trade Review. 

Tylor. — ANTHROPOLOGY : an Introduction to the Study of 
Man and Civilization. By E. B. Tylor, D.C.L., F.R.S. With 
numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo. *js. 6d. 

" If all manuals were like this, a generation over educated for its 
intellect would have no reason to complain. . . . A most attractive 
and entertaining introduction to the science of anthropology. . . . 
His writing is clear and luminous, and his arrangements masterly. 
. . . Mr. Tylor writes with as much caution as learning" — 
Saturday Review. 

Wallace (A. R.). — Works by Alfred Russel Wallace. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF NATURAL 
SELECTION. A Series of Essays. New Edition, with 
Corrections and Additions. Crown 8vo. Ss. 6d. 

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ANIMALS, 
with a study of the Relations of Living and Extinct Faunas as 
Elucidating the Past Changes of the Earth's Surface. With Maps, 
and numerous Illustrations by Zwecker, 2 vols. 8vo. 425. 




PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 23 

Wallace (A. R.)— continued. 

The Times says: ii Altogether it is a wonderful and fascinating 
story wh.itever objections may be taken to theories founded upon 
it. Mr, Wallace has not attempted to add to its interest by any 
adornments of style ; he has given a simple and clear statement 0/ 
intrinsically interesting facts, and what he considers to be legiti- 
mate inductions from them. Naturalists ought to be grateful to 
him for having undertaken so toilsome a task. The work, indeed, 
is a credit to al concerned — the author, the publishers, the artist — 
unfortuna'ely now no more — of the attractive illustrations — hist 
4>ut by no means least* Mr. Stanford's map-designer. , n 

ISLAND LIFE; OR, THE PHENOMENA AND CAUSES 
OF INSULAR FAUNAS AND FLORAS, including a re- 
vision and attempted solution of the problem of geological 
climates. With Maps. 8vo. i8r. 

4 Island Life is a work to be accepted almost without reservation 
from beginning to end . . . Whoever reads his book must be 
charmed with it" — St. James's Gazette. " The work throughout 
abounds with interest . . . It may be read with equal p'easure by 
those who are already acquainted with the general principles of 
distribution and by those who wish for the first time to learn some* 
thing about modern biological geography. — Athenaeum " The 
result of his work he has already given us in more th •n one form ; 
and his new volume on Island Life cont litis his latest views on 
the subject set forth in a clear and popular manner which should 
make them accessible to many readers who would not venture on 
the persual of his more strictly scientific expositions . . • Mr. 
Wallace has wtittm nothing more clejr, more masterly, or more 
convincing th. in this delightful vo'ume." — Fortnightly Review. 

TROPICAL NATURE : with other Essays. 8vo. 12s. 

" Nowhere amid the many descriptions of the tropics that have been 
given is to be found a summary of the past history and actual 
phefiomena 0/ the tropics which gives that which is distinctive of 
the phases of nature in them more clearly, shortly, and impres- 
sively" — Saturday Review. 

Warington.— THE WEEK OF CREATION; OR, THE 
COSMOGONY OF GENESIS CONSIDERED IN ITS 
RELATION TO MODERN SCIENCE. By George War- 
ington, Author of "The Historic Character of the Pentateuch 
Vindicated." Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

Wilson. — RELIGIO CHEMICI. By the late George Wilson, 
M.D., F.R.S.E., Regius Professor of Technology in the University 
of Edinburgh. With a Vignette beautifully engraved after a 
design by Sir Noel Paton. Crown 8vo. Ss. 6d. 



SSJSXTIFSC CATAJLOJZ m E. 



Wilson Daniel .— CALIrAN: & Cr^ime an ShikeeDms 
~T<srpes:*" a.tȣ "Miis^rsr N"^r:'* IrrsT-. ~ Py Iulsob. 

ITxctsjct Cou^s. Tocvac.:» 5*v. zacatl 

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xma^mtcum *.- wit." a* a - " air-x.- -~r v * .Taya-y 
/»«.y 2r iva.,; zi 

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SCIENCE CLASS-BOOKS. 25 

Science Primers for Elementary Schools— continued. 

Physiology — By Michael Foster, M.D., F.R.S. With 
numerous Illustrations. New Edition. 1 8 mo. is. 

Astronomy. — By J. Norman Lockyer, F.R.S. With numerous 
Illustrations. New Edition. i8mo. is. 

Botany — By Sir J. D. Hooker, K.C.S.I., C.B., F.R.S. With 
numerous Illustrations. New Edition. i8mo. is. 

L»Ogic._By Stanley Jevons, LL.D., M. A., F.R.S. New Edition. 
i8mo. is. 

Political Economy — By Stanley Jevons, LL.D., M.A., 
F.R.S. i8mo. is. 

Others in preparation. 



ELEMENTARY SCIENCE CLASS-BOOKS. 

Agriculture.— ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN AGRICUL- 
TURAL SCIENCE By H. Tanner, F.C.S., Professor of 
Agricultural Science, University College, Aberystwith. 

[Immediately. 

Astronomy — By the Astronomer Royal. POPULAR AS- 
TRONOMY. With Illustrations. By Sir G. B. Airy, K.C.B., 
Astronomer Royal. New Edition. 1 81110. 41. 6d. 

Astronomy.—ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN ASTRONOMY. 
With Coloured Diagram of the Spectra of the Sun, Stars, and 
Nebulae, and numerous Illustrations. By J. Norman Lockyer, 
1\ R.S. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. $s. 6d. 

QUESTIONS ON LOCKYER'S ELEMKNTARY LESSONS 
IN ASTRONOMY. For the Use of Schools. By John 
Forces Robertson. i8mo, cloth limp. is. 6d. 

Botany. —LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY BOTANY. By D. 
Olive.1, F.R.S., F.L.S., Professor of Botany in University 
College, London. With nearly Two Hundred Illustrations. New 
Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

Chemistry.. LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY CHEMISTRY, 
INORGANIC AND ORGANIC. By Henry E. Roscoe, 
F.R.S., Professor of Chemistry in the Victoria University, the 
Owens College, Manchester. With numerous Illustrations and 
Chromo-Litlio of the Solar Spectrum, and of the Alkalies and 
Alkaline Earths. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. 



26 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

Elementary Science Class-books — continued. 

A SERIES OF CHEMICAL PROBLEMS, prepared with 
Special Reference to the above, by T. E. Thorpe, Ph.D., 
Profesor of Chemistry in the Yorkshire College of Science, Leeds. 
Adapted for the preparation of Students for the Government, 
Science, and Society of Arts Examinations. With a Preface by 
Professor Roscoe. New Edition, with Key. i8mr>. 2s. 

Practical Chemistry — the owens COLLEGE JUNIOR 

COURSE OF PRACTICAL CHEMISTRY. By Francis 
Jones, F.R.S.E., F.C.S., Chemical Master in the Grammar School, 
Manchester. With Preface by Professor Roscoe, and Illustrations. 
New Edition. i8mo. 2s. 6d. 

Chemistry. — QUESTIONS ON. A Series of Problems and 
Exercises in Inorganic and Organic Chemistry. By F. Jones, 
F.R.S.E., F.C.S. i8mo. 3*. 

Electricity and Magnetism. — By Profesor Sylvamus 

Thompson, of University College, Bristol. With Illustrations. 

[Immediately. 

Physiology — LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY PHYSIOLOGY. 
With numerous Illustrations. By T. H. Huxley, F.R.S., Pro- 
fessor of Natural History in the Royal School of Mines. New 
Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

QUESTIONS ON HUXLEY'S PHYSIOLOGY FOR 
SCHOOLS. By T. Alcock, M.D. i8mo. is. 6d. 

Political Economy — POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR BE- 
GINNERS. By Millicent G. Fawcett. New Edition. 

1 8 mo. 2s. 6d. 

Logic— ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN LOGIC ; Deductive and 
Inductive, with copious Questions and Examples, and a Vocabulary 
of Logical Terms. By W. Stanley Jevons, LLD., M.A., 
F.R.S. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 3*. 6d. 

Physics — LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY PHYSICS. By 
Balfour Stewart, F.R.S. , Professor of Natural Philosophy in 
the Victoria Univer ity, the Owens College, Manchester. With 
numerous Illustrations and Chromo-Litho of the Spectra of the 
Sua, Stars, and Nebulae. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 4<-. 6d. 

QUESTIONS ON STEWART'S LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY 
PHYSICS. By Professor T. H. Core. i2mo. 2s. 

Anatomy — LESSONS IN ELEMENTARY ANATOMY. By 
St. George Mivart, F.R.S., Lecturer in Comparative Anatomy 
at St. Mary's Hospital. With upwards of 400 lllu trations. Fcap. 
8vo. 6s. 6J. 




SCIENCE CLASS BOOKS. 27 



Elementary Science Class-books — continued. 
Mechanics — an elementary treatise. By a. b. 

W. Kennedy, C.E , Profes -or of Applied Mechanics in University 
College, London. With Illustrations. [2 n preparation. 

Steam — AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE. By John Perry, 
B.E., Whitworth Scholar; Fellow of the Chemical Society, Lec- 
turer in Physics at Clifton College. With numerous Woodcuts and 
Numerical Examples and Exercises. New Edition. i8mo. 4*. 6d. 

Physical Geography. — ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN 

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY. By A. Geikie, F.R.S., Murchi- 
son Professor of Geology, &c, Edinburgh. With numerous 
Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

QUESTIONS ON THE SAME. is. 6d. 

Psychology.— ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN PSYCHO- 
LOGY. By G. Croom Rorertson, Professor of Mental 
Philosophy, &c, University College, London. [In preparation. 

Geography — CLASS-BOOK OF GEOGRAPHY. By C. B. 
Clarke, M.A.. F.G.S. New Edition, with eighteen coloured 
Maps Fcap. 8vo. 3*. 

Moral Philosophy.— AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE. 
By Professor E. Caird, of Glasgow University. \ln preparation. 

Natural Philosophy.-NATURAL PHILOSOPHY FOR 
BEGINNERS. By I. Todhunter, M.A., F.R.S. Part I. 
The Properties of Solid and Fluid Bodies. l8mo. 3*. 6d. Part 
II. Sound, light, and Heat. i8mo. 3*. 6d. 

The Economics of Industry. — By A. Marshall, M.A., 

late Principal of University College, Bristol, and Mary P. 
Marshall, late Lecturer at Newnham Hall, Cambridge. Extra 
fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 

Sound AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE. By Dr» W. H. 

Stone. With Illustrations. 1 81110. 3.V. 6d. 



Easy Lessons in Science. — Edited by Professor W. F. 
Barrett. 
I. HEAT. By C. A. Martineau. Illustrated Extra fcap. 
8vo. 2j. 6d. 
II. LIGHT. By Mrs. W. Awdry. Illustrated. Extra fcap, 
8vo. 2.s. 6d 

Others in Preparation. 



28 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



MANUALS FOR STUDENTS. 

Crown 8vo. 

Cossa.— GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY. By Dr. Luigi Cossa, Professor of Political 
Economy in the University of Pavia. Translated from the Second 
Italian Edition. W ith a Preface by W. Stanley J evons, F. R.S. 
Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. 

Dyer and Vines THE STRUCTURE OF PLANTS. By 

Professor Thiselton Dyer, F.R.S., assisted by Sydney 
Vines, B.Sc, Fellow and Lecturer of Christ's College, Cambridge. 
With numerous Illustrations. [In preparation. 

Fawcett A manual OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. By 

Right Hon. Henry Fawcett, M.P. New Edition, revised and 
enlarged. Crown 8vo. 12s. 

Fleischer A SYSTEM OF VOLUMETRIC ANALYSIS. 

Translated, with Notes and Additions, from the second German 
Edition, by M. M. Pattison Muir, F.R.S.E. With Illustra- 
tions. Crown 8vo. *]s. 6d. 

Flower (W. H.) AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OSTE- 
OLOGY OF THE MAMMALIA. Being the Substance of the 
Course of Lectures delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons of 
England in 1870. By Professor W. H. Flower, F.R.S., 
F.R.C.S. With numerous Illustrations. New Edition, enlarged. 
Crown 8vo. I or. 6d. 

Foster and Balfour the elements of embry- 
ology. By Michael Foster, M.D., F.R.S., and F. M. 
Balfour, M.A. Part I. crown 8vo. Js. 6d. 

Foster and Langley._A COURSE OF ELEMENTARY 
PRACTICAL PHYSIOLOGY. By Michael Foster, M.D., 
F.R.S., and J. N. Langley, B.A. Fourth Edition. Crown 
8vo. 6s. 

Hooker (Dr.)— THE STUDENT'S FLORA OF THE BRITISH 
ISLANDS. By Sir J. D. Hooker, K.C.S.I., C.B., F.R.S., 
M.D., D.C.L. New Edition, revised. Globe 8vo. ioj. 6d. 

Huxley PHYSIOGRAPHY. An Introduction to the Study of 

Nature. By Professor Huxley, F.R.S. With numerous 
Illustrations, and Coloured Plates. New and cheaper Edition. 
Crown 8vo. 6s. 



MANUALS FOR STUDENTS. 29 

Manuals for Students — continued. 

Huxley and Martin — a COURSE OF PRACTICAL IN- 
STRUCTION IN ELEMENTARY BIOLOGY. By Professor 
Huxley, F.R.S., assisted by II. N. Martin, M.B., D.Sc. New 
Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. 6s. 

Huxley and Parker elementary biology. PART 

II. By Professor Huxley, F.R.S., assisted by T. J. Parker. 
With Illustrations. [In preparation. 

Jevons.— MANUALS. By W. Stanley Jevons, LL.D., M.A., 
F.R.S. :— 

THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE. A Treatise on Logic and 
Scientific Method. New and Revised Edition. Crown 8vo. 12s. 6d. 

STUDIES IN DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. A Manual for Students. 
Crown 8vo. 6s. 

Kennedy.— MECHANICS OF MACHINERY. By A. B. W. 
Kennedy, M. Inst. C.E., Professor of Engineering and 
Mechanical Technology in University College, London. With 
Illustrations. Crown 8vo. [In the Press. 

Kiepert.—A MANUAL OF ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY. From 
the German of Dr. H. Kiepert. Crown 8vo. 5j. 

Oliver (Professor) — first book of Indian botany. 

By Professor Daniel Oliver, F.R.S., F.L.S., Keeper of the 
Herbarium and Library of the Royal Gardens, Kew. With 
numerous Illustrations. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d. 

Parker and Bettany — the MORPHOLOGY OF THE 

SKULL. By Professor Parker and G. T. Bettany. Illus- 
trated. Crown 8vo. ior. 6d. 

Tait — AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON HEAT. By Pro- 
fessor Tait, F.R.S.E. Illustrated. [In the Press. 

Thomson — ZOOLOGY. By Sir C. Wyville Thomson, 
F.R.S. Illustrated. [In preparation . 

Ty lor— ANTHROPOLOGY : An Introduction to the Study of Man 
and Civilization. By E. B. Tylor, M.A., F.R.S. Illustrated. 
Crown 8vo. *js. 6d. 

Other volumes of these Manuals will follow. 



30 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



SCIENTIFIC TEXT-BOOKS. 

Balfour.— A TREATISE ON COMPARATIVE EMBRY- 
OLOGY. With Illustrations. By F. M. Balfour, M.A., 
F.R.S., Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. In 
2 vols. 8vo. Vol. I. i8j. Vol. II. 21s. 

Ball (R.S., A.M.)— EXPERIMENTAL MECHANICS. A 

Course of Lectures delivered at the Royal College of Science for 
Ireland. By R. S. Bali,, A.M., Professor of Applied Mathema- 
tics and Mechanics in the Royal College of Science for Ireland. 
Royal 8vo. iox. 6d. 

Chalmers.— GRAPHICAL DETERMINATION OF FORCES 
IN ENGINEERING STRUCTURES. By James B. Chal- 
mers, C.E. With Illustrations. 8vo. 24s. 

ClausiuS.— MECHANICAL THEORY OF HEAT. By R. 
Clausius. Translated by Walter R. Browne, M.A., late 
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo. ioj. 6d. 

Cottcrill.— A TREATISE ON APPLIED MECHANICS. 
By James Cotterill, M.A., F.R.S., Professor of Applied 
Mechanics at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. With Illus- 
trations. 8vo. [In preparation. 

Daniell.— A TREATISE ON PHYSICS FOR MEDICAL 
STUDENTS. By Alfred Daniell. With Illustrations. 8vo. 

[In preparation. 

Foster. — A TEXT-BOOK OF PHYSIOLOGY. By Michael 
Foster, M.D , F.R.S. With Illustrations. Third Edition, 
revised. 8vo. 2\s. 

Gamgee. — a text-book of the physiological 

CHEMISTRY OF THE ANIMAL BODY. Including an 
account of the chemical changes occurring in Disease. By A. 
Gamgee, M.D., F.R.S., Professor of Physiology in the Victoria 
University, the Owens College, Manchester. 2 vols. 8vo. With 
Illustrations. VoL I. I&. [Vol. II. in the Press. 

Gegenbaur.— elements of comparative ana- 
tomy. By Professor Carl Gbgenbaitr. A Transition ty 
F. Jeffrey Bell, B A. Revised with Preface by Professor 1 . 
Ray Lankester, F.R.S. With numerous Illustrations. Svo. 
2 if. 




SCIENTIFIC TEXT-BOOKS. 31 



Scientific Text- Books— continued. 

Geikie.— TEXT-BOOK OF GEOLOGY. By Archibald 
Geikie, F.R.S., Professor of Geology in the Uuiversity of Edin- 
burgh. With numerous Illustrations. 8vo. [Immediately. 

<5ray.— STRUCTURAL BOTANY, OR, ORGANOGRAPHY 
ON THE BASIS OF MORPHOLOGY. To which are added 
the principles of Taxonomy and Phytography, and a Glossary of 
Botanical Terms. By Professor Asa Gray, LL.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d. 

Newcomb.- POPULAR ASTRONOMY. By S. Newcomb, 
LL.D., Professor U.S. Naval Observatory. With 112 Illustra- 
tions and 5 Maps of the Stars. 8vo. iSs. 

" // is unlike anything else of its kind, and will be of more use in 
circulating a knowledge of astronomy than nine-ten As of the books 
which have appeared on the subject of late 5 ears" — Saturday 
Review. 

Reuleaux.— THE KINEMATICS OF MACHINERY. Out- 
lines of a Theory of Machines. By Professor F. Reuleaux. 
Translated and Edited by Professor A. B. W. Kennedy, C.E. 
With 450 Illustrations. Medium 8 vo. 21 s. 

Roscoe and Schorlemmer. — INORGANIC CHEMIS- 
TRY. A Complete Treatise on Inorganic Chemistry. By Pro- 
fessor H. E. Roscoe, F.R.S., and Professor C. Schorlemmer, 
F.R.S. With numerous Illustrations. Medium 8vo. Vol. I. — 
The Non-Metallic Elements. 2is. Vol. II. — Metals. — Part I. 
i8j. Vol. II.— Metals. Part II. iSs. 

ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. A complete Treatise on Organic 
Chemistry. By Professors Roscoe and Schorlemmer. With 
numerous Illustrations. Medium 8vo. Part I. [Immediately. 

Schorlemmer.— a manual OF THE chemistry 
of the carbon compounds, or organic 

CHEMISTRY. By C. Schorlemmer, F.R.S., Professor of 
Chemistry, the Victoria University, the Owens College, Manchester. 
With Illustrations. 8vo. 14'. 

Thorpe and Riicker. — a TREATISE ON CHEMICAL 

PHYSICS. By Professor Thorpe, F.R.S., and Professor 
Rucker, of the Yorkshire College of Science. Illustrated. 8vo. 

[In preparation. 



32 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 



WORKS ON MENTAL AND MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY, AND ALLIED SUBJECTS. 

Aristotle.— AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE'S 
RHETORIC. With Analysis, Notes, and Appendices. By E. 
M. Cope, Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. 14.J. 

ARISTOTLE ON FALLACIES; OR, THE SOPHISTICI 
ELENCHI. With a Translation and Notes by Edward Poste, 
M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 8vo. 8j. 6d. 

ARISTOTLE.— The Metaphysics, Book I. Translated into English 
Prose, with Marginal Analyst?, and Summary of each Chapter. 
By a Cambridge Graduate. Demy 8vo. $s. 

Balfour.— A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT : being 
an Essay on the Foundations of Belief. By A. J. Balfour, 
M.P. 8vo. 12s. 

" Mr. Balfour's criticism is exceedingly brilliant and suggestive" — 
Pall Mall Gazette. 

" An able and refreshing contribution to one of the burning questions 
of the age, and deserves to make its mark in the fierce battle now 
raging between science and theology" — Athenaeum. 

Birks. — Works by the Rev. T. R. Birks, Professor of Moral Philo- 
sophy. Cambridge : — 

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORAL SCIENCE ; or, a First 
Course of Lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge. 
Crown 8vo. 8j. 6d. 

This work treats of three topics all preliminary to the direct exposi- 
tion of Moral Philosophy. These are the Certainty and Dignity 
of Moral Science, its Spiritual Geography, or relation to other 
main subjects of human thought, and its Formative Principles, or 
some eletnentary truths on which its whole development must 
depend. 
MODERN UTILITARIANISM; or, The Systems of Paley, 
Bentham, and Mill, Examined and Compared. Crown 8vo. 6s, 6d. 

SUPERNATURAL REVELATION; or, First Principles of 
Moral Theology. 8vo. Ss. 

Boole. — AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF 
THOUGHT, ON WHICH ARE FOUNDED THE 
MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF LOGIC AND PRO- 
BABILITIES. By George Boole, LL.D., Professor of 
Mathematics in the Queen's University, Ireland, &c. 8vo. 14*. 



MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 33 

Butler.— LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT 
PHILOSOPHY. By W. Archer Butler, late Professor of 
Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Edited from the 
Author's MSS., with Notes, by William Hepworth Thomp- 
son, M.A., Master of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of 
Greek in the University of Cambridge. New and Cheaper Edition, 
revised by the Editor. 8vo. I2j. 

Caird. — an introduction to the philosophy of 

RELIGION. By John Caird, D.D., Principal and Vice- 
Chancellor of the Univeisity of Glasgow, and one of Her Majesty's 
Chaplains for Scotland. 8vo. ior. 6d. 

Caird. — a critical account of the philosophy 

OF KANT. With an Historical Introduction. By E. Caird, 
M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. 
8vo. i&r. 

CalderwOOd. — Works by the Rev. Henry Calderwood, M.A., 
LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edin- 
burgh : — 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE: A Treatise on Man's 

Knowledge of the Infinite Being, in answer to Sir W. Hamilton 

and Dr. Mansel. Cheaper Edition. 8vo. js. 6d. 

"A book of great ability .... written in a clear stle, and may 

be easily understood by even those who are not versed in such 

discussions" — British Quarterly Review. 

A HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Sixth Edition. 
Crown 8vo. 6s. 

"A compact and useful work, going over a great deal of ground 
in a manner adapted to suggest and facilitate further study. . . . 
His book will be an assistance to many students outside his own 
University of Edinburgh. — Guardian. 

THE RELATIONS OF MIND AND BRAIN. 8vo. 12s. 

" Altogether his work is probably the best combination to be found 
at present in England of exposition and criticism on the subject 
of physiological psychology" — The Academy. 

THE RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. Being 
the Morse Lecturer, 1880, connected with Union Theological 
Seminary, New York. Crown 8vo. 5*. 

Clifford.— LECTURES AND ESSAYS. By the late Professor 
W. K. Clifford, F.R.S. Edited by Leslie Stephen and 
Frederick Pollock, with Introduction by F. Pollock. Two 
Portraits. 2 vols. 8vo. 2 «Jj. 

C 



34 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

Clifford— continued. 

" The Times of October 22nd says : — "Many a friend of the author 
on first taking up these volumes and remembering his versatile 
genius and his keen enjoyment of all realms of intellectual activity 
must have trembled, lest they should be found to consist offragmen 
tary pieces of work, too disconnected to do justice to his powers of 
consecutive readings and too varied to have any effect as. a whole. 
Fortunately these fears are groundless. . . . It is not only in 
subject that the various papers are closely related. There is also a 
singular consistency of view and of method throughout. . . . It 
is in the social and metaphysical subjects that the richness of his 
intellect shows itself most forcihly in the rarity and originality of 
the ideas which he presents to us. To appreciate this variety it is 
necessary to read the book itself for it treats in some form or other 
of all the subjects of deepest interest in this age of questioning" 

Fiske.— OUTLINES OF COSMIC PHILOSOPHY, BASED 
ON THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION, WITH CRITI- 
CISMS ON THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. By John 
Fiske, M.A., LL.B., formerly Lecturer on Philosophy at 
Harvard University. 2 vols. 8vo. 25J. 

** The work constitutes a very effective encyclopaedia of the evolution' 
ary philosophy \ and is well worth the study of all who wisji to see 
at once the entire scope and purport of the scientific dogmatism of 
the day." — Saturday Review. 

Harper.— THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SCHOOL. By the 
Rev. Thomas Harper (S.J.). In 5 vols. 8vo. Vol. I. 8vo. i&r. 
Vol. II. 8vo. i8j. [Vol. 111. in preparation. 

Herbert.— the realistic assumptions of modern 

SCIENCE EXAMINED. By T. M. Herbert, M.A., late 
Professor of Philosophy, &c, in the Lancashire Independent 
College, Manchester. 8vo. • 14J. 

" Mr. Herbert* s work appears to us one of real ability and import' 
ance. The author has shown himself well trained in philosophical 
literature, and possessed of high critical and speculative powers." — 
Mind. 

Jardine.— THE ELEMENTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
COGNITION. By Robert Jardine, B.D., D.Sc, Principal of 
the General Assembly's College, Calcutta, and Fellow of the Uni- 
versity of Calcutta. Crown 8vo. dr. 6d. 



MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 35 

Jevons. — Works by W. Stanley Jevons, LL.D., M.A., F.R.S. 

THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE. A Treatise on Logic and 
Scientific Method. New and Cheaper Edition, revised. Crown 
8vo. 12s. 6d. 

" No one in future can be said to have any true knowledge of what 
has been done in the way of logical and scientific method in 
England without having carefully studied Professor Jevons* 
booh" — Spectator. 

THE SUBSTITUTION OF SIMILARS, the True Principle of 
Reasoning. Derived from a Modification of Aristotle's Dictum. 
Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 

ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE AND 
INDUCTIVE. With Questions, Examples, and Vocabulary of 
Logical Terms. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. $s. 6d. 

STUDIES IN DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. A Manual for Students. 
Crown 8vo. dr. 

PRIMER OF LOGIC. New Edition. i8mo. is. 

M'Cosh— Works by James M'Cosh, LL.D., President of Princeton 

College, New Jersey, U.S. 

" He certainly shows himself skilful in that application of logic to 
psychology ', in that inductive science of the human mind which is 
the fine side of English philosophy. His philosophy as a whole is 
worthy of attention." — Revue de Deux Mondes. 

THE METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, Physical 
and Moral. Tenth Edition. 8vo. iar. 6d. 
*' litis work is distinguished from other similar ones by its being 
based upon a thorough study of physical science, and an accurate 
knowledge of its present condition, and by its entering in a 
deeper and more unfettered manner than its predecessors upon the dis- 
cussion of the appropriate psychological, ethical, and theological ques- 
tions. The author keeps aloof at once from the a priori idealism and 
dreaminess of German speculation since Scheling, and from the 
onesidedness and narrowness of the empiricism and positivism 
which have so prevailed in England" — Dr. Ulrici, in " Zeitschrift 
fur Philosophic.' 1 

THE INTUITIONS OF THE MIND. A New Edition. 8vo. 
cloth, iar. 6d. 

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Berlin. 



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36 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

M ' C O Sh — continued. 

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~ -JiTF' 7 "" 




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MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 37 

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38 SCIENTIFIC CATALOGUE. 

Litton— continued. 

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